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Summary 
This section summarises the content of each section of the thesis. The preface 
summarises the function of each chapter in the thesis. The detailed aims, the 
research questions used, the answers found, and definitions of terminology 
follow in a separate aims and research questions section. 
 
General Aim 
This thesis investigated whether two patterns of implementation of evidence-
based clinical practice guidelines in two NHS acute hospitals in Scotland were 
associated with different levels of Organisational Learning (OL) capacity. 
There was a lack of research on the relationship between the OL capacity and 
the process and outcome of guideline implementation. Clearly, checking 
compliance with the guideline and guideline implementation were likely to 
support each other. But checking compliance was time consuming, resource 
intensive and might encourage defensiveness and low motivation. If the 
abstract notion of Organisational Learning capacity can be shown to be 
statistically connected to a real world activity such as the implementation of 
evidence-based clinical guidelines, not only will this validate the concept, it will 
provide a quicker and cheaper way of externally or internally checking on the 
likely success of a particular hospital’s implementation of these guidelines as a 
proxy measure. 
 
Background 
The literature review gives the background to the study in three parts. First it 
covers strategic change in the NHS and then theories about strategic change. 
This looks at the pressures on the NHS for change, and the NHS responses, 
including the clinical audit initiative. It describes ways of understanding and 
managing change from the strategic literature, and then selects some key 
Summary 
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themes through which to understand the differences between the hospital 
contexts likely to affect the implementation of change.   
 
Secondly, the main theoretical approaches to Organisational Learning (OL) are 
described, and one, the information perspective, is selected as the most 
appropriate view for understanding guideline adoption. The other perspectives 
on communication and innovation are used within this. The importance of theory 
about the existence of different learning styles for OL research is pointed out. 
 
Thirdly, the history and role of clinical guidelines is discussed in detail. They 
were about change. Their aim was to improve quality of service (including 
safety). This was also using guidelines as a means of getting research evidence 
into practice quickly. A final section shows the relevance of strategic change 
and OL theory to guideline implementation and evaluation, and refers back to 
strategic theory to define the contextual issues in hospitals relevant to the 
research questions about guideline implementation. The research questions are 
stated. 
 
Methods 
The research strategy was comparative case study. Guideline implementation 
processes and outcomes and views and beliefs about them were compared and 
contrasted in a high and a low OL capacity hospital.  Nested within the hospitals 
was a case comparison of two professions which were compared where 
appropriate between and within hospitals. Guideline implementation focused on 
two main SIGN guideline topics, DVT prophylaxis and Diabetes. The professions 
were doctors and nurses. An initial idea of the OL capacity of the two hospitals, 
which informed their selection, was obtained before fieldwork commenced. This 
used a number of routine statistics thought likely to be related to OL capacity 
and a related dimension, organisational complexity. Two sets of data were 
collected. Firstly, the OL capacity of each hospital was confirmed in the 
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fieldwork using an OL capacity measurement scale developed elsewhere. 
Secondly guideline implementation was compared between the cases using semi-
structured interviews with study samples in each profession and hospital.  
 
Results 
Survey response rates were highest among senior staff (over 50%), and after 
reminders in hospital 2, were comparable between hospitals. Interview response 
rates were somewhat lower. The OL scale was validated against three other 
scales. It correlated mostly as expected, there was however not the expected 
weak negative correlation with organisational formality. Sub-scales of the OL 
scale were all correlated strongly with the main scale. Seniority was correlated 
with OL score, Age ranges had different correlations with OL score in the two 
professions.  
 
There were two datasets, these came separately from the interviews and the 
scores for Organisational Learning capacity produced by the OL survey. The 
two hospitals were analysed separately, and then combined to relate OL score 
to particular guideline implementation beliefs and activities. The two hospitals 
had the expected relationship with regard to OL score, hospital 1 was higher, 
but the difference was not statistically significant.  As expected too, doctors 
scored their hospitals higher overall than nurses, but not significantly so among 
the senior group in each profession. Nurses’ OL scores caught up with doctors’ 
with increasing age and seniority. They rose consistently, while doctors’ peaked 
at 31-40. Consultants in hospital 2 were much lower scoring than G-grade 
nurses and than consultants in hospital 1, but given the low numbers available 
this was not a statistically significant difference.  
 
Guideline implementation patterns were analysed by coding interview data from 
an OL perspective which saw learning as information creation and use. Two 
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patterns were confirmed, a type of implementation which could support both 
single loop and double loop learning and one which could support only single loop 
learning, which aimed to satisfy pre-established goals.  
 
Key results are summarised  below.  
 
Dissemination 
Those involved in guideline implementation had significantly higher OL scores 
than those who were not involved in each hospital, especially on the leadership 
sub-scale. Most interviewees had been involved. This applied also to those who 
used guidelines compared with those who did not. Doctors were significantly 
more involved in protocol development than were nurses. Doctors used 
significantly more double loop friendly methods of implementation than nurses. 
Using the SIGN guidelines for setting clinical policy was mentioned significantly 
more often in hospital 1 than in hospital 2.  
 
Nurses were significantly more likely to learn about guidelines through 
references already filtered through their ward structures while doctors 
received their own copies of all SIGN guidelines from SIGN.  Nurses were 
significantly more involved in guideline adaptation in hospital 1 as compared to 
hospital 2.  
 
The disseminees reproduced dissemination methods they had experienced when 
they disseminated in their turn, in that those who had used both one-way and 
two-way methods tended to have had both methods used on them when 
guidelines were disseminated. 
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Audit 
In hospital 1 doctors were most involved in doing audit, in hospital 2 it was the 
audit office. This was a significant difference between hospitals. The main aim 
seen for audit was checking on compliance. Both those who held this view of 
audit and those who wanted organisational support for guideline implementation 
were lower scoring on OL than those mentioning other single loop activities.  
 
Change 
There was a significant difference in OL scale scores after bonferroni 
correction between those reporting type 1 change and type 2 changes 
associated with guideline adoption in hospital 1. Those reporting type 2 change 
also reported significantly higher OL capacity in hospital 1. In both hospitals 
audit results were usually communicated for whole teams rather than for 
individuals. Doctors were significantly more likely than nurses to want support 
from the organisation for the facilitation of change, and those who identified 
this as a need scored their organisations lower on OL than those who did not. 
Innovative change often involved collaboration between specialist nurses and 
specialist medical staff, for example in hospital 1. 
 
Learning 
Nurses did significantly more type 1 learning than doctors in their own teams or 
directorates. There was more single loop learning in hospital 2 in comparison 
with hospital 1. Inter-organisational learning through the communication of 
audit results was significantly more frequently mentioned at hospital 1. Learning 
was most often about improvements to processes of care.  
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General views on purposes and uses of guidelines 
The most frequent view about the purpose of guidelines was that they were to 
improve the consistency of care. Reference was the most frequently mentioned 
use. Dissemination difficulties were the main barrier to implementation, and 
formal organisational support was the most mentioned facilitator for change. 
 
Contextual issues 
There were a number of contextual differences and also many similarities 
between the hospitals. Very briefy, a more collaborative culture at hospital 1 
resulted in more sharing and multidisciplinary creation of information.. 
Information systems appeared more reliable at hospital 1, but in neither 
hospital was there a central archive of audit results. Innovation was more in 
evidence at hospital 1 where it involved nurses and doctors together, and was 
related to specialisation. The audit support structure at hospital 1 seemed to 
be more facilitative in style, while at hospital 2 it still appeared to be 
attempting to drive audits centrally, and there were some negative comments 
about the audit department. Leadership in hospital 1 (but not hospital 2) was, 
clinically, strongly bound up with recognition as an expert, and so with 
specialisation and knowledge.  
 
Discussion 
After summarising the literature review, the results for each of the research 
questions were discussed in turn as follows.  
 
The lack of a significant negative correlation between organisational formality  
and OL, which was unexpected, perhaps implied a lack of acceptance and 
knowledge of the hospital mission among clinicians. The possibility that hospital 
2 was a sink hospital in a spiral of decline is discussed in relation to the lower 
OL capacity of consultants and of junior nurses. A quicker decline in OL 
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capacity with age was evident in hospital 2 doctors, although the highest age 
range gave a higher score. Possible reasons are discussed in relation to the 
hospital context. 
 
Two patterns of guideline implementation, which had been hypothesised, were 
identified at each stage of guideline adoption.  They were logically, rather than 
statistically, linked across the stages. They were not entirely separate 
activities in the hospitals. Type 2 change to personal practice as a result of 
guideline implementation was reported in hospital 1 but not in hospital 2. This 
type 2 change was reported by respondents giving significantly higher OL 
capacity scores than those reporting type 1 change. The possibility that this 
was because there was more time available in hospital 1 to play with and try out 
new ideas is discussed. Similarities as well as differences between hospitals are 
explained using institutional theory, as are reasons for the much greater 
prevalence of type 1 than type 2 guideline implementation activities and 
outcomes. A main difference was the greater involvement of hospital 1 
consultants in the professional Royal Colleges of both Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
Guidelines could reduce or increase the chance of both error and innovation in 
different ways which are described, and this, together with the importance in 
it of groups with mixed learning styles and of inter-professional learning, is 
noted.  
 
The higher OL capacity of guideline users in leadership and transfer of 
knowledge suggested using guidelines was a leadership activity. Those who saw 
audit as checking practice scored their hospital lower on transfer of knowledge 
than others who mentioned type 1 aims for audit. There was a possibility that 
this indicated that audit in this type 1 mode made respondents more aware of 
organisational deficiencies in this area. The finding that those who wanted 
more support for guidelines implementation were less aware of organisational 
mission (clarity of purpose) suggested the guidelines were professionally led 
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and controlled. I suggest here that leadership of  OL needs to better integrate 
individual and organisational learning in a less formally oriented way than 
seemed to exist at present. An OL strategy-making process with wide 
involvement might start to achieve this.  It would distinguish for example 
between ignorance and confusion and help clinicians integrate clinical and 
hospital learning priorities.  
 
The limitations of the study included the hospital selection procedure, which 
was not ideal.  The MacLean report on hospital 2 helped to validate it. The later 
implementation of the guidelines in hospital 2 may have affected the changes 
seen. There were no reminders in hospital 1, but response rates in the senior 
clinical comparison group were similar and above 50%, which was reasonable in 
the context of other similar research in this setting. Some advantages and 
disadvantages of the coding and analysis procedures are stated. Possible 
mechanisms affecting the success of guideline implementation included the role 
played by specialisation, span of control (particularly for effective 
dissemination), and peer pressures. 
 
Some limited methodological insights resulting from the project are described. 
The possibility is highlighted that the findings of this research might help to 
justify the measurement of OL culture as an additional way of accrediting 
hospitals in the new less monolithically managed NHS. OL could also be a core 
function of managed clinical networks in Scotland.  
 
Literature search 
At the start of research, relevant research studies were found using 
exploratory search strategies summarised in appendix A2. The titles and 
abstracts (if any) were scanned and references were selected for further 
reading only if they were relevant to the theory or practice of guideline 
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implementation or organisational learning. Pure audits were not included unless 
there was a research dimension. The search strategies were narrowed when the 
searches were updated at the end of the study, and there was more reliance 
than at the beginning on scanning selected core journals, and on government 
web sites for legislation and policy documents. 
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Preface 
A personal journey 
It is perhaps illuminating to give a flavour of my personal journey towards this 
research before a more formal statement of aims and questions. The specific 
aims evolved over a period of several months, but I had been involved in the 
general area for seven years.  I had a generally relevant work background which 
gave me first hand knowledge of many of the issues, and which had stimulated 
my interest in them. In the early part of the 1990’s I had a 2-year spell as a 
clinical audit co-ordinator appointed to introduce medical audit (which rapidly 
became clinical audit) in an English district health authority which quickly 
became a hospital acute trust. This was followed by a period as a research co-
ordinator in a community and mental health trust then recently formed from 
two smaller community and mental health trusts. After that, I carried out 
evaluative research into clinical audit and guideline implementation in a centre 
funded by the Scottish Office through the Clinical Resource and Audit Group 
(CRAG). CRAG was a Scottish national committee of health professionals and 
civil servants which aimed to improve health care and use resources better. My 
unit (the Scottish Clinical Audit and Resource Centre - SCARC) was jointly 
hosted in the University of Glasgow by the two university departments of 
Public Health and Postgraduate Medical Education.  
 
I had encountered systems theory in the late 1980’s during a year of 
postgraduate work at Lancaster University. This was guided by Peter 
Checkland, the originator of the soft systems methodological approach to 
solving ill defined and messy organisational problems. The idea of the 
organisation as a learning system was central to his thinking. At SCARC I came 
across the writings of Argyris and then Senge on Organisational Learning (OL), 
and was immediately interested in their application of systems concepts to 
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strategically identify and also to implement organisational change as a learning 
process. This way of understanding and dealing with change seemed very suited 
for understanding the problems which were appearing internationally in 
implementing clinical guidelines.  Essentially, these were that some doctors felt 
that evidence-based guidelines, rather than enhancing their professional 
autonomy, were a threat to it, especially because of legal issues. To implement 
the guidelines in a learning framework sensitive to the learning needs in 
different organisational contexts seemed the most sympathetic (and therefore 
the most effective) approach possible in the face of these professional 
concerns. 
 
I could not find any previous empirical research work on this topic in the 
hospital setting. So I decided to do the work myself. 
 
Epistemological position 
 
An issue both for the effectiveness of the NHS and for the research I 
undertook was the existence of very different epistemological perspectives 
among the key players in the NHS. Very different views, not just of the world, 
but about the ground rules for understanding it and for creating knowledge 
were held by managers and clinicians. The role of the manager replaced the 
administrator role with the introduction of general management in the mid 
1980’s following the Griffiths report. Some management practice was based on 
theories developed through management research. Management research was 
based predominantly in social sciences. A phenomenological epistemology 
underlay much of social science. In 1997 the manager role was well established 
in the NHS but still fairly recently introduced. Clinicians were based in the 
tradition of natural science and founded their professional knowledge on the 
epistemological position of positivism. Because of the complexity of the 
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research topic I needed to use multiple methods to increase the validity of my 
findings. The use of multiple methods demanded multiple epistemological 
positions. The most complete position for me as a researcher seeking to satisfy 
the demands of both the epistemological positions of those researched and of 
the management research tradition within which I was working, was the 
phenomenological stance, since this could address positivist attitudes and 
behaviour either quantitatively or qualitatively by viewing them as phenomena. A 
positivist position was arguably more limited than a phenomenological one in the 
way it could deal with social and organisational constructs.1 The quantitative and 
essentialist comparison of hospitals on levels of Organisational Learning 
Capacity is to be read as existing within an overall phenomenological framework 
which includes both this and the more contextual analysis. 
 
The research problem was seen under a general theoretical heading of how best 
to manage change, a strategic question. The main value of strategic 
perspectives on managing change was in improving managers’ understanding of 
the many complex influences at work, to help them chart an accurate path 
through the turbulent waters of current organisational environments. 
Organisations were managed better by managers who understood them better. 
Doing strategy was about improving understanding and insight in order to select 
goals which were then implemented by other processes, while perhaps under 
continuous strategic review. This was a phenonomenological stance. In this 
sense strategy itself was never implemented, except by involving as wide a 
range of key players in the process of strategy-making as practicable. 
 
 
                                                
1 This was because the multivariate complexity of these constructs increased to an 
unmanageable level when they were deconstructed (even if we assume it possible). By this, 
I mean splitting them up into component variables simple enough to behave according to 
mathematical formulae which could predict events for individual entities. 
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The function of the thesis, chapter by chapter  
 
Chapter 1 reviews the different perspectives on management strategy-making. 
Strategy-making is seen as understanding the most appropriate ways of 
identifying and implementing useful change in a particular context. For those 
responsible for setting strategic direction in organisations, this helped them 
navigate through the many competing environmental pressures and internal 
competing viewpoints. The history of clinical audit is traced as a strategic 
change implementation initiative which preceded the introduction of clinical 
guidelines.  The chapter also describes the structural framework known as 
“clinical governance”, which brought together clinical audit and other elements 
of a learning system for hospitals in the NHS. Guideline implementation was an 
essential link between theory and practice in this learning system. Some of the 
main perspectives on strategy are reviewed in the light of their 
appropriateness to the job of best managing change in acute hospitals. The 
processual perspective is selected as most suited to the NHS hospital context. 
 
Chapter 2 takes the processual perspective further, into the field of 
organisational learning theory, which is seen as a useful extension of the 
processual strategic perspective, and a potential way of putting it into practice 
in managing change. This is done for example by measuring different dimensions 
of organisational learning capacity to improve understanding of weaknesses and 
how they prevented new strategy from emerging or being implemented freely.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on guideline development and implementation 
methods. The problems in implementing clinical guidelines are seen as an 
instance of the wider problem of the implementation of change in hospitals, and 
recent work in that area is reviewed. That perspective emphasises the 
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importance of the organisational context for the kind of implementation used 
and its success.  Both strategic change theory and a particular field within it, 
organisational learning theory, are argued to be relevant theoretical 
frameworks to approach the practical problems of implementing and evaluating 
the implementation of evidence based clinical guidelines in acute hospitals.  
 
By charting the relationship of guideline implementation processes and 
outcomes to organisational learning capacity a contribution was planned to 
knowledge about the relationship between organisational learning and the 
success of guideline implementation, and to knowledge about the practical use 
of this strategic perspective. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the research methods used in relation to the research 
question and hypotheses. Case study was used to compare the two hospitals 
selected. The method of selection of the hospitals, guidelines and professions 
for the study in such a manner as to maximise a contrast between them on 
learning capacity is recounted. The method of selection of possible tools to 
measure organisational learning capacity (OL capacity) is described, as is the 
structure for the interview. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the pilot study. It states reasons for the choice of the OL 
capacity tool which was selected and described changes made to the interview 
schedule. 
 
Chapter 6 reports the response rates for the OL capacity survey and for the 
interviews. These were over 50% for senior staff and somewhat higher for 
consultants than senior nurses. Reasons for non participation showed a number 
of valid exclusions could be made from the sample. 
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Chapter 6 then reports the validity of the survey results by comparing the 
response rates between relevant demographic and organisational groups in the 
population, sample and the response group. The senior staff who responded are 
concluded to be representative of all senior clinical staff in their hospitals. 
 
Finally chapter 6 describes the validity of the scales in the NHS acute hospital 
setting. All the scales gave normal distributions of total scores for all staff and 
for subgroups by seniority and profession. The scores for each dimension of 
organisational learning capacity are shown by line graph to have very similar 
patterns in each hospital. As expected, hospital culture and job satisfaction 
were positively correlated with OL capacity, and formalisation was negatively 
correlated with OL capacity. These correlations varied somewhat with the 
different age groups, especially after age 50. 
 
Chapter 7 carries out the humanistic qualitative analysis promised in the 
methodology section, comparing the context of the two hospitals to illuminate 
differences in OL capacity and guideline implementation without any recourse 
to statistical comparisons. Evidence of more innovation and a more specialist 
but also more collaborative culture was found in hospital 1 as compared to 
hospital 2. 
 
Chapter 8 is the hypothesis testing core. Although a statistically significant 
difference in OL capacity was not found between the senior clinical groups in 
the two hospitals, hospital 1 scored higher than hospital 2, which was as 
predicted. There was a much larger difference in the consultants’ average 
scores between each hospital, which may well have been clinically significant. 
H2 consultants scored lower than their counterparts in H1, again this was as 
predicted. It was remarkable that the OL capacity scores of consultants and 
senior nurses were reversed between hospitals. At H1 consultants scored 
higher than senior nurses, at H2 senior nurses scored higher than consultants. 
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Another difference between hospitals was the fact that in H2 there was a 
significant difference between senior and junior nurses in OL capacity but this 
was not so in H1, although both H1 and H2 senior nurses scored more highly 
than junior nurses. 
 
Chapter 9 compares the interview data about guideline implementation 
activities and beliefs between the study samples (cases). The data had been 
finely coded into substantive activities (ie according to the content expressed 
by the interviewee) at the most basic level, and these codes were aggregated 
into higher level substantive activity and belief categories. They were also 
coded from OL theory into activities and beliefs supporting either learning 
seeking to comply with existing goals (Type 1 OL) or learning aiming at 
developing new goals (Type 2 OL). The main (most frequent) substantive 
category for each topic was tested using chi square to compare the frequencies 
for these nominal and therefore qualitative data between the hospitals and 
professions in order to provide a rigorous method of finding statistically 
significant differences between them in their guideline implementation 
activities and beliefs. This analysis used a quantitative method to compare 
qualitative data, mixing methods like this was legitimate bearing in mind the 
dual epistemological status of the subject matter (the management perspective 
needed to implement guidelines was social science based and took a largely 
phenomenological stance, while health professionals took a natural science 
based positivist stance in their reading of the evidence transmitted by the 
guidelines).  
 
Chapter 10 analyses the guideline implementation activities and beliefs by 
comparing the OL capacity scores associated with each of the main substantive 
and theoretical themes about guideline adoption. This analysis attacked the 
overall research question in a different way from the comparison of the 
hospitals themselves. The question was still about whether high OL capacity 
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was associated with different patterns of guideline implementation from low 
OL capacity (ie it hypothesised high OL capacity to be associated with type 2 
guideline implementation).  It differed in that it compared OL scores between 
those mentioning instances of type 2 implementation or main substantive 
categories, and those who did not mention them. Thus it took one step back 
from the case context of the hospitals, but it was still connected with the case 
context because the frequencies of these categories had already been 
compared between hospitals.  
 
Chapter 11 is the discussion and conclusions chapter. It starts by summarising 
the answers to each research question, and then discusses these findings in the 
context of other research, focusing on the hospital context. There were no 
statistically significant differences in OL capacity score or in type of guideline 
implementation between hospitals per se, and contextual information and 
institutionalist theory are used to explain and illuminate this.  For example 
some statistically significant differences were found between the OL capacity 
associated with certain guideline implementation activities and beliefs and 
other replies of the same type about that topic.  These differences were 
tested to see whether they applied particularly to one profession. Together 
with the information about differences in professional learning capacities 
within each hospital context, and the other contextual information under the 6 
contextual themes, this illuminated the differences between the hospitals and 
helped explain how the different learning capacities were reflected in their 
guideline implementation. 
 
Weaknesses of the study are discussed. The main weakness was that the two 
hospitals selected for comparison were not in fact significantly different on OL 
capacity, meaning that the hypothesis that guideline implementation would 
differ between hospitals of significantly different learning capacity could not 
be tested.  The more contextual analysis, which had in any case been intended, 
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assumed more importance. It included comparisons of the OL capacity of 
professions in each hospital, professions’ comparative involvement in guideline 
implementation, and other theoretically identified contextual themes as 
expressed in the interview data.  
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Aims and research questions 
 
The aim was to find out whether greater Organisational Learning (OL) capacity 
was associated with a greater emphasis on guideline implementation activities 
and beliefs likely to support double loop learning - the independent development 
of new professional goals both desirable and feasible in the local working 
context. Conversely, lower OL capacity was likely to be associated with 
activities which did not support double loop learning. OL capacity was always 
taken as a property of hospitals. Individuals and other groups within the 
organisation viewed it as greater or smaller. An average score for a 
representative group (senior clinicians) was used as a proxy or indicator of the 
value of OL capacity for each hospital. 
 
A potential benefit in posing this question was that if higher OL capacity and 
successful guideline implementation were linked, money and time currently 
employed in monitoring compliance with guidelines could perhaps be reduced. 
This would instead be done by monitoring OL capacity in relevant clinical groups, 
(hospitals, directorates or specialties). That would be in addition to the 
compliance level and perhaps partly instead of it. Another possible benefit was 
that if guidelines and innovative learning were shown to coexist, health 
professionals, particularly doctors who saw this research result would be more 
confident that guideline implementation would not diminish them professionally, 
and so be less resistant to it. 
 
The research question 
The broad research question was whether adaptive or generative activity and 
belief patterns surrounding guideline implementation were differently 
associated with a broader hospital culture of organisational learning. The null 
hypothesis was:  
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“There are no differences in the SIGN guideline implementation process 
between acute hospitals of different OL capacity.”  
 
Conversely, the hypothesis was:  
“SIGN guideline implementation would have more of the features of 
generative guideline implementation in the hospital with the highest OL 
capacity.” 
 
The analysis by hospital was the focus of the study.  
 
The research questions were divided into preliminary and main or hypothesis 
testing questions because some preliminary selection processes needed to be 
carried out to find hospitals and guidelines that were likely to have different 
OL capacity. Results of this had to be checked. The questions, were as follows, 
very brief answers are given with each research question: 
 
Question 1 (Preliminary) - OL Capacity  
1a - Was the OL capacity scale valid in the acute NHS hospital environment?  
 
Answer:  Yes, various tests of validity were passed. 
 
1b - Were the OL capacity scores of the hospitals significantly different as 
theoretically predicted?  
 
Answer:  Hospitals – not significantly, but they were different, hospital 2 
lower as predicted. Professions were not significantly different overall, but 
doctors scored higher especially in hospital 1 as compared to doctors in hospital 
2. Scores of those implementing different guidelines could not be realistically 
compared as there were too few diabetes responders to tell. Diabetes 
consultants were few in number – 1 in each trust.  
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Question 2 (Preliminary) - Guideline adoption  
Was it possible to identify different guideline adoption patterns (reflected in 
dissemination, implementation and audit activities and beliefs) as theoretically 
predicted? 
 
Answer: Yes, there were examples of both types of implementation, and 
type 1 was the most frequently occurring 
 
Question 3 (Main hypothesis testing) - Types of guideline adoption and OL 
3a – Did the hospital of higher OL capacity have significantly more emphasis on 
generative guideline implementation patterns than the lower OL capacity 
hospital?  
  
Answer:  No, not from quantitative comparisons. There were some 
significant differences in substantive activities and beliefs mainly between 
professions, and this could be interpreted in the light of the differences in OL 
capacity in doctors between hospitals. The qualitative data supported this, 
because hospital 1 had many more contextual features conducive to change 
implementation than did hospital 2. 
 
3b - Were potentially goal changing (generative) guideline implementation and 
dissemination methods and beliefs (model 2) connected to significantly higher 
OL capacity from adaptive beliefs encouraging compliance? 
 
Answer:  Generative change was associated with higher OL capacity in 
hospital 1.  
 
Question 4 (Hypothesis testing) - Substantive activities and beliefs involved in 
guideline adoption and OL 
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Were the main specific guideline implementation activities and beliefs 
connected to significantly different levels of OL capacity from others? 
 
Answer:  Yes some were. Those involved in guideline implementation had 
significantly higher OL scores than those who were not. Two single loop beliefs 
were associated with significantly lower OL scores than other single loop 
beliefs. 
 
Definitions  
 
Strategy 
This is “the direction and scope of an organisation over the long term, which 
achieves advantage for the organisation through its configuration of resources 
within a changing environment and to fulfil stakeholder expectations.”206 
 
Implementation patterns  
Understandings of implementation of SIGN guidelines were addressed. The 
working definition of implementation was ‘purposeful use of the guideline’. 
Details of the uses found are given later in the results.  
 
Acute hospital 
Scottish hospitals were classified by the NHS. There was no separate 
classification of acute hospitals. The classifications relating most closely to 
acute hospitals were chosen on the basis of the descriptions of the functional 
classifications, given by Information and Statistics Division (ISD).197 Hospitals 
were categorised by CAMO (Chief Area Medical Officer/Director of Public 
Health) functional classification. 197 
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SIGN guideline 
An evidence-based guideline for clinical practice developed with the support of 
the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network using a set process validated 
by the SIGN organisation. The guideline was published and formally approved 
by SIGN as a SIGN guideline. 
 
The SIGN guidelines selected for the study were No 2 The Prophylaxis of Deep 
Venous Thromboembolism (DVT) and all the SIGN guidelines on Diabetes (No’s 
4, 9, 11, 12, and 19). Further details on the reasons for this selection are given 
in sections 4.2.4. 
 
Organisational learning capacity/capability (OL) 
An organisation’s effectiveness in the detection, correction and prevention of 
error,6 and secondly in increasing organisational capability.370 It was measured 
using the Learning Organisation Survey (LOS).151 The LOS was a measure of 
individual satisfaction with the organisation’s learning capacity; the mean score 
for each hospital was an indicator of the OL capacity of the hospital. The mean 
score for a subgroup within each hospital was an indicator of the OL capacity of 
the hospital for that subgroup. 
 
Kinds of organisational learning  
Two main kinds of organisational learning were relevant to the study, the single 
feedback loop and the double feedback loop. Single loop was termed ‘adaptive’, 
and double loop ‘generative’ by Senge.370 
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Section 1 – Literature review 
Introduction to Section 1  
 
As Fig. 1 shows, guideline implementation was seen as an instance of the 
implementation of a strategic change. The first chapter explains different 
theories about how strategy was made in organisations. This work showed that 
strategy was a process of developing new understandings rather than setting 
particular organisational goals, although of course the new goals were 
implemented as part of this ongoing learning process. This insight led logically 
to examination of the theory about organisational learning, which provided a 
structure for framing the research questions.  The research questions used OL 
terminology and OL concepts, but OL theory was seen as a specialised subset 
within strategic theory.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1 The logic of the Litera
Chapter 1 
 
Strategic views of 
change and 
understanding change 
in the NHS   
Chapter 3 
 
The implementation o
SIGN guidelines in 
Acute Hospitals – the
relevance of an OL 
perspective in planninChapter 2 
 
Organisational 
Learning theory, 
understanding and   
managing change in
the NHS 41
ture Review.
f 
 
g  
Literature review Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
 42
Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
Purpose of this chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is to set this research in the context of British 
National Health Service (NHS) change strategy, and especially the 
implementation of the clinical audit initiative, to review approaches to strategic 
theory as a basis for the research questions, and to provide a context for the 
discussion.  
 
1.1 Change in the NHS 
Many legislative and policy changes have aimed to make the NHS more efficient 
and effective in the face of increasing environmental pressures, which included, 
for example: 
• rising demand owing to an aging population with greater health needs,  
• an increasing number of costly health technologies,  
• more retired and economically inactive people not contributing to the 
Gross Domestic Product and to National Insurance,  
• ever-rising consumer and electoral expectations of health care, and 
• an increasing threat of litigation when treatments have not met 
expectations. 
 
The history of the various pieces of legislation, policies and the strategic 
changes in structures and associated processes in response to these 
environmental pressures has been documented at length by a number of 
writers, including Forbes.134  It would not be appropriate to carry out such an 
analysis here for three reasons: lack of space, lack of immediate relevance, and 
because it has already been done by others. Chapter 3 gives the immediate 
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historical context for evidence based guidelines, and this chapter 1 will set the 
research in the context of the development of clinical audit.   
 
A brief summary is needed of the main NHS strategic changes to provide a 
background to the research approach taken later. The broad picture of 
strategic developments in the NHS from 1948 to 1972 was of government 
reports leading up to major reform in 1974. The 1974 reforms aimed for better 
co-ordination between health authorities and local government through changes 
in NHS structures. This was when the 15 Scottish area health boards were 
introduced, to replace regional and area health authorities. Unification of the 
previous tripartite structure (acute, community, and primary care) was the aim. 
Community services were brought under the control of area health boards. The 
consensus approach was adopted, and doctors had a right of veto over 
management decisions.170;227 
 
The next major reform was in 1979; it was set out in the white paper “Patients 
First”90, which delegated more power to local units, and put more emphasis on 
information systems. A number of separate efficiency initiatives were 
implemented in the 1980’s, the most important being the establishment of 
performance indicators in 1983.134 These allowed comparison of hospitals on 
cost per patient, waiting lists and availability of services to any particular 
population. The new structure was complex and over-specialised, the tiers did 
not communicate well, and strategic decisions were delayed.19 
 
A new enquiry into the management of the NHS was headed by Roy Griffiths in 
1982155 and implemented in 1985 in Scotland. Griffiths described the main 
constraint on the effectiveness of NHS management structures as being the 
lack of an identifiable individual in charge in every hospital, and his solution was 
to introduce hospital general managers, who were intended to give a new focus 
for the whole organisation. Other problems were a lack of concern with policy 
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implementation and a lack of a performance orientation. For this he 
recommended a more extensive review process, incentives to managers, and 
tighter cost-control mechanisms. A lack of attention to patient needs was 
another of his criticisms, and he suggested more market research to correct 
this. Ham suggested that the political drive to reduce spending had put cost 
and efficiency issues before quality of service and effectiveness.170 Griffiths’ 
management budgets “failed to link costing and budgeting developments with 
the hospital management process and particularly with individual patient 
activity.”.134 As a result this budgeting system was not supported by healthcare 
professionals, and failed.  
 
The next initiative also focused on costs. The Resource Management Initiative 
(RMI) in 1986 was intended to make doctors more cost conscious by showing 
them what they were spending. Other aims of the RMI were to involve doctors 
more in the management process, and to provide accurate information about 
what clinical activities were being carried out.   
 
A further review in 1988 aimed to increase the market focus of the NHS and 
thus make it more responsive to patient need and more efficient. The review 
produced a White Paper, “Working for Patients” (1989),91 which resulted in the 
NHS and Community Care Act 1990,92 implemented from the first of April 1991. 
This attempted to set up an “internal market” in the NHS. The main features of 
the internal market were: 
• Hospitals and community health services could become self-governing, 
and Trusts and General Practices could apply for fund-holding status.  
• Fund-holding practices were allocated a budget from a health board for 
purchasing services autonomously, and Trusts could in theory make 
service contracts with any purchaser.  
• Care was purchased by health boards and GP fund-holders from provider 
units – mainly hospitals and community health services.  
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• “Working for Patients” also introduced clinical audit, discussed in the 
next sections of this chapter, which provided data for measuring the 
quality of care.  
• The internal market structure led to increased administrative costs and, 
reportedly, to a reduction in information sharing and co-operation 
between providers. 
 
Clinical audit  
The immediate fore-runner of clinical guidelines work was clinical audit. The 
next part of this chapter traces the history of the implementation of clinical 
audit to explain why guidelines were needed. Finally, I point the way ahead to 
OL (further discussed in chapter 2) and the role of guidelines themselves 
(further discussed in chapter 3)  
 
Origins of clinical audit – the consumer movement and the NHS 
The consumer movement gathered pace in the 1970s in the USA. It was a 
reaction to large, producer-centred monopolies and cartels in business. For 
example, the oil companies were accused of having a prime loyalty to their 
suppliers, the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), rather than to 
their customers.353 In the UK, the movement influenced the introduction of 
clinical audit in the NHS.185 The costs of legal action for clinical negligence 
became a cause for concern from the UK government in the late 1990s. 
Litigation cost the NHS £235 million in 1996-7, “an increase of 17%” (sic).86 
The Scottish Executive introduced a compulsory indemnity scheme in 2001.367  
 
Clinical audit implementation in the NHS 
Systematic monitoring and improvement of the quality of clinical care was the 
aim of medical audit, which in England was implemented through the White 
Paper ‘Working for patients’,91 from 1/4/1991 as part of the NHS and 
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Community Care Act 1990.92 In Scotland, medical audit was introduced through 
Scottish Working Paper 2 ‘Medical Audit’.65 As a government policy, rather than 
an initiative by local management, medical audit was introduced in hospitals 
under medical control and in isolation from trust management structures. Audit 
was initially confined to the medical profession with ring fenced funding 
separate from general trust and DHA allocations. Participation was voluntary. 
 
Medical audit was publicised as a way to improve the care actually delivered. 
Costs often rose or shifted to other activities. For example, audit of consensus 
dyspepsia management guidelines agreed by GPs resulted in increased 
prescribing costs and reduced referral rates, but no change in use of 
investigations (radiology or endoscopy).214 Multidisciplinary clinical audit, rather 
than medical audit, became the policy in 1992, and nurses and professions allied 
to medicine were expected to be included in the process. Clinical audit was the 
mechanism for developing and implementing clinical quality standards, and 
formed the first basic hospital organisational learning system.298 
 
Barriers to clinical audit implementation  
Medical practitioners had traditionally held management at arms length.201 
Professionals thus viewed the clinical audit policy with suspicion at first. Was it 
a means of reducing the money available to treat patients? Some justification 
to this view came from a study of methods of rationing health care.173 Clinical 
audit, especially when formalised, was seen by many clinicians as an irksome and 
onerous extra task, but not as real (clinical) work: 
“The audit cycle has become a vicious circle, a noose to strangle any chance 
of it ever being a practical everyday tool;… a whole service industry has 
mushroomed around this fatal flower, and with every new blossom it becomes 
more and more remote from real practice and from the people who are 
actually doing the work.”118 
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The most important barrier facing the clinical audit process was the difficulty 
in getting agreement on the standards against which to measure practice, 
because of lack of evidence (for example, in infection control in the USA).273 
This culture had to change for effective implementation.110 Slowly, 
internationally, a realisation dawned that efficient and cost effective care was 
compatible with good care. The attempt to be efficient was not in itself an 
attempt to cut costs.239 
 
When Trusts became established, the OL function of audit suffered in some 
hospitals when audit data were retained by individual providers (rather than 
being District or Regional Health Authority (DHA or RHA) wide. One reason for 
this was concern about medico-legal issues with audit data, and its possible use 
in lawsuits for negligent practice.13 
 
This concern increased with the advent of guidelines. One approach to agreeing 
audit standards was for experts to agree guidelines and use this to create an 
audit questionnaire. An example was hospital care of acute asthma.26 Some 
staff saw the main purpose of explicit guidelines as a means for their hospital 
to avoid litigation.238 Others, especially medical staff, used to defining their 
own practice, saw them as creating a threat of litigation rather than providing a 
protection from it. Guidelines were eventually agreed to have a subordinate role 
to that of expert witness in court proceedings, and doctors still had a 
responsibility to exercise their clinical discretion.188;189 
 
Limitations of Clinical Audit  
In April 1992 a working group was set up on the relationship between clinical 
audit and management. Chaired by Sir Thomas Thomson, Chairman of Greater 
Glasgow Health Board, its report, published early in 1993, was entitled “The 
Interface between Clinical audit and Management”.404 It will be referred to 
here as the ‘Thomson Report’. In the foreword, the Chief Medical Officer and 
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the Chief Executive of the NHS in Scotland introduced the topic, saying 
clinicians and managers both had high hopes that clinical audit would lead to 
more effective and cost-effective clinical services. He went on to highlight the 
diverging views of clinicians and managers on the role of clinical audit: 
”However by 1992 it was clear that there were a number of areas where 
the assumptions and expectations of the two groups were significantly 
different. Most of these differences of opinion concerned the 
respective roles, rights and responsibilities of health care professionals 
and managers and the time scale within which clinical audit could 
reasonably be expected to produce results.” 
 
Cost effectiveness and clinical efficacy/effectiveness did not need to be 
always in accord in practice. Instead, Thomson presaged an idea of an 
organisational learning type dialogue between the two. Thomson saw computer 
systems as linking data on cost and quantitative clinical audit data. He warned 
against a threat to this from ‘protective attitudes’ but at the same time 
recommended setting explicit levels of confidentiality to prevent any need for 
protectionism, an example of the defensive ‘doublethink’ required to negotiate 
the minefield of competing interests at the time. Managers were to be allowed 
access only to aggregated, anonymised data. Data about individual clinicians’ 
work “should be shared with clinical peers only by prior agreement of the 
individual health care professional involved”. 
 
Clinical directorates were an attempt to simplify the complex specialty 
structures and manage costs. They started in the UK as a clinical initiative at 
Guy's hospital, London in 1985,381 though the original idea was developed in 
1974-5 at Johns Hopkins hospital in Baltimore US.181 In both cases, the 
introduction of the system was a response to financial problems. Clinical 
directorates were intended as mini-hospitals within the hospital, holding their 
own budget and functioning autonomously with clinicians taking responsibility 
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for finance. There were several possible groupings of specialties in clinical 
directorates.51 Clinical directorates did not always function as intended. Lay 
managers saw them as a means of gaining control over consultant decisions,207 
and chief executives did not always relinquish their control to clinical 
directors.56 
 
For Thomson, the clinical director would be the interface between managers’ 
questions based on aggregated data, and individual clinicians. In Thomson’s view, 
the link between audit conclusions and named patients should be broken by 
destroying records “any paper or computer record which could link individual 
patients or health care professional to audit conclusions must not be retained.”  
 
These measures were necessary to create a positive atmosphere for clinical 
audit at the time. In the long term, they were actually anti-evidence, and in the 
wider framework of OL, anti-learning, because they destroyed the audit trail 
from error to cause, making it impossible to test and verify clinical directors’ 
decisions about solving any problems found. For Thomson “The purpose of audit 
was to raise overall standards, not to identify unacceptable performance, for 
which other mechanisms exist”. The other mechanisms were not specified. In 
1998 the General Medical Council (GMC) published guidance on good medical 
practice and how to maintain it, which recommended using local procedures in 
Trusts and health boards before any referral to the GMC.146;147 Clinical audit 
was not linked to these mechanisms, so raising overall standards could be 
impeded by individual clinicians. There were still some clinicians who trusted 
their own experience more than research evidence collected outside their own 
local setting, so called ‘cookbook’ medicine.384 For hospitals, there was no way of 
insisting that clinicians subscribed to the evidence-based standards, or 
participated in clinical audit to check, improve and update their practice.  
 
Literature review Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
 50
The Thomson report acknowledged that clinical audit could be “viewed as an 
element of quality assurance,” but it stated that quality assurance was 
concerned with “non-clinical factors, that was, quality of service issues, (e.g. 
hotel services)”. Though they might be brought together in the future, “for the 
present the two [clinical and non-clinical] activities should be considered 
separately.” In accordance with this view, Thomson recommended that 
managers be involved in Area Clinical Audit Committees and Unit/Trust Audit 
Committees, but that there should also be professional-only audit 
subcommittees. 
 
In conclusion, Thomson emphasised reassurance: 
“reassurance to health care professionals that managers would not use 
clinical audit results inappropriately; and reassurance to managers that 
clinical audit results would be available to them to inform the planning 
and management of health services.” 
 
Three years later, in 1996, Hopkins reviewed weaknesses of clinical audit. 185  
He drew attention to methodological weaknesses, including bad data for audit 
based on record review, and lack of clarity about aims. He mentioned the 
importance of social structures for creating good care systems. Beliefs acting 
as barriers to audit included: 
“1. A reluctance to judge peers, 
2. The danger of reducing public confidence in doctors, 
3. A belief that doctors have already been auditing their work for years, 
4. Inadequate data and information systems, 
5. A lack of time, 
6. The fact that the process can be threatening or boring, 
7. Suspicions about managers’ interest in audit, 
8. A view that audit was a mechanism for the control of junior doctors.”  
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He concluded “Audit has failed to win the hearts and minds of the medical 
profession.” For Hopkins, clinical audit and guidelines had to be valued by 
clinicians as clinical work as important as research, with an important 
organisational dimension for planning whole services not as a ‘bolt on extra.’185  
 
Clinical audit began to provide evidence not only of variations in treatment 
process and outcome but also of inequitable treatment standards and unmet 
need. These could imply a theoretical need for more, not fewer, resources.249 
In summary, clinical audit had patchy impact as shown in a number of 
evaluations.279;341;415;416 
 
The integration of clinical audit into a nascent OL framework gathered pace in 
the Scottish NHS in 1995. The publication in July 1995 of “A Strategic 
Framework for Clinical Audit in Scotland”66 introduced the idea of clinical 
effectiveness as being the development of evidence-based guidelines and the 
implementation of clinical audit. The term ‘clinical effectiveness’, which 
originally applied to drug tests, was soon adapted and developed to mean an 
organisational process to improve delivered health care using and linking studies 
of cost effectiveness, research and development, education, and outcomes 
measures in addition to audit and guidelines.117 Resource distribution between 
health boards was revised by another process which did not take quality of 
guideline implementation into account.5 
 
Implementation of the clinical effectiveness initiative was slow. As late as 
1997, most Trusts had no written strategy for improving clinical effectiveness, 
and it was rare for chief executives to retain clinical effectiveness as their 
own responsibility. Hospital libraries restricted access to particular groups and 
to office hours.417 There were calls from the medical profession for clinicians 
to develop a culture of constant update and learning.136 Others recommended 
this be linked to practice and audit.40;41;440  
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The continuing need for the prevention and detection of error in health 
services (Argyris’ and Schon’s definition of OL) was shown by Leape.240 Leape 
estimated that if the adverse event rate shown in three large US studies (3.7% 
of hospital admissions), then 1.3 million people were being injured annually by 
treatment intended to help them. Fourteen per cent, or 180,000 of these died 
as a result.  Two thirds of such adverse events were found to be due to human 
error and were therefore preventable. Serious dosing errors in the 
administration of drugs made by nurses were in the order of 20%. In two per 
cent of patients these caused injury.  
 
Leape argued that the ‘train and blame’ approach to dealing with errors 
encouraged cover-ups. Giving doctors and nurses anonymity and immunity from 
disciplinary action increased error reporting, and made them “willing even 
anxious to discuss their mistakes and try and understand why they occurred.” 
The recognition that errors were a function of the system within which people 
worked encouraged change to that system, but this attitude was not always 
understood by clinicians as an accepted feature of clinical audit in practice. 
 
The recognition of a need for evidence based clinical guidelines sprang from the 
failings of medical audit (doctors only) and then clinical audit (all clinical 
professions). The validity of audit standards was improved by more valid 
guidelines. The new techniques used to create guidelines17 included more 
powerful computer literature searches and better synthesis of the methods 
and the results of research especially in randomised controlled trials. Research 
synthesis was pioneered by the international Cochrane collaboration which 
distributed the Cochrane Library of Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) via 
the internet.398 The evidence was used in guidelines such as those developed by 
the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN), which now could not 
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be ignored. Good data was a pre-requisite for OL too, so the clinical and 
business approaches to quality improvement were converging. 
 
Explicit, evidence-based guidelines had the potential to allow a reliable and 
meaningful comparison of process. Guideline-based documentation such as 
prospective audit sheets, or care pathways, offered a chance of improving the 
validity and reliability of process audit. SIGN guidelines encouraged consensus 
on audit criteria because they were an authoritative guide to the latest clinical 
evidence. Clinical discussion was recommended as a means of ensuring the 
effectiveness of audit and guidelines.342;403 Valid data and agreed clinical 
processes were intended to support discussion in their turn. The history of the 
development and implementation of clinical guidelines and their incorporation 
into Scottish NHS strategy is given in chapter 3. 
 
Sharing the learning from adverse events has since been called for 
elsewhere.285 In 2002 a national UK system for clinicians to report errors 
anonymously so that learning could take place was planned by the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA).139 
 
The internal market ended with the implementation of a new approach in both 
Scotland and England in 1997. The two White Papers: ‘Designed to Care’401 
(Scotland, 1998) and ‘The New NHS modern, dependable’84 (England and Wales 
1997) continued the pressure for change. The Scottish structure was 
implemented from autumn 1999.  A consultation paper on Clinical Governance 
(CG) was circulated widely within the NHS in Scotland in August 1998.369 CG 
was defined as “corporate accountability for clinical performance.” The 
consultation paper described CG as giving to NHS management the benefits of: 
• Assurance to enable it to meet its statutory duties, and 
• Creation of a culture throughout the trust to sustain and improve the 
quality of clinical services. 
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CG is further discussed in relation to clinical guidelines in the final chapter of 
this first section of the thesis. CG was in turn included in a new draft Scottish 
performance assessment framework366 as one of seven elements. The others 
drew on Maxwell’s dimensions of health service quality.266;366 Success criteria 
for each of these dimensions were specified as the characteristics of a 
‘successful local health system’. The seven headings under which performance 
was to be analysed were: 
• Health improvement and reducing inequalities, 
• Fair access to health services, 
• Clinical governance, quality and effectiveness of health care, 
• The patient’s experience, 
• Involving the public and communities, 
• Staff governance, 
• Organisational and financial performance and efficiency.366 
 
Separate English and Scottish consultations in 1998 covered a new approach to 
quality following these White Papers. They were the ‘Acute Services Review’,400 
which reported in June 1998 (Scotland) and ‘A First Class Service’,85 (England). 
The ‘Acute Services Review’ devoted a chapter to ‘Quality Assurance and 
Accreditation’. This recommended compulsory, professionally led, external 
accreditation. Accreditation methodology and standards were to be developed 
and safeguarded by a new Scottish national body, the Clinical Standards Board. 
For Scotland only, a Management Executive Letter293 gave more detailed 
guidance on the introduction of Managed Clinical Networks in February 1999. It 
defined them as:  
“linked groups of health professionals and organisations from primary, 
secondary and tertiary care, working in a co-ordinated manner, 
unconstrained by existing professional and Health Board boundaries, to 
Literature review Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
 55
ensure equitable provision of high quality clinically effective services 
throughout Scotland.” 
 
Among twelve proposed principles that an MCN would have to satisfy to be 
recognised, was:   
“use a documented evidence base, such as SIGN clinical guidelines where 
these are available, and must be committed to the expansion of the 
evidence base through appropriate R&D.”  
 
The Scottish ‘Our National Health’,292 like the English ‘The NHS Plan’,88 
addressed patient issues, putting a specific emphasis on patient friendly 
versions of guidelines “all clinical guidelines will have a version specifically 
written for people who use services”.292   ‘Our National Health’ included a plan to 
create a centre for change and innovation. 
 
The report ‘An organisation with a memory’87, presented an explicitly learning 
approach to the whole NHS at organisational level. It emphasised the 
importance of culture in learning, and the systems approach. After the Bristol 
case, the prevention of error became discussable, and the report 
recommended: 
• unified mechanisms for reporting and analysis when things go wrong; 
• a more open culture, in which errors or service failures can be 
reported and discussed; 
• mechanisms for ensuring that, where lessons are identified, the 
necessary changes are put into practice; 
• a much wider appreciation of the value of the system approach in 
preventing, analysing and learning from errors. 87  
 
The ‘Learning Together’ strategy published in Scotland in December 1999261;364 
made explicit reference to the ‘Learning Organisation’ with a particular 
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emphasis on knowledge management and improving access to information 
facilities and libraries.  The report tasked health boards and Trusts with 
working ‘in partnership with their local partnership groups to develop and 
publish local learning plans.’ The improved access involved lifting restrictions on 
access to libraries for certain professional groups. A Scottish Executive 
Publication ‘A Focus on Quality’362 in Dec 2000 further integrated a strategic 
vision of requirements for the connection between NHS quality, research and 
information initiatives in Scotland. The implementation of SIGN clinical 
guidelines was at the heart of this.  
 
1.2 Institutional context 
This section considers a number of variables affecting organisational autonomy 
in relation to OL. The variables were seen in terms of institutional theory. This 
was a body of theory about institutions, separate from organisational theory.360 
It applied to my research topic in a general sense, especially the idea of 
‘mimetic isomorphism’. This applied especially to organisations which played safe  
under environmental pressures from societal institutions by changing only by 
imitation of practices proved to work elsewhere. I wanted to explore what 
other implications this might have for guideline implementation. Organisations 
were often institutionalised, or routinised with set roles, norms, and values. 
There could be a normative pressure to fit in with prevailing orthodoxies441 and 
this went a long way to explaining why acute hospitals were in many ways so 
similar to each other. 
 
In public organisations and especially in the health service, the New Public 
Management (NPM) had replaced  an older Public Administration model for 
running public organisations.121 It had been the context of both the 
implementation and the rationale for quality improvement, and, in the NHS, 
Clinical Governance. It focussed on performance assessment by outcomes 
rather than probity and parsimony. Outcomes were notoriously difficult to 
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measure validly for healthcare organisations. This had led in the Scottish NHS 
to institutional requirements for the implementation of evidence based 
guidelines as a proxy for outcomes. Harrow stated that, although it was never 
intended to incorporate equity or social justice concerns, the  NPM had not 
been proved to have  excluded them yet.174 Guidelines might have promoted 
equity by providing a basis for consistent standard setting for measurement of 
the clinical process in all providers. 
 
Countering institutionalisation 
To allow change, especially in the context of the NPM, the question then 
became how organisations could divest themselves of institutionalist attitudes. 
The overall research focus in the terms of the debate about 
deinstitutionalisation300;301  was on whether OL was enhanced in an 
organisational context which balanced institutionalist mimesis and risk 
avoidance equally with innovation and  risk.   
 
For Oliver strategic responses to institutionalisation existed on a continuum 
ranging from passivity to increasingly active resistance (see fig 1.1)  
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reminiscent of Argyris’s defensive culture. By becoming more conscious and 
active towards the other end of Oliver’s scale the responses escaped the 
charge of being simply defensive and became innovative albeit in a defensive 
way. 
 
Institutional pressures and guideline implementation  
SIGN evidence-based guidelines were mentioned in the Scottish office 
guidance on clinical governance.363 The content of the guidelines was to an 
extent self-imposing for the health professions, because they were evidence 
based, and the professional imperative was to use the most effective 
treatments for the maximum benefit of patients.  Clinical Governance has been 
seen as an initiative to increase customer orientation equivalent in the NHS to 
“Best Value” initiatives in the majority of the public sector.180 
 
Oliver predicted strategic responses for different institutional factors.300 
These could be related to guideline implementation. The fact that guidelines 
were evidence based for example, gave them high legitimacy (an 
institutionalising factor for recommendations based on the strongest evidence), 
and Oliver predicted this factor would lead to high acquiescence (Hypothesis 1). 
The large number of guidelines, from a variety of sources, could be seen as an 
example of Oliver’s “multiplicity” an element of her “constituents” institutional 
factor, and likely in her view to lead to compromise or other resistance rather 
than acquiescence (Hypothesis 3).  
 
Clinical guidelines were often compatible with hospital goals and when this was 
the case hospitals (and directorates) usually were willing to comply, in 
accordance with Oliver’s hypothesis 5. Since SIGN guideline implementation 
was expected by Health Boards and NHS Scotland who funded hospitals, 
compliance was again likely (Oliver hypothesis 4). However it was the “context” 
factor that pointed most strongly to the way institutional pressures on 
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Scottish hospitals were increasing, and increasing the likelihood of compliance 
with SIGN clinical guidelines.  Oliver had two hypotheses about context, that 
lower environmental uncertainty increased the likelihood of resistance to 
institutional pressure and that lower interconnectedness in the institutional 
environment led to greater resistance to institutional pressure (Hypotheses 9 
and 10). It was at first sight difficult to interpret hypothesis 9 for hospital 
environments and in the context of SIGN guidelines. Though the guidelines 
were evidence-based, which seemed to increase certainty, at the time this 
research was undertaken, all of the following were still uncertain: 
1. the most effective methods of implementation for guidelines,  
2. the legal position of clinicians who did not follow guidelines which had 
been accepted by their peers,  
3. the future uses to which guidelines would be put, whether 
accreditation of hospitals, detection of underperforming clinicians etc.  
 
At the time of the research interconnectedness in the institutional 
environment was increasing, with the establishment of clinical governance 
structures within hospitals and of external national bodies for the inspection of 
hospitals and improvement of health care. Most of these factors were 
pressures for compliance by implementing guidelines rather than resistance to 
the evidence-based quality improvement agenda.        
 
Scott’s model of “Top-Down and Bottom-up Processes in Institutional Creation 
and Diffusion”361 (see Fig  1.2 below) provided a framework for thinking about 
the strategic reasons for the diffusion of models of practice such as evidence 
based clinical practice guidelines. We could for example see guidelines as a 
strategic initiative to make professionals more tightly coupled with the state, 
more accountable for their recommendations and so more motivated to take 
resource availability into account when arguing for change.361  Guidelines could 
also be seen as a governance structure361 to facilitate the regulation (through 
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accreditation) of healthcare providers. Another strategic aim we could see as 
satisfied by guideline implementation is that the New Public Management 
needed a mechanism for encouraging equity.174 
 
 
Fig 1.2 “Top-Down and Bottom-up Processes in Institutional Creation and 
Diffusion”361 
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alternative view to the classical one that learning resulted from close contact 
with market trends, or the systemic view that learning by a system was 
facilitated by openness of the system to its environment.  
 
Autonomy, self-accountability and innovation  
Context was multifactorial. This meant it was difficult to predict the future 
behaviour of a particular organisation in a particular context, though Boyne 
argued it was in principle possible to do so provided a small number of variables 
were used in statistical analysis.37 In practice it was often difficult to identify 
all the key variables. Although unpredictability was not the same as the willed 
self directedness of true autonomy, it was perhaps in retrospect rationalised as 
such by those involved, particularly if the organisation had successes. Clinical 
guidelines provided a basis of formal intention, a crystallisation of will, which 
might have helped prevent post-hoc rationalisation of chance success and 
improved an organisation's active control of clinical events. This did not prevent 
innovation, in fact Mintzberg interpreted Jelineck,204 who argued in favour of 
strategic planning, as saying that the formalisation of work (for example by 
Frederick Taylor)394 enabled it to be conceptualised, and so controlled, at a 
higher level of abstraction, and these conceptualisations could be changed and 
refined to generate innovations to practice.282 Another means of encouraging 
innovation in a formal setting was to formally reward it, and as Nord reported, 
this may work to the extent that unusual responses could be increased.295 Yet 
again, as Zucker pointed out, some innovations were institutionalised and some 
were not. Guidelines would come under the former category, and were less risky 
to adopt than were non-routine unexpected innovations.441 Non-routine 
innovation differentiated organisations, giving some a theoretical edge in 
competitive environments. In fact, Zucker found that non-routine innovation 
decreased performance, but not enough to alter organisational survival rates 441  
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Guidelines and institutional power 
Rowlinson’s definition of institutional power suggested that the use of 
guidelines was a means of exercising it: 
“From an institutional perspective, power was constituted by the ability 
to construct and ensure the continuation of institutional constraints on 
organisations.”.348  
 
In this view, institutional power was a limit to action rather than an increase in 
capability for action. Mintzberg argued that formal organisational systems such 
as those tending to result from institutional pressures did not create new 
strategies or innovations, these were driven by intuitive synthesis not rational 
analytical processes.282 Greenwood and Hinings took an opposite perspective, 
arguing that newer institutional theory could give an account explaining radical 
organisational adaptive change, which  linked context and the internal dynamics 
of the organisation.154 Even radical adaptive change was not the same as pure 
innovation, but the distinction between these two typologies of change was 
perhaps not as hard and fast as often accepted by the literature (for example 
Argyris’s single and double loop – there were perhaps any number of part loops) 
so that the adaptive/generative distinction was better seen as a continuum 
rather than necessarily either one or the other. 
 
Pettigrew distinguished two types of power. He implicitly saw power as a means 
of creating strategic change. Firstly, unobtrusive systems of power operated 
through the management of meaning. Symbolic activities shaped culture, which 
in turn defined some activities as valued and some as not valued. Secondly, 
there was a more public power:  
“more public face of power expressed through the possession, control, 
and tactical use of overt sources of power such as position, rewards or 
sanctions, or expertise.”322  
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Guidelines certainly operated in Pettigrew’s first mode, as part of the 
evidence-based culture current in the NHS at the time of this research. They 
were underpinned in his second mode by the possibility of sanctions both at the 
level of the individual clinician through internal clinical audit, and for the 
organisation through the external accreditation process. While the expertise 
of the developers was certainly important in their effectiveness strategically, 
individual guidelines could also be challenged on this basis by local experts.  
 
So, institutional pressures through guidelines might operate less powerfully 
where evidence was weaker, increasing the chance of innovative learning, but at 
the same time an evidence-base was needed upon which to build. So guidelines 
containing a few well evidenced recommendations would be likely to promote OL 
better than numerous recommendations backed only by weak evidence.  
 
1.3 Strategic perspectives 
There were a number of perspectives within strategic theory which were 
potentially useful to understand and so to manage the changes required within 
hospitals to structures and work processes as a result of these environmental 
pressures.  The rest of this chapter considers the main views and their 
suitability for understanding change implementation in hospitals, particularly of 
course with reference to guideline implementation. A full review of the 
strategy literature was not required for this. 
 
A number of writers explained strategic management from multiple 
perspectives. For example Johnson and Scholes206 used a three part taxonomy 
for strategic approaches –  
1. The Design lens – this was like the classical perspective (below) – the 
view that developing strategy can be a logical process using analytic and 
evaluative techniques to adjust the direction of the organisation to cope 
with environmental changes. It was useful but not sufficient. The 
Literature review Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
 64
complexity of the NHS hospital, its vulnerability to political change at 
the state level, and the existence of multiple professional worldviews 
and interests all made for a difficult fit between this as a sole approach 
to strategy-making, and conditions in NHS hospitals. In its favour 
though, was that it offered clarity and explicitness, which potentially 
both aided transparency in the strategic decision-making process, and 
provided an audit-trail, giving the process a degree of protection from 
domination by the interests of particular groups. However it was 
difficult to apply this. 
2. The Experience lens – this was a view in which models and paradigms 
became taken for granted, and where change came about as the 
adaptation of past strategies in the light of experience. It was like the 
processual view (below) in its focus on the detail of day to day 
operations. This had the advantage of enabling close links with the 
reality of day to day operational problems, giving the ability for a quick 
response to changes such as increase or decrease in client flow. An 
intuitive approach like this had some disadvantages, especially in a large 
organisation with a number of different operational realities which 
might make it more difficult to take an overview for the whole 
organisation. So while the evolutionary change from the strategic 
activity resulting from this understanding might be of limited success in 
particular contexts, the overall sense of direction might suffer. 
3. The Ideas lens – this was where both order and innovative ideas were 
seen to be generated in an unplanned (or ‘emergent’) way in conditions of 
diversity and through imperfect copying, at lower levels in the 
organisation, and from contact with the environment. It had the 
advantage of offering a way of understanding and so managing the 
innovation process, but new ideas would have to battle their way through 
the forces of routine and habit at lower levels of the organisation to 
survive. 
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This simple three lens structure had the overall advantage of being explicitly 
phenomenological with its metaphor of the lens, and so it was conceptually easy 
to apply each lens to a situation and use all of the insights given.    
 
Mintzberg (1990) identified ten schools of strategic thought: 
1. Design 
2. Planning 
3. Positioning 
4. Entrepreneurial 
5. Cognitive 
6. Learning 
7. Political 
8. Cultural 
9. Environmental 
10. Configurational281 
  
The complexity of this structure made it difficult to apply. There is not space 
to discuss each model here. They were all based on different configurations of 
the same elements. These were the ideology of the organisation, a central 
hierarchy composed of strategic apex, middle line managers and operational 
core, and parallel groups of support staff and of technical support staff.283 
Mintzberg in another publication distinguished seven types of organisation 
based on different emphases or ‘pulls’ within this basic concept. There is no 
need to list them, as they overlapped with the fuller list given above. The 
disadvantage of his classification was that it took on the whole a positivist 
stance which did not allow multiple perspectives on the same organisation. 
Strategy was seen as a particular type of product tied to a particular 
structure, rather than, more flexibly, as a process. The advantage, possibly, 
was that each strategic structure Mintzberg listed had some substantive 
content, and so could be adapted to function as an ‘ideal type’. Mintzberg fell 
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structural detail, but he was not a processualist in the same sense as Pettigrew 
because he put much less emphasis on the historical or narrative logic of 
organisational events. 
 
Whittington428 saw approaches to strategy as falling along two dimensions 
which if conceptualised as intersecting at 90 degrees, provided quadrants. The 
dimensions were Processes which could be deliberate or emergent, and 
Outcomes which could be profit maximising or plural (see fig 1.3). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
                                Outcomes 
        
                              Profit maximising 
 
 
Classical 
 
Evolutionary
Processes 
 
Deliberate  
 
Systemic 
 
 
Processual 
        
  
Emergent 
                   
      
  Plural 
 
Fig 1.3 Whittington’s Approaches to Strategy428   66
Focus on profit maximisation 
The two views where this was a core feature were:  
1. The Classical view, which aimed deliberately to maximise profit. It was 
assumed people would behave rationally according to self interest in 
planning.428 The problem was that external events to the organisation 
were unpredictable, for example a stock market collapse could occur. 
2. The Evolutionary view, which less deliberately held that all you could do 
was keep your options open and costs low, and strategy emerged to 
maximise profit 
Literature review Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
 67
Focus on plural outcomes 
This was a core feature in:  
1. The Systemic view, where managers created strategy by deliberately 
playing by the local rules, because the social context determined the 
reality engaged with, various outcomes could be aimed for, profit 
maximisation was not the only one,  
2. The Processual view where managers created strategy by keeping in 
close touch/involvement with everyday operations to allow effective 
strategies to emerge, various outcomes could be aimed for, profit 
maximisation was not the only one. 
The Classical view 
This used militaristic assumptions about implementation, for example that 
there was a chain of command and that orders relayed through it would be 
obeyed.428 It was similar to the design lens in its assumption that there was a 
single rationality and therefore one best way to design a particular 
organisation. It was accompanied by the idea of the rational economic man who 
acted to maximise his economic advantage with perfect rationality.  
“The profit maximising assumption was merely the economic expression 
of Smith’s sad belief that self interest was ‘inherent in the very nature 
of our being’” 428 
 
The defensive characterisation of Smith’s belief as “sad” encapsulated the idea 
that the classical view was limited and narrow. It did not allow for motivations 
other than economic, such as altruism – doing something for the greater good, 
or enthusiasm - doing something for its own sake, and these motivations may 
have had a part to play in NHS hospitals. In the NHS, saving cost replaced 
profit. This immediately invalidated the classical view for this setting. Although 
it was possible to conceive of a business as solely a money making or profit 
generating machine, a public hospital was not a cost saving machine; it could not 
switch to other activities. So, in the NHS context, a difficulty with the above 
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perspective was that there was no place in it for the effectiveness of the 
activities actually being undertaken, reducing mortality and morbidity for 
example. Although it was not the primary aim, there was still an important place 
for cost saving in the NHS.  
 
Ferlie120 identified a distinctive cluster of traits applying to public sector 
organisations which distinguished them from the private sector: weak and 
ambiguous goals, multiple stakeholders, high degrees of professionalisation and 
politicisation, very large organisational size, weak markets and few private 
property rights. Apart from the first, these seemed to apply to the NHS, 
which most would view as having a clear goal – the delivery of healthcare for 
the public in order to extend life and reduce morbidity. 
 
The Evolutionary view  
From this perspective, markets selected the best strategies – managers did not 
need to be rational optimisers – but this did not exclude a learning approach to 
strategy allowing a degree of anticipation and swift adaptation to market 
change. For example, in discussing strategies for differentiation it may be 
best:  
“to experiment with as many different small initiatives as possible to 
wait and see which flourish and which fail...”428 
 
For big companies this could be about selecting markets rather than being 
selected by them. Again it was difficult to see how this could apply to a public 
organisation which provided defined services for a defined whole population, 
unless overseas markets were targeted. For NHS hospitals this view was not a 
good cultural fit either, since it offered no real rationale for innovating within a 
professional canon, and actively improving the service, a prime received value in 
this professionalised and research-based environment. 
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The Systemic view  
Planning was possible, from this perspective, but did not necessarily have to be 
done under the monolithic assumptions of Classical rationality because firms 
were recognised to differ according to the social and economic systems in 
which they were embedded. 
 “The main message of the Systemic perspective, then, is that strategy 
must be sociologically sensitive.” 428 
 
This view of strategy was relevant to the complexity of the NHS in another 
way: it was the complexity created by the need to deliver services which 
satisfied not only many different client needs but also many different 
professional worldviews. Services had to continually learn their way to better 
solutions driven by developments in each of the professions involved. The fact 
that guidelines were multidisciplinary and were regularly revised fitted this 
strategic approach. A disadvantage was that this approach to doing strategy 
found it difficult to both involve, and manage power relationships between, vital 
groups in an organisation, some of whom could become disaffected if promises 
of empowerment and recognition for their worldview proved hollow in practice.  
 
The Processual view 
This was particularly informed by the notion of bounded rationality – that 
because of our limited human cognitive capacity we are reluctant to consider 
more than a handful of factors at a time:  
“Strategic behaviour therefore becomes entrenched in the “routines” 
and standard operating procedures imposed by political exigency and 
cognitive limits.” 428 
 
For Whittington, some key features of the processual view were: 
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• The technique of ‘adaptive rationality’ or the gradual adjusting of 
routines meaning also that organisations aimed to satisfice rather than 
profit maximise.  
• Logical incrementalism was seen as more rational than classical 
rationality because it accepted bounded rationality, and that strategy 
emerged after action, 
• It was acknowledged that plans reassured rather than guided 
 
This approach was the most in tune with the complexity of the conditions in the 
NHS, and evidence based clinical practice guidelines (guidelines for short) 
seemed the very model of such a boundedly rational approach to dealing with 
complexity. 
 
Because processualism emphasised learning, it placed strategic importance on 
cultivating internal competencies – through knowledge management for example. 
Understanding this learning and bargaining process was influenced by systems 
concepts from psychology. Argyris used systems concepts, (feedback loops for 
example6) though he was a psychologist in the interpersonal tradition, and thus 
perhaps sat more happily in relation to the processual school of strategy. 
Although learning was particularly associated with the processual view of 
strategy, systems thinking was seen as a key element of organisational learning 
(OL) by Senge, who was influenced by Argyris’s ideas. For him the systems 
approach united the other four OL disciplines,373 and allowed a higher level 
form of strategic learning based on recognising similar systems archetypes in 
different business contexts, and thus understanding what was going on. So 
although the systems approach to organisational strategy-making was separate 
from the processual one, there were also common areas, meaning processualism 
could incorporate some systems approaches to enhance understandings of 
relationships. In conclusion, the processualist strategic approach to 
understanding organisational change was on balance the most appropriate to 
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add a qualitative dimension to this research, firstly because of its strengths in 
unravelling contextual differences through close attention to processes, 
secondly because the NHS functioned in a complex way driven by multiple key 
groups, rather than as a simple top-down command and control model, and 
thirdly because of its emphasis on a learning approach to developing strategy. 
This processualist approach was taken further to use OL theory, in both a 
qualitative and a quantitative analysis. It remained to choose some particularly 
relevant topics within strategic theory to apply analytically to the 
implementation of guidelines, and also to OL. 
 
Processualism in relation to other strategic approaches 
Pettigrew classified the concept of emergence as “an interpretive view in which 
strategy was seen as the product of individual or collective sense making.”323 
 
The four views on strategy making and implementation within Whittington’s 
framework have already been discussed. They were the Classical, Evolutionary, 
Processual, and Systemic. Many of the other views can be mapped on to this 
framework. Since processualism was closest to a learning approach to 
organisational strategy creation, and also an intellectually sympathetic 
strategic counterpart to the implementation of clinical guidelines, it was 
appropriate to look more closely at some of the work of the seminal figure in 
this field, Andrew Pettigrew.  
 
Pettigrew324 provided a taxonomy of approaches to strategic choice and 
strategic change. These were the rational, boundedly rational, incremental and 
garbage can approaches.324 They seemed to cover Whittington’s classical  
(rational), processual (boundedly rational and incremental)  and evolutionary 
(garbage can) perspectives, but not the systemic perspective. 
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Writing in the early 1980’s, Pettigrew felt that change research did not take 
account of context, history or processes.324 It was cross sectional rather than 
longitudinal. It was unnecessarily constrained by using the change intervention 
as the unit of analysis. Pettigrew took account of these. His work on ICI had at 
times almost the flavour of an epic novel. His aim was to describe and explain 
the:  
“varying impact of five Organisational Development (OD) groups” in 
different divisions of ICI, “in facilitating and inhibiting organisational 
changes in each of their arenas of action and the natural history of each 
group’s emergence, development and fate.” 324 
 
The work was mostly descriptive. Although well written and full of small 
insights, explanatory conclusions were few and perhaps even rather banal. He 
said for example that those allied with powerful senior figures (such as John 
Harvey-Jones) were more likely to survive and have an impact than those with 
less influential links. Again, if line managers perceived an OD department as a 
threat they were less amenable to working with it. While useful to state it, this 
did not go beyond what a modest amount of experience might reveal. The 
position of non-clinical staff in guideline implementation and audit departments 
in acute hospitals was not dissimilar to that described for OD departments in 
Pettigrew’s ICI. 
 
Pettigrew excelled in his thorough and systematic historical approach. It gave a 
solid and convincing base for these pieces of knowledge, better than simple 
assertion by an experienced person, or a survey of experienced people, because 
he gave examples of how OD groups worked over time in differing but linked 
contexts. He compared and argued the contextual reasons for success or 
failure. This was the evidence of narrative, compelling our belief by creating a 
world. Like a good novelist, Pettigrew revealed general truths about the human 
condition, specifically the condition of those engaged in OD in organisations. He 
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did not provide theories about change. If scientific method involved testing 
hypotheses, this work was not scientific, he purveyed artistic rather than 
scientific truth. He did not report the response rates to his interviews and 
gave few details of his methods of data collection, beyond stating he used “long 
semi-structured interviews (sic) of company documents.”324 This underlined his 
non-scientific stance.  
 
Pettigrew appeared to have strongly influenced what was later, by Pawson and 
Tilley310, called “Realistic Evaluation”, (described below in the methods chapter 
4) the conceptualisation of research design in terms of context, mechanism 
(Pettigrew called it process) and outcome.  Pettigrew sometimes called outcome 
“content” or “strategic content”, meaning the purpose, or outcome aimed at, 
whether achieved or not. 
 
Whittington said that the processual perspective radically downgraded the 
importance of rational analysis. This view was seen elsewhere, but it was not 
strictly correct, bounded rationality was the best we could do, in this 
perspective. It led to the first of Whittington’s four distinguishing features of 
processualism – that strategy might be a  
“decision-making heuristic, a device to simplify reality into something 
managers could actually cope with;”.  
 
Secondly the processual view saw strategy as reassurance rather than 
guidance, and thirdly considered it emerged after action rather than preceding 
it. These fitted with nurses’ view that guidelines and audit were a reassurance 
that they were doing the right thing (process), and with his fourth feature, 
that strategy involved cultivating internal competencies, a nurses’ use for 
guidelines. 
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Individual clinical guidelines were technology rather than strategy, in a 
processual spirit, they did not just set goals, they very specifically laid out how 
to achieve clinical goals. They were also subject to continual revision. They were 
therefore perhaps processualist in spirit, and supported such a view of 
strategy. As a change instrument they might, at local level, involve innovation in 
the sense of doing something new, although the innovation was not a result of 
generative learning, it was a process of adaptation to the requirements, not of 
institutions, but of evidence. 
 
A move from a classical to a slightly more processual perspective was shown by 
the NHS in hospitals’ attempts to devolve strategy making to Clinical 
Directorates.135 These were intended to be strategic business units (SBUs), but 
were hampered because chief executives often held on to financial power by 
retaining control of contracting arrangements with purchasers of health 
care.135  For Ferlie and Shortell, this prevented the functioning of 
“microsystems” at the level of autonomy required to generate quality 
improvements locally rather than imitating best practice from elsewhere.122  
 
1.4 Key themes about organisational context from the strategy literature 
that apply to guideline implementation in hospitals 
Three central strategic management topics 
A number of strategic management topics had important relationships to both 
guideline implementation and to OL. Strategic planning had, for Johnson and 
Scholes at least, transformed itself into an OL process. No longer, they said, 
did we have corporate planning departments doing strategic planning as a formal 
intellectual exercise, in isolation from the day to day running of the 
organisation, and often obsessed with finding one “right strategy”, in a classical 
approach. Strategy making had become a more inclusive process involving face 
to face debate in, for example, strategy workshops for senior managers, but 
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increasingly also for other management levels.206 The importance of an open 
learning culture (such as Argyris’ type 2 culture) for the effectiveness of such 
events was obvious. The following three central topics were chosen from the 
strategic management literature and the guideline implementation literature 
combined. Each is examined from a number of strategic perspectives which 
were more fully explained earlier in the chapter. 
Strategic Leadership 
The classical view of the visionary charismatic and heroic leader was certainly 
not the whole story as far as OL was concerned. Processualists would be 
sceptical about the real influence of this type of leader, since as Whittington 
said, “heroic leaders need pernickety followers.”428 The pernickety followers 
were needed to implement the detailed changes to systems and processes which 
were always required.  From the systemic perspective the concept of the heroic 
leader was “culture bound”.428 It was therefore itself a product of our Western 
culture and had worked only within it.   
 
Leadership worked through business elites, for systemicists, said Whittington. 
This involved the collective advancement of self-interested social groups – 
managers in general or particular professions. To understand leadership we 
needed to understand these elites and how they operated to advance the 
interests of their own group in different societies. An organisational strategic 
leader would need first to be recognised as a leader within his or her own 
group, before being able to lead an organisation. This certainly applied to the 
SIGN guideline process, SIGN stood for Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline 
Network, the colleges were the Professional Royal Colleges, and the guideline 
groups were led by respected members of the colleges. These leaders had 
operational roles in some, but not all, hospitals.  Representatives from each 
relevant profession were normally included in the national SIGN development 
group for each guideline, to ensure the guideline reflected the perspective of 
each. 
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Perhaps because there were often a number of professional or business elites 
in an organisation, organisational politics arose, where each elite vied for 
greater influence over the organisational strategic direction and a greater part 
in it.206 The strategy development process was one of bargaining between these 
groups. The national development of SIGN Guidelines circumvented some of 
this at local level, but practical issues of implementation in each separate 
context remained.  The processual (Whittington) or experience (Johnson and 
Scholes) views explained how different perspectives arose from different 
experiences and roles, and the ideas perspective explained how this conflict 
might to an extent have constituted a debating process good for innovation. 
Such a process might be more akin to Quinn’s “logical incrementalism”330, where 
small steps to a long term goal were taken by learning through experience. 
Whittington talked about “constant adaptive innovation” and seemed to mean 
much the same:  
“As products become more complex and knowledge intensive, the 
Processualists argue that it will be constant adaptive innovation rather 
than remote and inflexible plans that will win the day”.428 
 
The systemic perspective would encourage the use of whatever techniques were 
accepted in that organisation “for the sake of credibility”.428  
 
Innovation 
Classical and Evolutionist  perspectives placed emphasis on a close connection to 
the market for innovation. However, there was technology “push” as well as  
market “pull”, and innovation could suppress competition and dominate the 
customer.428 In the NHS, technology push was more important than market pull, 
so important that it needed a special process – Health Technology Assessment - 
to deal with and control its implementation. Innovation at hospital level was, 
from the institutionalist perspective, more likely to be incremental changes to 
Literature review Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
 77
methods of service delivery than revolutionary new treatments. This was more 
accessible to the processual approach. 
 
Johnson and Scholes said, in the context of the classical management approach, 
(design lens) that strong cultures were weak learners:  
“[an organisation that] tries to insulate itself from its environment for 
example by trying to resist market changes or by relying on a particular 
way of doing or seeing things – sometimes known as a ‘strong culture’  - 
will generate less variety of ideas and less innovation.”206 
 
Whittington argued that for the classic tradition, a strong “market orientation” 
was essential for successful innovation. In this view, effective innovation came 
from seeking out customer needs and matching them with appropriate product 
or service offerings.428 For hospitals, this had the advantage of being an active 
strategy capable of implementation. The disadvantage was that patients were 
not customers, and particularly not consumers, in the usual sense217;283 and it 
was not always possible to establish their preferences even if they were well 
informed enough to choose. 
 
Evolutionists saw the market as selecting good innovations. It could be, however 
that markets selected good learners – firms with a processualist or perhaps a 
systemicist view. For Processualists though, innovation was uncertain and 
uncontrollable said Whittington, while systemicists knew that Anglo-Saxon 
assumptions of the rational and sequential processes that Classicists might 
have hoped would lead to innovation were not widely shared.428 Some medical 
innovation arose from practice without being planned. 
 
Johnson and Scholes set out the conditions they saw as encouraging 
innovation.206 One was that there must be enough order to allow things to 
happen, without being too rigid a control to prevent innovation, an idea from 
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complexity theory. Too much control might also reduce variety, and so prevent 
learning. New ideas had to be allowed to compete. Selection mechanisms 
operated on a new innovation idea at the levels of the market, the organisation, 
- how it got evaluated by planning reviews, whether it fitted with the prevailing 
culture, - and the idea itself – how attractive it was to people.206 
 
Whittington relegated OL to the status of a metaphor:  
“It too easily trivialises organisational change to the level of “opening up 
peoples’ minds, and reduces organisational resistance to mere wrong-
headedness (e.g. Argyris 1991). More sophisticated processual analyses 
recognise the entrenched political interests that also sustain existing 
organisational recipes and routines”428 
 
This view did not take account of the fact that because OL could be about 
revising aims, it was a political process. It did not recognise the systems 
thinking element of OL. For Johnson and Scholes the distinguishing feature of 
the Learning Organisation was that it was an organisation capable of continual 
regeneration through a culture supporting continual mutual questioning around a 
shared purpose by individuals who had a variety of experience, knowledge and 
skills.206 
 
The chosen strategic themes for contextual analysis 
The themes listed below referred to particular elements of hospital structure 
including culture. They formed the framework for a contextual analysis to 
complement the comparison of guideline implementation between hospitals. The 
way they were understood and applied was mediated by the interpretations of 
organisational actors.149 The three strategic themes were: 
• Leadership – this theme focused on opinion leaders and figureheads and 
the invented/not invented here factor: compared between hospitals. Did 
Literature review Chapter 1 Strategic change theory and the NHS 
 
 79
having the leader of the guidelines group in the hospital influence the 
methods of implementation for that guideline? 
• The drive for uniformity. This theme was used in the discussion and 
interpretation of results rather than in primary contextual analysis. It 
focused on the likelihood of a protective reaction from professionals 
perhaps because there was safety for professionals in being part of a 
crowd doing the same thing, rather than because it was best practice, or 
because it improved equity of treatment for patients - mimetic 
behaviour as predicted by institutional theory. The similarity of 
environmental pressures, together with mimetic behaviour, explained 
why hospitals tended to be very similar to each other, but were 
guidelines likely to increase (or decrease) this uniformity, perhaps to 
the detriment of innovation and patient choice?  
• The third theme was the perceived role of clinical audit and of clinical 
audit and guidelines implementation departments. These were not 
mentioned as such in the strategic management literature.  They formed 
part of the organisational support function to the core business of 
delivering treatment and care. There were some parallels with 
Pettigrew’s OD departments, which he studied in ICI, since clinical audit 
and guidelines implementation had implications for organisational change. 
As Whittington pointed out,429 since Pettigrew’s 1985 study there have 
been many case studies of strategic change but clinical audit and 
guidelines implementation departments generally implemented clinical 
audit and guidelines strategies rather than created strategic change. 
This implementation literature is a somewhat separate sub-specialisation 
of the strategy literature and is reviewed further in chapter 3 which 
specifically covers evidence based clinical practice guidelines and their 
implementation.   
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1.5 Conclusion to chapter - From Strategy to strategic change 
I chose this topic as the most recent initiative in a series of at best partially 
successful attempts to improve practice in the NHS as a whole and hospitals in 
particular. Through expert help and reading around the literature on strategy, 
I came to see it as not just an attempt to improve services, but as an example 
of new NHS strategies in general, which to be implemented needed hospitals to 
plan strategically for the implementation of change.  Hospitals needed to 
develop a capacity to do this, and this requirement led me further than the 
strategy literature, and into the theory of OL, and the measurement of OL 
capacity. Also pointing in the direction of a learning approach was my developing 
realisation that managing organisations was intimately connected to 
understanding organisational phenomena in suitable ways. The strategy 
literature remained relevant to the new OL perspective, especially when it was 
seen as a form of processualism, with its idea that strategy emerged from 
learning at the grassroots. Not only was this attractive because of its values of 
inclusivity, empowerment and democracy, it also justified my instinctive feeling 
that to assess what was really happening in the organisation, and find out why 
strategic initiatives so often failed at the last hurdle of implementation,  it was 
more useful to interview clinical staff than the highest levels of senior 
management.  
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Chapter 2 - Organisational learning  
 
Summary 
 
This section of the literature review aims to summarise the main theoretical 
approaches to OL, indicate their relevance to the problem of how to implement 
evidence-based clinical practice guidelines in the NHS, and to indicate the 
state of current OL research on health services. Three central ways of 
conceptualising OL were identified.  While one of these (the information 
perspective) was most appropriate for OL in connection with the 
implementation of clinical guidelines, the other two (the communication  and the 
innovation perspectives) were also used in developing the coding structure for 
the interview data. 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Changing NHS culture is now considered by many to be a key to improving the 
quality of patient care, but little attempt had been made to specify the type of 
culture change needed or what its role might be. OL was one potential 
framework for the new values needed in the health service. At the beginning of 
the 21st century, learning was culturally a more acceptable aim in organisations 
and to independently–minded health professionals than was control. There was 
only a scattering of theoretical research articles about OL in the NHS,49 and 
hardly any empirical or evaluative research.191 There had been no attempts to 
implement an OL programme as such in NHS hospitals.  
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2.1.1 Theories about OL 
 
Organisational Learning (OL) had been developed in the business world. It had 
intellectual roots from the convergence of a number of disciplines – psychology, 
sociology, cybernetics, economics, and ecology. Garratt summarised them well in 
a short paper.143 Romme et al346 distinguished four main approaches to OL. 
These were in brief: 
1. OL was organisational adaptation to change,  
2. OL was organisations creating their own frames of reference, 6 
3. OL was an information process, 294 
4. OL was about using systems theory to learn. 373 
 
A somewhat simpler classification was used for this study. Three main views 
about the purpose of organisational learning were identified. These were used 
to organise this part of the review. The following three sections consider them 
under the headings “managerial education”, “organisational science” and 
“managerialist”. 
 
1. The “managerial education” approach included Argyris and Schon6 and 
Garrat142 among others. Learning as the creation of meaning by making 
assumptions explicit came under this head.203 An emphasis on the importance of 
communication was the distinguishing feature of this perspective. 
 
2. “Organisational science” saw organisational learning as data processing that 
resulted in the development of an organisational knowledge base. This was the 
creation, dissemination and use of knowledge.60;290 The underlying assumption 
was that there was a two-way relationship between individual and organisational 
learning. This was intended as descriptive rather than normative. An 
information systems perspective was the underlying model here. 
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3. The “Managerialist” approach considered organisational learning as an 
institutionalised innovation process and as a means for achieving organisational 
flexibility in complex and turbulent market environments. This was a normative 
approach, likely to produce quick radical change, exemplified for example by 
Mills280 and Senge. The importance of rapid innovation in response to rapid 
environmental change was emphasised in this perspective.  
 
The latter two theories were especially influenced by management thinking, 
while the first was influenced primarily by social psychology. 
 
Managerial education 
 
Argyris’ work concerned interpersonal relations and team learning in 
organisations from the perspective of his psychological theory of personality 
development.  He saw formal bureaucracies as inhibiting the natural 
development of personality toward greater autonomy.46 Argyris and Schon 
contrasted “espoused theories” of action which individuals publicly accepted as 
the reasons justifying their actions, with the “theory-in-use” which were the 
reasons deducible as actually justifying their action. They developed two 
contrasting theories about beliefs actually guiding action, which they called 
model 1 “theory-in-use” and model 2 “theory-in-use” (see table 2.1).  
Model 1 “theory-in-use” 
Four governing variables: 
• Strive to be in unilateral 
control 
• Minimise losing and 
maximise winning 
• Minimise the expression of 
negative feeling 
• Be rational 
Behavioural strategies 
Advocate your views without 
encouraging enquiry 
Unilaterally save face 
 
Model 2 “theory-in-use” 
Three governing variables: 
• Valid information 
• Free and informed choice 
• Internal commitment 
Behavioural strategies 
Share control with those who have competence 
and who are relevant to designing or 
implementing the action 
Combine advocacy and enquiry 
Illustrate attributions with directly observable 
data 
Surface (make public and explicit) conflicting 
views for public testing   
Table 2.1 Models of “theory-in-use”6 
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For Argyris, model I created  “conditions of undiscussability, self-fulfilling 
prophecies, self-sealing processes and escalating error.”6 It would appear that 
these statements (table 2.1) referred to individuals and to the short term. 
Most individuals in any organisation had unsatisfied needs below the top level of 
Maslow’s hierarchy.264 Satisfying lower level needs by winning individual 
material rewards was therefore the dominant model. To remind the reader, 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs was: 
 
Transcendence, 
Self-actualisation, 
Aesthetics, 
Knowing and understanding, 
Esteem, 
Affiliation, 
Safety, 
Biological requirements. 
 
   Fig 2.1 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs  
 
Model II was often espoused but rarely practised as a “theory-in-use”. Model 
II, said Argyris, would surface issues and test and correct assumptions which 
had been made undiscussable by the self sealing processes supported by model 
I “theory-in-use”. Only those at the top of an organisation had sufficient power 
and personal security to try model II. Winning in the long term for the 
organisation became their aim in model II. For everyone to try to maximise 
their individual wins meant a lose-lose situation overall. The example often given 
to illustrate this situation is that of the over use of common grazing, where 
increasing the size of their own flock is in the short term to the advantage of 
each individual owner but causes the eventual destruction of the common 
pasture. The tragedy of the commons was one of Senge’s systems 
archetypes.373  
 
Argyris distinguished two kinds of learning, single and double loop. He explained 
single loop learning using the analogy of the thermostat:  
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“The thermostat is programmed to detect states of “too cold or “too 
hot”, and to correct the situation by turning the heat on or off. If the 
thermostat asked itself why it was set at 68 degrees or why it was 
programmed as it was, then it would be a double loop learner.”6 
 
So, double loop learning occurred when goals were questioned and changed in 
some reasoned way. Data was needed for such informed reasoning. A third type 
was deutero-learning, or learning how to learn.21 This sought to improve both 
type 1 and type 2 learning. 
 
Improved communication was the aim, but good communication could block 
learning. Focus groups have encouraged participants to give defensive reasoning 
and management blaming. Participants expected management to take action, 
rather than encouraging double loop learning about the reasons and motivations 
behind objective facts and examining their own behaviour.7 The blame culture 
had obvious parallels with Argyris’s non-learning model 1 culture, skilled 
incompetence, defensiveness, fear of incompetence, a cycle of blame, and 
control by collusion between managers and employees. Fitzgerald131 describes a 
situation very like the cultural failures mentioned in the report on the Bristol 
paediatric cardiology deaths:220  
“Employees collude with management to avoid blame and to not be 
accountable. Management colludes with employees to maintain control 
and create dependencies. The cycle was difficult to break because, as 
with all behaviours, it serves a purpose and was not the result of 
accidental patterning.”131 
 
 “One sign of a healthy organisational culture was congruence between 
the organisation’s espoused values and the daily behaviour of its 
members. Conversely, one sign of an organisational culture in trouble was 
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lack of congruence between the organisations espoused values and the 
daily behaviour of its members.”182  
 
Argyris’s educational approach was confirmed by research on barriers to OL. 
For example Marsick and Watkins included in barriers to OL an inability to 
change mental models, learned helplessness, tunnel vision, a return to 
individualism, cultures of disrespect and fear, and entrenched bureaucracy.263 
The single and double loop distinction made by Argyris was also termed 
adaptive / generative by McGill et al.272 Generative learning was also termed 
transformational learning and characterised by continuous experimentation and 
feedback in an ongoing examination of the way organisations go about defining 
and solving problems. Fidler, too, saw the learning community as inquiring about 
each others assumptions and biases, experimenting, risking, and openly 
assessing the results.125 
 
Argyris defined learning as the detection and correction of error, but he 
included questioning the underlying values that defined the error.6  When this 
took place double loop learning could happen. The discovery of penicillin was a 
medical example of an error being turned into learning. For Argyris the central 
problem preventing the development of innovative new goals was that people in 
organisations developed very skilled ways of protecting themselves and others 
from obvious conflict, while at the same time seeking to win. To do this, people 
would withhold their real opinions of the other’s statements even where 
discussion was ostensibly two-way. Dyer extended this work.108 Although people 
could recognise this behaviour in others they found it difficult to modify their 
own behaviour. They acted according to different rules from those that they 
espoused. In Argyris’ terms, their “theory-in-use” did not match their espoused 
theory. A Stracathro breast surgeon who refused to follow guidelines he had 
agreed with his colleagues demonstrated this kind of behaviour, but was not 
very skilful at camouflaging defensiveness.4;347 
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Argyris 6 hypothesised a connection between five characteristics of 
information and whether the information would facilitate error or inhibit it, see 
box 2.1. Argyris said the combination of left column information (box 2.1) and 
model 1 “theory-in-use” created a primary inhibiting loop for learning. This 
reinforced both the original model 1 “theory-in-use” and left column 
information characteristics. It was clear that model 2 “theory-in-use” would 
produce information with the characteristics of supporting learning shown in 
the right column. It was also clear that explicit guidelines would, in theory, 
support learning, by allowing consistent, clear and comparable clinical audit. 
 
Model 1 “theory-in-use” did not allow double loop learning to take place, and 
would hamper even single loop learning. In parallel with the two types of 
“theory-in-use” and the two types of learning, Argyris developed two 
organisational models, rules for organisations which supported each type of 
“theory-in-use” and each type of learning (see box 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2.
 
 Organisational learning type I Organisational learning type II  
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of information that: 
Enhance probability of error Enhance probability of learning 
Vague 
Unclear 
Inconsistent 
Incongruent 
Scattered 
Concrete 
Clear 
Consistent 
Congruent 
Available 
Box 2.1 Cognitive features of information that enhance or inhibit the 
production of error6  87
2 types of OL system6 
(OI)  
An organisation with a learning 
system based on Model I “theory-
in-use” and able to do Type I 
(single loop) learning, but not type 
II (double loop) learning  
(OII)  
An organisation with a learning 
system based on Model II “theory-
in-use” and able to do Type II 
(double loop) learning  
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In a model 2 organisation, espoused theory and “theory-in-use” would match, 
communication would be straightforward, and Organisational Learning would be 
quicker and more effective. From both the classical and operant conditioning 
behaviourist theoretical positions 45 there could be no distinction between 
Argyris’ espoused theory and “theory-in-use”, because there was no role for 
theory. In other words, the idea of reflection was not part of behaviourist 
learning theory. There could be no idea of mental models in behaviourist theory. 
OL was based in cognitive, humanist and constructivist theory rather than the 
behaviourist tradition.  The individual mind was essential to Argyris’ idea of 
social learning: 
“Individuals are walking social structures who cannot undergo double-
loop learning without reflecting on their actions” 6 
 
Argyris said that individuals’ espoused theories of action were their beliefs, 
attitudes and values. They were unaware of the theories they actually 
employed, but their actions were witness that these did not match their 
espoused theories. What, for example, led individuals to bad-mouth others even 
when they said they did not intend to do so?8  
 
These “theories-in-use” existed at a tacit level below the explicit, received 
culture, and they were the same across hemispheres, and age, education, 
income, gender and racial groups. The “theories-in-use” which were so widely 
found all conformed to the same governing variables, called model 1 by Argyris. 
They are set out above. In organisations, model 1 “theories-in-use” became 
defensive routines preventing embarrassment or threat. A self-reinforcing 
process built these up. Individual strategies of bypass and cover up resulted in 
organisational bypass and cover up which reinforced individuals’ model 1 
theories in use. Misunderstanding and prevention of double loop learning 
resulted. To change this situation, both individual and organisational defensive 
routines needed to change. But individuals esteemed themselves in terms of 
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their model 1 theories in use. Double loop learning would often be seen as ‘giving 
in’ or making embarrassing revelations, and lead to lower self-esteem in terms 
of model 1.  
 
To sum up, the managerial education approach to OL aimed to make 
interpersonal communication more useful for the organisation. Its main focus 
was cultural change to encourage this. 
 
Organisational science 
 
Checkland reviewed recent definitions of data and information in the 
information systems literature: 
 “they represent at least a partial consensus that data was transformed 
into information when meaning was attributed to it.”. 60 
 
The idea of learning as the generation of information, whether of local or more 
general application, was, like the managerial education approach, humanist, 
because information was itself a humanist concept, since meaning was 
attributed to data by humans. Clinical guidelines were an example of this. 
Recognised clinical guidelines were socially created and validated information. 
They could not be produced by one individual, so they were an example of 
organisational learning. Information creation was often involved in 
recommendations about the implementation of OL systems and culture. The 
separate theoretical traditions intertwined in the attempts to solve the 
practical problem of how to create a learning organisation. 
 
For example, Kilmann221 saw the key question for creating LOs, as defining the 
processes by which knowledge was created and acquired in OL. Nonaka, as part 
of his idea of the knowledge creating company saw the OL process as the 
transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit or explicit to tacit.294 Although 
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guidelines apparently converted tacit knowledge to explicit,294 at the same time 
they codified skills requiring thought to carry out, into routines carried out 
automatically and unthinkingly.388 Nonaka also saw knowledge creation as a 
process of creating metaphor to create analogies and models. Like Burgoyne, he 
supported the idea of spare capacity – functional overlap (redundancy) spread 
explicit knowledge through the organisation. It created internal competition 
which accelerated implementation.294 In the NHS acute sector there was little 
spare capacity, as bed shortages proved.  
 
Garvin said the learning organisation was one skilled in:  
1. systematic problem solving, 
2. experimentation with new approaches,  
3. learning from past experiences,  
4. learning from the best practices of others, and  
5. transferring knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the 
organisation.145 
 
The idea of rewarding learning as well as action was important. Jones outlined 
11 guidelines to bring thinking back into the organisation. These included 
rewarding the thinking and not just the doing.213 
 
All 5 common dimensions of OL found by Goh and Richards’ review151 were 
relevant to  knowledge creation. Teamwork and group problem solving and 
experimentation generated data, transfer of knowledge helped to implement it 
and perhaps put it in more permanent codified form, clarity of purpose ensured 
it was the right knowledge, leadership ensured the knowledge was valid and was 
used. Similarly, the creation of protocols from guidelines created knowledge. 
Guideline-based audit generated better data than non-guideline based audit. 
Better data allowed the creation of more consistent information relevant to 
recommended clinical practice. 
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Another approach to implementation listed 12 building blocks for a learning 
organisation.27 These were grounded in an examination of the practices of 25 
successful companies who were committed to becoming learning organisations 
and had demonstrated as much by adopting practices to foster it. The elements 
demonstrated the interconnectedness of information, vision, trust and 
communication. They were: 
1. having a strategy – a vision of where the company was going,  
2. executives who supported the vision of organisational learning,  
3. managers who supported their staff in their attempts to grow and 
develop,  
4. nurturing an open and trusting climate, 
5. open structures such as fluid job descriptions and flexible work 
teams, 
6. good information flow, facilitated by IT, 
7. sharing of learning and expertise, 
8. use of work practices that supported learning, such as benchmarking, 
and problem solving techniques, 
9. feedback on whether or not performance goals were being achieved, 
10. formal training and education programmes, 
11. developing teams simultaneously with individuals – communities of 
practice continuously reinvented their work, 
12. rewards and recognition for learning. 
 
In summary we can say that information systems were at the core of OL, and 
especially emphasised by these writers. The information was used to support 
most of the other activities, which without it have been difficult or impossible. 
Implementing guidelines was innovative in itself. It involved organisational 
learning because one individual or often not even one multidisciplinary team 
could implement the whole guideline alone. 
Literature review Chapter 2 Organisational Learning theory 
 
 92
Managerialist 
Background 
The learning organisation was defined influentially by Senge as one:  
“Where people continually expand their capacity to create results they 
truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, 
where collective aspiration was set free, and where people are 
continually learning how to learn together.”373 
 
Argyris’ work on uncovering defensive routines with OD consultants,6 and on 
single and double loop learning was used by Senge to develop a theoretical 
framework centring around learning as the prime motivating force in individuals. 
He aimed to harness this for organisations. OL capacity was the propensity of 
an organisation to support learning useful to it. Senge combined the other 
approaches to OL. He did this using systems thinking. His approach emphasised 
innovation. Five disciplines were linked. Systems thinking or understanding the 
whole picture was central to managing complex organisations. The other four 
disciplines were: 
1. mental models – the skill of surfacing personal assumptions, and 
understanding that people naturally have varying understandings of 
similar phenomena, and see different purposes,  
2. personal mastery – an ability to continually develop a personal vision,  
3. shared vision – an ability to surface the visions and mental models of 
others and develop shared pictures of the future that engender real 
commitment, not just compliance, and 
4. team learning – an ability to suspend personal assumptions and think 
together as a team.373 
 
Individuals in organisations needed to set personal goals to develop their own 
vision of their place in the whole and their route through it, this was "personal 
mastery".  The next step was to awareness that others would see the whole 
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differently. Recognition of these differing mental models allowed much more 
complex and structured feedback, or as Senge called it, team learning. Team 
learning enabled the building of a shared vision or a common high level mental 
model. In practice these stages might happen at the same time. 
 
Dialogue was one of the central skills for innovative learning. It has been seen 
as a technology at the root of all effective group actions.355 Its key feature 
was to enable the challenging of others’ views without causing withdrawal from 
valid debate. It was needed to build common mental models that transcended 
cultural differences and allowed common interpretations. One way of innovating 
was to create special groups to do so within organisations. These could include 
teams, committees, task forces, independent business units:   
“These high risk-high return organisational experiments may fail nine 
times out of 10, yet they are relatively low cost ventures and, when they 
fail, provide new information about technologies and markets.”409 
 
Taking this a step further, 
 “Organisations that want to innovate or revitalise themselves need two 
organisations, an operating organisation and an innovating organisation.” 
141 
 
The purpose of an innovating organisation was to allow ideas generated from 
practice ‘where the rubber meets the road’ to be perfected before they were 
tested prematurely in an operating environment. It was separate from the 
operating organisation. Senge thought “theories-in-use” could be tested using 
computer-based learning environments (microworlds).372 This allowed 
anticipatory learning. Mental models were “surfaced” that is to say they were 
made explicit and public, to facilitate the adoption of change by exposing 
unrecognised assumptions about the way things should be.371 In focus group 
research Calvert et al reported Senge’s approach was popular.48 They reported 
a learning organisation as one where: 
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1. People continually expand their capacity to create results they truly 
desire, 
2. New and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, 
3. Collective aspiration is set free, 
4. People are continually learning how to learn together. 
 
As this list shows, harnessing individual motivation was important for Senge’s 
followers. The link between individual and organisational learning was the 
central theme for this approach to OL.280;346. Kim, too, brought individual 
learning and OL together through the idea of sharing mental models.222 
 
Learning systems 
Learning systems were especially emphasised in the managerialist approach to 
OL. Their application to the NHS which had grown up organically and piecemeal 
was to provide a framework for designed healthcare, in the spirit of the 
Scottish White Paper of 1998 (Designed to Care).401 A learning system needed 
to be supported by a suitable culture. An atomistic individualist culture was 
unsuitable because a learning system at the organisational level was a social 
process allowing a dialogue between theory and practice. In a hospital, clinical 
audit was one means for this. The clinical audit cycle was similar to a single loop 
learning system. If standards were set within the cycle, it could be a double 
loop learning system, addressing more complex problems. If any stage was 
missing the learning cycle was broken. There was a danger that clinical 
guidelines would break the double loop learning cycle by taking over the 
standard setting stage at a level out of the control of local health 
professionals. 
 
Like Senge, Checkland used systems thinking as a problem-solving framework, 
unlike Senge he attempted to define a methodology - soft systems methodology 
(SSM) for understanding ill-defined human enterprises, just as ‘hard systems’ 
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thinking had done in engineering. In SSM, clarity that human systems were 
concepts and did not exist in the real world helped to free the action learning 
process from entrenched positions and defensiveness.61 Motivation was not 
explicitly considered in SSM. Checkland developed and tested SSM rigorously 
by applying it to real organisational problems.59;61 For SSM, human systems 
contained different hierarchical levels, having different emergent properties. 
Every level needed an input, which was transformed to an output. 
Communication links and control and monitoring systems were also essential.  
 
This was the ‘formal system model.59 It could be mapped on to Kolb’s better 
known learning cycle230 which implied that monitoring and control (management) 
were integral to the learning cycle. Single and double loop learning could also be 
understood in terms of the formal systems model. If evidence based guidelines 
were indeed to function as a single or double loop learning system all the 
elements of these models would need to be present. Cavaleri examined three 
forms of soft systems thinking in terms of their ability to support 
organisational learning.54 Positive results implied that clinical audit of guidelines 
could develop more in the soft systems direction to better support 
organisational learning from guideline implementation. The idea of an OL cycle 
was put forward by Dixon (fig 2.2).97 This had four stages analogous to the 
stages of the individual learning cycle.230  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.2 the organisational learning cycle (summarised from Dixon) 
 
Widespread generation 
of information 
Integrate new and local information 
into the organisational context 
Take responsible action 
on interpreted meaning 
Collectively interpret information
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The concept of the OL cycle has not been further developed or applied. For the 
implementation of guidelines through OL and clinical audit it had some 
implications. The chief was that if any one of the four stages of OL was missing 
the organisation would not implement guidelines as effectively as otherwise, for 
both type 1 and type 2 learning. It would have a low chance of developing model 
II culture. Through her idea of the OL cycle, Dixon seemed to be arguing for a 
reintegration of knowledge of organisational functions in each member.97 She 
even says this is to their benefit. Most were more effective learners if they 
relied on sharing learning strengths with others. To do even this, learners 
needed to understand the role of each learning style. 
 
Another systemic approach to OL was the learning company. It was developed 
by Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell in the late 1980s.315 It was more complex than 
other models of OL. It had 11 characteristics, all related to a very neatly 
structured model of an organisation: 
 1. A learning approach to strategy – pilots, feedback loops, emergent 
strategy, 
2. Participative policy making with key stakeholders, 
3. Infomating – making information available to front line staff to 
empower them to act on their own initiative, 
4. Formative accounting and control – structuring budgeting and 
accounting systems to assist learning about how money works in the 
business, 
5. Internal exchange – all internal units and departments see themselves 
as customers and suppliers in a supply chain to the end user, 
6. Reward flexibility – alternatives are available for both monetary and 
non monetary rewards to cater for individual needs and performance, 
7. Enabling structures – all structures and processes can be changed as 
needed, 
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8. Boundary workers as environmental scanners – “Processes are in place 
for bringing back and welcoming the information into the company.”, 
9. Inter-company learning – learning from joint ventures, 
10. A learning climate – managers primary task was to facilitate 
experiment and learning from experience, 
11. Self-development opportunities for all – resources and 
encouragement to take responsibility for own learning and development. 
 
These characteristics mapped onto specific information or energy flows 
between the parts of a four-part model. The model combined the information 
creation and systems thinking approaches to OL, but was less detailed than 
Argyris and Schon on communication and management education. It was based 
on the metaphor of energy flow, a difficult concept to relate to the 
practicalities of guideline implementation in the NHS. See fig 2.3: 
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2.2 History of OL in the NHS 
 
2.2.1 Why OL was needed in the NHS 
In the NHS, clinical audit needed support to enable more systematic and 
powerful OL. This involved inter-group learning between multidisciplinary 
clinical groups. To learn at this level, the groups needed to take account of 
organisational and management issues, as well as care delivery.162 Few, if any 
studies supported a relationship between individual learning and organisational 
performance.202 Clinical audit was not designed to address problems as complex 
as these. NHS professionals learned as individuals, but were not taught to 
transfer this to the organisation. The NHS needed to teach its employees how 
to transfer individual learning to the group.222;280 Their belief systems (for 
example distrust of managers)251 seemed to prevent this transfer. Managerial 
changes perceived as broken promises may have been to blame.251 
 
Two cultures 
Two different learning cultures existed between managers and clinicians, likely 
to block the transfer of learning between the clinical and the managerial sides 
of the organisation. A managers’ workshop to develop a learning organisation in 
the NHS agreed the main activity needed was to develop a higher degree of 
integration between personal and organisational development. This was to help 
managers “become less rule bound and more capable of surviving in the 
increasingly turbulent NHS environment.”10 The somewhat later clinical drive to 
deal with turbulence in the development of professional best practice 
contrasted in its attempt to produce more, rather than fewer, rules 
(guidelines) to cope with the increasing turbulence caused by a greater volume 
of research.  
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NHS consultants all had a training role but were not trained to manage the 
learning of their junior medical staff. Training received by junior doctors 
varied as a result.15 For OL, managers needed to learn to manage the learning 
process (deutero-learning) rather than the learning content, using others as 
their researchers and authorities and asking questions to which there were as 
yet no answers to stretch others’ learning.20 Everyday practice in using others 
to learn was presented by Stuart.390 
 
Guidelines could be an aid to process benchmarking, for example to compare 
implementation processes and compliance levels. Benchmarking was one form of 
NHS OL activity. Attention to benchmarking quality of care issues, whether 
process or outcome, came after the benchmarking of costs.3 Outcomes 
comparison was subject to wide error ranges.75 To detect a difference of 30% 
in mortality rates between two hospitals would take at least one years’ data. To 
detect a 15% difference would take more than 3 years’ data.75;259 Clinicians 
often had more sophisticated scientific research knowledge than managers and 
ignored benchmarking on these statistical grounds. When they knew more about 
the ways managers learned, clinicians were more satisfied with them. An 
occupational health study of physicians’ views of their organisation found that 
those aware of the mission statement for their hospital were more satisfied 
with and informed about departmental goals.9  
 
One cause of organisationally dysfunctional learning could be too close a link 
between an individual’s pay or promotion and her manager’s opinion of her 
because then the incentive was greater to say what the manager wanted to 
hear.383 This particular problem may have applied to junior doctors, a possible 
important source of new and challenging criticism for hospitals. 
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Culture and evaluation 
The importance of measuring culture as well as process was shown by a study 
which found “an association of detected nursing drug error rates with 
differences in unit properties.”113 The unit properties were organisational 
context, team leader behaviour, task design, resource adequacy and team 
composition. Unexpectedly (for the authors) “the primary influence on detected 
error rates was unit members’ willingness to discuss mistakes openly.”  
 
Higher detected and intercepted error rates found by survey were associated 
with coaching, and direction setting by nurse managers, good unit relationships, 
willingness to report errors, a perception that mistakes were not held against 
you, and good perceived unit outcomes. Qualitative data supported the 
hypothesis that there were not simply more errors in these units, but more 
were reported. Authoritarian leadership styles suppressed error reporting, but 
did not eliminate error.113 
 
Guidelines and OL 
Guidelines were suggested as a way of improving clinical practice by increasing 
communication437 and improving teamworking.275 These were directly relevant to 
OL. Multidisciplinary involvement and involvement of the wider society in 
guideline development and use has been recommended in Italy.156   
 
Guidelines stimulated the formation of heterogeneous implementation groups 
from a variety of professions. Hurst et al found that these had an enhanced 
performance in handling novel problems, while routine problems were most 
efficiently dealt with by a homogeneous group.187 This implied that short term 
groups looking at easy to solve routine problems ought to have homogeneous 
membership while long-standing groups have heterogeneous membership.187 For 
guideline implementation in the health service, this suggested that 
unidisciplinary audits should look at routine problems as short term projects. 
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In short, the literature suggested that concepts from OL were relevant to 
communication between managers and professionals, to the validity of 
comparisons of service quality, and to factors affecting the implementation of 
guidelines in the NHS. 
 
OL and Guidelines 
Many lists of OL factors or implementation requirements and steps seemed 
almost arbitrary. But most bore some relation to learning cycle or learning style 
theory. Many mentioned information430 and measurement and so had some 
relevance to guidelines and clinical audit. Others, for example Rheem, had a bias 
more toward innovation.335 Some business research on OL did not apply easily to 
the risk averse environment in the NHS. For example, Kline’s ten steps to 
becoming a learning organisation included rewarding risk taking228 but this 
needed more careful management when clinical negligence was so costly, and 
when health was at stake. 
 
So, just as there was no one learning style for individuals, there was no one 
model for a learning organisation. Learning orientations varied. For research, 
the issue was to match the OL approach to the OL issue. For OL in relation to 
guideline implementation the information-based organisational science approach 
was the most appropriate. Particularly relevant was the belief of Nevis, Dibella 
and Gould that it was possible to identify learning styles that represented a 
distinct pattern of orientations to knowledge creation and use.290 They used 
the acquisition, dissemination and use of knowledge as a three part structure to 
organise a framework of seven learning orientations and ten facilitating 
factors. 
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2.2.2 Learning styles and OL 
 
The existence of different learning styles was potentially relevant to 
difficulties in NHS quality improvement activities, including the implementation 
of clinical guidelines. Incorporating the idea of feedback, Kolb developed the 
concept of a learning cycle with four stages.230 The stages were direct 
experience, reflection on experience, theory creation and theory-informed 
action, which then gave rise to new experience. Meaning was thus created and 
recreated as experience and values were continually constructed and 
reconstructed. Earlier thinkers had seen this 94;412. Kolb said that different 
abilities were needed to carry out each stage of the learning cycle: 
“Learners, if they are to be effective, need four different kinds of 
abilities - concrete experience (CE), reflective observation (RO), 
abstract conceptualisation (AC), and active experimentation (AE).” 231 
 
He found four main pairings of these abilities in 800 practising managers. He 
called them the converger, the diverger, the assimilator, and the 
accommodator.231 These learning styles interacted with heredity, education, and 
career. In an organisation seen as a learning system, different functional units 
had different learning style norms. These needed to be integrated to maintain 
learning effectiveness, because “the most effective learning systems are those 
that can tolerate differences in perspective.” For the implementation of 
guidelines involving more than one professional group the possible different 
learning styles of the groups needed to be taken into account. 
 
Learning from experience (action learning) was classified into four other types 
by Mumford,287;288 who developed Kolb’s work. These were intuitive 
(unconscious), incidental (by chance), retrospective and prospective. The latter 
three labels mapped on to well recognised types of clinical audit – critical 
incident technique, retrospective using case notes, and prospective using special 
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data gathering instruments. Mumford showed how organisational performance 
was improved by working on real projects in workshops and integrating the 
results with learning from experience. He also criticised the emphasis on double 
loop learning by Pedler and Senge as being at the expense of incremental or 
single loop learning. 
 
To harness individual learning for the organisation, individuals’ learning styles 
needed to be taken into account. These in turn related to personality types and 
team roles.25 Certain personality types were associated with particular team 
roles. To learn, teams needed to recognise, accept and utilise the different 
learning styles and team roles of their members.287 Individuals needed to 
develop their own learning capacity to lead group learning, for example 
implementing guidelines.  
 
Barrington saw leading and managing the learning process as a new form of 
leadership.20 Senge saw the leadership role in learning organisations as radically 
different from the charismatic decision maker. He saw them as “designers, 
teachers, stewards.”374 An understanding of the value and role of each learning 
style was essential to leading a learning process. The continual reconstruction 
of experience by groups based on shared concrete experience enabled them to 
maximise learning by sharing reactions, and so to generalise, and apply the 
learning to new situations met soon after the learning.230 Skills in these areas 
were recognised as necessary for clinical leadership.32;33 
 
The need for change management skills in clinical leaders has been recognised 
elsewhere.171 Those with different learning styles would adapt to change in 
different ways. OL capacity would be related to success in the implementation 
of change by each individual. 
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Learning styles of doctors and nurses. 
Health professionals’ learning styles were unequally distributed. This meant 
different professional groups had different learning cultures. A study in 1999 
found for example: 
“In trainee surgeons the predominant learning styles (86.5%) were 
convergent (n = 31) or accommodative (n = 14) whilst only 5 (9.6%) 
assimilative and 2 (3.9%) divergent styles were detected.”104 
 
Another study in the same year found a majority of nurse trainees had 
converging243 learning styles.  A study in 1995 used the stages of the learning 
cycle to classify learning styles and found most nurses had concrete learning 
styles.55 An earlier French study in 1993 showed a majority of nurses had 
assimilative learning styles, and that these did better than accommodators in 
baccalaureate exams.167 The divergent learning style was the least well 
represented, but the four stages of the learning cycle were present in the 
three main learning styles found by this study in doctors and nurses. The least 
well represented stage was reflective observation (RO). RO was a component of 
both assimilative and divergent learning styles, but not of the convergent and 
accommodative learning styles. Since assimilators did better in exams they may 
have been more senior in professions and thus in a better position to prevent 
any risk of wild experimentation or ill judged organisational action by insisting 
on data gathering to support any case for change.  
 
In organisations assimilators were likely to struggle in putting this perspective 
simply because of their low numbers. Reflective observation would be important 
for data issues such as assessing the quality of data in case records, and in 
calling patients for review consultations. This was found needed in GPs, for 
example.387 Convergers were significantly more self-directed than either the 
accommodators, assimilators, or divergers.243 Autonomous learning (convergent) 
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was important since autonomous learners were best able to develop new 
practice. Among public health trainees there was no clear majority type of 
learning style, but assimilators did the best in exams.325 
 
To conclude, health professionals needed to ensure that the reflective 
observation stage was represented in guideline implementation groups. 
 
2.2.3 Motivation and OL 
 
The organisation motivated its staff by offering to satisfy their needs. The 
most effective motivating tool was, according to Skinner’s behaviouralism, 
positive reinforcement. But, since human beings were learning animals, learning 
was intrinsically rewarding and required no additional motivation. There was no 
conflict, learning could be positively reinforced:  
" originality is a form of operant behaviour. Positive reinforcement 
increased the rate at which original responses were emitted." 295 
 
Positive reinforcement, therefore, could reward creative deviance as well as  
conformity. OL succeeded by giving individuals greater autonomy, power of 
self-determination, than they could achieve alone (Senge’s ‘personal mastery’). 
This was equivalent to ensuring social mediation led to an enhanced ability to 
create and achieve new individual goals. This could be achieved only in a context 
that supported the alignment of individual and organisational goals, since 
individuals’ goals were dependent on others. Did clinical practice guidelines help 
to create this context? Learning of any sort was particularly important as a way 
of motivating professionals, who could be expected to have already satisfied 
more basic needs lower down Maslow's hierarchy.264 For Maslow, self 
actualisation, and the need for knowledge and understanding, were personality 
needs just as much as the basic physiological needs. 
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2.2.4 Medical Education and OL 
 
The traditional approach to medical education was called Continuing Medical 
Education (CME). This tended to use passive methods such as lectures, for 
knowledge transfer rather than knowledge creation. CME has been seen as 
deficient in that it:  
“blindly assumes that … medical professionals can intuitively match 
specialist knowledge to the demands of actual cases.”41  
 
While CME emphasised specialist knowledge and expert training, continuing 
professional development (CPD), had a wider perspective. In contrast to CME it 
focused on turning academic knowledge into professional knowledge by practical 
implementation in the delivery context, using the idea of knowledge 
construction by communities of practitioners. 
“The key to changing professional practice lies in bringing this practical 
knowledge to the surface and proceeding to refine and develop it in 
desired directions.”41 
 
For Fletcher,132 professional education and development were not of sufficient 
relevance to need:  
" The focus is on subspecialty topics without considering needs. The 
guidance from the Colleges exerts little influence as a prompt. The 
methods chosen are personal choices and ignore what the colleges 
recognise as valid CME."... “least popular was non-clinical professional 
development"..."the danger of no regulation lies in whether consultants 
identify the CME they need." 
 
The educational needs of clinicians were ultimately driven by patient needs. But 
guidelines produced by NHS clinicians ran the risk of providing what clinicians 
rather than what patients wanted. Therefore, the CPD approach was more likely 
to create a context for guideline implementation where individuals could 
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increase their self-direction and autonomy, and thus develop increased 
motivation to create and use knowledge in social action. This process might be 
best managed using incentives within an OL framework. 
 
2.3 Recent developments 
2.3.1 OL studies in the NHS 
 
No applied studies of OL capacity in acute hospitals were found.  In the report 
on the Bristol enquiry the systems perspective and culture were referred to,220 
but a full description of their role was not developed. References to, for 
example ‘the blame culture’ and ‘the club culture’ did not describe the workings 
of this culture or give a theoretical basis for changing it. Nor did the report 
provide any model of a culture that would support best clinical practice. The 
learning culture was the obvious candidate. Work already existed on OL theory 
in other settings, and individual learning was enthusiastically espoused by the 
health professions.  
 
Burgoyne found NHS trust hospitals were more able to maintain historically 
derived patterns of service and co-operative relationships with other hospitals 
than the NHS reforms (the purchaser-provider split) implied.47 From this 
perspective, hospitals were perhaps successful learning organisations that had 
broken through to a third level of learning – learning how to manage and change 
their own environment. This could equally be seen as the route to becoming a 
non-learning organisation, reducing the environment to fit organisational pre-
conceptions. A more positive perspective on managing the environment was to 
educate patients so as to increase their autonomy. 
 
Eddy111 mounted a convincing argument for imitating a free market by using 
“willingness to pay” as a means for deciding whether to include treatments in 
Literature review Chapter 2 Organisational Learning theory 
 
 108
guidelines. However there was always a danger that this would subsume an 
individual who would be willing to pay in the same group as those not willing. It 
has been suggested that patients should be allowed to pay extra for their 
care,336 but this too limited access for those willing but unable to pay. That 
taxpayers should be expected to pay for the care they actually received was 
also suggested in the popular press by a respected public figure (Lord Desai).42 
 
So, from the perspectives of patients, professionals and polity there was a 
need to test whether the OL framework could usefully be applied to 
healthcare. Was it associated with success in improving the quality of services, 
and specifically, with successful guideline implementation? 
 
The key measures relating to guideline implementation were likely to relate 
especially to the information system oriented “organisational science” 
perspective on OL (p.89-91 above). A tool to measure OL capacity was needed 
which captured the ways information was created and used.  Examples of 
information creation included mission statements of purpose, which prioritised 
the information needs, and by experiments, which generated new knowledge. 
Examples of information use were the ways in which it was communicated or 
transferred to decide action at different organisational levels. Teamwork and 
appropriate leadership were relevant in facilitating both information creation 
and use in different ways. The methodology used for the selection of a tool 
meeting these criteria will be described in the next chapter, (pp. 186-188 
especially). The pilot study confirmed the applicability of these key measures, 
and particularly of the information emphasis of the organisational science 
perspective to the evidence-based guideline adoption process (pp.201-203). The 
other perspectives on OL offered theoretical frameworks explaining some of 
the measurements made in the wider contexts of each hospital and in relation 
to differences in the guideline implementation activities and beliefs.   
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Chapter 3 - Implementation of guidelines  
 
Clinical audit and clinical guidelines aimed to improve quality of patient care 
(including safety) by helping to ensure practice reflected the latest research 
evidence. Guideline implementation was also a means of getting research 
evidence into practice quickly. This chapter describes the history of the 
Scottish approach to guideline development and considers the research on the 
most effective implementation of clinical guidelines, since this is central to 
improving the delivery of health care. It then shows the relevance of work on 
the implementation of change in hospitals and OL theory for guideline 
implementation and finally refers back to strategic change theory to define the 
research questions.  
3.1 Development and origin of clinical guidelines  
National audits examined critical incidents such as surgical deaths within 30 
days. They did not define standards for best practice. They used adverse 
outcomes as a measure instead, for example the Scottish Audit of Surgical 
Mortality (SASM) and, in England, the National Confidential Enquiry into 
Perioperative Deaths (NCEPOD).67;93 In contrast, evidence-based clinical 
practice guidelines (“guidelines”) offered guidance to clinicians about the 
accepted standard of clinical processes. A working definition from the 
Institute for Medicine (United States) was: 
“systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient 
decisions about appropriate healthcare for specific clinical 
circumstances.”199 
 
Guidelines were pioneered by the American College of Physicians starting in 
1976.18 The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) was created 
in 1989 by the United States government. Its aim was the quality improvement 
of health care, and it used an explicit structured methodology for guideline 
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development.67 The broad interest in clinical guidelines stretched across 
Europe, North America, New Zealand, Australia and Africa.436 The interest in 
guidelines originated in issues facing most health care systems: firstly, rising 
costs, owing to increased demand, more expensive technology, new treatments, 
and an ageing population, and secondly, variation in the quality of care.436 
 
Only an increased rate of learning could ensure hospitals kept pace with the 
increased rate of change.112 Evidence-based clinical practice guidelines were 
brought to the centre of the policy stage in the UK by Effective health care 
bulletin No 8,297 produced by the Nuffield Institute for Health at the 
University of Leeds in 1994. This publication was widely disseminated and had 
credibility as part of a series of bulletins using input from respected 
researchers. Guidelines were a clinical attempt to reduce physician uncertainty 
and speed up learning. The uncertainty gave rise, at group level, to 
disagreement about what clinical policies gave the best clinical outcomes. Some 
clinicians were uncertain about the best application of policies to their 
individual patients in the light of emerging evidence.339 
 
Bringing research quickly into practice was emphasised in this era,172;426 for 
example using research based evidence to develop consensus on standards for 
clinical audit. Getting research into practice was also a non-contentious 
argument for the implementation of clinical guidelines. Medical-scientific 
literature was ineffective in diffusing new knowledge about medical innovation 
to physicians, for example a large number of articles about Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging appeared years before its widespread introduction to clinical 
practice.331 Bero et al28 produced a useful overview of 18 systematic reviews of 
interventions to promote the implementation of research findings in 1998.  
Although the generalisability of the studies to other settings was questionable, 
they concluded that three single strategy methods were consistently effective. 
These were educational outreach visits, reminders, and interactive educational 
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meetings. The other consistently effective intervention was multifaceted 
methods – a combination of two or more of audit and feedback, reminders, local 
consensus processes and marketing. The evidence about the effectiveness of 
audit and feedback alone, local opinion leaders (though evidence was 
insufficient here), local consensus processes, and patient mediated 
interventions was variable. Simply producing and distributing educational 
materials including guidelines was definitely ineffective, as were didactic 
educational meetings. 
 
From the perspective of successful guideline implementation – which might not 
necessarily need to change practice – guidelines were unlikely to be 
implemented unless put in place as part of a strategy actively involving health 
professionals rather than treating them as passive recipients.   
 
Audit of both policy and practice and feedback about compliance was logically 
essential for guideline implementation (to give evidence of implementation), and 
as many of the other effective strategies as feasible would need to be added 
to create a multifaceted intervention appropriate for the context. The 
development of audit indicators was therefore an important part of guideline 
implementation, and guidelines could help to provide the consistency necessary 
to allow comparison of performance with criteria and standards, and could 
underpin greater compatibility of computer databases, both of which were 
recommended for the derivation and implementation of evidence-based 
performance indicators in primary care.269;270;432   
 
Guidelines were a component of the clinical effectiveness policy. The English 
Executive letters (EL) (96)45 and (96)110 retained the clinical effectiveness 
policy as a priority for 1997-8, and drew attention to a number of NHS 
Executive (English) publications about it as attempts to close the gap between 
research and practice.  
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3.1.1 Guidelines policy in Scotland 
 
The following discussion of the main policy developments focuses on those 
relevant to the introduction of clinical guidelines in Scotland. 
 
In early 1993, the Clinical Resource and Audit Group (CRAG) published the 
report of a working group on clinical guidelines headed by Derek MacLean,255 
which recommended CRAG co-ordinate and fund the Scottish Intercollegiate 
Guidelines Network (SIGN) to develop guidelines in Scotland. The report made 
a distinction between ‘clinical guideline’ and ‘protocol’. According to the 
chairman of SIGN, too, ‘Guideline’ meant the general statement of principle: 
“broad statements which relate to an optimal level of care in which 
current knowledge and experience are balanced against the constraints 
of available staff and other resources.”320   
 
‘Protocol’ meant the more detailed development of these broad principles for 
local application, specifically their adaptation to the local context. Through 
protocols and audit, the MacLean report linked guideline implementation to 
other organisational processes. It recommended: 
1. a very close association “between clinical audit and guideline 
development, monitoring and evaluation” and “mechanisms for 
encouraging this link should continue to be encouraged in Scotland.”, and  
2. guidelines “should not be looked on as training instruments to be used 
only by staff in training but they should be designed for use by all 
grades of staff”, and  
3. the beginnings of a notion of clinical governance (see below): 
“Incentives and sanctions are a major area of uncertainty in the 
application of guidelines which will need to be explored if clinical 
guidelines are to be brought into general use.”  
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Clinical guidelines were discussed in relation to the institutional context of 
hospitals in chapter 1. The history and methods of guideline development and 
research on the effectiveness of different implementation methods are now 
considered in detail. The Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN) 
was created in 1993 in partnership with the Scottish Home and Health 
Department (SHHD).376 Its aim was “To sponsor and support the development 
of national guidelines on a multi-professional basis”.319  
 
SIGN guidelines were developed according to an explicit, quality assured 
methodology.375 SIGN produced guidance on its guideline development process 
and the most useful guideline structure. It drew heavily on the AHCPR 
methodology,320 but unlike the AHCPR, did not itself produce guidelines. It 
catalysed and quality assured the guideline development process. (The AHCPR 
moved away from directly producing guidelines in 1996 for reasons including 
cost of production and criticism of lack of transparency in the development 
process.)316 SIGN’s role of quality assuring guideline development was important 
for implementation, as Health Boards, for example Lothian Health Board,250 
were beginning to evaluate the quality of available guidelines prior to selection 
as implementation priorities for their provider units. Consensus guidelines not 
transparently based on evidence resulted in variable compliance, for example 
from 37% to 73% in a sample of 31 Australian GPs.387 It was generally agreed 
that if clinicians were to accept guidelines they must be confident of their 
validity and therefore the method of development must be transparent392 and 
of agreed acceptability.11 In addition to the problems of assessing research 
quality, economic bias and pecuniary interest needed to be declared and if 
possible eliminated.13 
 
The main SIGN committee represented clinical specialties and professions 
through Scotland. There were about 30 members of this group, which met 
three times a year to consider proposals for topics for new guidelines. Topics 
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were submitted on a form asking for a description of the problem and for 
details of existing evidence about it. The forms were peer reviewed by 
specialist reviewers before consideration by the committee. In choosing topics 
the committee took into account the burden of disease, the potential for 
improvement, and the existence of other guidelines in the same area. Topics 
had to be multidisciplinary.   
 
SIGN working groups researched and wrote guidelines on clinical topics. They 
were led by Fellows of the Scottish Royal Colleges and Societies. A decision was 
made with the proposer about who should chair the working group. Members 
were invited, trained in critical appraisal, the remit was defined, and a 
literature search was carried out by a qualified librarian. Studies were selected 
for review according to agreed criteria. Their methodology was evaluated and 
an evidence grading was given. The evidence was then synthesised and 
interpreted and draft recommendations were produced. The draft guideline 
was presented at a national open meeting, comments assessed, and the final 
draft was reviewed by the SIGN editorial Board. The guidelines were published 
free to health service organisations in Scotland (personal communication, 
Harlen 1998). The SIGN guideline programme had approved 73 guidelines by 
July 2003. 
 
Guidelines were central in the Scottish NHS Management Executive guidance 
for 1998/99, which introduced Health Improvement Programmes in Scotland. 
Among other elements such as human resource strategies and information 
management strategies, these were expected to set out: 
“a rolling programme for the implementation of evidence-based clinical 
guidelines and clinically effective practice to be monitored through 
clinical audit.” 399 
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England did not have a national clinical guidelines initiative until the National 
Institute for Clinical Effectiveness (NICE) took this on.332 NICE was set up on 
April 1st 1999 under the chairmanship of Sir Michael Rawlins. It was a Labour 
government initiative.84 There had been calls for centralised guideline 
development for some years before. For example there was concern that the 
methods used to validate guidelines in hospitals locally were inadequate.334 
 
3.1.2 Guideline implementation 
 
The problem for this research was whether more effective implementation of 
SIGN clinical guidelines was associated with a higher OL capacity. To address 
this it was necessary to review previous research evaluating the effectiveness 
of the implementation of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines. If 
implementation methods with links to OL principles were successful, it would 
add strength to the research proposal and make the hypothesis worth 
investigating. 
 
Research on guideline implementation in clinical professions other than medicine 
was virtually non-existent.57 Findings applying to the medical profession may not 
have applied to nurses because of differences in cultural norms, particularly 
related to autonomy, peer review, and ability to influence practice.  
 
Clinical practice guidelines had been applied in various forms to a set of 
interlinked problems. These included improving the quality of delivery of care, 
and containing cost.107 OL theory was a potential framework for this co-
ordinated approach, because it was a large educational exercise needing a 
systemic perspective for successful implementation. For example Haines (1997) 
saw healthcare as moving from a system of passive diffusion of research 
knowledge into the medical community to: active dissemination by bodies such 
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as the NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination and the Cochrane 
Collaboration. Prefiguring an OL approach, he stated: 
“The next stage will be the development of a co-ordinated approach to 
implementation using resources currently devoted to continuing 
education, audit and information technology to better effect...”165 
 
There were suggestions in the era of the purchaser/provider split, and health 
care commissioning, that guidelines and audit would be used in the contracting 
process. Many influential commentators thought this too complex and data 
hungry a process to implement,184 and it was in any case made irrelevant by the 
change of government in 1997. 
 
While protocols adapted guidelines to local settings, they had themselves to 
give enough flexibility for practitioners to exercise the art of medicine and 
health care in treating individual patients. There were calls for guideline 
developers to state when patient preferences should play a prominent role in 
implementation of guideline recommendations. For example back pain was likely 
to be a more serious issue for a manual than a sedentary worker.305 By 
strengthening the knowledge base, guidelines had potential to improve OL, but 
the orientation to the individual patient in some instances took priority over the 
stronger general knowledge base, and professionals needed to retain a 
sensitivity to this.  
 
Guideline implementation methods 
The important questions for evaluation of guideline implementation methods 
were: 
1. Validity - could guidelines improve care?  
2. Reliability - did guidelines create sustained change in real practice and 
improve outcomes?  
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3. Methods - which implementation methods worked best in which 
contexts? 
 
1. Validity of guidelines 
Clinical guidelines were found to improve care by Grimshaw and Freemantle et al 
and Grimshaw and Russell et al in meta-reviews of guideline implementation 
research.157;159 They evaluated the evaluation methods of the projects 
reviewed.159 The authors recognised the most reliable trial design as a 
“balanced incomplete block design” in which “each participating doctor 
simultaneously experienced both guidelines for some conditions and the status 
quo for others”. Such a crossover design was used to evaluate the effect of 
self-audit on recording for cystitis and vaginitis.296 The authors accepted that 
few studies used this design to reduce the range of biases to which randomised 
controlled trails were subject in behavioural research. Grimshaw and Russell 
concluded that RCTs ran the danger of contamination across groups in the same 
context in evaluation of guidelines, and to the Hawthorne effect (beneficial 
effect of taking part267) where the implementation was in separate contexts 
(for example separate hospitals), with the result that the evaluation might 
overestimate the true effects.158 Five study designs that overcame these 
difficulties were then recommended. The study then reviewed 59 evaluations of 
guideline implementation meeting these criteria. The conclusion was that 11 of 
the 59 studies showed clinical guidelines effective in improving the outcome of 
care, and 55 showed improvements to the process of care. 
 
Later research suggested that frequent time lags in adjusting medical 
guidelines to new scientific developments meant that scientific progress not 
recognised in clinical guidelines might improve the outcome of non-compliance.179 
Compliance with a low quality guideline would not improve outcomes, guidelines 
needed to be carefully developed and tested.422 The SIGN process of course 
paid great attention to this. 
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2. Reliability of guidelines 
Because guidelines were based on evidence created under research conditions, 
it was possible, perhaps likely, that the outcomes upon which they based their 
recommendations would not be achieved in the real world. For example, if they 
were based on published research the effect of the intervention was likely to 
be overestimated owing to publication bias. Population selection procedures and 
the use of research staff to enhance patient compliance and highly skilled 
clinical staff, were likely also to increase the treatment effect.184 
 
So, guidelines had been shown effective in the context of evaluation studies, 
but in many cases these were artificial conditions. They did not test the effect 
in a real practice context. Guidelines that were too idealistic would be agreed 
with in theory, but not followed in practice. There was consensus that: “A 
considerable gap separates agreement with guidelines from action.”166 
 
Significant differences in compliance with guidelines were found among even 
the most dominant hospital providers of cancer services within the same 
medical community.391 Strategies for enhancing compliance were recommended 
to be integral to the process of guideline development. No specific strategies 
were recommended. Continuous quality improvement was shown as a way of 
ensuring continued use of asthma guidelines.148 This was an example of the use 
of the wider context to improve implementation.  
 
Problems found in implementation of guidelines included physicians’ tendency to 
over-treat. In a study of the impact of guidelines on practice patterns it was 
found easier to encourage physicians to do more for patients than less.52 The 
danger of such defensive practice was that guidelines could be applied even 
when they were not in the best interest of the patient, and difficult cases not 
attempted.  
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3. Effectiveness of Implementation methods  
The important question was widely agreed to be how best to implement 
guidelines, to ensure that they did change clinical practice where 
necessary.166;214;320 
 
Intervention, instruction, and involvement 
Simply sending out copies of guidelines to relevant clinicians did not work well 
as a method of getting the guidelines into practice.161;165;166 This was seen for 
example in the implementation of venous thromboembolism prophylaxis policy in 
hospital practice,268 and in the disappointing results of implementation of 
national guidelines for asthma.312 Formal lectures of the sort often used in 
Continuing Medical Education (CME) were similarly ineffective.78 
 
The calls for clinicians to develop a culture of constant update136 already 
alluded to contrasted with numerous early efforts to test individual guideline 
implementation strategies from a stimulus-response perspective on changing 
behaviour, for example, reminders,246;424 and reminders and feedback.343 As 
multiple interventions began to be tested in different settings, the 
behaviourist model, where a one way stimulus was applied to a “black box”, 
began to be seen as inadequate for the complexity of the problem. A more 
systemic and integrative perspective began to emerge, more in keeping with an 
OL approach.333 
 
Interventions based on the passive receipt of information were generally less 
effective than educational interventions requiring more active participation. 
Active involvement was an important feature of much OL theory. Outreach 
visits (1:1 education in the workplace) could work. Reviews of guideline 
implementation strategies concluded that those operating directly on the 
consultation between the professional and the patient were more likely to be 
effective, for example patient mediated interventions, patient specific 
reminders and restructured medical records.157;160 Although NHS patients were 
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not like business customers or consumers217 in that they did not pay directly 
for care, the patient-clinician relationship remained important for clinicians’ 
learning.  
 
Participative methods were generally successful for development and 
implementation. For example, a small group consensus process increased 
influenza vaccination rates in primary care physicians by 34%.216 In another 
example, consultants and GPs were involved in developing a local guideline about 
hypertension in the elderly. They were given direct feedback on drafts. 
Prescribing of bendrofluazide was significantly increased.302 But insufficient 
evidence existed to reach firm conclusions about the relative effectiveness of 
different educational and implementation strategies in different contexts.157;160 
There was general support for the view that there was no one ideal 
implementation strategy.161;307  
 
By 1995, a review from the Royal College of General Practitioners devoted a 
subsection to contextual factors influencing behavioural change.349 OL aimed to 
change context, for example by improving communication, giving a systems 
perspective and developing a learning culture. Higher OL capacity was 
therefore likely to provide the right context for guideline implementation. 
SIGN itself recommended careful involvement of hospital staff in adapting 
guidelines for local protocols. With continuing review, this could provide a way 
around the credibility (‘not invented here’) problem. It was in accordance with 
both the CPD model of professional education, and OL theory: 
“Studies of organisational learning suggest that the lessons of evaluation 
are more likely to be acted upon if they are generated from shared 
knowledge, and are conceived as interpretations of or judgements about 
continuing professional education rather than descriptions of it.”41 
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Single and multiple methods 
Studies were carried out testing single and multiple methods of dissemination 
and implementation of clinical guidelines. Multiple methods of implementation 
and tailoring the methods to the context to cope with specific barriers were 
shown important in later research. Evidence to choose particular interventions 
for particular contexts was at first lacking.157 Later work suggested tailoring 
the multifaceted guideline implementation strategy to deal with the different 
barriers identified. Where the barrier was cultural, social influence approaches 
(local consensus processes, educational outreach, opinion leaders, marketing 
etc.) were suggested.119 Other problems and the relevant approaches were:  
1. lack of knowledge (educational seminars and workshops),  
2. unawareness of sub-optimal practice (audit and feedback), and  
3. problems processing information in consultations (reminders and 
patient mediated interventions) 
 
Single method comparisons 
Examples of single methods of guideline implementation are given below to help 
the reader visualise what each method entailed: 
1. Educational methods, if used alone, were found ineffective, for 
example in achieving compliance with guidelines for the treatment of 
depression by US primary care physicians.242  
 
2. A comparison of educational programme and clinical recall interview 
found the interview more effective than factual communication on a 
group basis, in changing clinical practice on neonatal 
hyperbilirubinemia.274  
 
3. Reminder cards alone were of only limited effect in enhancing the 
effect of audit of GPs use of benzodiazepines.16 Peer review with 
feedback was tested for preventive care guidelines, and durably 
improved compliance among US resident physicians.150 
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4. Opinion leaders were compared to audit and feedback. Opinion leaders 
improved the Caesarean section rate for example, (reduced it) while 
audit and feedback had no effect.246 
 
So, although some single methods were sometimes more effective than others, 
there was no single magic bullet that was 100% effective in all 
circumstances,306 because there were no magic targets.100 
 
Multiple methods compared with single methods 
Multiple methods were generally found more effective than single methods306 
because of the variety of organisational situations and learning styles involved 
in dissemination and implementation. For example, practice guidelines were 
implemented using all of the following methods together:  
1. Educational conferences,  
2. written memoranda,  
3. reminders /cues to physicians from nurses, and  
4. opinion leader endorsement and public support.423 
 
Length of stay for patients with low risk chest pain was reduced and there 
were no adverse incidents in the two weeks following discharge. A further 
study showed that concurrent (written and verbal) reminders and audit 
increased compliance and reduced length of stay for a guideline recommending 
a 2 day length of stay for low risk patients with chest pain.424   
 
IT systems functioned in multiple ways. They were effective as reminders and 
for decision support. Computer assisted decision support was found to improve 
physician compliance with local clinician-derived antibiotic practice guidelines.317 
Antibiotic-associated adverse events decreased by 30%. In another study, 
electronic reminders within electronic medical records of HIV patients 
increased the response times of clinicians, ambulatory visits and 
hospitalisation.352 
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Co-ordination 
Multiple methods of introducing and disseminating guidelines required co-
ordination. This in turn implied a co-ordination role. To co-ordinate, feedback, 
and hence some form of evaluation of the implementation of the guidelines was 
needed. Co-ordinators improved compliance for only the duration of their 
involvement.43;271;385 
 
There was an emerging literature at a more general level than audit and 
guideline implementation on the diffusion, adoption and implementation of 
change to clinical practice. A recent review of a group of related studies in the 
field by Dopson et al100  attempted to aggregate analyses in seven separate 
studies, and drew some lessons. Dopson et al remark that, as noted in chapter 1 
above, the rational models of the innovation process have been challenged, and 
they emphasise the importance of ten common themes across the 7 studies. In 
brief these were: 
1. the strength of  the evidence base was not related to faster 
diffusion into practice, 
2. evidence was interpreted through social context – different 
stakeholders such as professions had different interpretations of 
the same evidence, 
3. Evidence was scarcer for some professions (eg nurses) and more 
widely available for others (eg doctors), 
4. Some forms of evidence (eg randomised controlled trials) were 
accorded greater credence than others by clinicians 
5. Clinicians especially surgeons and physiotherapists placed a high value 
on other sources of evidence – eg knowledge and skills rooted in 
experience, 
6. Professional networks provided a source of mentors and trusted 
colleagues who professionals relied on for guidance in the large areas 
of practice where limited current evidence was available, 
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7. Evidence did not flow easily across professional boundaries, and 
there were few regular multidisciplinary fora for sharing and 
debating recent evidence, 
8. Context, which Dopson et al conceived as resource availability 
affected the success of implementation. It included the quality of 
local relationships within and between organisations, and the 
presence of local opinion leaders,  
9. At least two different types of positive opinion leaders were 
identified,  
a. expert opinion leaders, seen as higher authorities, leaders in 
their field, and important in the early stages of 
implementation, and  
b. peer opinion leaders, with experience of the application of the 
innovation in their own field, perhaps more influential in the 
later stages of implementation,   
10. Interaction and debate about the specific evidence and patients 
needs for each particular innovation, which Dopson et al termed “the 
enactment of knowledge”.  
 
For an implementation exercise in a particular context it would seem essential 
to diagnose supports and barriers to implementation under each of these 
themes, and develop an implementation plan to take account of them. The role 
of opinion leaders was closely examined by Locock et al245, who were also the 
authors of one of the research reports102 examined by Dopson et al.100  They 
found that the definition of an opinion leader remained problematic. In their 
evaluation of the Promoting Action on Clinical Effectiveness (PACE) programme, 
which sought to implement clinically effective practice in 16 local sites, Dopson 
et al found a mutually reinforcing relationship between opinion leaders and 
evidence.102 They defined opinion leaders as those who influenced “the beliefs 
and actions of their colleagues in any direction whether positive or negative.”  
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Ferlie and Shortell122 developed a framework for change based on a comparison 
of common areas between the UK and the USA healthcare systems.  They 
covered a multilevel approach to change, and emphasised the individual, 
“microsystem” or team level and the organisational level for the UK, where 
change was driven mainly at national level by national policy. Ferlie and Shortell 
identified important core properties underlying quality improvement as follows.  
1. Leadership, seen as an ongoing conversation among people who cared 
deeply enough about something of great importance. It was important to 
distinguish between transactional leadership concentrating on single 
loop, or adaptive, learning, and transformational leadership (double loop 
or goal changing learning). Policymakers needed to decide whether new 
rules and assumptions were required to improve health service quality, in 
which case transformational leadership would be needed, as would 
training for it.  
2. Organisational culture needed to be conducive to quality improvement, 
and able to support double loop learning. The separate cultures within 
the NHS needed development to enable the different professional and 
managerial groups to learn together with a patient centred focus.  
3. Development of teamworking skills to work together and share 
knowledge in clinical teams (for example clinical directorates) was an 
obvious corollary of this.  
4. Information technology was another core property of organisations 
underlying quality improvement in four ways –  
a. providing real-time information about the results of patient 
treatment to enable corrective action to be taken quickly,  
b. using the internet to connect patients to their health care team,  
c. providing epidemiological information to facilitate tracking of 
patients over time, and  
d. providing accountability information to external agencies. 
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Ferlie and Shortell concluded by suggesting that clinicians in the UK had begun 
to lose control of the definition of quality in the NHS at strategic level, while 
retaining control at the operational level. Practice within the confines of 
written protocols would potentially contribute to “a serious erosion of the 
traditional autonomy of the medical profession and an increase in the powers of 
government.”. They finally suggested that in the UK the state might, to 
encourage a more bottom-up approach to innovation and acceptance at local 
level, need to develop “a new relationship with the medical profession based on 
examining the evidence and sharing accountability.”122 
 
Wood et al argued in 1998 from a poststructuralist perspective, that the 
distinction between research and practice should not be thought of as absolute, 
and that key academic researchers were important in connecting the two. 
There would always be different perspectives on and interpretations of the 
evidence base.435  Ferlie et al used Pettigrew’s processual perspective on change 
management rather than one of formal rationality in their examination of four 
clinical change issues.123 One of these became a more detailed case study of the 
implementation of evidence about prophylaxis for deep venous thrombo-
embolism in Orthopaedics.124 They concluded that implementing evidence was 
not simply a question of finding and applying the right levers for change. Clinical 
policy was negotiated in a loose way among senior consultants to build 
consensus. There was a range of views about the status of formal science. 
Although some consultants insisted RCTs remained the gold standard, other 
(perhaps more experienced) consultants put forward a different model based 
on “tacit and experiential craft knowledge.” One felt for example that what 
worked for one practitioner in his or her own situation might not work for 
another in theirs. This implied an alternative model of encouraging good 
practice involving “continuing professional development and individual learning 
and reflection rather than the use of formal EBM principles.”124 The 
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development of hybrid researcher-practitioner roles and identifying contexts 
ripe for change rather than change levers were recommended. They left open 
the question of how long it was reasonable to wait for readiness for change. 
 
Both the research on guideline (and audit) implementation and the recent 
research reviewed above on the implementation of strategic change led 
inexorably to the conclusion that, for guideline implementation, not only were 
multiple methods required, but all relevant contextual aspects of the health 
care organisation needed to be included and staff involved. These included 
leadership, information, cultural issues,100 patients’ views about guideline 
content in development stages356 (the usefulness of innovations) and teams’ 
readiness for change. A qualitative examination of these contextual issues and 
how they affected guideline implementation in each hospital was needed, as well 
as the measurement of OL capacity. 
 
Barriers to guideline implementation 
 
Context 
Different barriers applied in different contexts. Involvement of staff 
increased their motivation and helped in identifying barriers to be overcome. 
Team building across professions has received attention as needing to be 
developed to enable planned care and successful implementation of 
guidelines.275 An international group discussing the relationship between clinical 
audit and CME at a conference in 1996 reported that local guidelines were 
developed as a method of agreeing audit criteria. It said individual and team 
learning needed to be supported by a learning organisation because changes to 
clinical practice had “a whole series of knock on effects” which might mean the 
organisation needed to change before the team or individual could do so.22 
 
A psychological framework for changing the behaviour of doctors suggested 
matching the individual obstacles resulting in a doctor not following a clinical 
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practice guideline to a choice of an effective behaviour change strategy.340 
Each barrier was related to a psychological theory to explain why it prevented 
change, and to identify the strategy needed. This clinical approach to an 
organisational problem recommended cultural change when failure to implement 
national recommendations about the use of an equally effective but less 
expensive drug resulted from doctors not appreciating the consequences of 
expensive treatment for the service or colleagues. The more effective cultural 
change was to help doctors perceive the problem from colleagues’ and managers’ 
perspective, the less effective was management edict. This was clearly an OL 
type approach involving the explicit recognition or “surfacing” of tacitly held 
mental models.  
 
The need to tailor clinical behaviour change projects to local needs and cultures 
was the main finding of the Framework for Appropriate Care Throughout 
Sheffield (FACTS) project in Sheffield, England.183 This project applied 
especially to primary care. Here cultural issues also affecting hospitals were 
perhaps more clearly demonstrated because there were fewer organisational 
constraints on clinicians’ behaviour. 
 
The problem with centralised guideline development was that although more 
scientifically valid in terms of theoretical treatment effectiveness, local 
educational benefits were lost. Guideline development, for example by focus 
groups, was a valuable educational process itself.116 Hence the SIGN 
methodology of developing general statements and leaving it to local teams to 
adapt them to local circumstances.255 Even here, it was often possible to involve 
only a sub group of staff in post at the time of implementation of a particular 
guideline. Staff joining later had fewer opportunities to influence 
implementation. A study of the attitudes and behaviour of GPs to guidelines 
found that those who were members of the Royal College were more positive 
about the college guidelines than those GPs who were not.379 This supported the 
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idea that in theory at least, an OL culture of continual learning through 
continual review and audit of guidelines would make guideline implementation 
more permanent by increasing ownership. 
 
Putting audit implementation into a wider framework - tending toward an OL 
approach - was indeed effective in getting hospitals to incorporate guidelines 
into their routine procedures - quality initiatives and use of quality tools were 
shown to link well with audit projects.333 In the contracting environment, it was 
suggested that linking the implementation of change to the business cycle would 
allow optimal allocation of resources.23 The guideline implementation research 
influenced practice and policy. The clinical effectiveness policy was based 
solidly in this trend toward recognising, utilising and enhancing the local 
learning culture. For example, four requirements stated for the acceptance of 
change were: 
1. a knowledge base that was widely agreed on in the organisation,  
2. lessons not requiring changes in role definitions,  
3. recognition that changes in methods and relations could be required 
beyond the immediate audit task, and  
4. a learning culture in the organisation as a whole to support 
participation in audit and facilitate the early adoption of new 
methods.420 
 
The OL perspective was endorsed by the NHS Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination in a review of 44 published systematic reviews of methods and 
approaches for the implementation of evidence-based practice.291 This 
emphasised the importance of choosing appropriate change implementation 
methods for the context. The review recognised learning theory as one 
theoretical model for getting evidence into practice. Audit and feedback were 
mentioned under this heading. Organisational learning was not considered per se 
in the review. The review concluded by endorsing the idea that there were no 
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magic bullets306 (see above) and recommended a diagnostic analysis of the 
situation “to inform the design and content of the 
dissemination/implementation strategy.”. 
 
The LO was included as part of a conceptual framework put forward in 1998 by 
Kitson et al for enabling the implementation of evidence based practice.225 The 
framework consisted of the evidence level, context, and method of facilitation. 
Other dimensions of context were leadership and measurement. These had 
commonalities with accepted OL dimensions. The Kitson framework was static 
rather than dynamic. It had obvious similarities with the context, mechanism 
and outcome framework of realistic evaluation.310 Kitson used four case studies. 
The four cases all had good evidence but either high or low context or 
facilitation. A positive context and good facilitation were found to be important 
factors in achieving improvements to patient care. Facilitation was found to be 
possibly the key element. In the facilitation model used, external facilitators 
trained internal ones. This facilitation role could be seen as a leadership role 
passing on a culture of OL. This reflected real situations – the distinction 
between facilitation and context was perhaps not very pure. The Kitson 
framework was revisited in 2002,351 in the light of further theoretical 
developments by others including Ferlie et al,123 to include a more interpretive 
perspective on the nature of evidence, to include the idea of the learning 
organisation as part of context, to replace the idea of measurement with the 
broader concept of evaluation, and to more tightly define the concept of 
facilitation, while admitting, as previously mentioned, that this concept was still 
not fully distinguished from that of opinion leaders and other change agents.  
 
Specific barriers 
A number of studies found specific difficulties implementing clinical guidelines, 
for example among GPs.242;379. Time for education, information problems, and 
low quality guidelines, and suspicion of the intentions behind guideline 
implementation were the main problems. For example, a sample of 409 hospital 
Chapter 3 Implementation of guidelines 
 131
clinicians in the Oxford region espoused a welcoming attitude toward guidelines. 
But clinicians generally believed their own attitudes were more positive than 
those of their colleagues. In implementing a guideline they were influenced by 
encouragement from their peers and senior clinicians.258 Barriers to 
implementation were firstly, lack of awareness of guidelines, followed by low 
quality of guideline and impracticality of recommendations. Clinicians’ 
perception of barriers was thus mainly focused on dissemination. This was not 
in accord with the research showing dissemination alone was not enough to 
bring about adoption of guidelines. It pointed to a potentially interesting 
difference in espoused theory of action and “theory-in-use” among these 
clinicians. 
 
Comparison of outcomes was too complex for routine use in measuring 
performance. Most difference was accounted for by chance variation.185 
Problems included the uncertain nature of prognosis itself, practical difficulties 
in collecting and quantifying data, and adjusting for risk factors such as 
severity.303 The difficulty of validly and reliably measuring outcomes,75 meant 
that process measures still had advantages, for example in directly indicating 
deficiencies of care that needed to be improved.70  
 
Clinicians well knew that outcome variations had to be treated with caution as 
indicators of the quality of care. For example variation in one month survival 
after acute myocardial infarction in Scotland could be explained by variations in 
referral, admission, diagnosis, definition, and coding.50 Clinical audit showing 
process variation was less subject to these biases. When using outcome 
measurement for performance management, Davies and Lampel commented 
there was also the problem of how to involve all staff, and how to reduce the 
threat to self esteem and potentially to job security it posed for some.74 They 
recommended greater trust in professionalism as a basis for quality 
enhancements. Evidence-backed process measures in guideline-based audit sat 
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well with this, as they allowed some – but not too much – professional flexibility 
in both implementation and interpretation.  
 
The MacLean report, published in 1993255 considered barriers. It identified 
implementation of guidelines as the key issue for their success. MacLean 
identified factors hindering acceptance as including culture, which was defined 
as: 
“the belief system of a group”, incorporating “attitudes, role perceptions 
and ethical framework … and reflected in the language, images and 
concepts used…”. “The current medical culture in Scotland was judged 
now to be ready to accept the guideline approach.”255  
 
Other factors hindering acceptance included lack of resources, especially time 
to develop local protocols, to train for their implementation and to evaluate and 
monitor them. Lack of evidence was another hindrance “It has been estimated 
that only 15% of medical practice can be justified on the basis of sound 
research.”.255 Where experience rather than evidence backed a 
recommendation MacLean said this should be clearly stated. Inadequate 
dissemination was a problem too, with 50% of practitioners unaware of the 
existence of a relevant well researched guideline in one study. 
 
The problem of clinical freedom as a barrier to guideline implementation was 
addressed, because:  
“It cannot be assumed that because a guideline has been shown to be 
highly effective and efficient it will be acceptable to all relevant health 
care professionals.” 255 
 
MacLean said that clinical freedom carried an obligation to take account of 
evidence-based guidelines. At the same time guidelines had to give scope to do 
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what was best for the individual patient, and had to be used with discretion in 
each individual case. 
 
Guidelines, managerial control of resources and better accountability for 
clinical quality meant clinical freedom had to be defined. MacLean defined 
clinical freedom as, not clinical carte-blanche, but: 
“the obligation to do what was best for the patient” ...“In any guideline 
the balance between clinical freedom to do what was best for the 
individual patient and the need to ensure optimal care more generally 
should be considered and the scope for variation indicated.” 255 
 
MacLean identified factors promoting acceptance of guidelines, including 
credibility, education and feedback of information as an integral part of clinical 
management.  
 
As with clinical audit, unforeseen hidden costs of implementing guidelines 
appeared. There was a danger that the replacement of some professional 
discretion by explicit thresholds for treatment could lead to an overall increase 
in the volume of treatment through individual doctors adopting a ‘safety first’ 
policy to prevent litigation.176 An OL culture aimed to generate the trust 
required to combat this. So some clinicians continued to doubt of the utility of 
clinical guidelines.184  
 
In spite of the implementation and audit of guidelines, clinical errors recurred. 
Doctors were under great pressure to reduce waiting lists without 
compromising quality. At Bristol, senior surgeons were eventually found guilty 
of bad practice in 1991-95 leading to the deaths of 30-35 more children with 
heart problems than predicted by average levels.220  
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In Scotland the strain was demonstrated at Stracathro Hospital where a senior 
consultant who was also medical director did not follow guidelines he had 
himself developed with colleagues for breast surgery. He was being pressed by 
GPs and patients for treatment. He did not carry out prior X-rays or tests. The 
acting medical director brought in from Grampian Health Board was reported as 
saying that: 
“There was still a belief with some clinicians that guidelines reflect 
something which was almost purist or esoteric and not for the average 
doctor.”347 
 
Other examples came from the Victoria Infirmary in Glasgow. These included 
patient abuse2 and deaths of young people, for example from blood poisoning.237 
Hospital staff did not seem to be able to learn at the requisite organisational 
level to prevent repetition of similar errors. Improving the quality of care 
delivery became a political aim in its own right as successive clinical errors were 
recounted in the press.  
 
To summarise, improving care and preventing error became focused on 
improving the implementation of guidelines. Making staff aware of guidelines 
was important, but blindly following protocols could be ineffective, for example 
reducing staff motivation through boredom. It could prevent criticism and local 
development. Focus group research with British hospital health professionals 
confirmed that successful guideline implementation depended on achieving the 
right balance between standardising practice and allowing professionals to use 
clinical judgement.238 Just as the need to adapt guidelines to the local context 
meant redefining some goals, the need to interpret them for the individual 
patient could also mean redefinition.255 
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3.2 Recent developments 
3.2.1 Clinical governance 
Central initiatives and legislation 
The political concept of ‘governance’ introduced a new legal power for health 
service managers in addition to their resource power.  With clinical governance, 
the core idea was to make health professionals accountable for clinical quality 
through the chief executive of their organisation rather than solely their 
professional bodies.84 Chief executives retained their responsibility for 
efficient resource use, and gained a new legal responsibility for the quality of 
care. With this underpinning the chief executive now had a duty to ensure all 
staff performed adequately. A positive and open culture was accepted as the 
distinguishing feature of the best health organisations, but there was 
uncertainty about how to define a good culture and how to promote it.354 The 
implementation of guidelines remained patchy and impermanent, and needed 
improvement.  
 
Because of the early inception of SIGN, clinical guidelines were especially 
central to the clinical effectiveness initiative in the Scottish health service.401 
This charged Health Boards to consult with trusts in creating Health 
Improvement Programmes. These programmes had to set out: 
“a rolling programme for the implementation of evidence-based clinical 
guidelines and clinically effective practice, to be monitored through 
clinical audit;” 
 
Divergences between the Scottish and English legislation became apparent. In 
the Scottish White Paper of 1998, “Designed to Care”401 there was no explicit 
statement that all hospital doctors must be involved in audit. There was such a 
statement in the English “A First Class Service”.85 In Scotland guidance on 
clinical governance was given in a Management Executive Letter (MEL) 
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(1998)75363 and further guidance in MEL (2000)29.365 The Scottish approach 
was distinguished from the English by the different bodies developing and 
monitoring national guidelines and standards. There was a difference in 
language. The Scottish MEL insisted that Clinical Governance (CG) committees 
in Trusts were responsible for overseeing rather than delivering clinical 
governance. They were to “assure the board” that appropriate and effective 
structures were in place for the trust to support CG. In “A First Class Service” 
a senior clinician was to be identified to “ensure systems for CG” were in place.  
 
To sum up, the early setting up of a CG support network and web site showed a 
more supportive style in Scottish than English guidance. Further evidence of 
support from the central NHS administration in Scotland was the inclusion in 
the later MEL of a checklist for trusts’ use in monitoring and reporting on 
clinical governance. A sample of a clinical effectiveness strategy from South 
Glasgow NHS trust was included with the MEL.  Clinical effectiveness (CE) and 
CG further integrated clinical and managerial efforts to improve the efficacy 
of health care.  They widened the debate to the whole organisation. 
 
Clinical governance implementation 
The adequacy of the consultant led medical or surgical firm to meet the 
requirements and especially the risks of modern multidisciplinary health care 
was questioned in the mid 1990s.15;286 Consultants were thought to have too 
much responsibility, and doctors in training too much routine work. Role 
conflicts caused personal stress.260 A rethink of the consultant’s role was seen 
as fundamental to developing new organisational models better suited to 
training, including evaluation of clinical evidence and team working.286 Clinical 
directorates were still evolving after their introduction in 1990 as part of trust 
applications. The clinical director’s role was central to CG. It was particularly 
stressful, but more like a stool-pigeon (or decoy) than a scapegoat:   
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“Professionals want a colleague who would defend them against hostile 
purchasers and managers by operating as a buffer between them. 
Executives and managers want clinicians who will lead and influence their 
colleagues to go in the right direction for the Trust and be accountable 
for the delivery of contracts and external directives over which they 
may have little control.” 405 
 
However directorate development was only the first stage. Clinical directors 
had to encourage a culture where managers and clinicians learned together: 
“doctors need to develop effective management and policy boards to add value 
to corporate decision-making processes.” 405 This was a task for which they 
were not often actively prepared. As for the implementation of guidelines, the 
role of culture became central for CG. The BMJ reported government guidance 
recommending an open culture for successful clinical governance. This culture 
sounded very like a learning organisation:  
“education, research, and sharing of good practice are valued and 
expected; a commitment to quality that was shared by staff and 
managers; a tradition of active working with patients, users, carers, and 
the public; an ethos of multidisciplinary team working at all levels; and 
regular board level discussion of all major quality issues.”24 
Clinical Governance and Guidelines 
Up to the mid to late nineties, the prevailing medical culture of professional 
loyalty76 and also lack of time, meant doctors would not (perhaps could not) 
publicly criticise each other. Because of this, they found it difficult to take 
responsibility for learning in their organisations, including the organisation-wide 
implementation of best practice from research. After the paediatric heart 
patients died in Bristol, the emphasis in clinical quality improvement moved to 
the prevention and detection of error, which became publicly discussable. 
Other cases of medical error showed Bristol was not an isolated incident. For 
example, the report by Jean Ritchie QC, on the case of Rodney Ledward, a 
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gynaecologist who damaged hundreds of women with badly carried out surgery, 
and styled himself ‘the fastest gynaecologist in the South East’ concluded:  
“Failures in senior NHS management, a culture where consultants were 
seen as gods and where there were powerful inhibitions against ‘telling 
tales’ were among the factors which led to serious failures in this 
doctor’s practice not being identified at an earlier stage.”138 
 
For much managerial activity speed was more important than accuracy for a 
variety of reasons.421 For example:  
“speed often reduces the necessity for accuracy in the sense that quick 
responses shape events before they have become crystallised into a 
single meaning.”421 
 
In health care, by contrast, accuracy was often more important than speed. A 
managerial culture of speedy sensemaking did not make up for clinical errors, 
and may have increased them if it influenced some clinicians to value speed too 
much. In OL terms, the most radical feature of clinical governance was its 
insistence that accuracy (quality) was as much a management concern as speed 
(efficiency). Guidelines too, emphasised accuracy. They provided grounds for 
professionals to query the accuracy of their colleagues’ practice. Because of 
limited resources speed had some clinical value since patients died, suffered, 
and deteriorated on waiting lists. 
 
Before Bristol, nurses had been unable to criticise medical practice effectively 
because their evidence base was seen as less valid from the medical 
perspective of natural science. Indeed, an English attempt to produce mainly 
nursing led guidelines foundered because of this.218 That hospital trusts were 
expected to compete with each other in the era of purchaser-provider 
contracting only encouraged trust managers to collude tacitly with the 
suppression of critical debate. A culture of blame and fear where staff were 
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afraid to speak out against bad practice grew in the era of artificially 
competitive contracting.358 Dr Don Berwick mentioned the blame culture as 
preventing communication in a television series later in 2000.34 He 
recommended treating medicine in the same way as other high risk industries, 
and looking for areas where communication might break down.  
 
Explicit care guidelines were likely to support this systematic approach. But, 
with the ending of the purchaser–provider split in 1997, contracting and 
competition, a lever to give incentive for change (however misplaced) had gone. 
Other incentives to motivate staff and drive improvement were needed. The 
defensive culture of blame and fear had to go. Replacing it with an OL culture 
was suggested,76;77;144 but how this could be done was not addressed. Some saw 
the blame culture as associated with a culture that rewarded ‘doing brilliantly’ 
where the shapers or champions of new initiatives received most help, while the 
laggards who most required support and encouragement were ignored. They 
were not to be blamed for their slow response to clinical effectiveness 
initiative.127  
 
The Bristol case, taken to the General Medical Council in 1997, exemplified the 
difficulty for health professionals in being heard when speaking out. An 
anaesthetist, Dr Steve Bolsin, raised the alarm on the results of a clinical audit 
he carried out.350 Despite his eventual vindication, Dr. Bolsin was forced to seek 
work in Australia, after threats and discrimination from professional 
colleagues.350 The Bristol Inquiry, reporting in July 2001, emphasised failures 
of the systems and culture in Bristol Royal Infirmary. It saw the failures as 
owing as much to general failings in the NHS as to individual health 
professionals.  The report implied a culture of OL was the main factor in 
preventing error when it said:  
“Learning from error, rather than seeking someone to blame, must be 
the priority in order to improve safety and quality” 220 
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The report highlighted lack of communication, lack of effective working 
together, lack of (clinical) leadership and lack of teamwork. These were all well 
accepted dimensions of OL. The report commented on the changing NHS 
between 1984 and 1995, a time when: 
“there was no agreed means of assessing the quality of care. There were 
no standards for evaluating performance. There was confusion 
throughout the NHS as to who was responsible for monitoring the 
quality of care.”  
 
The report’s reference to the “’club culture’, an imbalance of power with too 
much control in the hands of a few individuals” was a perfect description of a 
non-learning organisation. The priorities were exactly those of Argyris’ model 1 
“theory-in-use”, aiming to put the club in unilateral control, discourage enquiry, 
and save face. 
 
The key recommendations, too, had great parallels with Argyris’s model 2 
“theory-in-use” – for example sharing control and creating valid information. 
The complete list follows.  
1. to make a child-centred environment for the care of sick children,  
2. to improve safety by promoting openness, and preparedness to 
acknowledge error, to learn lessons, to be candid with patients, 
3. to abolish clinical negligence litigation as it created a barrier to 
openness,83 
4. to make consultant appraisal part of their contracts, 
5. to treat consultants the same as other employees, with similar terms 
of employment, and lines of accountability, 
6. to create agreed and published standards of care for health 
professionals, and hospital standards for hospitals as a whole, 
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7. to be open about clinical performance, with information on hospital, 
service or consultant unit performance available to patients, and 
8. to put in place effective hospital systems to monitor clinical 
performance, and to have an external performance monitoring system. 
 
Especially telling for guideline implementation was the statement:  
“Bristol was awash with data. There was enough information from the 
late 1980s onwards to cause questions about mortality rates to be raised 
both in Bristol and elsewhere had the mindset to do so existed.”  
 
OL clearly had a role in both creating information from the data and 
engendering the motivation to act on it. Recent research identified guidelines 
and protocols as now the main method for changing clinical practice, but they 
were ineffective in about half of trusts. Only performance feedback was 
significantly worse - 74% said it was ineffective.414 If possible therefore, the 
implementation of guidelines needed improvement. 
 
SIGN Guidelines were seen in Scotland as the main route for setting up 
procedures to deliver clinical governance.321 Coverage of the Bristol enquiry in 
the Scottish press was influential in Scotland. For example, following the 
difficulties in guideline implementation at Stracathro hospital, a proposal from 
the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh suggested sending teams of 
troubleshooting doctors to hospitals ‘as soon as suspicions are raised about 
poorly performing staff.’408 There was a growing awareness that the problems 
were with teams and organisations as much as individuals. Quoted in the same 
article, the late Professor Jim Petrie, the President of the Royal College of 
Physicians of Edinburgh and chairman of SIGN said: 
“After Bristol, and the suspension of several colleagues, there was a 
demand to put in place systems which will reassure the public about 
monitoring and maintaining standards by the professions. Such systems 
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should also have the potential to detect organisational, team or 
individual problems at an early stage and avoid sanctions or suspensions 
which undermine public confidence and threaten clinicians and their 
teams.”408 
 
3.3 In conclusion 
Professor Petrie’s statement made a good starting point to draw together the 
threads of this review. It showed how far clinicians had moved since the late 
80’s when many resisted the introduction of clinical audit. They were now 
starting to take  responsibility for implementing error prevention systems.  
Clinical effectiveness attempted to provide a framework to get the best value 
for money, and clinical governance gave the legal sanctions needed to ensure 
this. Culture had recently been much mentioned as the key factor in improving 
performance and healthcare quality, but there was only limited evidence in 
support of this.359 The consequent need for research on the relationship of 
specific aspects of culture (especially learning) to specific aspects of 
performance continued to be increasingly recognised.73  
 
In relation to my three themes about the hospital OL context (see chapter 2) 
the Rycroft-Malone development of the Kitson framework (see this chapter 
above) explicitly included:  
• communication, this was interpersonal sharing of information and points 
of view, and factors affecting the benefit of the organisation from this,  
and secondly 
• information systems and procedures. This was methods of dissemination, 
and audit data collection, analysis and interpretation. It included 
dissemination and feedback of audit results and how they were used.  
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These were both part of the Rycroft–Malone framework’s context sub-element 
and part of the evaluation sub-element. The third of my themes was innovation,  
Rycroft–Malone included at least an indirect reference to this in the idea of 
transformational leadership (part of the leadership sub-element).  
 
Two of my chosen contextual themes related to strategic understandings of 
change (see chapter 1) were directly reflected in the sub-elements of the 
Rycroft–Malone framework. Firstly,  
• audit and implementation structures was a very similar idea to the 
framework sub-element of evaluation. Secondly,  
• leadership was included in the framework per se.  
 
The last strategic change theme, institutional context, was not reflected in 
Rycroft-Malone et al’s framework. This was probably related to the absence, as 
mentioned above, of a view of the external context for the organisation. 
Without such a context and the related theory of institutionalisation it is hard 
to explain why hospitals in general are so similar on their internal contextual 
dimensions. 
 
The Rycroft Malone framework provided a rationale linking OL score and 
context, high OL score was likely to be associated with ‘high’ context. 
 
Clinical governance did not address the creation of an open culture as a pre-
condition for successful error reporting systems without which even single loop 
learning could not take place or be evaluated. In the business world, 
Organisational Learning (OL) helped organisations deal with such increasing 
turbulence, complexity and competition. Guidelines were one approach to coping 
with increasing complexity and resource pressure in the health service. Besides 
error prevention, there was a need to develop innovative ways of delivering 
services and ways of deciding which of competing effective treatments gave 
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best value for money to the local population in any given health area. OL 
concepts had a potential role in creating and structuring the dialogue needed. 
The process of guideline implementation was an opportunity for these debates.  
 
In order to show whether such a dialogue could support guideline 
implementation in tandem with innovation, it was necessary to show whether and 
how guidelines could function in double-loop OL processes in hospitals. Could 
guidelines support groups of health service professionals in developing the 
focus to do double loop learning?  
 
No previous work related measurement of OL capacity to staff views on 
guideline implementation, although there had been calls to change to a more 
open and questioning hospital culture.253 This knowledge was needed in order to 
show whether the development of their OL capacity could have practical 
benefits for NHS hospitals.  
“There is precious little empirical work specific to the NHS to inform 
strategic and managerial action in these areas, and this lack should be 
attended to urgently if the Government’s ambitions for the NHS are to 
become reality rather than rhetoric.”298 
 
The hypothesis suggested that interviewees from the hospital or group 
reporting lower OL capacity would emphasise the referencing process, and 
those from the one reporting higher OL capacity would mention the information 
creation functions as well, since learning was both information creation and use. 
In the NHS, formalised routine and service delivery on the one hand and 
innovative ability and learning on the other, were equally necessary for high 
quality care. Patients were not standardised, so NHS work could not be entirely 
routinised. Curiosity was needed to motivate investigation of individual cases.  
 
Because all service delivery staff needed to do adaptive learning in any case, to 
conform to existing goals, the test of the hypothesis in practice was whether 
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those mentioning implementation activities with at least the potential to be goal 
changing achieved higher learning capacity scores than those not. 
 
The information set out in this review points firmly to the idea that guideline 
implementation activities may exist along an OL capacity continuum with purely 
single loop activities existing in an entirely model 1 organisation with model 1 
“theory-in-use” at one end, and purely double-loop in an entirely model 2 
organisation with model 2 “theory-in-use” at the other. The question was at 
what point along this implementation continuum was guideline implementation 
most effective. 
 
3.4 Specification of rival theories about guideline implementation 
 
The rival theories were about the connection between two guideline 
implementation patterns and the two forms of OL (see box 2.2, chapter 2, 
section 2.1).  Theory 1 was that joint (single and double loop) learning modes of 
guideline implementation were associated with similar levels of OL capacity to 
using either one alone. 
 
Theory 2 said that joint (single and double loop) learning modes of guideline 
implementation (Box B fig 3.1) were associated with higher levels of OL 
capacity to using either one alone (Boxes A or C fig 3.1). 
 
Fig 3.1 Possible organisational learning mixes and modes of guideline 
implementation in real organisations   
 
A 
Only single 
loop learning 
B 
Both single 
and double
C 
Only double 
loop learning
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Interview data was coded as single or double loop guideline implementation 
using the following pre-specified features: 
 
Features of single loop guideline implementation: 
1. Guidelines were seen only as a system for reference to formal rules,  
2. Type 1 learning only was appropriate in some groups,  
3. There was a finite learning process for individuals and organisation. 
This resulted in behavioural modification by simple conditioning not 
encouraging creative responses or understanding or curiosity.  
4. Health professionals were encouraged to give a uniform treatment 
process. There was little room for discretion, little patient choice. 
5. Service delivery and learning was team based in name only 
6. Educational inputs were delivered often only by lecture, for example 
continuing medical education (CME). 
7. Clinical and management learning were seen as separate  
 
Features of double loop guideline implementation: 
 
1. Guidelines were seen as an information system informing judgement 
and providing data used in fuelling further learning, (valid answers to 
valid answerable questions created new information to justify changed 
actions)  
2. Type 2 learning was recognised as possible in all groups,  
3. A continuous developing learning process was recognised for 
individuals and the organisation. This resulted in understanding of 
reasons for action and the links between process and health outcome. 
This in turn was intended to stimulate curiosity, and hence innovation to 
process. 
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4. Health professionals were empowered to use their judgement, and to 
know the boundaries for judgement. This encouraged diverse processes 
and allowed patients a choice. 
5. Service delivery and learning was team based with real dialogue 
6. Educational inputs were delivered usually as an integral part of the 
work situation involving reflection on current practice, for example 
continuing professional development (CPD).41 
7. Clinical and management learning were seen as part of a whole system 
of service delivery, service improvement and organisational learning. 
 
These theories were tested against the data. Type 1 (single loop) 
implementation was ‘adaptive’, ensuring compliance. It was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for type 2 organisational learning. Type 2 (double loop) 
implementation was ‘generative’ in the sense that it allowed the possibility of 
new goals.  
 
The rival theories in practice came down to whether double loop learning was 
supported, because single loop learning always existed to some extent, as a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for double loop learning.  
 
3.5 The research question 
The broad research question was whether the two theoretical activity and 
belief patterns surrounding guideline implementation A or C – (in practice this 
meant A) or B (see Fig 3.1 above) actually existed, and if so, were differently 
associated with a culture of organisational learning. Since OL capacity was the 
measure used to assess the degree of double loop learning capacity, the null 
hypothesis was:  
“There are no differences in the SIGN guideline implementation process 
between acute hospitals of different OL capacity.”  
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Conversely, the hypothesis was:  
“SIGN guideline implementation would have more of the features of 
generative guideline implementation in the hospital with the highest OL 
capacity.” 
 
The analysis by hospital was the focus of the study. The hospitals were the 
cases studied, professions were taken as nested cases within hospitals. 
 
The research questions were divided into preliminary and main or hypothesis 
testing questions because some preliminary selection processes needed to be 
carried out to find hospitals and guidelines that were likely to be associated 
with different OL capacity. The questions were as follows: 
 
Question 1 (Preliminary) - OL Capacity  
1a  - Was the OL capacity scale valid in the acute NHS hospital 
environment?  
1b - Were the OL capacity scores of the hospitals significantly 
different as theoretically predicted?  
 
Question 2 (Preliminary) - Guideline adoption  
Was it possible to identify different guideline adoption patterns 
(reflected in dissemination, implementation and audit activities and 
beliefs) as theoretically predicted? 
 
Question 3 (Main hypothesis testing) - Types of guideline adoption 
and OL 
3a – Did the hospital of higher OL capacity have significantly more 
emphasis on generative guideline implementation patterns than the lower 
OL capacity hospital?  
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3b - Were potentially goal changing (generative) guideline 
implementation/dissemination methods and beliefs connected to 
significantly higher OL capacity from adaptive beliefs encouraging 
compliance? 
 
Question 4 (Hypothesis testing) - Substantive activities and beliefs 
involved in guideline adoption and OL 
Were the main specific guideline implementation activities and beliefs 
connected to significantly different levels of OL capacity from others? 
 
Context 
A final analysis described key aspects of context (from interview material) 
within each hospital, under a small number of general headings. The headings 
used to organise the contextual material came from the theoretical background 
on OL and the strategic management theory. For OL, they were the three 
approaches to OL distinguished in chapter 2:  
 
• communication,  
• information systems and procedures, and 
• innovation  
 
For strategy, the three organising themes were: 
 
• leadership 
• clinical audit/guideline implementation  infrastructure  
• institutional context and the pressures for uniformity 
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A separate results chapter (7) examines the first five of these themes for 
each hospital. The last theme is used as a theoretical perspective linking the 
discussion to the literature review. 
 
The analysis by hospital was the focus of the study because organisational 
learning was about organisations per se, not professions or guidelines. The 
professions were analysed to find out only if who implemented a guideline and 
had a particular and different role affecting implementation in each hospital. 
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Section 2 – Methods 
 
Contents of section 2  
This section contains two chapters. Chapter numbering follows on from the 
preceding section.  
 
Chapter 4 – Chronological account of method  
 
Chapter 5 – Pilot study 
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Chapter 4 - Methods 
4.1 Research Strategy and Design 
Using the classification of research strategies proposed by Robson344 the 
research strategy was case study of two hospitals, and two cases nested within 
these, which were doctors and nurses. This section gives the rationale for their 
selection and describes the actual process. The samples within the cases are 
referred to as the study samples. There were two sets of data: 
 
1. validated scales measured aspects of organisational learning (OL) culture, and  
 
2. structured interviews investigated the guideline implementation process and 
results.  
 
4.1.1 Overview and rationale for research strategy 
The research design was case comparison. OL capacity scores and guideline 
implementation were compared between two acute hospitals and two clinical 
professions in each hospital, to see whether the types of guideline 
implementation differed between higher and lower OL capacity hospitals, and 
between professional groups within them. For the purposes of this quantitative 
side of the analysis, approaches to guideline implementation were 
chronologically the dependent variable, as guidelines were introduced into a 
pre-existing hospital culture with a particular OL capacity. However, this was 
not an experimental study, only the existence of an association, (and not proof 
of causality) was being tested, so the experimental concepts of the dependent 
and independent variables did not apply. 
 
In addition, selected contextual issues were compared between hospitals to 
explore context-mechanism-outcome relationships in order to capitalise on the 
diversity between the hospitals resulting from the case selection method. This 
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analysis was potentially able to give logical pointers to possible causal 
relationships.  
 
Research stages 
The following steps were needed to test the four hypotheses stated at the end 
of section 1: 
 
1. Identify contrasting pairs of high and low OL capacity hospitals and  
professions (study samples). 
a. Develop method for selection of study samples, 
b. Select and validate OL measurement scale for NHS acute 
hospitals, 
c. Compare study groups using OL capacity scores to confirm 
whether initial selection was valid. 
2. Describe guideline adoption methods, and perceived effectiveness. 
a. Develop and carry out interviews, 
b. Code interviews about guideline adoption to identify guideline 
adoption patterns. 
3. Compare the guideline adoption patterns. 
a. Compare the guideline adoption patterns between study samples, 
b. Compare OL scores for type 1 and type 2 guideline adoption, 
c. Compare OL scores for the main substantive activities and 
beliefs about  guideline adoption. 
 
A timeline diagram follows (fig 4.1 next page).
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Specified research 
Chose gls and 
Literature search
Found/copied articles 
Catalogued/filed articles 
Chose pilot scales
Interview designed
Pilot 
Decided Hospital 
Hospital Data 
Selected/accessed 
Sampling in hospitals  
Data collection Hospital 1 
First partic. Requests, H1 
Second partic requests, 
Interviewing Hospital 1 
Survey collection Hospital 
Data collection Hospital 2 
First partic requests H2 
Second partic requests 
Reminders Hospital 2  
Interviewing Hospital 2 
Survey collection Hospital 
Writing methodology 
Analysis of survey data 
Writing up of survey rslts 
Typing up all interviews 
Coding/analysing 
Drafting interview results 
Combined analysis 
Write combined analysis 
Redrafting methodology 
Writing literature review 
Writing discussion
Fig 4.1 timeline of project 
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Case study  
The type of case study to be used needed further definition. Yin,438;439 
reviewed the field and provided a useful classification. He identified three 
types of case study: 
 
1. Exploratory - establishing the unit of analysis, finding out what features to 
compare cases on - building theory. 
 
2. Causal 
1. Factor theories – hypothetical causes were used in case selection to see 
if cases with the hypothesised factors met criteria for effects. There 
was no theory of how the factor caused the effect. 
2. Explanatory theories- rival theories of how or why the phenomenon 
happened were tested against cases. Patterns of support or refutation 
for each theory resulted. Yin gave an example of three rival theories 
about how research findings got into practice, (1) knowledge driven, (2) 
problem solving, (3) social interaction. Of nine cases of exemplary 
research on the same topic, the six with good utilisation “were all found 
to have key ingredients of the social interaction theory.”439  
 
3. Descriptive - asked what the phenomenon should be like and developed a 
descriptive theory to test whether it was so in practice. Descriptions focused 
on describing critical differences between cases for use in multiple case 
studies. 
 
For Yin any of these types of case study research could be based on single or 
multiple cases. Yin’s pithy definition of case study showed the difference 
between it and other research strategies (surveys and experiments) was more 
than collecting data about the setting and using triangulation. He defined case 
study as: “An empirical inquiry in which the number of variables exceeds the 
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number of data points.”439 For Robson, following Yin’s approach, a unique feature 
of case study was its attention to the context in which the subject of the 
research was set: 
“a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation 
of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple sources of evidence.”344 
 
Case study was appropriate where boundaries between the researched 
phenomenon and its context were blurred (as so often in organisations). Case 
study used different methods of analysis from the experiment or the survey, 
and justified them in different ways. For example, patterns based on complex 
rival theories were developed and tested using rich and extensive data 
collection. Triangulation was an important concept for the cross-validation of 
data collected. Triangulation, aimed to ensure, through the constant use of as 
great a variety of different kinds of data as possible, that the research 
reflected the full range of interests, ideologies, interpretations and 
achievements in each case.380 Like any organisational research, qualitative 
research of organisational behaviour in hospitals needed to deal with the 
different perspectives held by different groups of respondents. Smith and 
Cantley (1985) discussed triangulation in relation to this issue, which also 
occurred in evaluation research:   
“Denzin81  has argued that any study dependent upon a single data source 
is "method bound". The point of particular relevance to evaluation 
research is that each data source is interest bound (as tied to the 
perspective of one group rather than that of another).380 
 
To help to test any connection between guideline implementation and OL 
capacity explanatory case study was used: patterns of guideline adoption 
beliefs and activities logically or statistically related to either or both single 
and double loop organisational learning were compared between study samples. 
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The case study comparison approach used two distinct methods. One (chapter 
7) was a humanistic one still seeking validity, but which as Donald Campbell 
recommended in the Foreword to the third edition of Yin’s book, “although 
making no use of quantification or tests of significance […] still work[s] on the 
same questions and share[s] the same goal of knowledge.”438 This humanistic 
analysis aimed to analyse hospital context to develop hypotheses of possible 
relevance in explaining differences reported in the later results chapters. 
The second approach was more quantitative, following Yin in reducing the 
qualitative data to thematic categories which were compared quantitatively 
across the two cases. The results of this approach are given in chapters 8, 9 
and 10.  
 
Reasons for using a case study strategy 
Different methods of guideline implementation both individually and in 
combination had been researched, sometimes by randomised controlled trials, 
more often using weaker designs. These typically assessed compliance with the 
guideline recommendations retrospectively through case note review. Problems 
included incomplete record keeping in the clinical case notes from which the 
data were gathered, and the Hawthorne effect, where the participants’ 
knowledge that they were being researched changed their behaviour.267 There 
was no research on the effectiveness of the guidelines in changing 
organisational behaviour. The research question asked whether better guideline 
implementation was associated with a culture of organisational learning. A case 
study strategy was appropriate to address this in hospitals because:  
1. Each hospital was a different setting for guideline implementation, 
2. Case study was capable of identifying implementation patterns  
3. Case study allowed multiple sources of evidence 
 
The case study strategy allowed a theoretical framework to emerge partly 
from the data (primarily the pilot), rather than being fully pre-specified. This 
Chapter 4 Methods 
 
 158
gave more valid information about a complex topic than a precise but narrow 
pre-specified theory. The multiple sources of evidence helped to illuminate the 
multiple facets of guideline implementation and organisational learning in 
hospitals. To use an analogy, light shone on the topic from many directions, 
giving better illumination than a single light source.  
 
The analysis framework for the interview data applied the distinction laid out 
at the end of Chapter 3 between two types of guideline implementation to the 
different stages of guideline adoption as a basis for two rival theories (see 
Chapter 3). Theory 2 was more likely than theory 1 to motivate people at work, 
because all participated in both learning behaviours, and learning was 
motivating.97 The rival theories in practice came down to whether double loop 
learning was supported, and to what degree.  
 
The rival theories connected cause and effect through logic rather than by 
statistical association. This distinction was explained by Pawson and Tilley in 
their discussion of generative and successionist causality.310 Generative showed 
a logical connection (the smoking gun), an explanation of the causal mechanism, 
which did not use (or need) statistical proof. Instead it linked context, process 
(or mechanism) and outcome.310. Successionist causality showed a statistical 
connection between cause and effect with no explanation of how. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
The data were gathered by survey and interview direct from doctors and 
nurses in two acute hospitals. Surveys and interviews were separate phases of 
data collection. 
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4.2.1 OL capacity surveys  
Following piloting, the OL survey151 (see appendix 1.1) was selected to measure 
OL capacity. This instrument included job satisfaction scale and a scale 
measuring the degree of formalisation of the hospital. The OL scale provided 
an index to identify high and low OL capacity groups for comparison. The scale 
measured five dimensions of organisational learning within each hospital and 
profession: 
 
1. Clarity of purpose / mission  
2. Leadership  
3. Experimentation  
4. Transfer of knowledge  
5. Teamwork and group problem solving  
 
The OL capacity survey measured generative learning capacity. There was no 
example of a single loop learning item in the scale such as: “We are given clear 
instructions about what to do.” In lower learning capacity groups fewer 
elements of double loop learning in guideline implementation were expected. 
The formalisation scale was separate from the OL capacity scale, though 
included with it on the research instrument. It had elements of theory 1 
learning, including item 23: “Most of our work must adhere to formal rules and 
procedures”. Another separate instrument, the hospital culture scale 229 
measured the strength of a culture of collaboration as a validating measure for 
the OL scale (see appendix 1.2).  
 
4.2.2 Interviews about SIGN guideline implementation activities 
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed and piloted (see appendix 
1.4). This asked about methods of dissemination, implementation and audit of 
the guidelines. The relationship to the OL scale scores was investigated to 
illuminate the implementation of the clinical guidelines in high and low learning 
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capacity groups. The qualitative data from the interviews was coded and 
analysed from two perspectives:  
 
1. Deductive - coding used prior theory about learning in organisations and 
guideline implementation.  
 
2. Inductive - coding used thematic categories built from the data.  
 
The interviews focused on the implementation of SIGN guideline 2, prophylaxis 
for Deep Venous Thromboembolism (DVT), and SIGN guidelines 4, 9,11, 12, and 
19 on Diabetes.  
 
4.2.3 Selection of Hospitals included in the study  
Aim 
The aim was to select acute hospitals of different OL capacity for comparative 
case study. Two were compared to give the required numbers to reveal the main 
patterns of guideline implementation and compare OL scores statistically. To 
cover more hospitals would have meant fewer surveys and interviews in each.  
 
Rationale for hospital selection method 
Routine data indicators showed only type 1 attainment of pre-established goals, 
for example reduction in waiting lists, reduction in unit costs, procedures 
carried out, size and complexity of the organisation. Routine data collection 
about type 2 OL was almost a contradiction in terms. This was implied by the 
Argyris’s richer description of the distinction between single and double loop 
learning:  
“One might say that one of the features of organisations as a social 
technology is to decompose double-loop issues into single-loop issues 
because they are then more easily programmable and manageable. Single 
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loop learning is appropriate for the routine repetitive issue – it helps get 
the everyday job done. Double loop learning is more relevant for the 
complex non-programmable issues – it assures that there will be another 
day in the future of the organisation.”6 
 
‘Programmable’ meant a codifiable procedure that could become a routine. 
There were no direct indicators of active re-evaluation and changed goals 
(double loop learning) in routine statistics, because they were difficult to 
codify. Possible reasons for this were firstly, it would be differently 
interpreted in each organisation, and secondly the examples found would vary 
widely in scope and would not be easily comparable. This dimension of the 
organisational learning process was accessible only through data collected in 
discussion or interview. Routine statistics measured performance and activity 
using pre-specified data fields. The data collected could arrive in those fields 
for a variety of reasons – including accident, clever manipulation, and genuine 
attempts to follow guidance. In only a small minority would changes in pre-
specified data reflect autonomous local learning. As there were no direct 
indicators of type 2 OL, cases were contrasted on their complexity. The logic 
was that more complex organisations would need to develop more type 2 
learning capacity than less complex ones. This method was only a best guess at 
selecting contrasting cases, and not of high validity. Routine data was used to 
indicate high and low complexity.  
 
Complexity as a dimension relevant to OL indicators in hospitals 
Introduction 
The more complex an organisation the greater was its potential to make 
mistakes, its need to correct them, and to react to and act on its environment. 
The degree of complexity was the amount of heterogeneity between the 
composite parts, rather than simply the number of parts. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defined complexity as:  
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“1. Comprehending various parts connected together, composite; 
compound. 2. esp. consisting of parts involved in various degrees of 
subordination; involved, intricate.”244.  
 
Three types of complexity were distinguished, based on a systems approach 
modelling hospitals as clinical process, resource use, and monitoring and control 
structures which joined the two together to deliver.59 The three part clinical, 
managerial, and organisational classification of types of complexity was the 
author’s own method of tailoring these ideas to acute hospitals. Chart 4.1 
illustrates the classification. The discussion below briefly relates this 
classification to wider theory about complexity.  
 
 
Chart 4.1 Organisational learning and complexity (original diagram) 
 
Managerial complexity and guideline implementation 
Resource limitation and rising expectations from patients and staff meant 
managerial learning about new ways of simplifying delivery structures was 
needed. The discussions of rationing by Harrison and Hunter and Eddy 
Organisational Learning
Clinical Learning
Clinical complexity
(Within case)
   deals with
Specialist  treatment
Clinical reasoning, clinical
judgement, clinical
dialogue
Organisational
complexity
(Between case )
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Managerial
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Specialty structure
Routine patient flow,
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allocation
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  deals with
Necessitates
Necessitates
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exemplify issues and approaches to dealing with this type of complexity.111;173 
Clinical guidelines could help costing by standardising care. 
 
Clinical complexity and guideline implementation  
Clinical guidelines made the clinical process more explicit and so more 
consistent. They also made it more valid by basing it on agreed and evaluated 
evidence. The greater the number of treatment options the greater the 
number of issues informing the eventual choice and the larger role for clinical 
judgement. In clinically complex cases, complexity science originally developed 
in a management context could help. For example in glycaemic control in 
diabetes, where diagnostic uncertainty was high and diagnostic agreement was 
low, uncritical adherence to guidelines encouraging too rapid reaction to short 
term variation may have done more harm than good.434 Where clinical evidence 
was not available or was too detailed to codify, the reasoning and judgement 
skills needed were part explicit, part tacit. To avoid becoming too complex to 
use, guidelines had to support rather than replace the tacit.  
 
Organisational complexity and guideline implementation  
Organisational complexity increased as organisational structures needed to 
react to environmental changes105  including changes to demographics and 
casemix.  Technological change creating new working methods, and increased 
clinical complexity also made new organisational structures necessary, so-called 
technological determinism.45 Reorganisation of specialty groupings, into 
directorates or clinical networks for example, delivered care and used 
resources more effectively. Resources could be reallocated between 
specialities using cost-effectiveness criteria based on evidence in clinical 
guidelines, instead of giving them to the specialties led by the most persuasive 
personalities.  
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Indicators of hospital complexity 
Introduction 
In selecting hospitals for the study, indicators relating to clinical, 
organisational and managerial complexity were included. In a DGH the most 
important aspect of complexity was likely to be organisational - between cases, 
rather than within case. These three types of complexity fed into an 
integrated organisational learning process in an ideal hospital. A schematic and 
simplified view is given in chart 4.1. In real situations there was likely to be 
interaction between all components of chart 4.1. For example, greater 
organisational complexity led to more complex decision processes about the 
most effective allocation of resources within the hospital, or greater 
“managerial” complexity. 
 
Having set out types of hospital complexity, and argued that they were related 
to OL capacity, what were specific likely OL indicators? Potential indicators 
were considered for the three types of complexity: managerial, clinical and 
organisational. 
 
Indicators of managerial complexity in hospitals 
Managerial complexity was about both the volume of potential cases and the 
resources available to treat them. Volume necessitated managerial learning 
about the most efficient use of resources. Higher volume caused more 
competition for resources, and so more complex resource allocation decisions. 
It reflected organisational complexity because the more cases, the more 
differences between cases were likely. The number of inpatient cases treated 
in a year was the measure of volume used. Outpatient and day cases were 
excluded as they were smaller groups with less impact on cost per case. The 
university hospitals generally treated more inpatient cases than the district 
general hospitals (DGHs). Selecting one of each of these types of hospital 
therefore gave a contrast on volume.  Higher volume meant increased work on 
referral, assessment, booking in, discharge and follow up.  
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Indicators of clinical complexity in hospitals 
On the assumption that hospitals were generally efficient and did not waste 
money, cost per inpatient week gave an indication of clinical complexity. The 
assumption was that more clinically complex cases were more expensive to 
treat. The extra teaching funding to university hospitals was included in the 
cost per inpatient week because it supported learning activities. The rationale 
for assuming clinically complex cases were more expensive than clinically 
simpler cases was:  
1. The main cost of treatment was the staff cost.  
2. Specialist clinical consultants treated complex cases.  
3. Specialist clinical consultants were more expensive than generalists, 
although there might be some variation between organisations.  
 
Cost per inpatient week was a better measure of clinical complexity than cost 
per case because some long stay patients were hospitalised for continuing care 
rather than treatment. Their cost per case would be high because of the length 
of stay, but they would receive mainly nursing care not expensive specialist 
treatment. Their cost per inpatient week would reflect that.  
 
Indicators of organisational complexity in hospitals 
There could be two cases of the same clinical complexity in different 
specialties. The qualitative difference entailed different clinical skills, 
equipment, bed usage, and different external relationships for the organisation 
This differentiation created organisational complexity. The number of 
specialties in a hospital reflected its complexity. Clinical guidelines could not be 
implemented in an undifferentiated structure if there were too many to apply 
at once.  
Process and outcome indicators relevant to OL in hospitals  
All indicators were of organisational processes and outcomes rather than 
indicators of learning. They were at best proxy indicators of possible 
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organisational learning. It was recognised that all items were subject to 
uncontrollable bias. None gave proof of different learning capacities in the 
hospitals chosen. 
 
Organisational support for learning in hospitals  
The inclusion of a university hospital was a prerequisite because the extra 
funding for teaching medical students was likely to benefit organisational 
learning. The other hospital therefore was a DGH without this funding. There 
were six recognised university hospitals in Scotland.197They were Edinburgh 
Royal, Western General, Glasgow Royal, Western, Dundee Ninewells (Dundee 
Royal included), and Aberdeen Royal. They received this funding. Most of these 
hospitals also received more research funding than others from the research 
support fund bidding process.62 They were the only trusts to receive over £2 
million each from this research allocation.  
 
Routinely collected data items –  strengths as learning 
indicators 
The data items considered are listed below 
 
PROCESS 
• Reduction in planned procedures not carried out 
• Waiting time reduction 
• Increasing day surgery rate 
• Increasing bed usage rate 
 
OUTCOME 
• Increasing complaints 
• Decreased wound infection rate 
• Decreased readmission rate 
 
Strengths and weaknesses for each data item are given are given in tables 
A3.1.1 and A3.1.2 in appendix 3.1. In summary, each indicator could have been 
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affected by a change in OL capacity, but also by other factors unrelated to OL 
capacity. They were therefore separately all only “partially valid”, but 
combined, were more valid. The indicators are further described below, as part 
of the results of hospital selection. 
  
Hospital selection process 
The population of acute hospitals in mainland Scotland was defined using four 
CAMO/DPH functional classifications as follows: 
 
01  Large general major teaching hospitals covering a full range of services 
(other than maternity in some cases) and with special units. 
02  General hospitals with some teaching units but not necessarily wholly 
teaching. 
11  Mixed specialist hospitals with maternity. No special units. Consultant 
type surgery undertaken. 
12  Mixed specialist hospitals without maternity. No special units. Consultant 
type surgery undertaken. 
 
There were 31 hospitals. Six were excluded. Five of these were ineligible for 
the study because they were in integrated trusts (Woodend, Stracathro, St 
John’s of Howden, Eastern General, and Perth Royal hospitals). They were 
excluded because, being integrated with community and mental health hospitals, 
their learning processes may have been encouraged or discouraged by this. The 
remaining exclusion was obviously classified as 12 by mistake, since when cross 
checked in the NHS in Scotland Directory for 1996,257 it did not fit the 
description (Randolph Wemyss). 
 
For ease of access, Glasgow hospitals were targeted. The two acute hospitals 
selected were in Greater Glasgow. They were not intended to represent 
Scottish hospitals in general. The selection group provided a context for the 
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two hospitals selected. Each hospital was scored on a number of selection 
indicators based on measurement of complexity and volume, as discussed above, 
and the results are described below. Rates as well as absolute levels were 
compared to allow for different denominators. Trends were also compared. 
Changing rates in an appropriate direction over a number of years indicated a 
possible learning hospital. The use of multiple indicators was a means of data 
triangulation where each indicator functioned like a filter. The rationale behind 
this was that although each indicator alone had flaws, if used together each 
would make up for defects in others.  
Filtering  
Because each indicator had weaknesses, all were applied. The aim was to select 
a clinically and organisationally complex hospital and a simpler hospital to 
compare. The complex hospital was expected to have a greater OL capacity 
than the less complex. The method tested whether, of the two hospitals, one 
was higher than average on all the indicators and one was lower than average. 
The higher was then taken to be of possibly higher OL capacity than the lower. 
 
Results of hospital selection process 
Introduction 
There was no one indicator of organisational learning for hospitals. The hospital 
selection process was better than a random pairing, but its validity was not 
claimed to be high. It provided a context for the hospitals finally chosen. 
 
A preliminary process of elimination based on practicalities of access arrived at 
the likely acute trusts for the study. The elimination resulted in two Glasgow 
hospitals. These were then tested through the filter indicators as outlined 
above. There were advantages in comparing Glasgow hospitals as they had in 
common the same health board and the same city council, thus reducing bias 
from variations in these factors. Glasgow hospitals were more accessible for 
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the researcher, both geographically and through professional links. There were 
two university trusts in Glasgow, and three general trusts with DGHs. This 
excluded the childrens’ hospital. One of the DGHs received elements of 
university type funding so was ruled out. It was known that one of the 
university hospitals was already heavily researched, which would have affected 
response rates to the survey. The remaining university hospital became hospital 
1 for the study. Of the two remaining DGHs, one had some connections with 
hospital 1. As the data collection in hospital 1 ended, its administrative 
structures began to merge with this other hospital. The remaining DGH became 
hospital 2 for the study.  
 
The selection indicators for OL capacity tested post-hoc whether the two 
Glasgow hospitals remaining after the elimination process were likely to give a 
contrast, one of high and one of low OL capacity. The five indicators already 
identified and potentially related to clinical, organisational and managerial 
learning, were used to compare the likely acute trusts in Glasgow with the 
Scottish average for the university or the DGH group as appropriate. In some 
cases the data related to a trust rather than an individual hospital. There was 
always a main hospital in a trust. The largest acute hospital in each trust (on 
the criterion of average available beds) was the eligible candidate for inclusion 
in the selection process. In addition to these five indicators, the number of 
cases and inpatient weeks were included as they showed volume of cases 
treated, relevant for organisational learning and managerial learning. The 
figures for each hospital are shown in table 4.1. 
Chapter 4 Methods 
 
 
Year Hospital Median days 
to deal with 
Complaints1 
for trust 
Percent 
Cancell-
ations 3 
for trust 
Cost per 
inpat’n’t 
week 2 
for trust 
(1000s) 
Inpatient 
cases 4 
(1000s) 
for trust 
Inpatient 
weeks per 
year 5 
(1000s) 
for trust 
1995-6 
(Univ  
mean) 
Hospital 1 35* 
(25.7) 
2.3 
(1.9) 
1.71 
(1.70) 
50.8 
(54.6) 
53.0 
(48.6) 
 
(DGH 
mean) 
Hospital 2  19* 
(19.5) 
4.2 
(1.6) 
1.13 
(1.49) 
34.0 
(25.4) 
40.4 
(23.6) 
Average for all 
University and DGHs 
combined 
21.1 1.7 1.55 33.0 30.1 
 
1996-7 
(Univ  
mean) 
Hospital 1 16 
(14.8) 
2.1 
(2.5) 
1.94 
(1.85) 
50.3 
(51.4) 
50.7 
(45.7) 
 
(DGH 
mean) 
Hospital 2  19 
(14.3) 
4.2 
(1.8) 
1.25 
(1.54) 
34.0 
(25.4) 
38.6 
(23.0) 
Average for all 
University and DGHs 
combined 
14.5 2.0 1.62 32.0 28.6 
 
1997-8 
(Univ  
mean) 
Hospital 1 15 
 
(14.5) 
Not 
available 
(2.9) 
1.86 
 
(1.99) 
50.1 
 
(53.2) 
52.2 
 
(43.8) 
       
 
(DGH 
mean) 
Hospital 2  19 
 
(14.5) 
Not 
available 
(1.9) 
1.30 
 
(1.61) 
32.9 
 
(26.1) 
37.9 
 
(22.6) 
Average for all 
University and DGHs 
combined 
 
 
14.4 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
1.71 
 
 
33.2 
 
 
 
28.2 
Table 4.1 Indicators for comparing hospital trusts.1193  3 198  2,4,5192;195;197 
 *Figures are average for quarter to end March 1996 
Costs are rounded to the nearest 10; Cases and inpatient weeks are rounded to the nearest 
100. (5’s rounded down) 
Brackets show means for university hospital trusts or district general hospital trusts as 
applicable. These are based on the taxonomy used by the ISD in table N1.5. It excludes 
Dental and Paediatric hospitals. 
Overall averages are for all acute trusts  170
 
Time to deal with complaints 
Average time taken to deal with inpatient complaints was a partial indicator of 
organisational complexity and clinical complexity and their mismatch with health 
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and patient needs, and associated potential learning process. There was an 
anomaly in the longer time shown in 1995-6 figures for hospital 1. A possible 
reason for this was given by the complaints manager in post in 2002, as the 
introduction of a new method for recording complaints in April 1996. The figure 
was confirmed in the minutes of the relevant trust meeting.95 In two of the 
three years, hospital 2 (DGH) took around 20% longer than hospital 1 to deal 
with complaints. Although other DGHs improved on average over the three year 
period, hospital 2 did not. On this test, hospital 2 was less good at OL than 
hospital 1  
 
Percent cancellations  
Percent cancellations of planned inpatient or day case admission was a partial 
indicator of organisational complexity and associated potential OL process. 
Hospital 1 had almost half the percentage cancellation rate of planned 
admission for inpatient or day case treatment of hospital 2. The rate fell in 
hospital 1 in the second of the two years for which data was available, but 
there was an average rise for university hospitals. The rate in hospital 2 
remained the same, as did the DGH average. On this test hospital 2 was less 
good at OL than hospital 1. 
 
Cost per inpatient week 
Cost per inpatient week was an indicator of conditions supporting learning, a 
partial indicator of clinical complexity, and of an ongoing learning process to 
deal with it. Hospital 1, the university hospital, had consistently nearly 50% 
higher cost per inpatient week than Hospital 2 for each of the three years. 
University hospitals were generally more expensive than DGHs as they had 
higher training costs. Hospital 1 had average cost per inpatient week 
comparable with other university hospitals. On this test hospital 1 was more 
clinically complex and had greater support to clinical learning than hospital 2.  
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Volume 
Volume (inpatient weeks per financial year) was a partial indicator of managerial 
complexity. Hospital 1 treated around 50% more cases than Hospital 2 and the 
average acute trust (table 4.1). Hospital 2 treated an average number. In both 
the number of inpatient weeks was around 10,000 greater than the Scottish 
average. On this test hospital 1 had greater need for managerial learning than 
hospital 2.  
 
Number of clinical specialty groups 
The final indicator was the number of clinical specialty groups offered by 
individual hospitals. It was used as an index of their organisational complexity. 
Clinical specialties were concerned with the different physiological systems of 
the body. They were grouped and tabulated for each hospital by the Scottish 
Office in the hospital/specialty group table.197The specialty groups were groups 
of related specialties combined on a consistent basis. Information and 
Statistics Division (ISD) provided a table showing how this composition of 
specialty groups was done.197 
 
These tables were used to find the number of specialty groups for 5 of the 6 
university hospitals and the 17 DGH’s. The missing university hospital 
(Edinburgh Royal Infirmary) did not appear in the table of hospitals. The 
number of specialty groups for this hospital was found using the relevant entry 
in the NHS in Scotland Directory (1996).257 This listed the specialties at each 
hospital. The specialties were coded to specialty groups using the table of 
specialties and specialty groups from ISD. The range, average, median and 
confidence intervals are shown in table 4.2.  
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 Number of specialty groups 
 University Hospital 
group n=6  
(containing hospital 1) 
District General Hospital 
group n=17 (containing 
hospital 2) 
All 23 
Hospitals 
combined 
Mean 20.3 20.8 20.7 
Median 20 22 21 
Range 5 13 13 
Minimum 18 14 14 
Maximum 23 27 27 
Count 6 17 23 
Confidence  
Level (95.0%) 
18.3-22.3 19.3-22.3 19.6-21.8 
Note. Hospital 1 = 20 specialty groups, Hospital 2 = 18 specialty groups. 
 
Table 4.2: descriptive statistics on the number of specialty groups in the 23 
hospitals in the population. 197 (NB Stonehouse hospital and Dundee Royal hospital were 
excluded from this table as they were secondary acute hospitals in a trust, and therefore 
would receive lower volume of cases, which could affect their need to learn.)  
 
Hospital 1 was within the 95% confidence limits for both university trusts and 
all 23 hospitals, while hospital 2 was below these limits both for DGHs and all 
combined. This indicated that hospital 2 had lower organisational complexity 
than hospital 1. DGHs saw the whole spectrum of cases, though referring some 
elsewhere. The average number of specialities was greater (though only 
slightly) for DGHs than for university hospitals. Hospital 1 (20 specialty groups) 
and  hospital 2 (18 specialty groups) were unusual in reversing this relationship, 
but this was useful for the research as it was further evidence of the higher 
complexity of hospital 1 compared to hospital 2. On this test hospital 1 had 
greater organisational complexity and so a greater need for organisational 
learning than hospital 2 
 
To summarise, on all the indicators, hospital 1 was more likely to be a learning 
organisation than hospital 2. As shown in table 4.1, hospital 1, the university 
hospital, was above average on all of the indicators in at least two out of the 
three years from 1995-6 to 1997-8. 
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Criterion validity of hospital selection  
Two external criteria supported the validity of the selection of hospital 1 as 
higher OL capacity and hospital 2 as lower: 
 
1. The comparatively low funding for hospital 2 was confirmed in the MacLean 
report published in March 1999 following adverse incidents.256 Data collection 
started for my project in hospital 2 in October 1999. MacLean’s conclusions 
were useful in validating project findings. It mentioned low morale, clinical 
dissatisfaction with CEO turnover, rising patient complaints following bad 
publicity about adverse events, and low resource provision in comparison with 
the other Glasgow hospitals. A number of substantive recommendations were 
made in relation to A & E, general surgery, general medicine. These were about 
organisation and delivery of care. For example, in A & E, staffing level was 
inadequate, but a separate receiving unit was needed. For general medicine, 
patient transfers between wards were recommended to be reduced, to improve 
continuity of care and to save time on ward rounds. The standard of medical 
practice was found to be “exemplary”. However, no independent clinical audit of 
care was carried out by the review. 
 
2. The Information and Statistics Division (ISD) of the Scottish Office, 
reported that hospital 1 was more complex than the average Scottish acute 
hospital. It produced an unpublished report about the complexity of hospital 1 
relative to other Scottish acute hospitals in 1997-98. The following quotes 
come from a letter written by the author of the report: 
“ISD produces national complexity weights for each acute specialty 
using English national reference costs. The weights are scaled so that 
the average weight for each specialty is 1.00.  When applied to SMR01 
data for an individual hospital or trust, a measure of the local casemix 
can be estimated in resource terms, for example an average complexity 
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or weight of 1.12 for specialty X suggests a casemix 12% more complex, 
in resource terms, than the Scottish average specialty X case”……………… 
……………… “Based on the 17 acute specialties covered by the 97/98 HRG 
report, [Hospital 1] trust’s overall complexity factor was 1.12 – i.e. in the 
specialties done by [Hospital 1]   (within the 17) their cases were on 
average 12% more complex than the average cases in these specialties in 
Scotland. Table 1 in the HRG report shows that [Hospital 1] trust has a 
cost efficiency index of 1.09 i.e. 9% more expensive across the included 
specialties than expected, based on national experience (not teaching 
trust experience).” Reid B. 1999 (personal communication). 
 
Health Resource Groups (HRGs) were groupings of procedures and diagnoses. 
They applied to particular clinical specialties. They were based on clinical 
similarity and similar resource use.197 
 
Post hoc validation of hospital selection.  
The measures (particularly for organisational learning) used to select the 
hospitals were crude (see above). There was a need to confirm by measuring 
the organisational learning culture again in the situations investigated. This was 
part of the main research. Each hospital’s culture was tested on two separate 
indices derived from separate validated questionnaire scales. One scale 
measured OL capacity, the other scale measured hospital culture. For senior 
staff, the OL scores were higher for hospital 1 than hospital 2. The hospital 
culture scores were slightly higher at hospital 1, but formalisation scores were 
significantly higher at hospital 1. The mean for hospital 1 was 4.48, that for 
hospital 2 was 4.12. The higher formalisation score raised some questions about 
the relationship between organisational formality and the OL measure.  
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4.2.4 Selection of SIGN guidelines included in the study 
Aim  
The aim was to choose a pair of guidelines, one more and one less complex to 
implement, on clinical and organisational criteria. The reason for this was to 
ensure guidelines chosen represented each. Managerial criteria were not 
relevant to this process for the guideline documents because the volume of 
patients involved was a local issue. The DVT prophylaxis and all the Diabetes 
guidelines were the prime candidates because they were widely applicable in 
acute hospitals, giving more chance of achieving the numbers of responses 
needed for the scales. A series of filters was not required for measuring the 
complexity of these guidelines. It was a simple content analysis, using the 
procedure described below, of the 22 pilot SIGN guidelines already published 
at the time of the research.  
 
Guideline selection  
Rationale – measurement of organisational complexity  
OL, although it took place in individuals, was necessarily a social process, which 
worked best in groups of heterogeneous personality types. Groups containing 
heterogeneous personality types were known to be more effective.187 
Personality types were linked to cognitive (and hence learning) styles.187 A 
relationship has been suggested between a team’s orientation toward the 
future, the present, or the past and more effective learning.187 Experiment, for 
example, involved speculation about future applications, but was based on 
theory developed over time (like practice guidelines). An organisational learning 
cycle embracing all the learning styles has been suggested.96 Different parts of 
the learning cycle relied on different learning styles.287 Different personality 
types were attracted to different types of clinical work.190;232;325 
Multidisciplinary clinical groups were composed of more heterogeneous 
personalities than single discipline groups. It followed from this, at least 
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hypothetically, that more multidisciplinary guidelines, although organisationally 
complex to implement had the greatest OL potential and were potentially (if 
successfully implemented) more clinically effective than unidisciplinary 
guidelines.  
 
Guideline selection process – for organisational complexity 
The specialties, professions, care types and patient representatives involved in 
developing the guideline were counted, as were the professions, specialties, 
care types, management groups and services recommended for inclusion in the 
implementation group. Local implementation group membership recommendations: 
one point was given for recommendation of:  
• more than one profession  
• more than one type of care,  
• more than one specialty,  
• more than one service (e.g. health and social services), and  
• management involvement.  
 
Protocol development group membership: 
points were given (one each) according to the numbers of:  
• medical specialties,  
• health professions,  
• care types and  
• patient representatives.  177
 
Box 4.1 scoring system for organisational complexity of clinical guidelines. 
 
 
Guideline 12, which did not make implementation group membership 
recommendations, was included in scoring based on the development group only. 
The counts were used to create an organisational complexity index for each 
guideline. Of the 22 pilot guidelines (guideline 10 was not SIGN), 16 gave 
recommendations for involving specific groups in implementation, and 17 gave 
recommendations for protocol development group membership. A system to 
score these was devised, see box 4.1. Scoring was carried out according to the 
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rules shown in box 4.1. The summed points provided an organisational complexity 
index for each guideline.  
 
Guideline selection - organisational complexity results 
Using the approach described above, the DVT guideline was significantly more 
complex than the other pilot guidelines, and the diabetes guidelines were about 
average.  
 
Rationale – measurement of clinical complexity 
Guidelines were viewed as lists of recommendations. The greater the number of 
recommendations the more complex the guideline became to implement. Only 
“A” grade recommendations were counted. The “A” graded recommendation in a 
SIGN guideline was the most important because based on the most valid 
evidence (at least one randomised controlled trial).368 For a description of the 
evidence levels and grades see appendix A3.2.  
 
The complexity of the implementation, rather than the complexity of the 
guideline itself, was the relevant factor for this study. Implementation 
included understanding the guideline, remembering the recommendations, 
comparing them with practice and policy, and deciding and communicating 
clinical action. A specialist guideline could be clinically simple if it had narrow 
scope (few recommendations), like the SIGN diabetic renal disease guideline 
(number 11). 
 
Guideline selection process - for clinical complexity 
The “A” grade recommendations in 21 pilot guidelines were counted. (Guideline 5 
was excluded as it did not grade recommendations, and 10 was excluded 
because it was not SIGN) The majority of recommendations were concerned 
with diagnosis and treatment. 
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Summary 
The OL capacity required to implement would be greater for a more complex 
guideline. The DVT guideline was assessed as more complex than each individual 
diabetes guideline for two reasons. These were:  
1. its implementation involved more specialties for protocol 
development and implementation than the mean for the pilot 
guidelines. (see appendix 3.2.2) It was therefore more 
organisationally complex than average, and   
2. it contained more A grade recommendations than the mean for the 
pilot guidelines (see appendix 3.2.2). It was therefore more clinically 
complex.  
 
4.2.5 Selection of health professionals  
The professions were doctors and nurses, as the majority of NHS clinical 
staff, with complementary roles. These two groups provided an opportunity to 
study a routine and bureaucratic structure working in parallel with a looser 
structure that aimed to facilitate non-routine activities, which benefited from 
more clinical reasoning. 
“The parts of an individual’s skill that are completely routinised are 
those that he or she does not have to think about – once a routine is 
switched on in the workers mind, it goes to its end without further 
consultation of the higher faculties.”388 
 
The theoretical framework for comparison developed as descriptions of type 1 
and type 2 guideline implementation were enriched (see chapter 3). Other 
substantive themes came out of the coding.81;82 
 
Statistically representative sampling was needed for the valid use of the 
survey. Most interviewees also completed a survey. This enabled survey and 
interview results to be analysed together. Nurses, midwives and doctors were 
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the majority of Scottish acute clinical staff (see table 4.2). Hence the focus on 
them. Midwives and medical staff made and accepted referrals, nurses 
generally did not.  
 
Hospital Services (All Scotland) Count 
Medical staff   6441 
Nursing staff   
  Qualified   (D grade and above) 29525 
  Unqualified  (Auxiliaries)   6325 
Dental      200 
Hospital and Community Services (All Scotland) (No 
separate figures given for hospital only) 
 
Professions allied to Medicine (9 professions)  
  Qualified (for membership of  professional association)     5247 
  Unqualified (assistants and  helpers)     672 
Table 4.2 Professional hospital staff in Scotland categorised by profession 
(Whole Time Equivalents at 30/9/95 193  
 
The research population was nurses and midwives of D grade and above, and 
doctors of all grades. Staff with less than 10 weeks service were excluded. 
Consultants and G- grade clinical nurses/midwives were the most important 
group for the study as they were the clinical leaders. At least 30 staff 
nurses/midwives and a small number of junior doctors were included in each 
trust as representatives of the led. The small number of junior doctors was 
because SHOs and HOs, as they stayed with a hospital for around 6 months, 
were unlikely to be as familiar with the hospital culture as consultants. Staff 
nurses formed the bulk of the workforce and this alone meant their attitudes 
were important for hospital culture. 
 
There were no midwives in hospital 2. The midwives in hospital 1 were included 
because the consultants from the relevant directorate were included. Midwives 
had largely the same training as nurses and they filled a similar role in that 
directorate. Their responses were compared with those of nurses later in the 
project. Health professionals in four directorates were excluded from the 
population to reduce the number without involvement in either DVT prophylaxis 
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or the specialist treatment of diabetes. These were Accident and Emergency, 
Anaesthetics and Theatres, Imaging, and Laboratories.  
 
In hospital 1, there was no researcher access to staff lists. The selection 
method was to take every second name from a randomly ordered list. In 
hospital 2, the sample was selected from the staff list by the researcher using 
an SPSS randomising function. Staff at another satellite hospital some miles 
away were excluded because this hospital did not share consultant staff with 
hospital 2. 
 
Justification of sample size  
The initial sample in each trust was intended to be 200, to give a total of 400. 
This assumed a minimum 50% response rate and a final response of 200 from 
the two trusts combined. This response rate was optimistic for this type of 
study (see studies listed in appendix 6.1). For example a comparison of whether 
staff had been involved in guideline implementation or not between the 
hospitals would ideally compare 100 staff in each hospital.  If a proportion of 
0.40 in one hospital and 0.60 in the other said they had been involved this would 
be a significant difference at p<0.05.308 From Machin and Campbell’s tables254 a 
sample size of 97 per group would give 80% power at p<0.05, and a sample size 
of 86 would give 75% power at this level of significance. A sample size of 43 
per group was closer to the size of the groups actually recruited for this 
analysis. This would detect a difference between a proportion of 0.35 in one 
group and 0.65 in the other at 80% power and p<0.05. 
 
The statistical power to detect differences in OL capacity means between two 
groups was worked out formally retrospectively using statistical tables.254 An 
80% power was given by this sample size (100 in each group), assuming a minimal 
difference between OL capacity means of 0.40 needed to be detected. This 
assumed for example an OL capacity mean in hospital 1 of 4.2 and in hospital 2 
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of 3.80, and a significance level of 0.05. As in fact, because of the response 
rate, only around 45 senior staff from each hospital were in each group used to 
compare the hospitals a minimal difference of 0.60 would have been detected 
at 80% power. If however standard deviation was assumed to be 0.8, the 
minimal difference detected at 80% power would be 0.6*0.8=0.48. All of the 
above has been confirmed with a statistician at University of Glasgow, 
department of statistics. 
 
Reminders were intended. The response rate was lower than hoped and 
reminders were not possible in hospital 1, so approximately a further 300 were 
sampled in an attempt to get the sample of 100 assuming only a 20% response 
rate. The same sample size (c 500) was used in the second trust for 
comparability. As senior staff had a higher response rate in hospital 1 (over 
50%) the sampling strategy was amended to allow reminders in hospital 2 
concentrate on obtaining equivalent response rates from senior staff as to 
hospital 1 so the senior professional groups could be compared between 
hospitals.  
 
There were no reminders at hospital 1 owing to lack of resources to carry this 
out at the personnel department because the contact organising the issue of 
letters to the sample was not allowed to reveal who had initially been asked to 
participate. Hospital confidentiality rules forbade it. When the contact went on 
long term absence from work for health reasons, resources did not allow for 
replacement.  
Invitations to participate 
A personally addressed letter requested participation. An addressed returns 
envelope was included to increase response rate. The interviews were tape-
recorded. Because this was thought likely to discourage some health 
professionals from being interviewed two different versions of the letter, one 
giving an option to return a survey without being interviewed (see appendix 3) 
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were sent out a month apart in each hospital. The first letter was sent to 200 
sample members and the second to the rest. Both letters included a standard 
summary of the project. The letters were varied as described below. This was a 
means of triangulating the data collection methods.  
 
Version 1 of invitation letter 
The reply slip for the first letter (see appendix 3.9) asked for participation in 
the research without distinguishing between interview and survey. The first 
went to a randomly selected group of 200. This group was given the survey at 
interview. That the interviews were to be tape-recorded was not mentioned. 
Potential interviewees were made aware of the need to tape record by 
telephone when the appointment for the interview was booked. 
 
Version 2 of invitation letter 
The second reply slip (see appendix 3.10) distinguished between participation in 
the survey and the interview. Respondents could therefore choose to 
participate in the survey only. The survey was included with the letter. The 
need for tape recording the interview was mentioned in the letter. Respondents 
were told they need not be involved with DVT prophylaxis or diabetes 
treatment to answer the survey. Respondents to the second letter could return 
the survey whilst ensuring they remained anonymous as the survey was included 
with the letter and could be returned anonymously by post.  
 
Reminders 
The best response rates at hospital 1 were from G grade nurses/midwives 
(sister/charge nurse) and from consultants. Consequently, at hospital 2, G 
grades and consultants were targeted as key comparison groups for both 
surveys and interviews. Reminders were by telephone to all non-responding 
consultants and clinical G grade nurses. The response rate among these groups 
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was high for health services management research in this setting. As 
consultants and G grades were long serving and had a wider span of control than 
junior staff they could be expected to know more about the learning capacity 
and culture of the hospital. Added to this, with their educational role they were 
likely to be the main transmitters of values and behaviours affecting learning 
capacity.  They therefore made an important group for comparison of the 
learning capacity of the hospitals. 
 
When no further responses were obtainable from these groups, 50 D and E 
grade nurses were reminded by a modified version of letter 2 in order to 
increase survey response toward the 100 level (appendix 3.11). 
 
4.3  Measurement method for organisational learning 
4.3.1  Rationale  
Acute hospitals had broadly similar levels and sources of funding, and they 
were subject to the same legislative constraints. Variations in organisational 
behaviour were likely to reflect values, beliefs and expectations. Some formal 
structures such as libraries, computer information networks, briefings, 
seminars, and training programmes were helpful for OL, but they did not 
guarantee it.  
 
So, to measure OL capacity it was more important to measure OL culture than 
to collect data about structures. OL culture was reflected in the strength of 
beliefs (attitudes) about aspects of OL. It was thought to have multiple 
aspects.151;313 How could these be measured? 
 
The measurement of attitudes 
The best methodology for the quantitative measurement of attitudes was 
scaling, for the following reasons: 
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1. the large number of items sampled a number of dimensions of the topic, 
giving a more valid and balanced measure, 
2. the most reliable items were selected from an initial pool, 
3. idiosyncratic responses which might have led to biases in individual items 
cancelled each other out when absorbed into an overall mean.  
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the Likert scale were reviewed in comparison 
with other types of scale (see appendix 3.5). Scales were categorised into 
those where the respondent directly estimated their own attitude and those 
where the attitude was adduced by the researcher from comparisons of 
responses.115 On balance a Likert scale was thought best because it was 
additive, gave a total index and was preferred by respondents. Likert scales 
used direct estimation, and the danger of social desirability bias was 
recognised. Although there was a danger of confusing different dimensions the 
OL capacity scale finally chosen had only one dimension anyway, confirmed in 
factor analysis by the authors.  
 
There were other possible methods for gathering data about learning capacity. 
These included nominal group process, repertory grid techniques, and discourse 
analysis. They were rejected for this study because they were not quantitative 
and also impractical because time consuming for health professionals who had 
little spare time in their working day. Table A3.4 in appendix 3.4 gives details. 
 
Selection of scales piloted 
The BPO database was trawled using “organisational learning” as a search term. 
Neither the British and the American approaches were able to show examples 
of instruments that had been widely used in the health service.  
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Scales considered 
Other possible scales were identified. Further literature searches were done. 
Two search strategies were used for each database to maximise “hits”. See 
appendix A3.3 for details of search results. 
 
Search 1 
Of four papers identified using “measurement scale”, two related to the 
SERVQUAL an instrument which assessed health services quality through 
patient perceptions.14;234. The third also assessed patient perceptions of service 
quality.164 The fourth measured nursing quality.427 None were suitable for 
measuring organisational learning capacity or culture because: 
1. they assessed quality rather than learning,  
2. three took a patient perspective which was external to the learning 
process,  
3. the other applied only to one professional group. 
 
Search 2 
One reference was retrieved using “learning culture OR learning capacity”. It 
concerned a scale measuring learning capacity in business purchasing 
functions.186 This identified 4 orientations: to the team, to systems, to learning 
and to memory. Further scales were identified mainly through other 
researchers and personal knowledge from previous research projects. These 
included: 
1. The Team Audit Questionnaire (Hearnshaw HM – personal communication 
1998). This questionnaire was confined to audit only and had not been 
formally validated.  
2. The Culture Questionnaire ((Hearnshaw HM – personal communication 
1998). 
3. This was adapted for general practice from a published business 
approach.140 There was no claim to measure organisational learning. Its 
Chapter 4 Methods 
 
 187
purpose was to stimulate discussion about culture. The items were 
similar to those on the scale finally used. It was longer. 
4. The Evaluation of Clinical Competence form (ECC).80 This applied to 
physiotherapy students only. 
5. Questionnaire for assessing staff perceptions of trust-based clinical 
audit programmes.247;248 Limited to clinical audit only. 
6. The ward atmosphere scale.284 Confined to wards rather than the whole 
organisation.  
7. The clinical learning environment scale.106 This applied to clinical learning 
and ward nurses only. 
8. The Learning Company questionnaire.314 (see below). 
9. The Learning Organisation survey.151 (see below). 
 
From these, all but two were rejected for piloting for the reasons given above. 
The two piloted were the Learning Company questionnaire314 and the Learning 
Organisation Survey.151 See report of pilot. 
 
The learning capacity of each hospital was measured using the Learning 
Organisation Survey.151;152 This was a seven category Likert type scale. The 
items were clearly related to day to day experience and obviously connected to 
underlying values and beliefs. The scale used self-report, not direct 
observation, as learning was not directly observable. It was short, quick, and 
the language used performed well in piloting (see chapter 5). It included 5 
separate OL sub-scales based on dimensions found in a literature review. It was 
self-validating as the instrument included two other scales for job satisfaction 
(predicted to have positive correlation with OL) and formalisation (negative 
correlation). The scale was not developed for use specifically in the NHS acute 
sector. The hospital culture scale was developed for this setting. It measured a 
related aspect of culture, collaboration. It validated the OL Scale in the NHS 
acute setting. 
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The sub-scales of the OL scale were: 
 
1. Clarity of mission and vision (4 items) 
2. Leadership (5 items) 
3. Experimentation (5 items) 
4. Transfer of knowledge (4 items) 
5. Teamwork and group problem solving (3 items) 
 
The further scale measuring hospital culture229 was administered at the same 
time.  
 
The first use of the 21 item learning capacity survey was to develop an overall 
learning index for each study sample. This was done as detailed in appendix 
1.1.2. 
 
4.3.2 Aims of comparisons using scale scores 
The OL scale was a measure of individual satisfaction with the organisation’s 
learning capacity, the mean score for each hospital was an indicator of the OL 
capacity of the hospital. The mean score for a subgroup within each hospital 
was an indicator of the OL capacity of the hospital for that subgroup. The aims 
of these analyses were:  
 
1. firstly, to see whether as predicted by the selection procedure hospital 
1 had a higher learning capacity than hospital 2, so that guideline 
implementation could be compared in organisations of different learning 
capacity, and 
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2. secondly, to identify natural groups of high and low organisational 
learning capacity, not only the hospitals themselves, but also 
professions.  
 
The five sub-scales in the learning organisation survey were compared for 
hospitals and professions. This was to see if any sub-scales in particular were 
associated with the differences. 
 
4.3.3 Main groups 
Comparisons were between scores on all scales and sub-scales, clinical seniors 
only, except where seniors and juniors were explicitly compared. Seniority 
groups were systematically compared because senior grades scored higher on 
OL capacity. This was a known effect with this instrument (personal 
communication, Goh S. 18/05/2000 – see appendix 1.5.3).  The exclusion of 
juniors controlled for bias caused by different proportions of junior staff in 
the groups compared. The main planned comparisons were between the two 
acute hospitals. The OL capacity of the medical and nursing professions were to 
be compared with special reference to differences and similarities between 
hospitals, making the hospital the main focus of comparison. Different sets 
within sets were planned for comparison of these groups as in table 4.3 below. 
It was necessary to look at the sets within sets as scores varied considerably 
between sub groupings. These variations could have been cancelled out in the 
full response set, and any subgroups of significantly high or low learning 
capacity consequently missed. 
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 Between Hospitals Between Professions 
Within hospital - All senior Doctors with senior 
nurses in each hospital  
 
Within Profession All senior doctors 
and nurses 
- 
Within grade Seniors and juniors Senior doctors with senior nurses 
Junior doctors with junior nurses 
Overall All seniors hospital 1 
with hospital 2  
Doctors with nurses 
Table 4.3 Main planned comparisons of OL scores 
 
To give information generally relevant to the interpretation of other analyses, 
the correlation between all scale scores and career history items including age 
was tested. 
4.3.4 Other comparisons 
Guideline implementers as a group were compared on scale scores with non-
implementers, and members of implementation groups were compared with 
those not on them. This gave an overall measure of the association of OL with 
involvement in guideline implementation. The scores of those in service at the 
date of guideline implementation were compared with those joining the hospital 
later to see whether the initial implementation process in the hospital had any 
lasting effect on the OL capacity of the staff who experienced it.  
 
4.4 Data collection method for guideline implementation 
4.4.1 Rationale for the use of semi-structured interviews for data 
collection 
Reasons for the use of the case study strategy were given in this chapter, 
section 4.1. The semi-structured interview was able to gather this type of data. 
It was possible to use it to find the patterns of belief about implementation of 
SIGN guidelines. Specific advantages and some disadvantages are listed in 
table 4.4. 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
Explanation/clarification of questions 
Qualification of responses 
Flexibility – could probe for 
unexpected topics, not entirely 
predefined 
Other non-verbal information 
recorded – tone of voice, laughs, 
sighs etc 
Interpersonal reaction to interviewer (this was 
at least consistent) 
Interviewer characteristics - for example age, 
gender, not being a health professional 
Variety in interviewer behaviour. Large number 
of interviews helped to even this out 
Defensive responses. Reassurances of 
confidentiality and anonymity were given to 
reduce suspicion 
Table 4.4 Semi-structured interviews – advantages/disadvantages for this 
research389 
 
4.4.2 Guideline implementation interviews 
Reasons for rejecting alternatives to semi-structured interviews 
For completeness, the main alternatives to semi-structured interviews and 
reasons why they were not used are given in table 4.5 below. The development 
of the pilot interview schedule is described in chapter 5, followed by the 
changes to the interview schedule as a result of the piloting. 
 
Possible Method Reason(s) for rejection 
Unstructured interviews Some structure was needed for consistency in comparison 
Structured interviews Would not have allowed probes following up unexpected  
issues 
Participant observation  Access was not allowed to confidential meetings. 
Documentary analysis  
of audit reports  
Access not allowed, only a minority of guidelines was 
audited, reports were very general. Primary data on the 
views of health professionals was the research focus 
Documentary analysis  
of departmental policies 
Did not show whether there was dissemination or 
implementation, (the research focus).  
Survey  Superficial, misinterpreted, inflexible, though more neutral 
than face to face interview. Response rate problems. 
Table 4.5 reasons for rejecting alternatives to semi-structured interviews 
 
The interview schedule (see appendix A1.4) covered protocol development, 
dissemination, and implementation (including audit and change), for a guideline 
chosen by the interviewee. General issues were also covered. All interviews 
were tape recorded and transcribed. 
Chapter 4 Methods 
 
 192
4.4.3  Interview structure  
The interviewee was given a choice of talking with reference to SIGN DVT 
prophylaxis or SIGN diabetes or another clinical topic. The interview was 
structured using guideline implementation theory about stages of 
implementation (see rationale for methods section).  
 
The guideline referred to in each interview was recorded in the interview 
script. If the interviewees did not wish to reply with reference to either SIGN 
DVT prophylaxis or one of the SIGN diabetes guidelines they were invited to 
reply about another guideline rather than abandon the interview. The full 
interview schedule is in appendix 1.4. 
 
Dissemination was covered under four heads – 
1. How the interviewee got to know about the guideline, 
2. How the interviewee informed others, 
3. Desirable changes, 
4. Support needed from the hospital.  
 
Implementation covered - 
1. involvement in implementation groups developing local protocols,  
2. action to ensure recommendations were put into practice,  
3. involvement in the audit group, 
4. knowledge about the audit aims and quality improvement.  
 
Results of implementation included - 
1. communication of findings to the interviewee and others, 
2. Changes to interviewee’s and others’ practice. 
 
A section on learning investigated - 
1. learning about other teams and directorates,  
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2. new ways of working, and help needed.  
 
A final section asked for general views on - 
1. purposes and use of SIGN guidelines,  
2. whether professional colleagues and other professions would agree, 
3. ideal expectations of guidelines,  
4. their effectiveness,  
5. any factors constraining or facilitating their implementation.  
 
4.5. Summary of case selection rationale  
There were 2 groups (“study samples”) each containing two contrasting cases. 
They were:  
Profession  – Doctors and Nurses 
Hospital  – Hospital 1 and Hospital 2 
 
The cases formed an four cell matrix (Chart 4.2).  Two cells were predicted to 
be at opposite poles of the spectrum of OL capacity because they contained all 
the groups expected to be of high or low OL capacity. Depending on the relative 
influence of each of the two factors (unknown) the others were expected 
somewhere between these poles. 
 
High OL 
Doctors H1 
 
Doctors H2 
 
 
Nurses H1 
 
 
Nurses H2 
Low OL 
Chart 4.2  Four possible combinations of cases and predicted OL capacity. 
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In brief, hospitals, professions and guidelines expected to be associated with 
different OL capacity were selected, OL capacity was measured and guideline 
implementation activities and beliefs were compared.  
 
There was no possibility of proving causality from this research design. It 
tested the association between learning capacity and type of guideline 
implementation activity in hospitals and professions. Each difference that was 
found between groups at interview was tested by matching it to the type 1 and 
type 2 models  to see whether either hospital was implementing the guidelines 
more as an information system supporting double loop generative OL, a 
reference only system supporting only single loop compliance checking, or 
neither. 
 
4.6 Statistical methods 
 
4.6.1 Corrections for large number of tests 
Quantitative comparisons of scale scores 
The bonferroni correction for large numbers of tests was applied to the 
distinct groups of tests rather than the tests en masse, since the bonferroni 
correction was known to be conservative (personal communication from H. 
Gilmour, statistician at University of Glasgow Department of Statistics, 2001). 
To determine the significance level required the formula used was p-value 
divided by number of tests. Some tests were repeated within study samples 
(profession and hospital) as well as for the overall sample. For this reason they 
were correlated with the overall tests, so not included in the number of tests 
for calculating the bonferroni correction required.35 The small number of 
comparisons of OL in each group of main scale comparisons, meant correction 
for large numbers of tests was not required here. The sub-scales were highly 
correlated with each other. Bonferroni corrections were thus inappropriate for 
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the comparisons on sub-scales.35 As there was only one chi square test, a 
Bonferroni test was not required there.  
 
Qualitative comparisons of guideline implementation  
The chi-square tests were applied to the five different guideline adoption 
stages and to the general issues about guideline adoption. The bonferroni 
adjustment was made in each of these distinct groups for each of the three 
types of data. The level of significance required for significance at 5% after 
bonferroni adjustment  (if required) was calculated for each distinct group. 
Bonferroni adjustment was not considered required if there were less than five 
tests in a distinct group. 
 
Comparisons of  OL capacity and guideline implementation  
Rules for calculating the bonferroni correction for large numbers of statistical 
tests were followed. The tests were divided in to 3 distinct groups as shown in 
the columns of each table. Bonferroni correction did not apply where measures 
were correlated.35 As the OL sub-scales were highly correlated with each other 
(chapter 6), the correction level was not increased from that used for the 
complete OL scale (see chapter 10, table 10.2). So although there were five 
sub-scale tests for each test of the whole scale, because they were correlated, 
the number of tests used to calculate the bonferroni correction remained the 
same as for the whole OL scale. The correction for sub-scales was therefore 
the same as that applied for the complete OL scale in each distinct group of 
tests. Since SPSS would not show more than 3 decimal places for p values, in 
practice p<0.001 was used. The closed questions were fewer and a slightly 
higher value for p could have been used, in practice this would have made no 
difference.  
 
There were two Chi square tests to compare study samples involved in guideline 
implementation activities found to be associated with significantly different 
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levels of OL capacity. This was too few for bonferroni correction to be 
necessary.  
 
4.6.2 t-tests 
Variances were assumed unequal between groups, and significance tests were 
two tailed. 
 
4.6.3 Adjustment method for missing values 
Missing values were adjusted for in the calculation of scale means by reducing 
the denominator. 
 
4.6.4 Correlations  
Correlation statistics used were parametric – Pearson’s r. 
 
4.6.5 One sample Chi square 
This test was used to compare hospital 2 responders with the population for 
example on gender. It compared the proportions in the population with the 
proportion among the responders. This test is discussed by Cohen and 
Holliday68  and Langley.236 The numbers for the population and excluded 
directorates were supplied by the personnel department at hospital 1. The 
numbers in excluded directorates were checked directly with the relevant 
clinical director. There was a reasonable convergence. 
 
4.6.6 Estimation of nurses and doctors in research sample in hospital 
1  
The number of G-grade nurses and the number of consultants in the hospital 1 
sample were not available to the selection process. The size of the sample was 
known, and so were the numbers of G-grade nurses and consultants in the 
research population. As the sample was a simple random one, the numbers in 
these groups in the sample were estimated using the proportions in the 
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population. The number of consultants in the hospital 1 sample was estimated by 
deducting the number in excluded directorates, (58) from the total number in 
the hospital (85). This gave a research population of 27, deducting the 7 
medical and clinical directors, who were all included in the sample, and halving 
the remaining 20, (since the sample was 1 in 2) to give 10. The sample was 
therefore 10 plus 7 = 17. The number of G grade nurses/midwives in the 
hospital 1 sample was estimated by deducting the number in the excluded 
directorates (31) from the population (161), to give a research population of 
130. The 1 in 2 random sampling gave a final sample of 65.  
 
A different method was used to estimate the proportions of nurses and 
doctors among all staff in included directorates in hospital 1. As the breakdown 
of all staff by profession in the excluded directorates was not known, this 
estimate was liable to be invalidated by there being proportionately more 
doctors in the excluded directorates. This was in fact quite likely as there was 
a high number of consultants in the anaesthetics and theatres directorate, 
(excluded). The assumption might have been that that there were a similar 
proportion of doctors in the hospital 1 population as in hospital 2. In that case 
the difference between responders and research population on profession in 
hospital 1 would have been smaller but still significant at p<0.05. 
 
The population in each age group in hospital 1 in the included directorates was 
estimated from the breakdown by age group in the whole hospital supplied by 
the personnel dept.   
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Pilot study 
 
Chapter 5 - Pilot study 
5.1 Development of initial interview schedule 
The aim of the interview schedule was to gather data about implementation 
patterns for the guidelines. The structure came from accepted stages of the 
implementation of clinical guidelines. The stages were development, 
dissemination and implementation.160 For the interviews, these stages were 
applied to the development and introduction of the local protocols resulting 
from local adaptation (Fig 5.1). Further sections on the outcomes of guidelines 
and on general views were added. The interview questions were developed in 
consultation with audit experts (including clinical) at the Scottish Clinical Audit 
Resource Centre. 
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Protocol  
Fig 5.1 Model of Guideline im
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planned new research investigated reasons for action at each stage of guideline 
implementation, and the OL levels associated. Specific issues included: 
1. the effectiveness of different methods of dissemination,  
2. multiprofessional collaboration,  
3. the effectiveness of clinical audit,  
4. clinical and managerial learning and change, and  
5. expectations for what guidelines should achieve. 
 
The initial interview schedule included a section specifically on clinical audit 
because another study413 corroborated the use of audit (with feedback) as the 
main implementation method in use in Scottish hospitals. That study had 
focused only on DVT prophylaxis. Relevant questions were adapted from a semi-
structured interview schedule developed and piloted for a study of barriers and 
facilitating factors to clinical audit.209 Open questions were used within the 
development, dissemination, implementation and outcome structure. A section 
was added on learning at team level, and between teams. Since the research 
question covered SIGN guidelines generally, a section covering general ideals 
and beliefs about SIGN guidelines was included. 
 
5.2 Pilot study aim 
The two short-listed OL measurement scales151;313 pre-selected from the 
literature review, the hospital culture scale,229 and the initial interview 
schedule were piloted. The pilot took place in a District General Hospital 
outside Glasgow. For the pilot of the scales, the aim was to choose the 
instruments best accepted and understood in the acute hospitals in the NHS 
(Scotland). For the interview pilot, the aims were:  
1. to test face validity,  
2. to identify any ambiguous or overlapping questions,  
3. to gather comments for better wording and on topic coverage,  
4. to reveal questions not essential to the research question, 
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5. to assess timing,  
 
5.3 Pilot Method 
Four consultants from different medical and surgical specialties (Care of the 
elderly,  anaesthetics, pathology and respiratory medicine) and five senior 
nurses were selected purposively using recommendations from a contact in 
personnel and a trust structure chart to ensure wide coverage of directorates. 
Some interviews were audio-taped. Others, including a Director of Quality and 
a Consultant Obstetrician gave informal opinions.  
 
Following the pilot, interviewees were asked to complete the survey before the 
interview if possible. This was to increase rates of return and to provide 
opportunities for clarification.  
 
5.4 Pilot Results 
5.4.1 Organisational learning measurement scales  
The Learning Company questionnaire 
This tool explicitly measured ideals for learning with the reality in 
organisations. These could then be compared to measure the potential for 
change. Comments indicated that the Learning Company questionnaire314 was 
found too long and heavy with business terminology alien to health service 
professionals. It had been used in one acute hospital, but no published report 
of this was available. The only published report concerned use of the scale in 
measuring the organisational learning capacity of chartered surveyors firms.265 
This study compared the firms on the 11 dimensions used by the questionnaire, 
which the authors concluded, if “tailored to suit surveying organisations” would 
provide “helpful categories to explore and evaluate learning in surveying 
practices”. The Learning Company questionnaire was not used for my study. 
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The Learning Organisation survey 
This is referred to as the OL Survey. It was developed in Canada by Richards 
and Goh.338 This survey used a rationale based in the second approach to OL, 
the information-based organisational science theory described in the literature 
review. It assumed firstly that “OL is really about individuals learning and 
sharing knowledge that will help the organisation achieve its goals.” The second 
assumption was that “Design elements of an organisation (its structure, tasks, 
decision-making processes, reward systems and communication processes) 
either encourage or discourage learning and information exchange.”338  Richards 
and Goh’s rationale was:  
“Therefore, if we can assess how well an organisation’s design helps to 
clarify goals, encourage experimentation, and promote teamwork and 
information sharing we can evaluate the organisations learning 
capability.”  
 
The OL survey measured how satisfied the individual members of the 
organisation felt with these aspects. It performed best in the pilot. Its 
relative brevity and low use of jargon were liked. It had been reported in a 
well-recognised journal.151 There were no published examples of use of the OL 
scale in hospitals, but published articles described its use and development in 
the public sector.337;338 It was direct measure of respondents’ satisfaction with 
learning in their organisation. Lower satisfaction indicated greater potential for 
change. This scale was chosen because it was quicker to complete, had more 
face validity for health professionals, and was simpler to analyse. 
 
Because there were no published examples of use of the OL scale in hospitals, 
and as the publications related to the developers’ use of their own instrument, 
further validation was needed. A more general measure of specifically hospital 
culture was needed to do this. The hospital culture scale229 was particularly 
suitable as it focused on doctors’ and nurses’ attitudes.  It caused some 
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chuckles of recognition, especially from nurses. It was designed to measure 
health professionals’ beliefs about collaboration in the hospital. The validation 
hypothesis was that, within limits, (for example the ability to accommodate 
constructive conflict) more collaborative culture would be associated with 
greater learning capacity.  
 
5.4.2 Interview schedule 
The full interview schedule both as piloted and as changed after the pilot is 
given in technical appendices to this chapter. 
 
Theoretical framework from coding of interview schedule 
responses  
The responses to the interview questions were assigned to theoretical 
categories related to the creation and use of information, to test the 
applicability of this OL perspective to guideline implementation. These 
categories were termed “codes”. It was a hierarchical structure. The codes 
were grouped into a structure relating to the creation and use of information.  
This was called the pilot coding frame. The main headings are given below. The 
pilot coding frame appears in full in appendix A4.2. 
1. Information about the guidelines, involvement and control in their 
introduction, 
2. Quality of information (e.g. whether evidence-based), 
3. Motivation to use information, 
4. Using information, 
5. Control over the use of information, 
6. Clinical audit, 
7. Time, 
8. Limitations of information, 
9. Equity for patients, 
10. Generating or creating information, 
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11. Team uses of information. 
 
The emergence of this coding structure showed that the interview responses 
fitted into a framework based around information creation and use. That they 
did so indicated guideline implementation could be viewed as an OL process 
from the “organisational science” perspective.  
 
Implications of pilot coding frame for coding the main data 
So a culture of organisational learning, could be seen in more concrete terms in 
relation to guideline implementation as information creation (type 2 learning) 
and information use (type 1 learning). A learning culture valued both the 
creation and use of information. A hospital or group of high learning capacity 
would use guidelines to create information as well as simply using the 
information in them. Type 1 guideline implementation was referencing process. 
Type 2 guideline implementation was the creation of new information to support 
the identification and achievement of new goals.  
 
The coding frame developed in the pilot bolstered and refined the concepts of 
type 1 and type 2 learning. It applied them to information processing activities 
and skills. This information perspective later underlay the coding and analysis 
of the main project data.   
 
Revisions to the interview schedule 
Where a question did not yield codes relevant to the research question, it was 
omitted from the revised questionnaire. Where varying interpretations showed 
a relevant question had been badly designed the question was revised or merged 
with others. Where responses showed a question was not answerable - for 
example because of lack of knowledge, it was discarded. The codes are 
explained in appendix A4.3. Revisions to the interview schedule are tabulated in 
appendix A4.4 to state explicitly why each retained question was necessary in 
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relation to the OL approach used, and why each discarded or adapted question 
was dropped or changed. Questions were cross-referenced to the questions in 
the old interview schedule that had generated them.  
 
5.5 Summary of changes resulting from pilot 
A technical appendix (A4) cross-references the interview schedule to the 
coding frame. This appendix contains: 
1. the interview schedule piloted 
2. the coding of responses showing how each code was related to individual 
questions in the old interview schedule, and also showing how the codes 
were intended to relate to the new questions 
3. the pilot coding frame – formally ordered and numbered, 
4. the revisions to the piloted interview schedule with reasons for each 
amendment or deletion 
 
The new interview schedule with reasons for asking each question is given in 
appendix A1.4. The full changes made to the pilot interview schedule and 
personal details survey are summarised in tables A4.4.1 and A4.4.2 in appendix 
4.4. Deletions were made for the following reasons:  
 
1. The question was not directly related to the research question, for 
example: 
i. to what extent  there had been previous involvement in guideline 
implementation,  
ii. what were attitudes about clinical audit.  
 
 
2. The question was covered elsewhere,  for example: 
i. attitudes to particular guideline – covered in general issues 
section, 
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ii. length of service, age gender etc were covered in the OL survey. 
 
3. The question was found to lead the interviewee to assent or to influence 
answers to other questions, for example: 
i. whether the interviewee found any local protocol (if developed) 
satisfactory, 
ii. section on audit replaced by one on implementation, 
iii. whether results were shared with other teams replaced with 
question on learning about other teams. 
 
There was a change in ordering of questions to put general questions at the 
end, because they were more difficult for interviewees to answer “cold”. These 
changes were intended to increased validity and reliability as they further 
focused the interview, prevented redundancy and reduced threats to validity 
from leading questions. Some additions were made. The main research issue was 
highlighted by reflection on the pilot as whether involvement in guideline 
implementation was associated with higher OL capacity. The data testing this 
was strengthened by adding a question on whether the interviewee was part of 
the implementation group for the guideline. A suggestion from a senior manager 
that how trust senior management could help to facilitate learning from 
guideline implementation should be a question was included. That the suggestion 
was made showed there was for senior managers a real interest in how to make 
guidelines effective. 
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Section 3 – Results 
This section has 5 chapters.  
• Chapter 6 is concerned with validity. It reports response rates, tests of 
the survey data to ensure they were representative of the hospitals, and 
tests of the validity in the NHS acute hospital setting of the instrument 
used, 
• Chapter 7 is hypothesis generating, and compares the context of each 
organisation using a humanistic qualitative analysis,  
• Chapter 8 is hypothesis testing. It compares OL score between study 
samples,  
• Chapter 9 is hypothesis testing, and compares guideline implementation 
activities and beliefs between study samples, 
• Chapter 10 is hypothesis testing, and compares the OL scores associated 
with the main guidelines implementation activities and beliefs with the 
OL scores for others. 
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Chapter 6 – Validity testing 
6.1. Aim of this chapter  
The overall purpose of this chapter can be divided into three  parts: 
1. to report the response rates and missing values,  
2. to make demographic comparisons between the sample and the 
populations, and analyse the effect of reminders 
3. to validate the research tools in the NHS acute hospital setting 
 
6.2.  Response to scales and interviews 
It was essential to show how representative the survey responders were to 
allow valid comparisons of hospitals’ OL scores. 
6.2.1 Response rates 
In hospital 2 the sample was over 75% of the population, in hospital 1 it was 
50%. The replies from all grades of staff to the requests for participation 
included both first and second time responders. The first time response rate 
was higher at hospital 1 than hospital 2. No differences were found between 
first and second time responders in hospital 2 on mean scale scores or 
demographic and other indicators. There were no reminders at hospital 1. Some 
of the replies were refusals to participate. Some participated in interview or 
survey but not both. See chart 6.1. 
 
The important response for comparison of hospitals was that from senior staff 
in each profession (G grade nurses and consultants), because this group was 
compared between hospitals. This rate was much higher.  See charts 6.2 and 
6.3. 
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Chart 6.1 – response rates from all staff by hospital (N=1499) 
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Chart 6.2 Response rates of senior Nurses/Midwives by hospital (N = 189) 
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Chart 6.3  Response rates of consultants by hospital. (N=62) 
Notes to charts 
$ The number of G grade nurses/midwives in the hospital 1 sample was estimated - see 
statistics section 4.6 
# The number of consultants in the hospital 1 sample was estimated – see statistics section 
4.6 
* In hospital 1 the Medical director and the 6 Clinical Directors in the relevant directorates 
were all included in the sample. The total population in Hospital 1 was 1210, the research 
population of 883 excluded the 327 staff in the excluded directorates. 
** 1 anonymous survey respondent deducted 
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In hospital 2 the high response from the senior staff was due partly to 
telephone reminders, which were much more effective than the written 
reminders to the junior staff. Responses from the consultants and G grades 
combined to give a reasonable comparison in this important senior clinical group 
of the learning capacity of the two hospitals (see table 6.1). 
 
HOSPITAL Doctor Nurse Total 
1 11 (39%) 33 (53%) 44 (49%) 
2 17 (61%) 29 (47%) 46 (51%) 
Total 28 (100%) 62 (100%) 90 (100%) 
Table 6.1 senior clinical comparison group for analysis by profession and 
hospital. 
 
6.2.2 Reasons for non participation 
Reasons for refusing to participate in the survey fell into 5 broad groups (table 
6.2).  
 
Reason Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Total  
Not involved with topic 16 (47%) 3   (12%) 19 (32%) 
Too busy 2  (6%) 12 (46%) 14 (23%) 
No knowledge of SIGN guidelines 2  (6%) 1   (4%) 3  (5%) 
Other 5  (15%) 3   (12%) 8  (13%) 
Away from work etc. (exclusions) 9  (26%) 7   (26%) 16 (27%) 
Totals 34 (100%) 26 (100%) 60 (100%) 
Table  6.2  All staff, reasons for non response 
  
Some non-participants were excluded from the study. Exclusion from the study 
was justified if it did not reduce representation. The two main reasons for non-
response were not grounds for exclusion from the study because: 
1. Non-involvement with the topic was no bar to completing a survey, 
these people were as much a part of the culture as those involved.  
2. Lack of time (“too busy”) would exclude the busiest people who were 
also likely to have more contact with others and hence to be the 
most influential. 
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The relative sizes of the two main reasons for non-response were reversed 
between the hospitals (table 6.2), but the total percentage was similar. Valid 
exclusions (both hospitals) were mainly for maternity absence, (table 6.3). 
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Outpatient attachment only (1) 
Only 1 session per week (1) 
Left hospital (2) 
Less than 3 months in post (1)  212
 
able 6.3 Reasons for exclusion from the study (all staff both hospitals) 
ssuming the proportion excluded was reflected in the samples, the effective 
ample size was reducible by an equivalent percentage in each hospital. This 
eant the effective response rate was increased. The increase was not 
uantifiable because the non-responders may have differed from the 
esponders. The exclusions applied to senior clinical staff too. See table 6.4. 
Gave reason for 
refusal 
No 
Reason  
Total 
refusals 
ospital 1 Exclusion     Not 
exclusion
  
 Grade nurses /midwives 2 14 4 20 
onsultants 1 1 3 5 
otal 3 15 7 25 
ospital 2 
 
Exclusion 
 
Not 
exclusion
  
 Grade nurses 2 7 2 11 
onsultants 1 5 5 11 
otal 3 12 7 22 
able 6.4 Senior grades’ reasons for refusing to participate in the survey 
.2.3 Missing Scale Values  
ain scales 
n the calculation of main scale means the denominator was reduced according 
o the number of items missing. In the OL scale responses there were three 
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items with more than two missing responses.  Comments about the 
organisational mission indicated that the important mission was seen as 
professional. This may have explained the 8 missing responses to this item. 
Other items had between zero and two values missing.  
 
On the formalisation scale no item had more than four responses missing. On 
the job satisfaction scale the highest missing responses were seven for 
satisfaction with supervisor. This item did not apply to some staff. The hospital 
culture scale allowed respondents to check a “don't know” or “not applicable” 
box for each item instead of scoring it. These were coded as missing for the 
calculation of means, resulting in higher numbers of missing values. The 
maximum was 25.  
 
The highest numbers of missing items on both the hospital culture and the 
learning capacity scales related to knowledge of the hospital mission statement 
(item 10 on the culture scale and item 2 on the learning capacity scale). For the 
other main scales, >95% of scale items were 100% complete. 
 
Sub-scales in the learning capacity scale – missing values by 
response case 
Sub-scale means were calculated by reducing the denominator if there was only 
one item missing in a response. If more than one item was missing the sub-scale 
mean was coded as missing. One response was affected for senior clinicians 
(transfer of knowledge sub-scale), and four for all staff. For all respondents 
199 scale means resulted for all sub-scales except transfer of knowledge (197) 
and teamwork and group problem solving (198). For senior clinical staff 90 scale 
means resulted for each sub-scale except transfer of knowledge (89). 
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Hospital culture scale 
Sufficient items for the calculation of scale means were completed by 195 of 
199 respondents. The large percentage of “don’t know” and “not applicable” 
responses, which were coded as missing and replaced by means, meant these 
results from this scale had to be interpreted with slightly more caution. 
Sufficient items for the calculation of scale means were completed by 88 of 
the 90 senior clinical respondents. There were fewer missing values to be 
replaced by scale means among senior respondents than in the full set of 199. 
 
Missing values effect on means for main scales 
Scale means were calculated both for all respondents and the senior clinical 
group. For each main scale, the number of items with missing values was 
counted by response case rather than by individual item. The maximum number 
of items missed by any respondent was 10 by one respondent on the hospital 
culture scale. The maximum for a senior respondent was eight by one 
respondent on the hospital culture scale. Most responses were complete. 
 
6.2.4 Response to interviews  
The majority of interviewees were senior staff (31 in hospital 1 and 32 in 
hospital 2). In hospital 1, 48 of 54 interviewees responded to both the survey 
and interview, in hospital 2 it was 44 of 47. The response for interviews about 
DVT guidelines was higher than for Diabetes (see table 6.5).  
 
Hospital DVT 
interviews 
Diabetes 
interviews 
Other guidelines 
interviews 
Total 
Interviews 
1 36 10 8 54 
2 37 2 8 47 
Table 6.5 Interview numbers split by guideline and hospital.  
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The low number of diabetes interviews in hospital 2 may have been because the 
consultant in charge of the diabetes unit did not participate. Lack of time was 
the reason given. 
 
6.2.5 Summary of response rate analysis 
The analysis of response rates has shown the following points: 
1. the survey response rate from senior clinical staff sampled in each 
hospital was higher than for junior staff.  
2. the response rates among senior clinical staff were broadly similar 
between hospitals,  
3. response rate  was highest in hospital 1 consultants (65%) and hospital 2 
consultants (57%).   
4. hospital 2 G-grades (57%) gave a higher response than hospital 1 G-
grades (53%).   
5. a significant minority (roughly a quarter) of the total reasons given for 
non-participation justified the exclusion of the respondent from the 
study sample, so increasing the effective response rate, 
6. a somewhat smaller but still significant proportion of senior clinical 
staff (20%) gave reasons for non-participation justifying exclusion from 
the study, somewhat increasing the effective response rate for senior 
staff so that comparisons between hospitals based on them were more 
valid,  
7. the completion of individual items by responders was good on the main 
scales, where >95% of scale items were 100% complete, 
8. only two sub-scales had more than 1 item missing. The senior clinical 
staff missed fewer items.  
 
Overall, the response from the key group of senior clinical staff was better 
than from junior staff. It was acceptable for management research in NHS 
Chapter 6 - Validity testing 
 216
hospitals, as shown by comparison with other published studies with low 
response rates shown in tables A6.1.1 and A6.1.2 in appendix 6.1.  
 
6.3 Responses for demographic and organisational groups 
6.3.1 Introduction 
It was important to assess whether demographic factors might bias 
comparisons. To assess the likelihood of this, the compositions of population, 
sample and survey response groups were compared. Scale score was compared 
for demographic sub groups across the study samples. Those responding after 
reminders were compared with first time responders. The full response group 
was used in validation of scales and for comparisons within hospitals. The senior 
clinical staff were compared demographically between hospitals as they were 
the group for whom scale scores were compared between hospitals. 
 
In hospital 2 additional data was available about the population’s seniority, 
length of service, age, and gender. In hospital 1 the numbers of senior clinical 
staff in the sample were estimated from the population. The survey responders 
in hospital 1 were compared with those at hospital 2. There were no significant 
differences in age band, length of service, or profession. Midwives and audit 
co-ordinator  (hospital 1) were excluded for the comparison of profession.  
 
6.3.2 Gender 
Response in comparison to population 
A significantly higher proportion of males than females responded at hospital 2. 
A one sample Chi square test showed this (statistics section 4.6 and table 6.6). 
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Gender Responders Population  
Male 24 (27%) 111 (18%) 
Female 66 (73%) 500 (82%) 
Total 90 (100%) 611 (100%) 
Table 6.6 Difference in gender between responders and population in hospital 2  
X2 = 4.37, DF=1, p<0.05 (Note: 13 anonymous responders (1 male and 12 female) and 16 of 
unknown sex (13 who did not respond, and 3 who responded but were not in the sample) were 
deducted from the population. This was so as not to inflate the value of X2.) 
 
Hospital 1 in comparison to hospital 2  
The survey response in hospital 2 was compared with that in hospital 1. Gender 
of the survey respondents was significantly different (see table 6.7).  
 
Gender Hospital 1 Hospital 2 
Male 15 (14%) 24 (27%) 
Female 94 (86%) 66 (73%) 
Total 109 90 
Table  6.7 Number of survey responders by gender and hospital (Yates’ X2 
statistic = 5.2, DF=1, p<0.05 )  
 
More males responded than expected at hospital 2 – this difference was 
evident between hospitals to a small extent across all professions. It reached 
significance owing to the high number of junior midwives responding at hospital 
1, who were all female. Females were significantly more likely than males to see 
their hospital as formal, and significantly less likely to see it as collaborative 
(table 6.8). 
 
Scale Female mean Male mean T 
statistic 
Significance 
Formalisation 4.6 4.0 3.6 <0.000 
Collaboration 3.1 3.4 2.7 <0.01 
Table 6.8 Significant main scale differences between females and males (all 
responders) 
 
There was no significant difference between the genders in job satisfaction or 
learning capacity scores. There were no significant differences between 
hospitals for senior clinical responders on gender. This was important, as they 
were the group used for comparison of OL capacity scores between hospitals. 
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6.3.3 Seniority 
To confirm whether the seniority balance in the hospital 2 sample represented 
the population, a one sample X2 test was used. Grade was re-coded into two 
categories, senior and junior. Clinical consultants and nurses of G-grade and 
above were classified as senior, all others as junior. There was no significant 
difference between sample and population on seniority (table 6.9). 
 
Grade Sample Population 
Senior 83 (21%) 116 (19%) 
Junior 390 (79%) 510 (81%) 
Total 473 626 
Table 6.9 Population and sample in hospital 2 by grade. (1 clinical audit and 13 
anonymous responders excluded) 
 
However, differences between survey responders and population in hospital 2 
were significant as shown in table 6.10. 
 
Grade Survey responders Population 
Senior 51 (57%) 116 (19%) 
Junior 39 (43%) 510 (81%) 
Total 90 626 
One sample X2 =  86.60, DF = 1, p<0.01 
Table 6.10 Population and survey responders in hospital 2 by grade. (1 clinical 
audit and 13 anonymous responders excluded).  
 
The survey response in hospital 2 significantly over-represented senior staff. 
The stratification at the reminder stage explained this. It was part of the 
reminder strategy to include as many senior clinical staff as possible. The 
seniority of responders was compared between hospitals (table 6.11). 
 
Seniority Hospital 1 Hospital 2
Senior 45(42%) 51(57%)
Junior 63(58%) 39(43%)
Total 108 90
X2 = 4.42, DF = 1, p<0.036 
Table 6.11 Hospitals by seniority level (1 clinical audit excl.)  
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The imbalance in seniority between hospital responses did not affect the 
comparison between hospitals because the comparison group was restricted to 
senior clinical staff.  
 
6.3.4 Profession  
In hospital 2 data for grade, length of service, age, and gender were available. 
In hospital 1 the numbers of clinical G grades and consultants in the sample 
were estimated as confidentiality rules forbade their disclosure. The survey 
response group was compared with the research population for each hospital. 
The profession balance was similar for each hospital between survey 
responders and population. See table 6.12.  
 
Senior  clinical staff Hospital 1 
response 
Estimated 
Population 
Hospital 1 
Hospital 2 
response 
Population 
Hospital 2 
 
consultants 11 (25%) 27 (17%) 17 (37%) 35 (37%) 
nurse/midwife (G grade) 33 (75%) 130 (83%) 29 (63%) 59 (63%) 
Total  44 157 46 94 
 X2= 1.9, DF = 1, p>0.05 % response as for population 
Table 6.12 Senior clinical survey responders and senior clinical research 
population by hospital. 
 
The 46 senior clinical staff from hospital 2 were compared with the hospital 2 
population. The profession balance was similar (see table 6.13). 
 
Profession Hospital 1 response Hospital 2 response 
Doctor 11 (25%) 17 (37%) 
Nurse or 
Midwife 
33 (75%) 29 (63%) 
Total 44 46 
 X2 (Yates) = 1.00, DF = 1, p>0.05 
Table 6.13 Comparison of response by senior clinical staff between hospitals  
 
There was no significant difference between the hospitals in the balance 
between G grades and consultants responding to the survey - see table 6.13. 
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There was no significant difference in profession between all survey 
responders and population in hospital 2 (see table 6.14). Anonymous responders 
and 1 clinical audit were deducted from the population for the chi-square. In 
hospital 1 however, proportionately fewer doctors responded than 
nurses/midwives. Proportions of doctors and nurses/midwives in the hospital 1 
research population (which excluded certain directorates) were estimated from 
the proportions known to exist in the whole population for hospital 1, but this 
was not of high validity as described in the statistics section 4.6.  
 
Profession All Survey 
responders 
hospital 1 
Estimated 
research 
population 
hospital 1 
All Survey 
responders 
Hospital 2 
Population 
hospital 2 
Doctor 16(15%) 256(29%) 23(26%) 136(21%)
Nurse/midwife/audit 92(85%) 627(71%) 67(74%) 504(79%)
Total 108 883 90 640
 X2 = 10.5, DF = 1, p<0.01 X2 = 1.08, DF = 1, p>0.05
Table 6.14 Numbers of each profession responding from each hospital  
 
6.3.5 Time in organisation 
Length of service for the survey responders was normally distributed in each 
hospital. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z value was 1.3 for hospital 1  (p>0.05) and 1.1 
for hospital 2  (p>0.01). The mean for hospital 1 was 11 years (n=107) and for 
hospital 2 12.2 years (n=90). 
 
 
For all respondents, there was a correlation between length of service (time in 
the organisation) and learning capacity score, job satisfaction score and 
collaboration score (see table 6.15). There was no correlation between length of 
service and formalisation score. Both senior and junior seniority groups 
differed from all respondents, their length of service had no correlation with 
any of the scale scores, so seniority rather than length of service was the main 
factor associated with scale score.  
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 Correlation 
(Pearsons r)
Significance N 
OL Capacity 0.155 0.029 197 
Job satisfaction 0.196 0.006 197 
Hospital culture 0.151 0.036 193 
Table 6.15 Time in organisation (all staff) – correlation with scale scores 
 
Start year of service, hospital 2  
The sample in hospital 2 was compared on start year of service with the 
population. The population mean start year was 1991. The mean start year for 
the survey responders was 1988. The start year of service was compared 
between the survey responders (excluding the anonymous ones) and the whole 
population using a one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (rather than a one 
sample t-test) as the research population was not normally distributed on 
length of service – shown by the high value for Z from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test (see table 6.16). The survey responders were normally distributed. 
 
 N Z p 
Research population  
(not normally distributed) 
626 3.8 <0.001 
Survey responders 
(normally distributed) 
77 1.08 >0.1 
Table 6.16 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of population and survey responders’ 
distributions on start year of service in hospital 2  
 
 
Chart 6.4 shows how the year of start of service in hospital 2 was not normally 
distributed. It was skewed toward more recent starts. 
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Chart 6.4 Hospital 2 research population by start year of service (N=626) 
 
Both population and sample of senior clinical staff were normally distributed on 
start year of service. Kolmogorov-Smirnov “Z” = 0.66 for the hospital 2 
population, and 0.54 for the sample, (p>0.7 for both). Length of service for the 
senior clinical survey responders and the senior clinical population was normally 
distributed in each hospital. Kolmogorov-Smirnov “Z” = 0.49 for hospital 1 and 
0.56 for hospital 2, (p>0.9 for both).  
 
There was a significant difference between hospitals in length of time in their 
current post for all responders, but not for senior or junior staff alone (table 
6.17). Staff stayed longer in their positions at hospital 2. There was no 
significant difference between hospitals for length of service.  
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Group Hospital 1 mean 
time in current 
position 
Hospital 2 mean 
time in current 
position
N T 
statistic 
Two tailed 
sig. 
Senior clinical 
responders 
8.9 10.8 90 1.31 <0.194 
Junior 
responders 
3.1 3.6 107 0.60 <0.53 
All survey 
responders 
5.5 7.5 197 2.15 <0.034 
    
 Hospital 1 mean 
length of service 
Hospital 2 mean 
length of service
N 
 
T 
statistic 
Two tailed 
sig. 
Senior clinical 
responders  
17.15 15.78 90 0.80 <0.43 
Junior 
responders 
6.6 7.4 107 0.60 <0.55 
All survey 
responders 
11.0 12.2 197 0.93 <0.36 
Table 6.17 Years in current post for responders by hospital and mean length of 
service for senior clinical responders in each hospital 
 
 
The mean number of previous organizations staff had worked in was similar 
between hospitals (Appendix A5.1). The same applied for senior and junior staff 
to the mean number of previous functional areas staff had worked in. For all 
staff considered together, staff had worked in significantly more functional 
areas at hospital 1 (Appendix A5.1). From hospital 1 38 (36%), and from hospital 
2, 34 (38%) had worked in another industry. In hospital 1 32 respondents, and 
in hospital 2, 25, gave a length of time in another industry. There was no 
significant difference between hospitals for all staff or for senior or junior 
staff in the length of time. They had spent on average twice as long in the 
hospital as since working in the other industry and joining the hospital. These 
responders had thus had time to absorb hospital culture.  
 
6.3.6 Age group 
The population in each age group in hospital 1 in the included directorates was 
estimated as described in the statistics section 4.6. There was a significant 
difference in age group (see table 6.18) at 5% between hospital 2 responders 
and hospital 2 population (one sample X2 = 10.00, DF = 3, p<0.05). 
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Age group 20-30 31-40 41-50 51+ Total 
Estimated population Hospital 1 
 
247 
(28%)
391
(44%)
164 
(19%) 
77 
(9%) 
879
(100%)
Population Hospital 2 215
(33%)
241
(38%)
129 
(20%) 
55 
(9%) 
640
(100%)
All survey responders hospital 1 24 
(22%)
52
(49%)
24 
(22%) 
7 
(7%) 
107
(100%)
All survey responders hospital 2 17
(19%)
41
(46%)
21 
(23%) 
11 
(12%) 
90
(100%)
Senior clinical responders Hospital 1 0
(0%)
20
(45%)
18 
(41%) 
6 
(14%) 
44
(100%)
Senior clinical responders Hospital 2 2
(4%)
22
(48%)
12 
(26%) 
10 
(22%) 
46
(100%)
Table 6.18 Numbers and rounded row percent for the balance of age groups 
between hospitals and all survey responders and the population in hospital 2. (4 
in hospital 1 were of unknown age) 
 
There was no significant difference between age group of hospital 1 responders 
and the estimated age groups in the hospital 1 population (one sample X2 = 1.63, 
DF = 3, p>0.05). There was no difference in age group between hospitals for all 
staff (X2 = 2.13, DF = 3, p<0.55) or for senior clinical responders (X2= 4.25, DF 
= 3, p<0.24). This meant bias of scale score comparison between hospitals owing 
to age group was unlikely.  
 
Age within hospital  
The OL score for different age groups showed a similar pattern in each 
hospital for all respondents (see charts 6.5 to 6.6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6.5 OL score by age group within profession (Hospital 1) 
 
HOSPITAL:         1
Age range 
51-6041-5031-4020-30
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OL 
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Nurses’ scores increased, doctors’ decreased with age. The pattern was similar 
for senior staff. This was of course an age effect rather than a cohort tracked 
longitudinally. The over 61 age group was excluded as it contained one doctor 
and no nurses. There were 2 missing values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6.6 OL score by age group within profession (Hospital 2) 
 
Scale means in individual age groups 
OL score varied differently with age in each profession (see chart 6.7). 
 
 
Chart 6.7  scale means for age groups by profession (N=196) 
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Generally, OL capacity peaked at 41-50. See chart 6.8. 
 
Chart 6.8 Scale means for age groups (N=196) 
 
For all survey responders together, the age effect was tested using one–way 
ANOVA. It was significant for: 
• formalisation (F=2.8, p<.05), 
 
and sub-scales: 
• clarity of purpose (F=3.3, p<.03),  
• leadership commitment and empowerment (F=3.0, p<.04), 
teamwork  (F=2.8, p<.05). 
 
Age within profession 
Appendix A5.2 contains a table by age group and profession. OL capacity 
peaked in the medical profession in the 31-40 group, while in nurses it rose 
consistently through the age groups and overtook doctors in the 41-50 age 
group (see chart 6.7 above, and appendix A5.2). For nurses the age effect on 
OL capacity was significant (F=4.7, p=.009). 
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Appendix A5.2 gives table giving means for the sub-scales of OL capacity. 
Chart 6.9  (below) gives an overview. 
Chart 6.9 – Sub scale means by age within profession 
 
The teamwork and group problem solving means were generally the highest. The 
age effect in the sub scale score was significant for the medical profession for 
one of the learning capacity sub scales. This was clarity of purpose and mission 
(one way ANOVA, F=5.7, p<.004). For doctors, OL clarity of purpose peaked at 
31-40, but fell after that. For nurses all of the sub scale scores in the learning 
capacity scale except for clarity of purpose were significantly affected by age 
group (table 6.19).  
 
Sub-scale F P 
Clarity of purpose 0.5 <0.68 
Leadership 4.3 <0.007 
Experimentation 3.7 <0.015 
Transfer of knowledge 2.7 <0.050 
Teamwork 6.7 <0.000 
Table 6.19 Analysis of variance in sub-scale scores by nurses’ age group 
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For midwives there was no significant age effect, perhaps because most of 
them (23 of 29) were concentrated in the 31-40 age group. Possible causes for 
the changes in OL score with age are discussed in Section 4. 
 
6.3.7 Guideline Implementation dates 
Hospital 1 
In hospital 1 the DVT prophylaxis guideline was implemented with Clinical audit 
department support in February 1996. The Diabetes guidelines were 
implemented from June 1996 (clinical audit department). 
 
Hospital 2 
In hospital 2 the DVT guideline was first implemented at different times from 
1995 to 1997 in separate directorates by the clinical audit department, see 
Appendix A5.2 for details.  
 
Of the diabetes guidelines, only the visual impairment guideline needed formal 
implementation in hospital 2 (clinical audit department), again see appendix 
A5.2 for details of directorate implementation dates.  
 
Numbers starting pre or post implementation were compared using the date of 
directorate implementation. There was an obvious equivalence in the figures for 
each hospital (table 6.20). 
 
                   Hospital 1 Hospital 2 
Started Survey Survey 
Pre DVT  
Post DVT 
Unknown  
77 (71%) 
31 (28%) 
1   (1%) 
64 (71%) 
26 (29%) 
0 
Total 109 (100%) 90 (100%) 
Table 6.20  Both hospitals. Counts of survey responders by DVT guideline 
implementation date. X2 = 0.13, DF = 1, p>0.05 
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A comparison between responders and population was possible for hospital 2. X2 
for hospital 2 survey responders compared to research population on whether 
started in post at hospital before or after implementation of DVT guideline 
showed no significant difference. 
 
6.3.8 Reminders (Hospital 2) 
The methods and targets for reminders in Hospital 2 are shown in table 6.21.  
 
Reminder type 53 telephone 
reminders   
50 written reminders 
To 21 consultants 
30 G-grades * 
 2 F-grades 
 9 Doctors below consultant  
40 D/E grades 
 1 F grade 
Surveys 
returned 
28 (53%) 7 (14%) 
Table 6.21 Response to reminders, Hospital 2. (* 6 G and 9 H grades employed 
on non clinical duties were excluded, 1 G-grade on night shift was not 
contactable) 
 
Comparison of first and second time responders 
The survey responders from the reminded group were compared to the first 
time survey responders on age profession and whether started in the trust pre 
or post DVT guideline implementation. There was no significant difference.  
Sub-scale scores were compared for first time survey responders (55) and 
second time survey responders (35). An independent samples t-test showed no 
significant difference between those reminded and the first time responders. 
There was no significant difference in the balance of consultants and clinical G-
grades returning surveys before compared with after a reminder (table 6.22). 
 
Doctor Nurse 
Survey response and reminder 7 (25%) 14 (23%) 
Survey response no reminder 21 (75%) 48 (77%) 
Total  28 (100%) 62 (100%) 
Table 6.22 First time and reminded respondents in senior clinical group (both 
hospitals combined) X2 = 0.063, DF = 1, p >0.05 
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Sub-scale scores were compared for the senior clinical group. An independent 
samples t-test showed no significant difference between those reminded and 
the first time responders.  
 
6.3.9 Conclusion on demographics of the sample 
 
The senior clinical groups in each hospital were sufficiently similar on 
profession, gender and age to provide a useful comparison of learning capacity 
scores between hospitals and between consultants and G grade nurses. The 
senior staff included were representative of senior clinical staff in the 
hospital. The survey sample in hospital 2 was weighted to males and the senior 
clinical staff.  
 
Length of service had no significant correlation with OL score for senior staff 
or for juniors, but did for all staff as a whole, implying seniority was the active 
factor. It was normally distributed in the survey responders, but not in the 
population in hospital 2. Senior staff were normally distributed on this. There 
was no significant difference between hospitals in length of service for senior 
staff. Nor was there a difference for them in time in position or number of 
organisations or functional areas worked for. 
 
Age was related to nurses’ OL score in Hospital 2 but not for doctors and not in 
Hospital 1.  Age was associated with differences in clarity of purpose and 
mission for senior staff. This peaked at 31-40 for seniors as a group, but rose 
consistently for senior nurses, though not as much as their score on other OL 
sub-scales. 
 
There was a spread of responses from different directorates in each hospital. 
Reminders were possible in hospital 2, and created a response group of senior 
clinical staff that was comparable between hospitals. However, the DVT 
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guideline was implemented a year later in Hospital 2 than in hospital 1, while the 
diabetes guidelines were implemented in both hospitals from the first half of 
1996. 
 
6.4 Validation of scales 
 
As the OL, formalisation, and job satisfaction scales had not been tested in 
NHS acute hospitals they needed validation in that environment. The first 
stage was to test whether the distribution of the data was normal, and thus 
whether parametric statistical tests could be used. Item means were compared 
between hospitals. Then the scores of all staff on the four main scales, OL 
capacity, formalisation, job satisfaction, and collaborative culture were 
correlated to see whether correlations obtained by the developers were 
replicated. Correlation was done both overall and in main demographic 
subgroups. Where possible, this validation used both hospitals combined for the 
larger numbers and better statistical significance. The correlation between the 
OL sub scales and between the OL sub-scales and the OL main scale was 
checked as a test of reliability. 
 
6.4.1 Distribution of survey scores. 
The responses to the OL capacity scale, the formalisation scale, the job 
satisfaction scale and the hospital culture scale were normally distributed. The 
one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirmed this. Overall, job satisfaction 
and formalisation were slightly positively skewed but not significantly at 5% 
(see appendix 5). 
 
The distributions were normal for: 
• each hospital sample and for hospitals analysed together,  
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• Doctors and for nurses and midwives grouped together both across and 
within hospitals,  
• G grade nurses and consultants as separate groups both within each 
hospital and for the hospitals combined, 
• Both senior and junior clinical staff.  
 
6.4.2 Mean survey scores 
 
Means for each item on the OL capacity scale were calculated in each hospital 
and for both hospitals together. The means are shown in Chart 6.10. A table is 
to be found in appendix A6.2 and the full text for scale items in appendix 
A1.1.1.  
 
Chart 6.10 Means for individual items in the OL capacity questionnaire. All 
survey respondents.  Sub-scale name is shown at beginning of each group. 
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Similar patterns for individual scale items in each hospital gave evidence of 
item reliability. The highest and lowest items were the same in both hospitals. 
The highest was item 20: “The organisation’s mission statement identifies 
values to which all employees must conform.” The lowest was item 10: 
“Innovative ideas that work are often rewarded by management.” The means 
for individual items were similar in each trust. In general, means for hospital 1 
were, as predicted, higher than for hospital 2. This suggested hospital 1 had 
greater OL capacity. 
 
6.4.3 Correlation between the 4 main scales 
The OL capacity scale was found by its authors to be positively correlated with 
job satisfaction (r=0.064, p<0.001, n=429) and weakly negatively correlated 
with formalisation (r= -0.023, p<0.001, n=429).151  
 
In the two hospitals taken together, the correlation with job satisfaction was 
confirmed (table 6.23 below). The correlation with the collaborative culture 
scale, was positive, as expected. This gave further evidence for the validity of 
the OL capacity scale in the acute NHS hospital setting. There was no 
correlation with formalisation score either negative or positive.  
 
Table 6.23 Correlation between hospital culture (HC), OL and other main scales 
for (1) senior clinical group only (bold) and (2) all respondents.  
 
 OL /job 
satisfaction 
OL/Formalis’n OL /HC Formalis’n/ 
HC 
Job 
satisfaction/HC 
 Senior All Senior All Senior All Senior All Senior All 
Pear’n 
Corrl’n   
0.516 0.58 -0.032 -0.13 0.444 0.49 -.030 -0.13 0.476 0.48 
Sig. <0.000 <0.000 <0.766 <0.07 <0.000 <0.000 <0.78 <0.08 <0.000 <0.000 
N            90 198 90 198 88 195  88 194 88 194 
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Correlation between the scales was tested separately in consultants, G grades, 
and junior staff. Two of the 3 correlations found between scales existed to a 
greater degree for consultants than for juniors or G-grades (see table 6.24).  
 
Group Job satisfaction /OL 
capacity 
Correlation (r)   Number 
Hospital culture 
/OL capacity 
Correlation (r)     Number 
Hospital culture 
/job satisfaction 
Correlation (r)      Number 
Consultants 0.57 28 0.695   26 0.56 26 
G-grades 0.6 62 0.48 62 0.39 62 
Juniors 0.52 90 0.44 88 0.48 88 
Table 6.24 Significant correlation between main scales for consultants, G-
grades, and junior nurses/doctors p<0.01 for all 
 
Correlation between scales within age groups 
The effect of age on the correlation between scales was investigated, with the 
results shown in tables 6.25, 6.26 and 6.27.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.25 Correlation of OL / job satisfaction scale scores in the 4 main age 
groups  
 
In those under 51 years old there was a highly significant positive correlation 
between OL capacity score and job satisfaction (table 6.25). In those over 50, 
OL capacity score and job satisfaction were not significantly correlated. The 
OL scale was therefore most valid for those under 51. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.26 Correlation of OL / formalisation scale scores in main age groups  
 
Age group Correlation of OL / job 
satisfaction (Pearson’s r) 
Significance  Number  
20-30  0.62  <0.000 41 
31-40  0.64  <0.000 93 
41-50  0.54  <0.000 45 
51-60  -0.124  >0.63 17 
Age group Correlation of  OL / 
formalisation (Pearson’s r) 
Significance Number  
20-30  -0.077 >0.6 41 
31-40   0.018 >0.8 93 
41-50   0.082 >0.59 45 
51-60   0.37 >0.14 17 
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OL and formalisation were not significantly related in any age group. The 
developers found a weak divergence here. See table 6.26.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.27 Correlation of OL / collaborative culture scores in the 4 age groups  
 
In those under 41 OL capacity and collaborative culture were, as predicted, 
significantly positively correlated (table 6.27). This showed again that the scale 
was most valid for younger staff, who scored most highly on OL. In the 51-60 
age group there was a significant negative relationship between job satisfaction 
and formalisation (Pearsons r -0.67, N = 17, p <0.004). The relationship between 
job satisfaction and collaboration was significant in age groups 20-30 and 31-
40. This was again in accordance with other data showing the scales were most 
valid in younger age groups – table 6.28. Over age 40, the relationship between 
job satisfaction and collaboration remained positive but not significantly. 
 
Age group Pearsons r N Significance 
20-30 0.49 39 p<0.002 
31-40 0.56 93 p<0.000 
Table 6.28 Relationship between job satisfaction and formalisation  
 
Correlation between scales by age within profession 
To check for any differences within professions which might affect hypothesis 
testing, the significant correlation of the OL capacity scale with the other 
scales was tabulated for each profession within each age group. See table 6.29. 
 
 
 
 
 
Age group Correlation of  OL / 
collaborative culture (r)  
Significance Number  
20-30  0.58 <0.000 39 
31-40  0.6  <0.000 93 
41-50  0.288  >0.05 44 
51-60  0.089  >0.74 16 
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Age group Job satisfaction/ OL  Collaborative culture/ OL  
 Pearsons r N Pearsons r N 
20-40     
Doctor 0.76**  18 0.78**  17 
Nurse/midwife 0.63**  115 0.60**  114 
41+     
Doctor 0.42 21 0.55*  19 
Nurse/midwife 0.61**  42 0.36*  42 
Table 6.29 Correlation between OL capacity and other scale means by age group 
within profession (Related at 5% = * at 1% = **) 
 
Like the OL score itself, the correlation between OL and job satisfaction and 
collaborative culture scales for doctors lessened after the 20-40 age group. 
For nurses the reduction was gentler or not present (table 6.29 above). Both 
the correlation between doctors’ OL capacity and job satisfaction (table 6.29) 
and their mean OL capacity (chart 6.7) were highest below age 40. 
 
6.4.4 Correlation between sub scales  
For the full response set, all the OL capacity sub-scales were significantly 
correlated with each other at p<0.000. See table 6.30. 
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Table 6.30 correlation between sub-scales. N=199. 
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All sub-scales were correlated with OL capacity scale total at p<0.000 for all 
respondents (not shown) and for the senior clinical staff alone (table 6.31) 
 
SUBSCALE 
 
Pearson Correlation 
Clarity of Purpose and mission 0.73 
Leadership commitment and empowerment 0.85 
Experimentation 0.89 
Transfer of Knowledge 0.85 
Teamwork and group problem solving 0.68 
Table 6.31 correlation between sub-scales and scale total.  
N= 90. (Senior clinical staff) 
 
Unexpectedly, the clarity of purpose sub-scale was significantly associated with 
the formalisation scale, in both the full group (r=.263, p<0.000), and senior 
clinical staff alone (r= 0.262, p<0.013, N=90), and junior staff alone (r=0.283, 
p<0.004, N=101). The correlation applied in each hospital. The correlation was 
strongest for hospital 2 doctors, but not significant for any one profession 
within a hospital. No other OL sub-scale was associated with formalisation.  
 
The developers found a single factor which captured all the five dimensions. It 
explained 46.7 percent of the total variance.151  A factor analysis was carried 
out on the 21 individual items using my hospital data for all respondents. One 
factor was clearly most important, with an eigenvalue (standardised variance) 
of 6.3 explaining 30% of the total variance. There were 5 other factors with 
eigenvalues between 1 and 1.6. An eigenvalue of 1 is the accepted cut off point 
for initial factors.223 Cumulatively all 6 factors explained 60% of the total 
variance. Therefore the results achieved by the developers were not entirely 
verified in my study, but there was certainly a similar pattern, with one main 
factor. Using the other accepted method,395 a visual (“scree”) plot to see any 
marked reduction in gradient (see chart 6.11) and so decide which factors to 
extract, only one factor would be used and so no rotation would be required. 
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Chart 6.11 Scree plot of initial eigenvalues for OL scale factors 
 
I also did a factor analysis using the 5 sub-scale means from all respondents.  
This resulted in a single factor. This factor alone explained 63% of the 
variance. The sub-scale means thus behaved more in accordance with the idea 
of a single factor explaining organisational learning behaviour, because a single 
factor explained more of the total variance. 
 
6.4.5 Summary for scale validation 
Together, the statistical tests reported in this chapter gave good evidence for 
the validity of the OL, formalisation and job satisfaction and hospital culture 
scales in the acute hospital environment. The distributions were normal overall 
and in the main study samples. The means for individual OL scale items followed 
similar patterns in each hospital, which helped to confirm scale reliability. As 
predicted by the selection procedure, item means were generally higher in 
hospital 1.  
 
Both job satisfaction scores and hospital culture scores were highly correlated 
with OL scores. This was as predicted and validated the OL scale for use in the 
NHS acute hospital context. Both the correlation and the mean OL scale scores 
were affected by age group, particularly for doctors, peaking at age 31-40. The 
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correlation weakened especially for those over 50 years old. There was no 
correlation either positive or negative between formalisation and OL score. 
This was unexpected, as the authors reported a weak negative correlation. 
However the difference may have simply indicated somewhat different 
conditions in Scottish hospitals from public service environments in Canada.  
 
The five sub-scales of the OL capacity scale were highly correlated with each 
other, and with the OL scale total. This showed that the instrument measured a 
single dimension and was likely to give a total index rather than a profile. This 
was in accordance with the developers’ findings using factor analysis.151  
However, the factors found by the developers for the 21 scale items were not 
entirely verified in my study. These results mean there might be scope for 
developing an improved version of the OL capacity scale for the NHS. 
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Chapter 7 - Hospital context 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 described response rates, missing values, demographic differences 
between responders and population and gave validation evidence for the 
research instruments.  
 
The context each hospital provided for guideline implementation was important 
in providing potential explanations of both the similarities and differences in 
guideline implementation which were also relevant to the hypotheses. This 
chapter 7 reports qualitative findings about each of the five themes identified 
in the literature review to enhance and enrich understanding of the hospital 
contexts. It uses a humanistic approach, not a quantitative one. 
 
Method of analysing hospital context 
The sub-themes found in 20 senior clinical interviews were structured by the 
researcher, though not coded, under the three approaches to OL and the 
themes of clinical audit and leadership which were identified as important 
aspects of context in the literature review. As well, the issues thought from 
this experience to be the most revealing were examined for all 101 interviewees 
with the help of computer text searches for key words. Finally, the whole of 
each interview with each clinical audit co-ordinator in each hospital was 
examined in detail.  
 
Previously, the complete full transcriptions of the 101 interviews had been fully 
computer coded, using NUD.ist, in a hierarchical structure of nearly 2,500 
individual codes within the interview question structure. This was based around 
the dissemination-implementation-outcomes model of guideline adoption. These 
substantive codes were combined into larger substantive themes derived from 
the natural groupings they fell into. The term ‘substantive’ is used because 
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these themes were real-world content based rather than theoretical and form 
based. Where appropriate, the high level themes were further grouped under 
theoretical categories of single and double loop learning derived from 
organisational learning theory. These formal (theory and form based) 
categories were used in the current analysis as part of looking at innovation, 
since this equated to type 2 change. There were of course numerous response 
categories which could not easily be grouped as either type 1 or type 2, and 
numerous substantive categories offering alternative explanations of hospital 
context could not be discussed for reasons of space, or were not pursued. 
These will be briefly discussed at the end of this chapter.  
 
Aim of the analysis of hospital context 
The aim was to trace in each hospital the logical links between the context, the 
cultural mechanisms or processes, and the outcomes in terms of the facilitation 
or hindering of guideline implementation.  
 
Background 
In 2002 Rycroft–Malone et al351 updated a conceptual framework for change 
originally developed by Kitson et al225 in 1998 (see chapter 3). This was the 
most structured approach to the problem of describing and comparing hospital 
contexts I found in my literature searches, and it helped to validate my choice 
of relevant aspects of context. It did not drive the work, it was an alternative 
but complementary approach to the five themes I identified myself from the 
literature. The framework, as revised, included the original three main 
dimensions of evidence, context and facilitation; although within these some of 
the sub-elements were changed. Examples of high and low poles are given for 
each dimension. The framework predicted more successful implementation of 
change when more of the dimensions and their sub-elements were “high” than 
when they were “low”. This framework did not include the external context of 
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the organisation – the climate of public opinion, hospital and NHS media 
profiles, governmental and health board political pressures, legal frameworks, 
or pressures from social care, primary care and professional bodies.  
 
Brief Hospital vignettes: 
Hospital 1 
As this was written, 300 consultants at Hospital 1 trust tabled a list of 
concerns to the health minister, Malcolm Chisholm, criticising in detail the way 
the trust was being managed. Two months later, the trust press office refused 
to supply an original copy of the document on the grounds that the matters had 
been addressed; however a copy had been given in the (Glasgow) Herald 
newspaper on 25.1.02 (see appendix A6.2). The criticisms displayed an 
understanding of management language and criticised management of the trust 
in its own terms - structures, communication, feedback, decision timing, and the 
chain of command, as well as on specific clinical issues.252  
 
Many of these consultants led SIGN guideline development groups, (this applied 
for both of the guidelines focused on by the present study) and some were 
involved in their own research. The audit department was not criticised. Higher 
funding for teaching and research gave more capacity overall. There seemed to 
be real consensus team-working. There had been a large investment in a new 
maternity unit, on the site, which had room to expand.  
 
Hospital 2 
At hospital 2, consultants were longer serving than in hospital 1. The MacLean 
report on hospital 2256 contained criticism of a number of organisational 
features, for example boarding out of patients in wards not covered by nurses 
experienced in working with the specialty or the consultant responsible for 
them. 
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The audit department was criticised in my interviews, and had been recently 
reduced in number. Team working seemed in a number of cases to be done (eg 
orthopaedics) just by splitting the individual consultants’ work along the lines of 
separate patient groups rather than joint working by pooling all the skills 
relevant to each patient. An important aspect of context was the buildings. 
Whilst hospital 1 was originally Victorian, it had a large new block, and other 
new building was in progress, hospital 2 was still almost entirely in the old 
Victorian building, with no room to expand. Consultants’ offices, for example, 
were often hidden away up narrow dark staircases. 
 
7.1 Communication  
 
7.1.1 Communication - hospital 1 
Uses of guidelines in communication 
In hospital 1 feedback from audit of guidelines gave reassurance that you and 
your practice were satisfactory, and would not be criticised. “Best practice” 
was the key phrase: it was mentioned nearly four times more frequently in 
hospital 1.  
 
 Doctors communicated because of interest, or "Internal commitment" - as 
Argyris put it (see chapter 2).  "as it happens we've got a major interest in 
diabetic nephropathy", (consultant hospital 1). A consultant emphasised the 
polarity between being compelled or forced to implement guidelines and doing 
so through interest. A senior nurse contrasted dissemination through a 
newsletter with dissemination by an individual pushing a topic out of interest 
combined with implementation through others who might be less interested. It 
was acceptable to be dictatorial if you were an enthusiast for patient care. 
Chapter 7 Analysis of hospital context 
 244
"if you don't have somebody pushing them people will ignore them" 
(senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
The value given to multidisciplinary practice was connected with a high value on 
consensus practice in hospital 1 and also with tendency in hospital 1 to value 
sub-specialisation. This was encouraged by guidelines which showed it was 
better for a sub-specialist to treat rare conditions, which might not be 
included in SIGN guidelines in any case (consultant, hospital 1). Hospital 1 
clinical directors were positive about standardised practice; a corporate vision 
was considered part of the hospital 1 culture:  
“basically our staff do not have to worry about it being a Tuesday and so 
and so's patient as to whether or not treatment a, b, or c is used” 
(consultant, hospital 1), 
 Specialist issues were referred to nearly four times as often in hospital 1 
(text search for speciali*). Unfortunately, with specialisation also came a 
tendency to lack interest in other areas of care. Asked what the problems were 
in implementing guidelines a consultant replied: 
“ennui - I mean I think that's the basic problem you know it's the fact 
that you know you get so much stuff through the mail that sometimes 
it's difficult to prioritise and you know if you're a super-specialist then 
you tend to concentrate in your area don't you?” (consultant, hospital 1) 
 
Implementing guidelines, for example by training new house officers in them 
every 6 months, was a chore,  
“I mean quite candidly, 2 weeks from now someone will do something and 
I’ll say why did you do that and they'll say because we always did it in 
such and such a place,” (consultant, hospital 1)  
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Power, guidelines, and communication 
The national development of both the DVT and diabetes SIGN guidelines was 
widely recognised in hospital 1 as driven by consultants (for example by a senior 
nurse, general medicine). So if anything, power was wielded by those hospital 1 
consultants who were involved in guideline development over their hospital 
colleagues and professionals in other hospitals such as hospital 2. This also 
meant that practice often did not require to be changed in hospital 1 with 
implementation of these guidelines because it had evolved in accordance with 
this view of the evidence in any case. This was less likely to be the case at 
hospital 2. For some doctors though, SIGN guidelines were an unwelcome 
attempt to control the quality of their practice. 
 
Another consultant made an interesting classification of people into guideline 
producers and guideline followers, seeing it implicitly as a power relationship: 
"I don't think nurses are any different to doctors both are human 
beings, and they are divided into those that issue guidelines and those 
that receive them. Those that receive them have a healthy scepticism 
about those that issue them" (consultant, hospital 1)  
 
Most nurses did not issue clinical guidelines that directly affected the practice 
of doctors. But a senior nurse said nurses were now reading and doing research 
and senior nurses would now take account of written evidence from junior 
nursing staff. (senior nurse, hospital 1)  
 
 Midwives saw themselves as different in having practitioner status:  
“Do you know that the burden is on us to update and provide care and 
having practitioner status is different from nursing we have different 
legal responsibilities in midwifery than nurses do so it's on our back to 
initiate some of these things.” (senior midwife, hospital 1) 
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At hospital 1 there were mentions of doctors reminding nurses about guideline 
implementation, checking on ward rounds for example, but not in hospital 2. 
 
Scope of communication 
A consultant described the implementation process – firstly a discussion of 
whether change was needed to policy, and then discussion with other surgical 
teams in the hospital. Audit was of mortality and morbidity, including 
complications. Once only, doctors only had attended at extraordinary single 
discipline audit meeting when they had to address a problem. This supported an 
idea that a level of confidentiality was sometimes needed for the open debates 
(open within the confidentiality boundaries) required to get change.  
 
There were some examples of structural factors leading to restriction of 
communication by the nursing profession. Nurses were invited to medical 
meetings, but did not have time to go (senior nurse, general medicine). A weekly 
hospital meeting was in theory open to all but “in practice maybe 99% of the 
audience are medical staff and I hardly ever see a nurse there...” (consultant, 
hospital 1) 
 
Hospital 1 had a general practice (health centre) housed within the hospital 
buildings, this may have helped in liaison with primary care for audit and 
research for example – a consultant mentioned it in connection with his 
innovative research with primary care on hypertension. There was a primary 
care representative on the DVT implementation group in hospital 1 but this was 
not mentioned in hospital 2. 
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7.1.2 Communication – hospital 2 
 
Uses of guidelines in communication 
In hospital 2 there was a tendency to retain individualised practice. The 
orthopaedics directorate was an extreme example of where the SIGN 
guidelines were not agreed on: 
“I mean even getting two consultants to agree on what type of 
prosthesis to use is a major problem [….] it’s very difficult, it’s very, 
they just won't decide on anything.” (senior nurse, hospital 2)   
 
Nurses reminded doctors more insistently about DVT prophylaxis at hospital 2 
than at hospital 1, while leaving the ultimate responsibility with them: 
“down here especially we're good at saying to medical staff on I don't 
agree with that and we've got this here to prove that this is the best 
way to go.” (senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
Power, guidelines and communication 
The general feeling of lack of strategic control of guideline implementation at 
Directorate level was echoed in a view that hospital 2 was part of a bigger DVT 
prophylaxis audit across Glasgow - the data collection was criticised, but 
passively. This wider audit was not mentioned at hospital 1. Similarly, the view 
that: 
"the only folk who truly benefit from guideline production are the people 
who are intimately involved" (consultant hospital 2) 
 
– was not given at hospital 1, and it was difficult to imagine such a view being 
heard there – perhaps because so many were involved in writing and 
implementing the guidelines – both DVT prophylaxis and Diabetes SIGN 
guidelines groups were led by people at hospital 1. 
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Nurses might use their reading of guidelines to challenge the practice of 
individual doctors, but only if the guideline had been accepted by the doctors 
as directorate policy. So, while in hospital 1 the main thrust of nurses’ views 
was to encourage and remind doctors to use guidelines, in hospital 2, nurses saw 
the use of TEDs as a medical decision and one that might need to be challenged 
on nursing grounds for example, if there was broken skin.  
“We would say to a consultant we shouldn’t be using stockings on this 
patient because the SIGN guideline [says so], we’ve not to do it” (senior 
nurse, hospital 2) 
 
Nurses felt empowered by guidelines: 
“now, we probably say to the medical staff have you prescribed 
whatever for that patient or you haven't prescribed, why not.” (senior 
nurse, hospital 2) 
Scope of communication 
At hospital 2 the concept of the clinical team was somewhat ambiguous – what 
it was depended on how you defined it. It could be seen as broad and 
multidisciplinary (ward based) or as consultants only.  
 
In orthopaedics the potential conflict about DVT prophylaxis (seen too in 
hospital 1) had been bypassed by splitting up the work: 
“we weren't certain that there was really evidence to support what was 
recommended. As I say that's not been a concern to me because I don't 
do those operations.” (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
This could be seen as a defensive measure; it certainly prevented further 
debate, and therefore prevented type 2 OL, but in a situation where debate 
among doctors was causing day to day problems for nurses this was perhaps in 
the short term, but probably not in the long term, a good thing for OL in 
general. In this situation, the evidence was not conclusive about prophylaxis for 
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lower limb joint replacement, so in a sense there was no place for type 2 OL at 
local level other than carrying out or participating in primary research.  
Summary of communication context 
Briefly then,  best practice  defined by specialists and research was accepted 
as communicated by guidelines in hospital 1, where there was also acceptance of 
multidisciplinary information sharing with some reservations about cost and 
confidentiality. In hospital 2 local and individual versions of best practice were 
still possible, although nurses challenged doctors on this. 
 
7.2 Information systems and procedures 
7.2.1 Information systems and procedures – hospital 1 
Availability of SIGN guidelines 
The DVT prophylaxis guidelines appeared to be the most effectively 
disseminated guideline: “DVT is one of the very few ones that I can honestly 
say is looked at.” (senior nurse, hospital 1). At the implementation level, 
information was related to the ward organisation and held on the ward. A 
consultant and a senior nurse remembered being issued with a little card about 
DVT prophylaxis, and had found this useful. One or two hospital 1 doctors 
mentioned accessing the SIGN guidelines through the internet, but not through 
internal hospital IT systems. 
 
Professional involvement  
A senior nurse in surgical HDU mentioned the audit nurse who worked for the 
quality nurse. That the audit officer was seen as being still a nurse indicated 
again some professional ownership by nurses of audit. Involvement might be in 
protocol development or audit or both.  
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Feedback methods for audit results  
A senior nurse, (orthopaedics) and a midwife mentioned difficulties with 
communication and information about audit:  
"I don't know what happened sort of level above us - medical level"… 
“you sort of hear maybe 6 months down the line that it’s been a positive 
or negative audit and you very rarely get it on paper.” (senior nurse, 
hospital 1) 
 
 “you know when you audit something and then you're supposed to get 
the interim results and then a reaudit. That doesn't seem to happen,” 
(junior midwife, hospital 1) 
 
This was perhaps the organisational learning downside of having too much 
protection within medical groups. Feedback on audit results was not usually 
specific to individuals, nor was it very quick, and for these reasons it was likely 
to have lower impact than if the opposite applied. An increase in team working 
and team accountability meant feedback was usually to teams not to individuals.  
For better OL, there needed to be a constructive process within the team for 
discussing individuals’ contributions in the light of audit results, but this was 
rare and only done in exceptional circumstances.  
 
In one relatively recently set up unit (Day Surgery) where nurses were in 
control, there was the exceptional feature of rapid individual feedback to 
doctors: 
“we go right back to the consultant and say look here it's early days but 
we find that a, b and c is happening and that has only happened since 
your registrar has taken hold of your list or whatever.” (senior nurse, 
hospital 1) 
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In both hospitals feedback was generally not to individuals but to directorates. 
A particular problem with feedback was where it could not be in “real time” 
because of IT limitations.  
 
7.2.2 Information systems and procedures – hospital 2 
Availability of SIGN guidelines 
In hospital 2 the difficulties with information seemed to be at the more basic 
level of the technicalities of filing and referencing it. A consultant said for 
example: 
“the common areas, the duty areas, are festooned with folders, 
information packs of one kind or another; extremely difficult to keep in 
order and the average nurse wanting to find information might be hard 
pushed to find it there." (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
A senior nurse in the elderly directorate confirmed the difficulty of finding 
guidelines for nurses "a huge folder together with lots and lots of other 
folders". Although the hospital 2 clinical audit co-ordinator said that the SIGN 
guidelines and excerpts from texts on guideline implementation had been 
uploaded onto the hospital intranet, the problem was that the computers in 
theatres and in the wards were in use for other purposes. 
 
The library had copies of all SIGN guidelines, said a consultant in hospital 2. 
She had not been able to get copies through the hospital otherwise, having 
come into post after implementation. This doctor had worked both at hospital 1 
and hospital 2 and remembered the DVT prophylaxis card issued at hospital 1. 
She found this easier for medical staff than the method at hospital 2 where 
"they have to actually seek them out in a folder or a booklet". She had not 
heard any audit presentations on the topic at hospital 2. She had been in post 
for 18 months. 
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There was no mention of information about the results of previous audits, they 
were not, for example, known to be filed in the library, so it was difficult to 
build on previous work, and to create a knowledge base including the local 
historical context. This was a general omission in both hospitals. 
 
Professional involvement  
There was much emphasis on the need for more resource and the time 
limitations for protocol development from hospital 2 doctors. A consultant 
mentioned the time and support needs, from audit staff for example, so that 
doctors did not have to write up protocols in their own time – this was seen as 
an imposition. Another consultant confirmed this, saying guidelines were not 
audited because:  
"the problem here with audit is that we are not given resources to carry 
out audit."  (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
This theme was not seen at hospital 1, (which had more resource for training). 
Yet the DVT audit was remembered in hospital 2 as being done, not primarily by 
a clinical professional, but by the audit department (senior nurses in 
gynaecology, CCU/ICU, elderly directorate, and a consultant in hospital 2). 
 
There was a link between individual and organisational learning. The guidelines 
were used in studying for qualifications by nurses (senior nurse, elderly 
directorate). But they were also used by "untrained" nurses (assistants) who 
had had training on the DVT guidelines. Audits were carried out by junior 
doctors as part of their training, for example in the elderly directorate. But 
again the results of these efforts were not explicitly centrally filed so did not 
attain their full potential as an organisational learning resource. 
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Feedback methods for audit results 
A senior nurse (elderly directorate) felt you got better feedback about audit 
results for a guideline if you were in the audit group for that guideline, a theme 
echoed in each hospital. The unfortunate outcome of this was that those 
outside the audit group, who probably needed better feedback, in fact got 
worse feedback. No hospital audit day had yet been held in hospital 2. A senior 
nurse, said, in rather surprised tone, referring to hip fracture and the guideline 
implementation facilitator at hospital 2: 
 “the girl unfortunately has left to another job but she did actually send 
us on the literature to say what actually came out of the audit.” (senior 
nurse, hospital 2) 
 
The Scottish Confidential Enquiry on Perioperative Deaths (SCEPOD) was a 
source of feedback independent of hospital feedback systems: 
“.. something they often point out is DVT prophylaxis, then that would 
come back to me. That's only if a patient dies. (consultant, hospital 2 
 
This mechanism appeared to have been weakened by orthopaedic issues about 
the evidence, since the doctor quoted seemed to regard a comment on the 
omission of DVT prophylaxis as a routine matter. 
Summary of information context 
 
The key points were the better availability and dissemination of the DVT 
guideline in hospital 1 as compared to hospital 2, and the demand for more 
feedback from nurses about audit results in hospital 1. Consultants in hospital 2 
wanted help with writing protocols. In both hospitals there was no central 
archive of audit results, and a feeling that the best audit feedback was 
restricted to members of the audit group 
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7.3 Innovation  
7.3.1 Innovation - hospital 1 
Active or reactive 
A consultant at hospital 1 mentioned comparing his own practice with best 
practice. This meant using published literature and led to innovative ways of 
matching best published outcomes. The following quotation describes a context 
and mechanism difficult to imagine in hospital 2: 
“10 years ago as I say we set up a unit whereby anybody with renal 
disease would be seen by both - a team of both diabetologists and 
nephrologists and we audited that clinic after 10 years experience and 
we looked at various things which are in SIGN but before SIGN, […] it's 
not really been through SIGN.” (consultant, hospital 1)  
 
The important points about context here were that there were resources 
available in hospital 1 to fund the mechanism – a research registrar, and the 
consultant had enough autonomy to invest in the research he wanted. The 
outcome of the research was pending, but the outcome of these conditions was 
that a piece of type 2 learning was in progress, with possible implications 
beyond the immediate local context.  
 
Involvement in developing SIGN guidelines 
Perhaps the main contextual difference between hospitals was that consultants 
in hospital 1 were actively involved and leaders in national groups writing SIGN 
guidelines, for both DVT and Diabetes, but consultants in the hospital 2 were in 
the main not – with 1 exception – this was a consultant who was leading a SIGN 
national group for a different guideline. This involvement in SIGN guideline 
development was professionally prestigious. Leading development groups 
indicated that a clinician was a respected expert in the field, and this was 
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closely associated with doing research personally, another respected activity. 
Innovation was a valued leadership activity in the medical profession. 
 
Clinical, structural, and processual innovation 
High Dependency Unit (HDU) had been an innovation resulting from informal 
review of processes 5 years before (senior nurse, surgical HDU). The 
anaesthetists talked to nurses about patient care informally and HDU came 
about with their support. HDU was a nursing led unit but used one SHO. There 
was not good support from medical staff for this development - unlike for ICU. 
Hospital 1 had other examples of specialist units run by nurses or with nurses in 
lead development roles – for example the day surgery unit (two senior nurses, 
day surgery were interviewed), which served 25 consultants from different 
specialties using separate protocols for each specialty, and which had done an 
audit to improve its liaison with primary care nurses (senior nurse, day surgery), 
through a liaison sister. Another innovation was the specialist multidisciplinary 
stroke team with 16 designated beds for stroke patients in the hospital. There 
was a nurses’ standard setting group for stroke care, and a stroke redesign 
project with a designated co-ordinator. Innovative change in hospital 1 often 
involved collaboration between specialist nurses and specialist medical staff. 
 
7.3.2 Innovation – hospital 2  
Active or reactive 
Reactive innovation was mentioned at hospital 2 as a result of bad publicity 
about patient abuse some years ago, and a resulting visit from the Scottish 
Health Advisory Service (SHAS). Funding was given for new soft furnishings 
for two wards. It was an innovation to the patient environment (senior nurse, 
hospital 2). 
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In hospital 2 a barrier seen to using guidelines was the problem in keeping them 
up to date, not mentioned in hospital 1 (senior nurses, CCU/ICU, and  general 
medicine, hospital 2). This was probably connected to hospital staff not setting 
the guidelines but rather attempting to ensure practice mimicked them.  
 
In hospital 2 the lack of a change management culture was criticised: 
“There isn't a change management culture within the trust. It doesn't 
happen in anything.” (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
Involvement in developing SIGN guidelines 
There certainly appeared to be a much lower level of involvement by hospital 
consultants in hospital 2 in the national SIGN guideline development groups. In 
the one case where a hospital 2 consultant was leading such a group it was 
obvious from many comments that this was very influential in the department. 
The consultant was mentioned by a senior nurse proprietorially:  
“Our Dr X has had a part in playing in the SIGN guidelines Stroke so the 
guidelines are clinical guidelines that we've got at ward level” (senior 
nurse, hospital 2,) 
 
There was evidence here of higher self esteem generated by feeling you were 
in the vanguard of national best practice, that it was your practice first. 
 
Clinical, structural, and processual innovation 
An organisational innovation at planned hospital 2 and not seen at hospital 1 was:  
"one day a week, sorry, one day a month, whereby all clinical 
commitments are cancelled for the day...presumably things such as audit 
would be discussed at that" (consultant, hospital 2,) 
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In hospital, 2 link nurses formed a system to link up to disseminate information 
about more specialist care for patients to staff in other specialist and general 
wards. A device co-ordinator trained staff on the use of clinical devices.  
 
There were many notices in this hospital about aggression management of 
patients, and dangers to staff, and there was a local guideline on this (senior 
nurse, elderly directorate). This was not seen or mentioned at hospital 1. 
 
A less successful innovation at hospital 2, which told of a culture of cost 
cutting, was the practice of washing and reusing TED stockings. A senior nurse 
at hospital 2 considered it acceptable to wash TED stockings and reuse them: 
“you found a lot of the girls doing a quick wash, hanging them over the 
heater and they actually weren't wearing them till they dried again” 
(laugh) (senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
Two others at hospital 2 mentioned washing TEDs – one that patients were 
taught to wash their own at home (junior nurse) and the other, an infection 
control nurse, was concerned to stop this practice. In hospital 1 by contrast 
patients were sent home with a supply of TEDs. 
 
The hospital 2 orthopaedic directorate was an innovation in Glasgow: 
“we have a separate orthopaedic unit from A & E and we, our department 
stays open almost for 24 hours a day, whereas other orthopaedic units 
are core hours, Monday to Friday 9 to 5, we're not, so we have a big 
input in patients that come in out of hours” (senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
The knowledge that they had this important role may, with support from the 
Royal College of Orthopaedic Surgeons, have increased resistance to pressure 
for implementation of the DVT prophylaxis guideline in this directorate, 
despite the generally weaker links into the Royal Colleges in hospital 2. 
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Summary of innovation context 
Active critical thinking and testing of new practice at hospital 1 was not evident 
at hospital 2, where innovation was more reactive. There was greater 
involvement in SIGN by consultants at hospital 1. Cost constraints had 
undesirable effects at hospital 2, where updating guidelines was seen as a 
problem.  
 
7.4 Clinical audit infrastructure  
7.4.1 Clinical audit infrastructure - hospital 1 
 
Unit of implementation  
An initial mass approach to dissemination of the audit results of the DVT 
guideline in hospital 1 by the clinical audit dept was abandoned when they found 
it ineffective.  
“Mass dissemination exercise (laugh) unbelievable. […] We then 
reaudited the impact of that only in medical block, because we didn't 
have resources to do anything else, and only found a slight increase, and 
we got lots of feedback from staff as to why that was, which was very 
helpful. (clinical audit co-ordinator, hospital 1) 
 
This first audit was done without involving the ward staff, and the clinical audit 
co-ordinator felt this had been a mistake. Audit results were then more 
targeted to people known to have an interest in receiving them, such as clinical 
directors and senior nursing staff. This was a piece of OL for clinical audit.  
 
Dissemination of guidelines was structured around directorates, and audit was 
directorate based. There was an overall impression that consultants saw the 
directorate as a reality for policy creation in hospital 1 more than in hospital 2. 
Discussions and policy-making about guideline implementation took place in 
directorates in hospital 1.  
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“with DVT well because DVT is - involves the whole specialty and because 
we've a kind of department that is heavily interested in 
thromboprophylaxis, then we just set up a small group for that to sort it 
through.” consultant, (consultant, hospital 1) 
 
In hospital 1 the obstetrics directorate “came out trumps” (Clinical audit Co-
ordinator hospital 1) as having the best rates of compliance, but directorates 
were not encouraged to compare themselves competitively against each other. 
Results were fed back at directorate level, not at consultant level; individual 
consultants could not be immediately identified.  
 
A physiotherapist gave an instance of the hospital 1 culture of focusing on the 
clinical problem rather than the guideline implementation, and also highlighted 
the importance of actually carefully reading the guideline. (NB this was actually 
a rogue interview which of course was excluded from the analysis by 
profession, but was retained as contextual information): 
“I said that masses of them weren't receiving it until 48 hours later […] 
so the next time when we audited again they looked at the time lapse 
and that showed a much clearer picture.” (Senior physiotherapist, 
hospital 1) 
 
Audit department  
 
The clinical audit co-ordinator saw better information systems as the way 
forward to improve the learning process, and used an interactive model: 
“Well I think the way to do it is through a clinical information system  
and build in either prompts on a clinical information system or maybe  
more de- well it depends maybe to pick particular conditions and perhaps  
do a you know, care pathway.” (clinical audit co-ordinator, hospital 1) 
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This respondent also felt there was probably a big mass of nurses on the wards 
who did not know what the SIGN guidelines were. 
 
As indicated above, resource limitation had reinforced the learning that 
expensive mass dissemination was not the way to implement guidelines, and the 
audit co-ordinator was prepared to admit an implementation gap, a piece of 
open, model 2 behaviour. No criticism of the audit department was voiced. 
 
7.4.2 Clinical audit infrastructure - hospital 2 
 
Unit of implementation  
A centralised approach to communication and to doing audit here, contrasted 
with the learned less centralised approach in hospital 1. The centralised 
approach was described by the clinical audit co-ordinator as follows: 
“Basically we, the guideline arrives on our desk and comes to the 
guideline implementation group who then through the group nominate an 
appropriate lead person to lead that guideline within the trust.”  (Clinical 
audit co-ordinator, hospital 2)   
 
As in hospital 1, a person with a temporary role in facilitating the 
implementation of that guideline (DVT prophylaxis) was introduced, but 
whereas in hospital 1 the person had a real clinical job title “DVT Prevention Co-
ordinator”, in hospital 2 the role was that of “guideline nurse”. The difference 
was that in hospital 2 the focus was on the role and the guideline itself, while in 
hospital 1 the focus was on the clinical problem.  
 
Audit department  
The clinical audit department had over the years developed the protocol for 
guideline implementation already described. Although the audit department 
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claimed the protocol had evolved and changed it did not seem to have changed 
much from the initial DVT implementation methods, except that now a 
multidisciplinary hospital group brought all the key players together more 
explicitly at hospital level. This did not seem to have gone hand in hand with 
increasing legitimacy (and hence effectiveness) of the centralised structures:  
"very recently, we had one of the guideline team come over just to go 
over things with us and reinforce and so on, but not a very positive 
interaction somehow." (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
In hospital 2, the clinical audit co-ordinator saw clinical information systems as 
the way ahead, but with rather a different emphasis from hospital 1 – simply to 
upload the HTML version of the guideline on to the trust intranet, rather than, 
as in hospital 1, using a system of prompts within electronic records. 
 
Compliance rates with the recommended DVT prophylactic methods had, 
according to the audit co-ordinator, increased and remained steady in hospital 
2 (as in hospital 1) since the initial implementation. Ongoing audit in hospital 2 
was by a spot check or snapshot of all patients in a ward on a particular day 
every 6 months. Some clinicians were sceptical about the audit results because 
only a sample was audited (consultant). The audit department had recently lost 
most of its staff owing to job moves and other reasons, and the audit co-
ordinator blamed this for the inability of his department to do more auditing.  
 
Summary of audit infrastructure context 
A learning approach to clinical audit in hospital 1 contrasted with an approach at 
hospital 2 that continued to be centralised and focused on doing audit rather 
than helping others to do it. It focused on roles rather than real problems. In 
hospital 1 the audit process was used by directorates to develop policy; in 
hospital 2, although this happened there was also distrust of the validity of 
audit results and criticism of the audit department. Hospital 1 had a vision for 
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the way IT would integrate with practice; hospital 2 saw IT more narrowly, as 
an electronic version of a paper record. 
 
7.5 Leadership 
7.5.1 Leadership - hospital 1 
An inclusive approach to decision-making, a prime value of evidence-backed 
consensus and a respect for knowledge generation through research were main 
characteristics of leadership in hospital 1. The leadership roles of consultants 
and ward sisters are considered separately in the following analysis. 
Consultants’ leadership role  
In hospital 1 clinical directors generally made a point of their democratic 
inclusive consensus style of leadership.  
“there was then discussion amongst the clinicians on the unit as to 
whether there was any requirement for a change in policy.” (clinical 
director, hospital 1) 
 
However, junior doctors and senior nurses in this directorate were told rather 
than involved: 
“I think that the decisions in relation to the adoption of the guideline 
would be made at consultant level and then disseminated to the junior 
doctors and the senior nurses.” (clinical director, hospital 1) 
 
The medical local champions gained respect for their knowledge, expertise and 
skill from their peers and from nurses, and so they gained influence, partly at 
least, as a result of their involvement in research, for example at hospital 1 the 
DVT guideline leader was referred to proudly as “an expert” by others: 
“we had [x] who's sort of expert, a world wide expert on clotting, blood 
clotting, doing ward rounds in the wards you know so I was always very 
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aware that oh God these my end should have their TED stockings on or 
you know whatever.”    (senior nurse, hospital 1)) 
 
A text search for the word “expert” found occurrences in 7 interviews out of 
all 101, and these were all in hospital 1. This implied leadership through 
technical expertise was valued in hospital 1 rather than leadership by formal 
role or by resource power. 
 
Hospital 1’s culture was thought to determine the kind of consultant leaders it 
appointed, leaders who expected to be part of a consensus-based team: 
“I think we have been very active in multidisciplinary working and getting 
things in the way of guidelines and protocols in place and educating 
people to ensure that we speak with a kind of corporate vision which has 
been a feature of this hospital for years you know we don't have a ...that 
it's cultural is probably really, probably influences things like who gets 
appointed into senior consultant jobs and midwifery jobs […] we're big 
enough people to accept that it's safer and more sensible for 90% of 
people to buy in to something and do it one particular way than for 
people to cause confusion by saying well it has to be done my way or no 
way. And that's a cultural thing this hospital thinks a big strength, but 
from my previous experience in other places it's rare.” (consultant, 
hospital 1) 
 
A number of consultants and ward sisters in small directorates or specialty 
units said that the small unit size made dissemination of information easier. 
This seemed to be an important leadership function, so span of control was 
important – a nurse said she had a small unit of 12 staff, a doctor said he had 6 
consultants and 10 juniors, and this made it easy to communicate. There was 
perhaps therefore a span of control issue in relation to the key issue of 
dissemination. 
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Doctors were not seen as managers by nurses, yet nurses still did what they 
said in a curious arrangement where doctors had power over nurses without 
responsibility for them. These relationships seemed the same in each hospital.  
 
Ward sisters’ leadership role 
G grade nurses (more commonly still called sisters) were the ward leaders for 
nursing: 
“... the senior the G grade is the person that's responsible. I'm involved  
a good deal in practice, I'm involved in the clinical area more putting  
them into practice.” (F grade nurse, hospital 1)   
 
Sisters led their staff using evidence-based practice, and might also delegate 
the learning management part of the leadership role to a junior: 
“I'm ward manager for learning of it but the sister we've got here is a 
ward manager. The ward as a whole is very striving towards standards 
and good quality of care, and she's always trying to upgrade things by 
evidence based practice, research, or looking at the guidelines.” (junior 
nurse, hospital 1)   
 
Ward meetings were reported as two-way, with opportunity for questions, and 
an inclusive explanatory style was usually regarded as essential to get staff 
commitment: 
“All the information was made available to the staff and it was discussed 
- it's been discussed at ward meetings.” (senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
Motivation of staff was an important leadership role in nursing, although the 
combined ward manager and clinical role was found problematic by some g-
grades owing to time constraints and the demands of the clinical role which was 
seen as a priority that could not be denied: 
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“at times I think I don't think this is worth it you know it's like, you 
know I'm supposed to [be a] ward manager, but I can't manage a ward 
when I'm out there looking after patients you know and the amount of 
bits of paper I get.” (senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
A very positive comment such as the following would not have occurred in 
hospital 2: 
I don't actually have any problems with the trust the way they  
approached it. I think if you have, they give us a lot of leeway, we can  
run up, we have a whirlwind teaching program running here which is open  
to multidiscipline, anyone. Anyone who's got something that they've  
researched or want to talk about, there's time given to us and we can  
share it with other disciplines […] so we're given a lot of time if you've 
got an idea you've got a lot more backup now to go and say look I need 
time for this, and I need a wee bit of help, if I get a group of people 
together is that OK? - And you know there's a lot more - even in the last 
two years than there has been in the 20 years I've been in nursing..” 
(senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
Specialist nurses often had specific leadership roles, usually at sister level, so 
the pattern of specialist knowledge-based leadership was repeated in nurses as 
in the hospital 1 doctors: 
“There's a diabetic sister that works in X ward in Y hospital, and she 
runs the diabetic clinic.” (junior midwife, hospital 1) 
 
In both hospitals, audit was led at two levels, care audits were led by nurses, 
and treatment and outcomes (recovery) audits were generally led by 
consultants. A previously quoted remark makes the point: 
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“The audits generally - it's led, it's sister led within our ward for the 
standards. Anything higher than that is led by our senior consultant.” 
(junior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
7.5.2 Leadership - hospital 2 
Consultants’ leadership role 
An inclusive style was used for dissemination to junior doctors by consultants in 
one directorate, but the nursing structures were kept at arm’s length. Nurses 
were involved in clinical audit which was by definition multidisciplinary, but 
doctors had their own uni-professional medical audit group, and saw audit and 
guidelines in a different way: 
“without being elitist about this, I suspect guidelines for many nurses 
means just some clinical pointers as to how best to treat a given 
condition.” (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
The 23 interviewees who mentioned the word “consultant” in hospital 2 revealed 
some useful contrasts with hospital 1. For example the culture was seen very 
differently from the collaborative guideline-accepting culture in hospital 1: 
“So you have to make people feel part of it, […] Not all consultants 
believe they're [guidelines] important.” (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
In this hospital fears about “big brother” were explicitly voiced, again by the 
same doctor, and about others rather than himself: 
“this concept of big brother is watching, you know the clinical standards, 
governance, professional performance, re-accreditation now for 
doctors.” (consultant, hospital 2) 
 
Leadership through knowledge and evidence were little mentioned. Nurses still 
deferred to the consultant role, but there were some indications that this 
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might be wearing thin, There was a sense of exasperation with consultants who 
were “set in their ways” sometimes from nurses. 
 
Ward sisters’ leadership role 
Some nurses in hospital 2 wanted a more inclusive leadership approach to 
dissemination from doctors, but this was more about doctors supporting nurses 
in implementation rather than as in hospital 1, nurses demanding an input into 
the process of producing the local protocols: 
“I think we could have done with a bit more instruction, a bit more 
dissemination through the G grades, rather than just these are the 
guidelines, and this is what you've to do.” (senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
Ward managers (G-grades) were regarded as having the main responsibility for 
disseminating guidelines to their staff (as distinct from ensuring they were 
acted on): 
“even if you send something to a clinical director there is no guarantee 
that he will speak to his colleagues. If you send it to a clinical nurse 
manager she will certainly give it to her colleagues and everybody else” 
(senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
Ward sisters had the important responsibility for ensuring guideline 
recommendations were acted on day to day, not only by their nurses, but also 
by junior doctors.  
“it's my responsibility as a nurse to make sure that they do know about 
them and that the patient I'm looking after is receiving the appropriate 
treatment within those guidelines.” (junior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
As in hospital 1, sisters had ultimate responsibility for the delivery of 
education and training of ward nurses, which included education required to 
implement guidelines: 
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“she has the end responsibility to make sure that they know these kind 
of things.” (junior nurse, hospital 2)     
    
While individual responsibility was supported by some in hospital 1, individualism 
was generally abhorred by nurses, especially in hospital 2: 
 “if they've got their own ideas on things sometimes they can be a bit 
difficult.” (senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
There were examples of supportive and communicative management styles being 
preferred at hospital 2:  
“she very much smoothes the path for us in a lot of ways, and as I say 
she's got a good long term with the medical staff within the area, so 
that helps a lot.” (senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
Leadership seemed, from the following quotation, to be sometimes a more 
informal process in H2 than in H1. This interviewee said the real ward leaders 
might not necessarily be ward managers (G-grades), but this was said in a spirit 
of surprise, (whereas in H1 as a previous quote showed, all levels were 
encouraged to come forward with new ideas): 
 “if I want things done, I don't always go to the person that would 
appear to be the one that would do it, I'll go to the one that will actually 
achieve that change, […] you know you maybe have a real bright wee 
staff nurse that knows how to get things done” (senior nurse, hospital 2) 
Summary of leadership context 
In hospital 1 the most accepted leadership style was inclusive and collaborative 
and used expert power and research involvement as a prime value, but this was 
not mentioned in hospital 2. Hospital 1 doctors used a less inclusive approach 
with junior medical staff than some parts of hospital 2, but nurses were not 
generally excluded from any regular audit meetings, while they were excluded 
from some medical audit meetings in hospital 2. A small span of control was an 
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asset to consultants’ directorate dissemination in hospital 1. It was still possible 
to be a convincing consultant leader and to use different practice from 
guideline based best practice in hospital 2. In both hospitals senior nurses at G-
grade level in charge of wards were responsible for implementation. In hospital 
1 nurses found it difficult to combine management and clinical roles, and were 
willing to question this. A continuing clinical involvement was valued by their 
staff. Informal nurse leaders were encouraged in hospital 1 but were a surprise 
to some in hospital 2. Specialist nurses had leadership roles in hospital 1, but 
less so in hospital 2. There was a two level leadership of audit in both hospitals. 
Nursing audit and medical audit were separated because there was no medical 
involvement in nursing audit. 
Conclusion 
This conclusion summarises and starts to discuss the differences and some of 
the similarities between hospital contexts as a basis for further discussion in 
chapter 11, where similarities between hospitals are also further analysed and 
discussed. Each of the contextual themes is now compared between hospitals in 
a loose and discursive format.  
 
Communication about audit results was particularly seen as needed for 
reassurance that practice was best practice in hospital 1, although checking 
compliance was mentioned equally in both hospitals. Specialisation and super-
specialisation were important elements of the hospital 1 context, and much less 
emphasised in hospital 2. Specialisation was, with research-based expertise, 
how hospital 1 consultants retained their professional autonomy. Specialist 
nurses were a particular feature of hospital 1. Innovation to service delivery 
was often led collaboratively by specialist nurses working together with 
specialist consultants. Hospital 2 consultants had their role power, which some 
defended vigorously by insisting on retaining their own practice either 
explicitly or by subterfuge. This curtailed further medical debate about best 
practice in that area.  
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Some hospital 2 directorates retained uni-professional medical audit groups as 
the explicit norm, while in hospital 1 these groups were uni-professional in fact 
but not in principle. In contrast hospital 1 emphasised a collaborative culture of 
consensus practice in most directorates. Dialogue, debate, even disputation 
were accepted in hospital 1 as part of medical practice at the policy level, but 
not in day to day practice. 
 
In both hospitals nurses had responsibility for day to day implementation of 
guidelines in wards, though consultants and audit departments gave talks and 
manuals (hospital 1) to new junior doctors. While in hospital 1, consultants would 
remind sisters about guideline implementation, they expected to be reminded 
by them in hospital 2, and nurses there were quite insistent about doing so, with 
less appreciation than in hospital 1 of the advisory nature of guidelines.  
 
Information systems at hospital 1 seemed to have succeeded in making the DVT 
prophylaxis guideline widely known there. Copies were held on wards in folders, 
and posters gave the key points. A small card had been used initially and was 
generally held to have been most useful. Some doctors said they used the 
internet to access the guidelines.  
 
The audit co-ordinator saw IT systems as the way forward in both hospitals, 
though in different ways. In hospital 2 copies of guidelines were available on 
the trust intranet, but this had limited terminal access.  In hospital 1 a more 
ambitious vision of electronic care plans with audit points and prompts for 
guideline implementation was mentioned by the audit co-ordinator, but this was 
only a hope. At present in both hospitals nurses performed many of the 
information system functions. In hospital 2, unlike hospital 1 there appeared to 
be a desire among some doctors to be less involved in guideline implementation, 
including audit and writing protocols. A need for more resource for these 
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activities was mentioned in hospital 2, and this was being addressed (the 
proposed monthly audit day). Feedback was not full in either hospital. In 
hospital 1 there was a sense from nurses that guidelines were filtered out at 
levels above them in the nursing and management hierarchies. Nurses did not 
like this, perhaps because they used the guidelines for professional 
development. 
 
The diversity and amount of innovation, particularly in new ways of delivering 
care, - new roles and structures - was where the greatest difference between 
the hospitals could be seen. Hospital 1 had a much greater range of initiatives. 
The greater number of consultants at hospital 1 leading or contributing to 
SIGN guideline development groups was an important difference between 
hospitals. Some innovations were related to SIGN guideline topics, the stroke 
team for example, and many were collaborations between nurses and doctors. 
Implementing guidelines was a more passive form of innovation, and at hospital 
2 there were examples of reactive innovation in response to external pressures. 
Some less desirable innovations in the form of “making do” such as washing and 
reusing TEDs were also reported there, presumably a result of resource 
limitation. The lack of a change management approach was mentioned at hospital 
2.  
 
The clinical audit and guideline implementation infrastructure seemed to have 
varying styles. The audit department in hospital 2 had a strong but very 
centralised approach, which despite some changes in terminology did not seem 
to have changed in essence. The audit department in hospital 1 although 
starting with a centralised dissemination process quickly found this ineffective 
and abandoned it, using dissemination to key contacts and spot audits of 
compliance on a single day. It seemed to be generally held in high esteem. The 
hospital 2 audit department still seemed to have a one-way style, seeing itself 
as driving rather than supporting and facilitating the implementation. Hospital 1 
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appointed a guidelines nurse and then a DVT prevention nurse on a temporary 
basis, a different and more practical approach to the real problem, likely to 
have been appreciated more by those with coal-face values. 
 
Leadership in hospital 1 was closely bound up with the issues about expert 
knowledge, specialisation and technical power which were expressed in but not 
conditioned by the involvement of so many of its consultants in leading and 
contributing to guideline development groups at national level. It may well have 
been the case that the hospital 2 link nurse system was an attempt to 
compensate for a lack of communication between its consultants. The hospital 2 
consultants had role power, but this was validated in most cases by wider 
professional structures, not by respect for their research. In hospital 2 some 
routine audit meetings were explicitly for doctors only. Guidelines were still 
viewed as a threat to autonomy by some hospital 2 consultants rather than an 
enhancement of autonomy through improvement of professional practice as a 
whole, as was more the case in hospital 1. Ward meetings were generally nurses 
only in both hospitals. But these were often to cascade essentially medical 
agendas as well as to deal with nursing issues.  
 
There were many similarities between the hospitals. These are discussed 
further in chapter 11, section 11.2.3. For example, there were more similarities 
than differences between the nurses in each hospital. Nurses generally did not 
appreciate doctors’ individualism in having their own ideas, because it made day 
to day delivery of care more complex and liable to error, although perhaps 
paradoxically they had great respect for medical research. There was generally 
great emphasis on the benefits of uniformity and consistency in care, and none 
at all on the value of patient choice – care decisions were choices made by 
professionals. Patients were not involved in protocol development. Sisters, like 
consultants, had a training role, so were OL leaders but were not trained in this. 
There was a liaison nurse in hospital 2’s elderly directorate, who liaised with 
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primary care outwith the hospital This form of liaison nurse did exist in 
hospital 1 – for example in day surgery. 
 
The overall thrust of this qualitative evidence supported, illuminated and 
amplified the findings from the quantitative comparisons of qualitative 
categories, and added to the validity of the comparisons. In the further 
context of the Rycroft-Malone/Kitson framework, the majority of the 
differences found between the hospitals mapped on to that framework for 
change such that hospital 1 was generally high context (helpful for change) and 
hospital 2 was low context (less helpful).  
 
What this implied for the high level research question was that in the high OL 
capacity context of hospital 1, a hidden potential in clinical guidelines (the 
mechanism) for producing truly innovative changes (outcome) generated from 
within the hospital rather than by copying best practice from elsewhere was 
realised. Guidelines, in the terms of the institutionalist debate, could function, 
in the right (high OL capacity) context, as an antecedent of innovative de-
institutionalisation as well as, in other lower OL capacity contexts, as an 
institutionalising force. What appeared to affect the benefits achieved from 
guideline implementation most was not the guidelines themselves, but the kind 
of context in which they were implemented. In the next chapter the specific 
aspect of context addressed by the research question, the OL capacity of the 
hospital, will be quantitatively measured and compared between the cases 
(hospitals and the professions nested within them), to confirm whether they 
were as different as this contextual analysis has implied.  Before that though, a 
word about the limitations of the coding.   
 
Limitations of the coding framework 
Single loop activities often had double loop implications – increased uniformity 
of care for example, seen as an aim of the implementation of guidelines, was 
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associated with a new emphasis on the goal of assuring better safety for staff 
as well as patients. In systems terms, routines were the “hows” at the systemic 
hierarchical level beneath the “whats” of the clinical goals. It was often the 
case that these “hows” contained “whats” when looked at from the perspective 
of a still lower systemic level. For example if a goal was to apply TEDs to 
patients with high risk of DVT, there were a number of different possible 
methods for doing this, including new storage and ordering procedures. A 
double loop learning process was needed to choose the best method. So 
whether a type of learning was single or double loop depended on from what 
point in the system it was being viewed. This was encouraging as it meant that 
double loop learning could occur even at low levels, it was not confined to a so-
called “strategic” level at the top of the organisation. Leadership like this was 
needed from line leaders for OL to work; senior managers could create a 
climate for leadership to flourish at this level by creating vision and high level 
strategy, but they could not lead at this level themselves.  
 
The base-level coding of substantive activities and beliefs was very low-level, 
so that some code categories contained only one item. These were aggregated 
into bigger categories in a hierarchical structure, but it was not possible to 
discuss even all of these higher level substantive categories, primarily for 
reasons of space. I could have investigated all the different defensive beliefs 
preventing communication. I could have investigated all the different forms of 
clinical audit. Instead, I focused mainly on the guideline adoption process as the 
main theoretical framework. I could have coded the stages of the OL cycle97 
especially viewed as information creation, integration, interpretation, and use 
(action), and found  facilitators and barriers at each stage. 
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Chapter 8 - Comparison of OL scores of study samples 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first part of hypothesis testing, which continues in chapter 
9 with the analysis of interview data and, then in chapter 10 with analysis of 
association between the main themes found at interview and levels of OL 
capacity. Data from two sources, the OL survey scales and the interviews, were 
analysed both separately and together.  
 
In the present chapter, in accordance with the hypothesis, OL capacity is 
compared between the main study samples. Seniority level (i.e. senior or junior) 
was added to the analysis, as clearly important. The scores for formalisation, 
job satisfaction and hospital culture were not included as they were used for 
validation of the OL scale and were not part of testing the hypothesis. Clinical 
seniors were compared where possible. Sub-scale scores were investigated only 
if a significant difference was found on the complete OL capacity scale.  
 
There were 11 comparisons of OL scale scores between study samples using t-
tests. Three showed statistically significant differences. OL sub-scale scores 
were compared only if there was a statistically significant difference on the 
main scale. There were 3x5 comparisons of OL sub-scales, of which 9 were 
significant.  
 
The comparisons were grouped by hospital, profession, and seniority. These 
were regarded as “distinct groups” for the purpose of calculating the 
bonferroni corrections for p-values (see section 4.6), which meant bonferroni 
corrections were not required. The sub-scales were put in separate “distinct 
groups” because they were correlated with the main scales.  
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8.2 Hospitals comparisons 
8.2.1 Differences between hospitals 
Clinical seniors had a slightly higher mean score at hospital 1, in accordance 
with the hospital selection process and hypothesis, but this was not significant 
at 5%, using independent samples t-tests (table 8.1). 
 
Scale Hospital 1 
mean 
Hospital 2 
mean 
T statistic Significance 
(P) 
Number 
OL capacity 4.16 4.01 0.840 <0.404 90 
Table 8.1 Comparison of OL capacity score between hospital 1 (44) and hospital 
2 (46) – senior clinical group 
 
The higher score at hospital 1 was owing to the consultants there. The higher 
scores in hospital 1 were influenced by consultants in the 31-50 age range, who 
scored higher than their age counterparts in hospital 2. (N=16, Means: H1 4.37, 
H2 3.67). This was a large difference between hospitals for consultants. G 
grade nurses at hospital 1 had very similar scores to hospital 2. Midwives at 
hospital 1 had the lowest score (table 8.2). 
  
OL capacity Scale Hospital 
1 mean 
Hospital 2 
mean 
T 
statistic 
Two tailed 
Sig. (P) 
Number 
consultants 4.26 3.66 1.6 <0.126 28 (11+17) 
G-grade nurses 4.20 4.21 0.47 <0.964 58 (29+29) 
G-grade midwives 3.58 - - - 4 (4+0) 
Table 8.2 Comparison of OL capacity score between hospital 1 (44) and hospital 
2 (46) – senior clinical group by profession 
 
8.2.2 Differences within hospitals 
Professions within hospital 
Consultants were compared with senior clinical nurses (G and above) in each 
hospital. See tables 8.3 and 8.4. Consultants in hospital 2 scored their hospital 
lower on OL capacity than did G grades. As variances were in fact equal the 
actual significance of the difference was p<0.04. This is why sub-scale scores 
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are given in the table.  In hospital 1 consultants reported higher OL capacity 
than G grades. 
 
Consultants saw hospital 2 as doing significantly less team working and 
experimentation and as having significantly less clarity of purpose and sense of 
mission than G grades.  
Table 8.3 Senior clinical group comparison of mean sub-scale scores (hospital 2) 
 
There was no significant difference between OL scores for professions in 
hospital 1, (table 8.4) and hence the sub-scale scores are not shown. 
 
SCALE  Consultant 
mean 
(N=11) 
G grade 
mean 
(N=33) 
t statistic 
(between 
professions) 
p 
OL capacity  4.26  4.13 0.40 <0.69 
Table 8.4 Senior clinical group comparison of mean scale scores in hospital 1 
 
The OL capacity differences between professions were most significant 
between medical and nursing senior staff in hospital 2, and senior nursing staff 
scored hospital 2 higher than consultants. The consultants in hospital 1 
reported higher OL capacity than those in hospital 2, but the higher OL 
capacity seen by senior nurses in hospital 2 (table 8.3) obscured this difference 
when the senior clinical staff as a group were compared between hospitals.  
  
 
 
SCALE /SUBSCALE Consultant 
mean  
(N=17) 
G grade 
mean 
(N=29) 
t statistic 
(between 
professions) 
p 
OL Capacity  3.7  4.2 2 <0.052 
Clarity of Purpose and mission  3.8  4.5 2.2 <0.033 
Leadership commitment and 
empowerment
 3.8 
 
 4.1 
 
0.7 <0.478 
Experimentation  3.2  4.1 3.1 <0.005 
Transfer of Knowledge  3.8  4.0 0.62 <0.544 
Team working and group 
problem solving
 3.8 
 
 4.6  2.4 
 
<0.026 
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Seniority within hospital 
 
There were no significant differences in OL capacity seen between grade levels 
in each hospital (table 8.5), but when grade was examined within professional 
groups there was a significant difference between senior and junior nurses (see 
this chapter section 8.4). 
 
Scale name Senior 
Mean 
Junior 
Mean 
T Significance Number 
OL Capacity (H1) 4.19 3.91 t=1.74 p <0.85 N=108 
OL Capacity (H2) 4.03 3.76 t=1.5 p <0.136 N=90 
Table 8.5 Scale differences between seniors and juniors in each hospital 
 
8.3 Professions comparisons 
Doctors were higher scoring overall than nurses (table 8.6). This accorded with 
the selection hypothesis that medicine was a more complex profession than 
nursing. The difference was not statistically significant.  
 
Scale name Doctors’ 
Mean 
Nurses’ 
Mean 
T Significance Number 
OL Capacity 4.17 3.9 1.28 <0.209 90 
Table 8.6 Comparison of OL capacity score between doctors (28) and 
nurses/midwives (62) – senior clinical comparison group 
 
8.4 Seniority 
Senior clinical staff were compared with juniors. For 185 respondents who said 
whether they had implemented/adapted any SIGN guideline, seniors were much 
more likely than juniors to be involved in implementation (table 8.7). 
 
Seniority Implemented Not 
implemented 
d/k 
Senior 71 (57%) 11 (38%) 7 (23%) 
Junior 54 (43%) 18 (62%) 24 (77%) 
Total 125 (100%) 29 (100%) 31 (100%) 
 X2 = 13.08, DF = 2, p<0.002 
Table 8.7 Seniority comparison of those implementing/adapting any SIGN 
guideline (125), those not doing so (29) and those who did not know.  
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For 67 senior clinical respondents who said whether they had implemented or 
adapted any SIGN guideline, there were no significant OL score differences 
between those who had implemented or adapted guidelines and those who had 
not. Seniority was thus associated with involvement in guideline implementation 
or adaptation generally (table 8.7) and seniority was also associated with higher 
reported OL capacity for nurses (see table 8.10). Involvement in guideline 
implementation or adaptation was not associated with any significant difference 
in scale score for all senior clinical staff as a group, but those who had 
implemented scored their hospital higher (table 8.8). 
  
Scale 
name 
Implemented  
Mean 
Not 
Implemented  
Mean 
T Significance Number 
OL 
Capacity 
4.14 3.92 0.97 <0.352 N=67 
Table 8.8 Scale differences between those implementing/adapting any SIGN 
guideline (58) and those not doing so (9) (senior clinical group) 
 
Senior clinical staff scored more highly than juniors, in accordance with their 
more complex organisational role (table 8.9). 
 
Scale name Seniors’ 
Mean 
Juniors’ 
Mean 
T Significance Number 
OL Capacity 4.08 3.85 t=1.88 p <0.063 N=192 
Table 8.9 Scale differences between clinical seniors (90) and juniors (102) – 
full response group  
 
The difference was not significant overall, but senior nurses (G grade and 
above) had significantly higher OL capacity scores than juniors (see table 8.10). 
 
Scale name Senior 
Mean 
Junior 
Mean 
T Significance Number 
OL Capacity (Doctors)  3.90 3.89 t=0.014 p <0.99 N=28s+11j 
OL Capacity (Nurses) 4.20 3.85 t=2.68 p <0.009 N=68s+91j 
Table 8.10 Scale differences between seniors and juniors in each profession 
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The sub-scales contributing to the difference were leadership, 
experimentation, and teamwork and group problem solving (see table 8.11). 
 
SCALE  Senior 
mean 
(N=68)
Junior 
mean
(N=91)
t statistic 
(between 
grades) 
p
Clarity of Purpose and mission 4.56 4.40 1.05 <0.296
Leadership commitment and 
empowerment
3.98 3.57 2.30 <0.023
Experimentation 4.10 3.60 3.20 <0.002
Transfer of Knowledge 4.05 3.86 1.23 <0.220
Team working and group problem 
solving
4.46 4.02 2.97 <0.003
Table 8.11 Comparison of mean sub-scale scores – senior and junior nurses  
 
In fact, there was a significant difference between senior and junior nurses in 
hospital 2, but not in hospital 1. This was an important difference between 
hospitals. The figures are shown in table 8.12. 
 
SCALE  Senior 
mean 
(N=34)
Junior 
mean
(N=33)
t statistic 
(between 
grades) 
p
OL Capacity (Nurses) 4.23 3.69 2.65 <0.011
Clarity of Purpose and mission 4.43 4.14 1.08 <0.290
Leadership commitment and 
empowerment
4.06 3.36 2.42 <0.019
Experimentation 4.14 3.48 2.77 <0.008
Transfer of Knowledge 4.13 3.76 1.57 <0.230
Team working and group 
problem solving
4.51 3.86 2.84 <0.007
Table 8.12 Hospital 2 only - Comparison of mean sub-scale scores for senior and 
junior nurses  
 
8.5 Summary 
Although there were 11 OL scale and 10 sub-scale t-tests between study 
samples Bonferroni corrections were not required because the tests fell into 
distinct groups and OL sub-scales were correlated. 
 
Clinical seniors at hospital 1 gave higher OL scores than those at hospital 2. 
This was caused by much higher scoring consultants at hospital 1 in comparison 
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with those at hospital 2. However, because of small numbers the difference was 
not significant.  
 
Hospital 2 consultants reported significantly lower OL scores than hospital 2 G-
grades, and this was particularly significant for experimentation, clarity of 
purpose and team working. This contrasted with hospital 1, where consultants 
scored OL higher than G-grades. There were no significant differences in OL 
score within each hospital between those implementing different guidelines or 
(within hospital) between seniors and juniors generally. 
 
Senior doctors overall scored hospitals higher on OL than senior nurses. 
Seniors in general scored hospitals more highly than juniors, but the difference 
was significant only in the nursing profession, where seniors scored their 
hospitals significantly higher on leadership, experimentation and team working.  
 
This difference was actually significant only in hospital 2, making another 
important difference between hospitals. Guideline implementers gave 
significantly higher OL scores than those not implementing. This may have been 
because implementers were significantly more likely to be senior than junior. 
DVT guideline implementers had only slightly higher OL scores than diabetes 
guideline implementers. Seniors involved in guideline adaptation allocated 
hospitals higher OL scores than those not involved, but not significantly. 
 
In relation to the overall research question, the information from this analysis 
strengthened and enriched a number of the hypothesised differences between 
cases suggested by the qualitative analysis in the preceding chapter. The much 
higher OL capacity reported by hospital 1 consultants compared to hospital 2 
consultants strengthened the view that the clinical super-specialist culture in 
hospital 1 where what you knew was valued highly, was supportive of high OL 
capacity as well as of high clinical learning capacity, because collaborative 
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relationships between professions were formed, based on common specialist 
interests. This happened in spite of a hypothetically possible tendency for 
specialisation to narrow individuals’ range of interests. Once another profession 
(specialist nurses) came into their sphere of interest, an organisational 
dimension opened up for specialist doctors. Learning styles theory may help to 
explain this, if as implied by the literature review, professions’ learning styles 
differed in emphasis but were complementary, forming together a complete 
organisational learning cycle as suggested by Dixon, one which was able to 
innovate as well as to comply. The markedly different OL capacity scores of the 
two professions in hospital 2 implied that this was not happening there, while 
their similar scores in hospital 1 suggested a healthier relationship. Although 
senior nurses’ scores were not very different between hospitals, all did not 
appear to be well with even the nursing profession in hospital 2. This was 
implicit in the difference in OL capacity between the senior and the junior 
nurses, tending to imply that juniors’ learning was not being nurtured. In a high 
OL capacity context this would not be the case. A number of comments from 
junior nurses in hospital 2 exemplified in the preceding chapter gave evidence 
of their disillusionment with senior hospital staff.  
 
The results presented in the following chapter show differences in guideline 
implementation processes in these two hospital environments, and evidence has 
now accumulated to suggest more strongly than before that the two 
environments were indeed very different. Hospital 1 had a higher OL capacity 
than hospital 2, not overall perhaps, but between the professional cases nested 
within them, and especially the consultants, there were marked differences on 
quantitative measures, which were backed up by qualitative evidence suggesting 
that key dimensions relating to the ability to create strategic change and to 
three different perspectives on OL capacity differed systematically in 
important respects between the hospitals.  
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Chapter 9 - Analysis of Interviews 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses Yin’s quantitative approach to case study. Chapter 7 was a 
humanistic qualitative analysis looking especially at contextual issues by case. In 
the present chapter, the interview responses are first analysed to describe 
guideline implementation activities and beliefs overall. With the descriptions, 
the interview responses from senior clinical staff are also compared by hospital 
and profession (using chi-square) to see whether any of these study sample 
groups was significantly more involved in the main activities or beliefs. The 
study samples were profession (doctor and nurse/midwife) and hospital (1 or 2).  
 
The term ‘qualitative’ was used for this analysis of the interviews, although 
statistical comparisons using Chi-square were at the heart of it because this 
part of the research was exploratory and descriptive, as well as comparative. 
The development of a bottom-up coding structure to categorise raw data was a 
step toward a set of concepts on which to base the development of substantive 
theory, a main function of qualitative research (pre-defined theoretical 
categories were used for coding, and developing formal theory). Because the 
hospitals were in many ways so similar, differences in guideline implementation 
methods and outcomes were often a matter of emphasis rather than absolute 
presence or absence of a particular quality. Chi-square was the appropriate 
statistical test for such comparisons of nominal (i.e. qualitative) data. The 
explanatory comparison of the study samples on the categories of behaviour 
and belief used Chi-square for testing for differences in the amount of 
emphasis given to that quality in each hospital. The use of chi-square was a 
rigorous way to test for difference in emphasis between study samples. It was 
a logical development of Yin’s quantitative approach to comparative case 
study.100;438 
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The chapter is a comparative analysis of the hospitals and the professions ‘in 
parallel’, (by guidelines issues) rather than ‘in series’, (by hospital) for each 
interview topic. This facilitates the comparison of each guideline issue by 
considering the same issue in each hospital at the same point in the text. The 
disadvantage is it loses some of the case context. Chapter 7 compensated for 
this by providing a more traditional qualitative analysis of the cases one after 
the other or ‘in series’, comparing and contrasting selected qualitative themes 
within the case context of each hospital. 
 
Why compare the study samples’ guideline implementation activities and 
beliefs? This was done to answer the next part of the research question. The 
first stage (chapter 8) was to measure and compare the OL capacity of the 
study samples, having previously set up a situation where each member of a pair 
of samples was likely to have a different OL score. The second stage (this 
chapter) was to see whether there were differences between study samples in 
types of guideline implementation and whether any differences supported the 
differences found in OL score between study samples. The third stage (chapter 
10) was to see whether different OL scores were associated with particular 
guideline implementation activities and beliefs, and whether any study sample 
was particularly involved in those differences.  
 
9.2 Aims 
To recap, the hypothesis testing was structured in three parts according to the 
three aims: 
• the first analysis (chapter 8) tested for differences between study 
samples on OL capacity as measured by the OL scale.  
• the current analysis (this chapter) aimed to describe and to test for 
differences between study samples  in the most common issues 
perceived  in guideline adoption activities and beliefs,  
Chapter 9 Analysis of interviews 
 
 
 285
• the combined analysis (chapter 10) aimed to test for any relationship 
between particular guideline adoption patterns and OL capacity. 
 
9.3 Coding system for interviews 
The interview schedule is given in appendix A1.4. The interviews were 
structured around the three stages of guideline adoption, outcomes and 
learning. 
• Dissemination 
• Implementation 
• Audit 
• Outcome 
• Learning  
 
A detailed base of substantive coding resulted. Base codes were grouped into 
broader substantive themes. Where appropriate, these were amalgamated into 
formal groups defined according to OL and guideline implementation theory. A 
number of closed questions required agreement or disagreement. All 101 
interviews were transcribed and all text was coded. In total, there were 
approaching 2,500 separate codes. 
 
Substantive coding 
The interview transcripts were coded to substantive categories. The analysis 
was structured by the above five stages. Most of the substantive categories 
were created using data driven coding from answers to open questions. Some 
resulted from closed questions (questions requiring yes or no answers). 
 
Formal coding 
The formal, or theoretically based, code applied to a number of different 
stages of guideline adoption was: 
Chapter 9 Analysis of interviews 
 
 
 286
• Type of guideline adoption (type 1 or type 2 or both, as described in the 
methodology chapter 4) 
 
Because type 1 adoption was common and type 2 was rare, type 2 usually 
overlapped with type 1. Testing of hypothesis 1 (type 1 or type 2) versus 
hypothesis 2 (type 1 and type 2) came down in practice to a comparison of type 
1 and type 2 implementation. 
 
A small number of more specific formal codes applied only to dissemination: 
• Disciplinary setting – single discipline or more than one  
• Direction of dissemination – single (type 1 OL), or two way (type 2/both) 
• Type of group – structure based or task based. 
 
These formal groups related directly to the hypothesis. This approach to 
coding was designed both to test formal (general) theory and to generate 
substantive (context dependent) theory for testing elsewhere. Bryman 
discusses this distinction.44 The seniority effect on OL capacity found in the 
quantitative analysis was excluded by using only senior clinical doctors and 
nurses/midwives in comparisons between hospitals and professions. Out of a 
total 101 interviewees including 9 who replied only to the interview, 62 seniors 
were left after these exclusions. More doctors were interviewed at hospital 1, 
but the difference was not statistically significant, see table 9.1.  
 
Profession HOSPITAL
  1 2 
Doctor 14 (44%) 8 (27%)
Nurse 16 (50%) 22 (73%)
Midwife 2 (6%) 0 (0%)
Total 32 30
 Table 9.1 Senior clinical interviewees by hospital X2 = 4.52, DF 2, p<0.11 
 
The high level substantive categories were assigned to a formal category where 
possible. This allowed some formal theory testing by comparing the relative 
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frequency of study samples inside and outside the substantive category 
involved. The comparisons used chi-square to determine if differences were 
statistically significant. This combination of approaches to analysis of the 
qualitative data continued the multi-method strategy of the whole project. The 
qualitative analysis gave the overall frequency of each code.  
 
Tables of frequencies by hospital/profession are usually shown only if there 
was a significant difference in the relevant study sample after bonferroni 
correction. Some frequency tables are shown where there was a difference 
before but not after bonferroni correction if they related to a point that had 
come out in the qualitative analysis (see chapter 7). The main code for every 
question was subject to two chi square tests; one between professions and one 
between hospitals (see section 4.6). The number of tests per topic was 
therefore 2* (number of questions in the group) for bonferroni purposes. 
However, if a main code had fewer than 10 responses no X2 test was done, 
unless there was an obvious disparity. This was because the expected frequency 
in one cell of a 2*2 table would then have been less than 5, as the positive 
responses would be split between 2 cells and the null responses for that code 
would be split between the other two. If the expected frequency was less than 
5 Fisher’s exact test was used. 
 
9.4 Analysis by stage of guideline adoption  
9.4.1 Introduction  
In the following analysis, a descriptive table shows each main code for answers 
to individual questions about each stage of guideline adoption. The codes shown 
in these descriptive tables are not mutually exclusive. The chi square tests 
were carried out for the main code appearing in answer to each question. The 
chi square tables which are shown after the descriptive table therefore relate 
to a single line or cell within it, containing the count for a main code (N=62). 
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They do not relate to the descriptive table itself, which is for showing the main 
codes or themes for a question. The chi square table is shown only if there was 
a significant difference between hospitals or professions for that code. The 
figures in the chi square tables are for the existence or non-existence of one 
code only and so are mutually exclusive. 
 
The analysis was structured by the questions used within the stages of 
adoption. Within each stage of guideline adoption the analysis was structured 
by the three different types of coding used as follows: 
Closed questions 
These questions investigated guideline adoption through pre-specified 
categories as given in the text. Each study sample participated in each stage of 
adoption. The largest category (yes or no) was compared with the rest of the 
62 senior clinical interviewees using chi-square for profession and hospital.  
Substantive data 
The number of interviewees in the largest substantive category for a topic (the 
main one within each type, if types were applied) is given in bold. These were 
compared with the rest of the 62 senior clinical interviewees to see if any 
study sample was particularly represented using chi square as described above. 
Where there were other large categories these were given in italics as 
additional descriptive context. 
Formal categories 
The frequencies of different formal types of guideline adoption are given for 
each stage of adoption. Chi square tests were carried out as above.  
 
9.4.2 Dissemination 
Of the 62 interviewees 34 said they had been involved in adapting guidelines 
for local use and 28 said they had not. There was a significant difference 
Chapter 9 Analysis of interviews 
 
 
 289
between hospitals in whether or not senior nurses said they had been involved 
in helping to adapt SIGN guidelines for local use (see table 9.2). 
 
 
 Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Total  
Involved 13 (81%) 7 (32%) 20 (53%) 
Not involved 3 (19%) 15 (68%) 18 (47%) 
 
Total  16
 
22
 
38 
Table 9.2 Senior nurse interviewees’ involvement in adapting guidelines for local 
use, comparison between hospitals. X2 (Yates) = 7.2, DF 1, P<0.004 (Fishers) 
 
As for each descriptive table in this chapter, there were 2 chi-square sub-
tables for each main code with over 10 responses, one for profession and one 
for hospital. “Yes/no” was treated as one code. Only tables showing a 
significant difference are shown in these results. There were four sub tables 
here; views were similar between professions and hospitals. The high number 
who said they would disseminate differently next time (table 9.3) suggested 
some learning about dissemination had taken place. The demand for support was 
high. 
 
Dissemination Yes No 
Would disseminate differently next time 32 29 
Dissemination support from senior management wanted 39 22 
Table 9.3 frequencies for yes and no responses about dissemination  
 
Table 9.4 shows frequency and description for the main substantive category 
within each type of dissemination. In both hospitals, dissemination to 
interviewees by references in the work area was especially by posters (4) and 
guideline/protocol folders (7).  
 
Dissemination topic Direction 
 One-way Two-way 
To interviewee Reference in work area     19 Discussion               5 
By interviewee Reference in work area     31 Discussion             11 
Change desirable One-off training                 13 More discussion       4 
Support wanted Access                              12 More discussion       4 
Table 9.4 Frequencies of main substantive categories related to dissemination.  
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Other than reference in the work area, the nurses mostly had heard through 
one-off training (17). This was mentioned by only two doctors. The doctors 
mainly had their own personal reference documents as they heard from SIGN 
by post (14). They were the main channel through which this information came 
into the organisation. There were 19 mentions of information about guidelines 
filtering through, 16 came from nurses and 3 from doctors. In 2 cases (both 
nurses) it was explicitly stated that information was deliberately filtered out 
at higher levels: 
“I think the nursing staff dissemination is a bit haphazard. I'm sure it's 
supposed to come down via the operations managers to the clinical nurse 
managers then to the sisters, but I'm sure they're filtered out at ops 
managers level.” (Senior nurse, hospital 1, Cardiac Surgery (ITU)) 
 
Dissemination to their own staff by providing reference in the work area was 
mentioned by 23 nurses/midwives and 8 doctors. It included posters (11) and 
guideline/protocol folders (11) held on the ward. Equal numbers of senior 
doctors (8) and nurses/midwives (10) disseminated by giving staff their own 
reference documents. More nurses (19) than doctors (6) used one-off training 
for their staff. 
 
Dissemination preferred in future shifted from both methods experienced and 
those used. It moved to the provision of one off training rather than reference 
in the work area, or personally held references, though both were still 
mentioned. The question on organisational support suggested the hospitals 
needed to support better access to guidelines. This included giving them more 
publicity. 
 
There were 10 sub-tables for testing chi square distribution between study 
samples. One difference was significant at the required level. Doctors were 
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less likely than nurses to have been disseminated the guidelines through a 
reference in the work area (see table 9.5). 
 
Profession Not reference in work area Reference in work area 
Doctor 21(49%) 1(5%)
Nurse or Midwife 22(51%) 18(95%)
Total 43 19
Table 9.5 Frequency of doctors and nurses disseminated guidelines by a 
reference in the work area. X2 (Yates) 9.1, DF 1, P<0.004 
 
In both hospitals one way dissemination was between twice and three times as 
frequent as two way (table 9.6). It was used to disseminate to others more 
than to the interviewee. Interviewees wanted to use more one-way than two-
way dissemination in future, and wanted more support for it from senior 
management. 
 
Dissemination Direction Disciplines Group rationale 
 One-way Two-way Uni- Multi- Structure Task 
To interviewee 50 25 13 12 14 7 
By interviewee 49 14 10 4 13 2 
Change desirable 29 11 4 7 8 2 
Support wanted 35 7 - - - - 
Table 9.6 Frequencies of binomial formal categories related to dissemination. 
 
In dissemination to interviewees there was an equal balance of uni-disciplinary 
and multi-disciplinary contexts. Dissemination to their staff tended to be in a 
uni-disciplinary context. Those who wanted more dissemination tended to 
express a preference for multidisciplinary contexts. Groups used for two-way 
dissemination were more frequently structure-based (eg wards, directorates) 
than task (project) based. 
9.4.3 Implementation 
 
Implementation topic  Yes No 
Member of an implementation group 16 46 
Acted to ensure recommendations put into practice 49 13 
Other implementation activity 21 36 
Table 9.7 Frequencies for yes and no responses about implementation  
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About 25% of interviewees were members of an implementation group, while 
about 75% said they had acted to put guidelines into practice. Most recalled 
their own implementation effort rather than others’ efforts (table 9.7). 
 
Interviewees were asked what they had done to implement the guideline.  
reminding (13) was the main substantive type 1 code (table 9.8). 
 
Implementation Type 1 implementation Type 2 implementation 
By interviewee - main Reminding                    13 Agreed local protocol  7 
- other Checking                      12 - 
- other Documenting                12 - 
Other implementation  Clinical audit                   5 - 
Table 9.8 Main substantive types of guideline implementation. 
 
Checking (12) and documenting (12) were close behind and are included as 
context. The main type 2 substantive code was agreeing the local protocol (7). 
There was a significant difference between professions on this (table 9.9). 
 
Profession Agreed local protocol Other 
Doctor 6 (86%) 16 (29%) 
Nurse or Midwife 1 (14%) 39 (71%) 
Total 7 55 
Table 9.9 Frequencies of professions agreeing local protocols. X2 (Yates) 6.39, 
DF 1, p (Fishers) <0.007 
 
The one nurse involved was included in an “unofficial” directorate group.  
“There's a small group within the orthopaedic unit and I was invited to 
one of their meetings.” (Senior nurse, hospital 2) 
  
Clinical audit was mentioned as type 1 implementation (checking) by 5 
nurses/midwives and no doctors. There was one significant difference between 
study samples for implementation type (table 9.10).  
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Implementation  Type 1 Type 2 
Type 37  11* 
Table 9.10 Frequencies of type 1 and type 2 implementation activity 
* significant difference at 5% between professions. N=62 
 
Doctors used significantly more type 2 methods of implementation (table 9.11). 
They were for example involved in agreeing local protocols and discussing the 
relevance for implementation of feedback from audit. 
 
Profession Type 2
implementation
Not type 2 
implementation
Doctor 9 (82%) 13 (25%)
Nurse or Midwife 2 (18%) 38 (75%)
Total 11 51
Table 9.11 Type of implementation by profession (X2 =10.2, DF1, p<0.002) 
 
9.4.4 Clinical Audit 
In both hospitals most interviewees knew that there had been an audit (table 
9.12). A minority were members of an audit group. Audit groups were drawn 
from one or two directorates, with little representation from primary care.  
 
Topic Yes No 
Audit   
There was an audit 43 12 
Member of audit group 16 33 
One directorate in audit group 20 19 (more than 1) 
Audit group included primary care 5 33 
Table 9.12 Frequencies for yes and no responses about audit of the guideline  
 
Interviewees were asked about clinical audit of the guideline. Most 
interviewees mentioned type 1 aims for audit such as checking that practice 
complied with the guideline (table 9.13). 
 
Clinical audit issue Main codes  
Audit aims Type 1 – Checking 33              Type 2  - Testing    8 
Who did the audit Audit office            17               Doctors                 12 
Audit group Multidisciplinary   22                Unidisciplinary      18  
Understandings of quality 
improvement  
Improve practice   35                Clinical audit        24 
Table 9.13 main substantive clinical audit codes by type (where applicable). 
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Improving practice in accordance with the guideline (9) and observing practice 
(9) were also important.  
“It was to establish the degree of the percentage compliance or 
percentage of the use of prophylaxis.”  (Senior doctor, hospital 2)  
 
The main type 2 aim was to test the effect of the new intervention in the local 
context. Solving implementation problems (1) and getting the patient 
perspective (3) were included under this code. The audit office was the main 
group actually carrying out the audit. Nurses often remembered a nurse 
employed by the audit department checking patient records in the ward.  
“It was the clinical audit department, there was a nurse who was 
seconded I think if I remember rightly to do that.” (Senior nurse, 
hospital 2) 
 
Doctors were the second most commonly mentioned group doing audit (12) 
(table 9.12a) and after that were multidisciplinary groups (11).The composition 
of the audit group was most often thought multidisciplinary. The main 
understanding of quality improvement went no further than “improving 
practice”, mentioned more frequently at hospital 2. The next most common was 
clinical audit. This was mentioned more by doctors, but not to the point of 
significance after bonferroni correction (p=0.03). There was a significant 
difference between hospitals before bonferroni correction, in that doctors 
were more often mentioned as doing the audit in hospital 1. (See table 9.14): 
 
 Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Total 
Doctor 9 (47%) 3 (17%) 12 (32%) 
Audit Officer 5 (26%) 12 (66%) 17 (46%) 
Nurse 5 (26%) 3 (17%) 8 (22%) 
Total 19 18 37 
Table 9.14 Main Professions mentioned as doing the audit: comparison between 
hospitals (percentages may not add up to 100 owing to rounding errors) X2 = 6.36, 
P<0.043 
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In both hospitals a large majority of interviewees mentioned type 1 aims (table 
9.15). Type 1 aims included checking, improving and observing practice, type 2 
included testing the effect of a new intervention and providing a basis for 
research. 
 
Clinical Audit  Type 1 Type 2 
Aim 44 7 
Benefits of being in audit group  16 7 
Table 9.15 Frequencies of type 1 and type 2 audit aims and benefits of being in 
an audit group 
 
The benefits of being in a guideline audit group were also predominantly type 1 
– including providing reassurance that practice was acceptable, showing room 
for improvement, and ensuring compliance. Type 2 benefits of being in an audit 
group included the potential for influencing practice and getting feedback on 
the adaptation of guidelines to local practice. 
 
9.4.5 Changes resulting from guideline implementation  
 
Findings about interviewees’ personal clinical practice were not often formally 
disseminated (table 9.16). Where respondents answered that they were 
disseminated it was often because if in charge of a ward they regarded the 
work of the ward as their personal practice. 
 
Change to practice Yes No 
Findings communicated for personal practice   7 42 
Findings communicated for team practice 32 19 
Change to interviewee’s practice 45 14 
Other change to practice 26 33 
Audit findings communicated outside clinical team 25 15 
Table 9.16 Frequencies for yes and no responses about changes to practice  
 
In one case two doctors shared results informally: 
“in the individual audit that [Dr X] and I do, we break it down into how 
she and I are managing patients,” (Senior doctor, hospital 2,) 
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Findings were usually communicated for team practice. Most interviewees said 
there had been a change to their practice. 
 
Results issues Main codes  
Changes to personal 
clinical practice 
Type 1 – More effective 
treatment delivery        29 
Increased awareness  12 
Documentation              6       
Type 2 – New care delivery 
model                             6 
New clinical activity        3 
Other changes to practice Type 1 - More effective 
treatment delivery        13 
Increased awareness    7 
New treatment from g/l  3 
Type 2 – New care delivery 
model                             4 
Learning culture             3 
Communication of audit 
findings – where to 
Between organisations   9 
To management             8 
Table 9.17 Main substantive results themes by type. 
 
To explain table 9.17, there were 10 sub-tables dividing respondents (N=62) 
into those coded and not coded to the main codes and tabulating them against 
the study samples (professions and hospitals). Communication between 
organisations was mentioned significantly more at hospital 1 (table 9.18).  
 
Hospital Inter-organisational Not Inter-
organisational 
1 8 (89%) 24 (45%) 
2 1 (91%) 29 (55%) 
Total 9 53 
Table 9.18 Whether communication of audit results was inter-organisational   
X2 = 4.24, DF 1, p (fishers) <0.028 
 
More effective treatment delivery (type 1) included quicker, safer and more 
reliable delivery (table 9.17). New models for care delivery (type 2) included 
changes to roles – for example nurse/midwife initiation of DVT prophylaxis by 
raising the matter with medical staff. Increased awareness was mentioned by 
10 nurses and 2 doctors. One doctor mentioned it in connection with setting up 
a new protocol. 
“I think it made me aware that, but it wasn't the only reason, that we 
had to look to make an official policy or at least to get a sound policy for 
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my team for DVT prophylaxis and hence that was done.” (Senior doctor, 
hospital 2)  
 
It was not always clear what increased awareness meant. Most often it was 
that the interviewee was sensitised to the issue: 
“I think you became more aware, you were looking for patients to fit into 
the category of the SIGN guideline, whereas before it was very much 
left to the consultant...” (Senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
The communication of audit findings between organisations meant to the health 
board or through conferences: 
“the clinical effectiveness group of the health board have seen the audit 
results and discussed them.” (Senior doctor, hospital 1)  
 
Results of implementation (Changes to 
practice) 
Type 1 
Change 
Type 2 
Change 
Own practice 39 10 
Other changes 21 10 
Table 9.19 Frequencies of type 1 and type 2 changes to practice 
 
For personal clinical practice, type 1 changes were again the most frequent 
(table 9.19). They included more effective treatment delivery, the introduction 
of new treatments to accord with the guideline, greater awareness of clinical 
issues related to the guideline, and better documentation. Type 2 changes 
included new models for care delivery, and new clinical activities. This 
substantive pattern was repeated for other changes reported by interviewees.  
 
9.4.6 Learning in groups 
 
The learning outcomes of guideline implementation are shown in table 9.20.  
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Learning topic Yes No 
Learning about practice in other teams/directorates 28 33 
New ways of working in own team/directorate 32 27 
Primary care involved in new ways of working 10 31 
Help suggested from the organisation  54 8 
Table 9.20 Frequencies for yes and no responses about learning  
 
Half had learned about practice in other teams, and half said new team or 
directorate work practices had resulted. A minority reported involvement of 
primary care in new ways of working. A large majority suggested ways the 
organisation could help this learning process, which indicated a need existed. 
 
Directorates were the main group learned about as a result of the guideline 
implementation (table 9.21). 
 
Learning topic Main codes  
Learning about other 
team/directorate 
Other directorate              17  
Other hospital                    5 
New ways of working in 
own team/directorate 
Type 1 – Care process    14 
Increased awareness        8 
  Type 2 – Care process 14 
 
Organisational help 
needed for this learning 
process  
Education                         21 
Dissemination                  16 
Audit improvements         12 
Resources or time              7         
Table 9.21 Main substantive learning themes by type. 
 
This indicated that the directorate was the natural learning unit. Mentions of 
learning in the interviewee’s own directorate continued to highlight “increased 
awareness”. It was mentioned, by 8 nurses but no doctors. The learning, 
whether coded type 1 or type 2, was mainly about care processes or working 
practices, including roles and relationships and changes to workload.  
 
Type 1 examples included risk assessment for DVT on admission, support to 
decision making, more measurement for TEDs, fitting of TEDs by auxiliaries, 
more or quicker prophylaxis, more uniform practice between wards, and better 
form completion. Type 2 examples included policy review, more shared 
treatment, specialist nurses, self-policing, closer nurse liaison with medics and 
between specialties, easier clinical consensus, and more initiative from nurses. 
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More education was the main focus for help wanted from the organisation. 
More study days/sessions and more time for education outside the ward were 
included. 
 
New ways of working in the interviewee’s team or directorate showed an even 
split overall between type 1 and type 2 (table 9.19). Increased awareness was 
classified as type 1. Culture issues were included under type 2 change.  Both 
type 1 and type 2 included different changes to care processes, roles and 
relationships. For example “risk assessment for DVT on admission” was 
classified as type 1 as it was a guideline recommendation, but “more initiative 
from nurses” was type 2 as it indicated increased autonomy. There was a 
significant difference for type 1 learning here (table 9.22). 
 
Learning in interviewee’s team or directorate Type 1 Type 2 
Type  21 *p,*h 16 
Table 9.22 Frequencies of type 1 and type 2 learning at team/directorate level. 
 
There was significantly more type 1 learning for nurses, and more type 1 for 
hospital 2 (table 9.23) which was consistent with the idea that the medical 
profession did more goal questioning and had higher OL capacity. 
 
Profession Type 1 
learning 
Not type 1 
learning
Chi square 
Doctor 2 (10%) 20 (49%)
Nurse or Midwife 19 (90%) 21 (51%)
Total 21 41
X2 = 7.71, DF 1, 
p<0.005 
 
Hospital 1 5 (24%) 27 (66%)
Hospital 2 16 (76%) 14 (34%)
Total 21 41
X2 = 8.22, DF 1, 
p<0.004 
 
Table 9.23 Differences between hospitals and professions in type of 
team/directorate level learning  
 
There was more type 2 learning at hospital 1, supporting the idea that hospital 1 
had higher OL capacity. Nurses mentioned both types together as frequently as 
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type 2 alone, the overlap showing perhaps the more routine nature of nurses’ 
involvement with guidelines. 
 
9.5 General issues – aims and implementation  
9.5.1 Aims of implementation of guidelines  
 
In both hospitals and professions there was consensus on the aims and uses of 
guidelines. The main purpose of the guidelines was seen as promoting 
consistency (often called uniformity) of care practice or policy for all patients 
(table 9.24). 
 
Aim  N=62 for each code 
Consistency                                        29 
Best practice                                       24 
Evidence into practice                        19 
Improvement                                       17 
Table 9.24 General views on aims of SIGN guidelines. 
 
Best practice referred to best process. The wider purpose was to decrease the 
often reported variation in outcome between units and geographical areas, and 
even between practitioners in the same unit: 
“you could fetch up to exact same hospital the next day to someone 
else's clinic and get a completely different outcome as a result of it. “ 
(Senior doctor, hospital 1) 
 
The promotion of best practice was often mentioned in the same breath as 
consistency (10 interviewees did so) 
“Best practice - I think it standardises best practice.” (Senior midwife, 
hospital 1) 
 
Others saw a logical impossibility in “standardising best practice”, because not 
everyone could have the best care. For them a more realistic aim was to set a 
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minimum standard. A minimum standard allowed some flexibility for a unit to 
learn better practice than the minimum, while providing a safety net too. 
“What you're looking for basically is what is the minimum that you'd be 
satisfied with that would be regarded as acceptable practice by a 
responsible body of medical opinion, and supported by a responsible body 
of peer scrutinised evidence.” (Senior doctor, hospital 1) 
 
There was still a minority of staff who regarded guidelines as an imposition, but 
a negative comment such as the one below was not what it seemed. A consultant 
who was driving research ahead of guidelines made it. It was more a declaration 
of autonomy – potentially a good thing for OL - than resistance to change: 
“The SIGN guidelines are an attempt by bureaucrats to control the 
quality of our practice - medical practice - and they are adding to the 
deluge of paperweight - paperwork that that rains down upon us advising 
and cajoling us and have almost no impact at all.” (Senior doctor, hospital 
1) 
 
Evidence and best practice were mentioned together by 7 interviewees, for 
example: 
“I think the SIGN guidelines are evidence based, it's best practice and 
we should all be adopting that practice...” (Senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
Improving care was closely related to promoting best practice. It included 
safer care, improving resources for care and better integration of care: 
“Really improving patient care from a multidisciplinary kind of point of 
view instead of just being kind of unidisciplinary...” (Senior nurse, 
hospital 1) 
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9.5.2 Meaning of implementation  
 
There was consensus that implementing guidelines was “carrying them out”, also 
called “putting into practice” (table 9.23). The pre-requisite was to ensure they 
could be carried out, by adapting them, by knowing about them. 
 
 
Meaning of implementation  N=62 for each code 
Carry them out                                      27 
Check/ensure they are carried out        23 
Adapt them                                            21 
Know about them                                  20 
Table 9.25 General views on meaning of implementation of SIGN guidelines. 
 
Checking they were carried out was a way to ensure it, and thus was also part 
of implementation. Implementation had most of the elements of a learning 
process, for example a comparison of guideline theory with local practice and 
its constraints, developing new theory (protocol), acting on it and review. 
Ensuring compliance was a more intimate ward based matter than formal clinical 
audit. It involved quick feedback from the ward manager (usually a G grade 
sister) to individual nurses, and nurses reminded doctors. Adaptation involved 
both defining exceptions as policy, and adapting the guideline to individual 
patients. Knowing about guidelines involved getting and disseminating 
information and ensuring the awareness of others.  
 
9.5.3 Own use of guidelines 
 
Guidelines were used for reference day to day particularly by nurses (table 
9.26). Doctors used them for reference where there was uncertainty about 
treatment of a non-routine patient because the condition or situation was 
infrequently seen. 
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Own use of guidelines N=62 for each code 
Reference                                                20 
Set/agree clinical policy                           19 
As procedural rules                                  12 
Table 9.26 General issues on own uses of SIGN guidelines. 
 
They were said to be used significantly more for setting clinical policy in 
hospital 1 than in hospital 2 (table 9.27).   
 
Own use of 
guidelines 
Hospital 1 Hospital 2 TOTAL 
Reference 8 12 20 
Setting clinical policy 14 5 19 
TOTAL 22 17 39 
Table 9.27 General issues on own uses of SIGN guidelines, by hospital. X2 = 4.5, 
P<0.05 
 
There was a significant difference between hospitals on those who said their 
use for guidelines was in setting clinical policy, which was mentioned more at 
hospital 1 (table 9.27). This use was proportionately more mentioned by doctors 
(half) than nurses (a quarter). Table 9.27 shows the hospital split, and a chi-
square test for both the main uses interviewees mentioned they had for the 
guidelines. 
 
Doctors would typically read through relevant guidelines when they arrived and 
then file them, while nurses would keep protocols in a folder with others 
relevant to practice on the ward. 
“I very occasionally use them as a sort of textbook type resource. 
Otherwise, when they come out we have a look at it and decide whether 
it ought in some way to be incorporated into the list of guidelines we 
have in our directorate...” (Senior doctor, hospital 2) 
 
“We usually just refer to the guidelines we've got and work through to 
make sure that we're implementing as best as possible.” (Senior nurse, 
hospital 2) 
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Setting or agreeing clinical policy was about incorporating the guideline into the 
unit (usually the directorate) policy: 
“When we get guidelines that come through that are relevant to our 
area of practice we review the guideline and then look at our area of 
practice and see whether there is anything that we need to vary within 
that practice. Now that hasn't happened very often because when there 
is something that we have to deal with that's outwith our area of 
expertise there are so many specialists within a big teaching hospital 
that it's very easy at any time of the day or night to get help from 
someone who is an expert.” (Senior doctor, hospital 1)   
 
Use as procedural rules meant that the guidelines were embedded as the basis 
for practice, they were internalised. This was mentioned almost entirely by 
nurses, and more in hospital 2: 
“You change your practice and you go with it and then it becomes second 
nature, you don't conscientiously think I'm using SIGN guidelines to do 
this...” (Senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
9.6 General issues – effectiveness and change 
9.6.1 Effectiveness level  
The consensus in both hospitals and the professions within them alike was that 
SIGN guidelines were effective rather than very effective (table 9.28). A 
number said they would be more effective if they were implemented better. 
“Overall I think they're useful, but I think there are issues there about 
targeting the guidelines that are actually relevant to peoples’ practice 
and making sure that those people get them and are aware of them.” 
(Senior doctor, hospital 2)  
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Effectiveness code N=62  
Very Effective                                    9) 
Effective                                           29) Positive = 41 
Fairly effective                                   3) 
Could be more effective                    6) 
Not very effective                              4) Negative = 21 
Ineffective                                         1) 
Other                                               10) 
Table 9.28 Effectiveness of SIGN guidelines. Codes are mutually exclusive. 
 
Those who said they had been very effective tended to mean they had focused 
attention and caused reflection. The one interviewee who thought guidelines 
were ineffective qualified this to say their effectiveness would be marginal. 
But this was the doctor mentioned previously in a specialist unit doing research 
in advance of the guidelines.  
 
9.6.2 Barriers to effective implementation of guidelines 
 
The main barriers to implementation in both hospitals were linked to 
dissemination and secondly cost and resistance to change (table 9.29). These 
were mentioned to similar extents in both hospitals. 
 
Barrier                          N=62 for each code 
Dissemination difficulties                    29 
Resistance to change                         20 
Too costly                                           20 
Disagreement with it                           17 
Lack of understanding                        13 
Table 9.29 General issues on barriers to effectiveness of SIGN guidelines.  
 
In hospital 2 disagreement with the guidelines was mentioned as often as 
resistance to change. Equally lack of knowledge of the existence, content and 
location of the guidelines (mentioned by 14) was a major factor, especially in 
hospital 2: 
 “I think the most likely thing would be apathy - people not bothering to 
read it or hospitals and departments in hospitals not having meetings to 
discuss these things.” (Senior doctor, hospital 2) 
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“the barrier there was ignorance in that the SIGN guidelines weren't 
freely available to us but when somebody else knew about it and you 
know demonstrated that there were benefits and it's probably safer for 
all our patients the nursing staff are quite amenable and they did it.” 
(Senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
It was important to make the guidelines easy to read, and to provide 
opportunities for reading and discussing them, for example at induction or 
elsewhere. 
 
Other than dissemination per se, natural human resistance to change was an 
important barrier. It was applied to both nurses and doctors, but doctors 
criticised their own profession in more detail: 
“I think doctors, many doctors are quite conservative and if they've 
always done something some way they don't really like to be told to do it 
another way,” (Senior doctor, hospital 2) 
 
Practicality was important, recommended practice had to be practicable: 
 “I mean there's a lot of problems with the sizes and things like that, 
with TED stockings, people don't conform to the you know the actual 
size of them, they're difficult to get on,” (Senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
It also had to be easily communicable: 
“for some of the SIGN guidelines the juniors - the residents - change 
every 6 weeks, and that's quite a lot to keep educating people, that's 
hard work” (Senior doctor, hospital 1) 
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Impractical recommendations were costly to implement, and cost was an issue in 
itself. Related to cost was volume, both of individual guidelines and of numbers 
of separate guidelines: 
“I think that there's a danger of trying to be too comprehensive, that 
you actually turn people off...” (Senior doctor, hospital 1) 
 
“frankly I was disappointed in the DVT guideline because I felt it gave 
too many options” (Senior doctor, hospital 1) 
 
“Guideline fatigue is a real issue I think at the moment.” (Senior doctor, 
hospital 1)  
 
The volume problem meant only guidelines with the most cost effective 
recommendations that were also simple and cheap to implement would be well 
implemented. Contentious guidelines would be expensive and difficult to 
implement because of disagreement from a number of clinicians:    
“Guidelines which are perceived to be not appropriate to actually not be 
building on peoples current practice but trying to be too prescriptive and 
change people too fast I think, or make statement and give advice which 
are perhaps regarded as not in the main stream of opinion.” (Senior 
doctor, hospital 1) 
 
This meant it was difficult to implement innovative new practice through 
guidelines.  
 
Lack of understanding was a motivational issue, rather than an intellectual 
deficiency: 
“if people […] don't understand the reason why it's going to be better 
for their patients then that stops it, so that's the biggest thing - people 
not understanding.” (Senior nurse, hospital 2) 
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9.6.3 Facilitating change 
 
The questions about the facilitation of change in acute hospitals, and about 
barriers to change, helped to validate the data about barriers to the 
implementation of guidelines. They also gave interviewees a chance to reflect 
on ideas from earlier.  
 
Change facilitating factor N=62 for each code 
Formal support by the organisation     21 
Specific implementation activities        20 
Supportive culture                                18 
Better quality guidelines                       17 
Table 9.30 General issues on facilitating change.  
 
Formal support (time/resources) from the organisation was mentioned as a 
facilitating factor for change by significantly more doctors than 
nurses/midwives (tables 9.30 and 9.31). 
 
Profession Would like formal 
support from hospital
Would not like formal 
support from hospital 
Doctor 12 (57%) 10 (24%) 
Nurse or 
Midwife 9 (43%) 31 (76%) 
Total 21 41 
Table 9.31 significant difference for profession in formal support wanted from 
hospital X2 5.16, df 1, p<0.024 
 
Formal support included time and resources but also endorsement by clinical 
directors. Time and resource to implement guidelines were each mentioned 5 
times, also resource for audit, staff to implement, time to discuss it with the 
team: 
“if it massively increases workload then nobody's going to implement 
them. But the whole point of the guidelines is usually that it makes life 
much simpler because people don't need to sit and wonder what the 
blazes they're supposed to do.” (Senior doctor, hospital 1)  
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Culture was directly mentioned in comments about the need to remove a blame 
culture, to encourage a culture open to change, a more inclusive culture, and a 
non-threatening culture. In other cases where it was not directly mentioned it 
was the main factor in the comment, such as the organisation valuing staff 
looking at their own practice, and leading by example. 
 
Explicit implementation activities meant especially better publicity; including 
advance warning, and ensuring that the views of all professions were included. 
Easier access included physical documentation as well as quick reference 
through IT. A named leader to push a topic was mentioned twice. Verbal 
presentation and time to read guidelines were mentioned. Better quality 
guidelines meant clear guidelines backed by good evidence of benefit.  
 
9.6.4 Hindering change 
 
Culture issues were as frequently thought to hinder change as resource issues 
(table 9.32). Culture issues included seeing guidelines as a threat, not being 
prepared to question or to accept questioning (for example not encouraging 
early involvement in implementation), unwillingness to share (for example non-
participation in audit), a culture of clinical individualism, and dictatorial 
leadership, which had a negative effect. 
 
Change hindering factors N=62 for each code 
Culture issues                                       22     
Resources                                             22 
Guidelines (lack of benefit)                   16 
Resistance to change                           16 
Education (lack)                                    14 
Lack of motivation                                 13 
Communication  problems                    10 
Table 9.32 general issues on barriers to change  
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Resource issues particularly included lack of staff. Lack of facilities, volume of 
guidelines, and high treatment costs were mentioned. Medical politics (part of 
“having their own ideas”) was mentioned by 2 nurses. One consultant swam 
against the stream on the resources issue: 
“I would be more comfortable with people going on about needing more 
resources and needing more money if I was still not aware that 
resources are not wasted on a day to day basis.” (Senior doctor, hospital 
1) 
 
A consultant put resources second to disagreement; resources could 
presumably be gained more easily than agreement on best practice: 
 “Well firstly if one disagreed with it, and secondly if there wasn't the 
resources to carry it out.” (Senior doctor, hospital 2) 
 
Lack of time to reflect on the guidelines was another resource issue. A minority 
said guidelines reduced workload. Resistance to change was much mentioned. 
Evidence-based change was thought to be more difficult to resist. The inertia 
of habit was part of the resistance. The following quote sums up the issues: 
“I think its getting through to the people. None of us like change, and I 
think that goes for old and young, and I think it's getting through to 
people that this is the right thing, it's research based and it's been 
approved and it does work, maybe breaking old habits more than 
anything.”  (Senior nurse, hospital 2) 
 
Guidelines issues hindering change came in the three categories seen 
previously, lack of clarity (too complex), low benefit, and poor evidence. 
 
Lack of motivation included lack of interest in the subject: 
“if you're looking at people who are not very interested in what they're 
doing then lack of interest. (Senior doctor, hospital 1) 
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Leadership was needed to motivate some staff to change: 
“you've got to be positive and show that you appreciate people the way 
that they're changing things because if not, if you go in and just tell 
somebody that's what you've got to do, and don't explain it, it's 
completely negative.” (Senior nurse, Hospital 2) 
 
“you know - here you are, start this today, or start this tomorrow, and 
that - I don't know enough about it but you've to do it you know, a sort 
of apathy ..” (Senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
Growing valuation of research activity was increasing nurse motivation to 
improve practice: 
“nurses used to be very much head in sand, I've done it this way and I 
will always do it this way and this is the way the nurses 20 years ago 
done it and there's nothing wrong with it, that is all changing very, very 
much so because nurses are very, very much into research now there is a 
lot of evidence based practice coming into the wards which was never 
ever there before...” (Senior nurse, hospital 1) 
 
Lack of knowledge and understanding were included with lack of education. 
Understanding developed through discussion, questioning and explanation, and 
with understanding came motivation. 
 
Communication could be poor for a variety of reasons. It could be untimely – too 
late, it might not cover everyone - also a dissemination issue: 
 “it was probably getting round to all the staff.” (Senior nurse, hospital 
2) 
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 Listening could fail: staff might not listen to instructions, on the other hand, 
senior staff needed to listen to new ideas: 
“I mean the sisters are more than willing to listen to any member of 
staff who's got a piece of information written information to say this 
should, this the way we're doing this in ward, this is wrong this is the 
way it should be done and I'm the very first one who'd be more than 
willing to listen to any member of staff who'd went to the bother to find 
out about something that they weren't happy about in the ward.” (Senior 
nurse, hospital 1) 
 
9.7 Summary 
This summarises firstly the main activities and beliefs of 62 senior clinical 
staff about guideline implementation, and secondly, it summarises the 
significant differences between study samples (hospitals and professions) for 
their main guideline implementation activities and beliefs.  
 
9.7.1 Main activities and beliefs 
Dissemination 
In both hospitals dissemination to the interviewee was for nurses usually by 
posters or folders of guidelines in the ward, while the doctors usually received 
their own copies direct from SIGN. These were supplemented by discussion. 
Multidisciplinary methods such as one-off training and more discussion were 
seen as the most desirable enhancements to dissemination. Support from 
management was mainly either to improve access to guidelines or provide 
opportunities for more discussion. There was an even split about whether 
different forms of dissemination would be used for another guideline, a 
majority wanted some support to dissemination from senior management. One 
way dissemination was used and wanted more than two-way dissemination.  
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Implementation  
In both hospitals a majority had actively put guidelines into practice. The most 
frequent form of implementation activity was reminding others to comply, while 
the most frequent goal setting activity was agreeing a local protocol. Most 
recalled their own implementation effort rather than others’ efforts 
 
Clinical audit 
About two thirds of interviewees in both hospitals said there had been an 
audit, but only about a quarter had been a member of an audit group. There was 
an even balance between single and multi-directorate audit groups, but little 
representation from primary care.  Most audit aims were reported to be type 1, 
and the most common was checking up on practice. The most common type 2 aim 
was testing new interventions. Audit groups were both uni- and 
multidisciplinary. Quality improvement was most frequently understood in a 
broad sense as improving practice, but a substantial minority saw it as clinical 
audit. 
 
Changes 
Hospitals were similar in that audit results were most frequently communicated 
for the whole team rather than for individuals. A substantial majority reported 
changing their own practice by more effective delivery of treatment. Only a 
small minority said a new model of care had been developed.  
 
Interviewees’ learning was about both new ways of working within their own 
directorate and about practice in other directorates. The learning was mostly 
about improvements to processes of care and increased awareness of best 
practice. The main aid to learning was seen as educational activities separate 
from day to day work. Most learning was within directorates. 
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General issues about guidelines 
Generally the most frequent view was that guidelines aimed to improve the 
consistency of care, especially in line with evidence-based best practice. The 
most frequently mentioned implementation activity was actually carrying out 
the guidelines, and checking this had been done, while the most frequently 
mentioned use was reference. There was a consensus that guidelines were 
effective rather than very effective. The main barrier to implementation was 
seen as dissemination difficulties. Formal support by the organisation was the 
most mentioned facilitator for change, while cultural issues such as resistance 
to change, and lack of resources were most often mentioned as hindering it. 
 
The results summarised above represent the descriptive outcomes of the 
project about guideline implementation activities and beliefs. The identification 
and description of the different ways of enacting guidelines and the beliefs 
justifying them necessarily preceded and underpinned the qualitative and 
quantitative comparisons between study samples. 
 
As the perspective on OL theory as an information system suggested, guidelines 
were mainly implemented in ways based on a single loop model of learning relying 
on primarily one-way methods of dissemination and communication. It was not 
surprising therefore that changes ensuing were usually also concerned with the 
acceptance of the goals as given in the guidelines (or perhaps the simple 
rejection of them) and with putting in place methods for checking and 
increasing compliance. Much more rarely, particularly at the change stage of 
implementation, there were examples of double loop change, creating and 
testing new goals. These were generally solidly based in previous detailed 
development work, equal dialogue between specialist nurses who knew the detail 
of the care process, and consultant medical staff who were experts in the 
medical science. This confirmed the effectiveness and relevance of the 
processual approach to understanding and driving change for these NHS acute 
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hospitals.  Interesting though it was to confirm Argyris’s predictions, and those 
of the processualists, this did not shed much light on the overall research 
question for the study. The hypothesis testing required an additional approach 
to strengthen it. As well as the logical analysis and comparative discussion of 
the cases, in a traditional humanistic mode, a quantitative comparison of the 
qualitative themes between the cases as suggested by Yin lent a statistical 
dimension which aimed to test and validate the purely qualitative humanistic 
work from another perspective. In the following final section of this chapter, 
the statistical differences in guideline implementation activities and beliefs are 
listed and then briefly discussed in relation to the humanistic analysis of the 
qualitative data about hospital context and guideline implementation and with 
reference also to the OL capacity comparisons of the hospitals. The analysis 
builds cumulative rung upon rung in this way toward an answer to the high level 
research question about whether there were two patterns of guideline 
implementation and if so whether they were differently associated with OL 
capacity.   
 
9.7.2 Statistically significant differences between professions and 
hospitals in main guideline implementation activities and beliefs 
 
There were eight statistically significant differences here, five between 
hospitals and three between professions. They are listed and discussed below. 
Every one of these differences was capable of an interpretation backing the 
hypothesis that hospital 1, most likely to be the higher OL capacity hospital of 
the two (from contextual and OL scale score evidence) supported type 2 forms 
of guideline implementation more effectively. That doctors, who had higher OL 
capacity, (chapter 8) were more involved in audit (point 1 box 9.1, below) was in 
itself an indication that type 2 forms of audit would be more used where this 
was so, and this was further supported by point 2 in box 9.2 below, revealing 
that doctors were more involved in protocol creation, which audit was  
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at least potentially more able to influence through doctors’ involvement in 
hospital 1.  
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BoxThere was a difference between hospitals regarding the professions mentioned
as doing the audit. Doctors were mentioned most at hospita1 1, and the audit 
office at hospital 2. 
There was more type 1 learning in hospital 2 teams and directorates than there
was in hospital 1. Type 1 learning was the norm. Overall, nurses mentioned 
significantly more type 1 learning than doctors. 
Inter-organisational learning through the communication of audit findings to 
another organisation was more frequently mentioned at hospital 1. 
Nurses were more involved in adapting guidelines for local use in hospital 1 than 
in hospital 2. 
Using the SIGN guidelines for setting clinical policy was mentioned more often 
in hospital 1 than in hospital 2. 
 9.1 Significant differences between hospitals in guideline 
implementation   316
is interpretation was reinforced by their use of guidelines in policy setting 
oint 5 box 9.1). Doctors’ involvement in protocol creation was likely to lead to 
re type 2 goal setting learning from guideline implementation, since nurses 
cused on type 1 learning (point 2 in box 9.1). 
e more one-way dissemination experienced by nurses, especially in hospital 2  
oint 4 in box 9.1 and point 2 in box 9.2) did not encourage a true dialogue on 
e treatment issues with doctors. Although dialogue at ward level about care 
ovision and the most practical methods of delivery of treatment happened 
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among nurses in both hospitals it remained apparently limited by the immediate 
situational constraints and did not free itself from these by referring to a 
theoretical framework. The greater inter-organisational communication found 
at hospital 1 also implied that hospital 1 actively sought to share its own goals  
and the treatment and care delivery models that went with them, and to access 
other models for comparison and consideration for possible adoption in a type 2 
approach. 
 
It could also be argued that hospital 1 was in a sense more institutionalised 
than hospital 2 if it sought, rather nervously, other models of care delivery to 
imitate blindly. The imitation was not blind though, it was informed by the 
guidelines’ evidence of effectiveness, and there were also the examples of 
hospital 1’s self-generated efforts at improvements to treatment and care 
delivery structures. 
 
Doctors’ recognition and communication of a need for more resource may have 
betokened an unwillingness to be limited by arbitrary constraints, which implied 
a wider vision than nurses of possible treatment alternatives. The fact that 
1. Nurses were more likely than doctors to learn about the guideline through 
dissemination by a reference in the work area such as a poster or a folder of 
guidelines held on the ward. This was likely to be because doctors nearly always
had their own copies of guidelines sent by post from SIGN. 
2. Overall, doctors had a greater involvement in developing local protocols from 
guidelines. Doctors used significantly more type 2 methods of guideline 
implementation because protocol development was a type 2 method.  
3. Doctors were more likely than nurses to identify a need for support from the 
hospital to the facilitation of change. 
Box 9.2 Significant differences between professions in 
guideline implementation  
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this need was often expressed in relation to providing more time for discussion 
of implementation matters was an indication of a desire to engage in type 2 OL 
activities, and this was voiced by both professions, especially in hospital 1. 
 
As predicted, of the four possible combinations of hospital and profession 
(chapter 4 methods) the hospital 1 consultants scored their hospital highest on 
OL capacity, their high OL capacity was confirmed by their demonstrated 
leadership, based on specialist evidence, the value they placed on collaboration 
and the evidence of innovations related to SIGN guidelines through 
collaborative working between professions. The differences between hospitals 
in the type of change related to guideline implementation will be highlighted in 
the next chapter which compares guideline implementation activities, including 
change resulting, on the OL capacity score associated with them. 
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Chapter 10 - Analysis of combined datasets 
 
10.1 Analysis framework 
 
10.1.1 Background 
To briefly recap, chapter 7 used a humanistic approach to qualitatively analyse 
the interview data, and the quantitative analysis in chapter 8 compared the 
main study samples’ OL scale scores. The second analysis of the interviews 
(chapter 9) used a quantitative analysis of the qualitative interview data to 
statistically relate main study samples to guideline adoption patterns.  This 
combined analysis now compares OL capacity scores associated with the main 
guideline adoption themes. It then investigates whether any significant 
differences in OL score between guideline adoption activities and beliefs are 
particularly associated with either hospital or either profession.  
 
This analysis is organised by the three stages in the guideline implementation 
model plus an analysis of reported action on outcomes, learning and change. 
Beliefs are covered separately. Guideline adoption data found associated with 
significant differences in OL scores (t-tests) is then analysed to see whether 
any study sample was particularly involved (chi-square tests). 
 
10.1.2 Aims  
The aims of the combined analysis were: 
• to discover the OL levels associated with different guideline 
implementation patterns, 
• to interpret the meaning of differences in OL scores for the different 
guideline implementation behaviour and beliefs of the study samples.  
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10.1.3 Main comparisons 
From the interviews, three distinct types of qualitative data were available: 
• direct answers to closed questions,  
• different substantive categories (these were driven by the meaning of 
the data in its context to a greater extent than by formal theory). 
• different formal theoretical types, for example type 1 and type 2 
learning (these were driven by formal abstract external theory applied 
to the data). 
 
The OL scores were compared for categories in these three groups for each 
stage of guideline adoption. A final comparison within each hospital separately 
compared OL score between type 1 and type 2 changes reported. 
 
10.1.4 Hypothesis 
To briefly remind the reader, the type 1 / type 2 distinction applied Senge’s 
categories of adaptive and generative learning. Adaptive learning meant the 
ability to change routines to meet unchanging goals in the face of changing 
conditions. Adaptive learning used single loop feedback. Generative learning 
meant an expansion in capability, and changing goals at any level. Generative 
learning used double loop feedback. It enabled “seeing the systems that control 
events”.370 Deutero-learning or learning how to learn, was a third type.47 205  
Type 1 guideline adoption used methods which could support adaptive OL only; 
type 2 guideline adoption also used generative methods. Two-way dialogue 
supported the latter because it encouraged groups to adopt new perspectives 
and new goals. The hypothesis was that OL scores would be higher when both 
types of guideline adoption were present rather than either one or the other. 
In practice because adaptive (type 1) learning was more common than 
generative (type 2), the presence or absence of a potential for generative 
learning distinguished theory 2 guideline adoption. 
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10.1.5 Analysis method 
The group used in the combined analysis was 92 interviewees who had also 
completed a survey (see table 10.1).  
 
Profession HOSPITAL 1 HOSPITAL 2 Total 
Senior Doctor 10 7 17  (18%) 
Senior Nurse  
or Midwife 
16 23 39  (42%) 
Senior clinical audit 1 0 1    (1%) 
Senior total 27 30 57  (62%) 
Junior Doctor 4 2 6    (7%) 
Junior Nurse or Midwife 17 12 29  (32%) 
Junior total  21 14 35  (38%) 
OVERALL TOTAL 48 44 92 (100%) 
Table 10.1 Group used for joint qualitative/quantitative analysis (totals may not 
add up to 100% owing to rounding) 
 
The senior clinical audit officer was excluded from the analyses by clinical 
profession. Chi square was calculated and showed that there was no significant 
difference between hospitals in the balance of senior and junior staff in this 
group (X2 (Yates = 1.09, DF =1, p<0.30). The top level NUD.ist coding for each 
interview question was exported into the existing SPSS database to form a new 
database for interviewees only, combining the scale results with the qualitative 
coding.  
 
The 5 sub-scales of the OL scale were: 
• Clarity of purpose / mission  
• Leadership  
• Experimentation  
• Transfer of knowledge  
• Teamwork and group problem solving  
 
They were measured separately, giving a total of 6 available comparisons 
between profession and hospital – the OL scale as a whole plus its 5 sub-scales. 
In some cases a lack of significant difference between groups needed 
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interpretation because a difference was expected.  For example different 
learning capacity was expected to be associated with membership of a guideline 
implementation group. This was expected because adapting the guideline and 
possibly amending goals, was a generative (type 2) learning process. This 
difference was not found. 
 
Table 10.2 shows the numbers of t-tests between groups for the complete OL 
scale: 
Test class t-test on 
closed 
questions
t-test on 
theoretical 
categories*
t-test on 
data-derived  
category
Total
t-
tests  
Total Individual tests 20 30 50 100
Total sig. Individual 
tests at p<0.05  
6 5 7 18
Level of significance 
needed after correction 
<0.0026 <0.0017 <0.0011
Total significant tests 
after correction 
0 0 0 0
* Type 1 or 2, direction 1 or 2, single or multi-profession, structure or task base. 
Table 10.2 Breakdown of t-tests done for complete OL scale, significant at p<0.05 
before and after Bonferroni correction. The comparison of interviewees with non 
interviewees was not included in the count as it was a validation test, not a test of 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 10.3 shows the same information for the OL sub-scales: 
 
Test class t-test on 
closed 
questions 
t-test on 
binomial 
categories*
t-test on 
substantive
category
Total
t-
tests  
Total Individual tests 100 150 250 500
Total sig. Individual 
tests at p<0.05  
17 14 29 60
Level of significance 
needed after correction 
<0.0026 <0.0017 <0.0011
Total significant tests 
after correction 
1 0 2 3
* Type 1 or 2, direction 1 or 2, single or multi-profession, structure or task base. 
Table 10.3 Breakdown of t-tests done in the 4 stages of guideline adoption and 
for beliefs for OL sub-scales, significant at p<0.05 before and after Bonferroni 
correction. 
 
Chapter 10 Analysis of combined datasets 
 
 323
Bonferroni corrections were applied to allow for the large number of statistical 
tests (see statistics section 4.6).  
 
Interpretation of OL scores 
OL score was a composite of organisational and individual learning capacity. 
Individuals’ perceptions reflected their preconceptions, but these were in turn 
influenced by their experience.421 Differences in OL scores had therefore to 
be interpreted in context. A lower score might have suggested aspirations 
higher than experience. A higher score implied a better match between the 
two. It did not indicate the absolute level of learning in the group, and so to 
take the comparison of OL score as being a comparison of the absolute level of 
OL was meaningless. However, higher scores were taken to indicate satisfied 
OL potential and if lower OL capacity was taken to indicate an unfulfilled OL 
potential, the size of the potential could be compared across groups.  
 
Comparison of interviewees with those surveyed but not 
interviewed 
The interviewees’ scale results were compared with those who refused 
interview. This was a validity test for an actual difference, and so bonferroni 
correction was not required.   
 
Scale name Interview 
and survey
Survey, no 
interview
t Sig.
 N Mean N Mean   
OL 92 4.17 107 3.83 2.87 <0.006 
Formalisation 91 4.36 107 4.60 1.83 <0.069 
Job satisfaction 91 5.04 107 4.57 3.02 <0.004 
Hospital culture 90 3.28 105 3.07 2.31 <0.023 
Clarity of Purpose  92 4.44 107 4.22 1.50 <0.136 
Leadership  92 3.94 107 3.63 2.02 <0.046 
Experimentation 92 4.00 107 3.60 2.86 <0.006 
Knowledge Transfer 92 4.17 105 3.80 2.40 <0.018 
Teamwork  92 4.45 106 4.07 2.62 <0.011 
Table 10.4 Interviewees’ scale means in comparison to those responding only to 
the survey. 
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Interviewees who returned a survey had significantly higher OL scores than 
those who returned a survey but refused interview (table 10.4). They were 
significantly higher scoring on 4 of the 5 sub-scales. They were significantly 
higher on collaboration score and had significantly higher job satisfaction. The 
non-significant differences between interviewees and non-interviewees were in 
the clarity of purpose and mission sub-scale, which interviewees continued to 
score more highly, and formalisation, which they scored lower. 
 
10.2 Analysis of guideline adoption data by OL score 
10.2.1 Dissemination 
Dissemination experienced and used 
Dissemination methods experienced were correlated with those used, by a Chi 
square test. Those who had experienced both one-way and two way 
dissemination were significantly more likely to use both methods for their staff 
than those who had experienced only one type of dissemination. See table 10.5. 
 
Dissemination to staff
One direction 
only 
Both directions 
Both directions 53 (82%) 7 (50%) Dissemination to self 
One direction only 12 (18%) 7 (50%)       
Total  65 14 
Table 10.5 Correlation between experiencing and using both one and two way 
dissemination. X2 = 6.27, DF 1, p <0.013 
 
10.2.2 Implementation 
Membership of implementation group 
There was no significant difference on any scale between those who were (19) 
and were not (73) members of a guideline implementation group. This was a 
surprising finding, indicating that guideline group members were not 
significantly different on OL capacity than interviewed staff generally. They 
therefore reflected the learning culture of the whole hospital, and this perhaps 
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had advantages for an implementation group. Compared with a higher OL group, 
they were likely to be more realistic about implementation needs such as 
education. 
 
10.2.3 Audit of guidelines 
Perceptions of professional involvement   
There was a significant correlation between being a doctor and saying that the 
medical profession had been involved in the audit (X2 = 5.54, p<.033, 1 said no, 
10 yes). There was no such correlation between being a nurse or midwife and 
saying that the nursing profession had been involved. This implied doctors as a 
profession felt greater ownership of audit than did nurses and indicated higher 
professional cohesion among doctors than nurses. 
 
Aim of audit of guidelines 
Those who said the aim of the audit was to check practice gave significantly 
lower transfer of knowledge scores than those giving only other substantive 
responses classified as type 1 to this question (table 10.6).   
 
Check 
Practice
Other Type 
1 aim 
t Sig. (2-
tailed)
 N Mean N Mean  
OL 37 4.05 13 4.72 2.67 <0.014
Clarity of purpose  37 4.52 13 4.75 0.71 <0.482
Leadership  37 3.90 13 4.38 1.54 <0.137
Experimentation 37 3.79 13 4.60 2.50 <0.022
Transfer of Knowledge 37 3.89 13 5.12 4.01 <0.000
Teamwork  37 4.32 13 4.90 1.83 <0.080
Table 10.6 OL score differences between those who mentioned checking 
practice as the aim of audit and those who did not 
 
This applied in both hospitals together and in hospital 1, but there was not a 
significant difference in hospital 2, though the direction was the same. Those 
seeing checking practice as an aim of audit also had considerably lower 
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leadership and experimentation scores than those who did not, though not 
significant at 5%. 
 
Audit group membership 
There was no significant difference in scale scores between those who were in 
the group doing the audit and those not. Except for the transfer of knowledge 
sub-scale, scale scores were all higher for those in the audit group. This result 
mirrored the finding of no significant difference for members of guideline 
implementation groups. As the transfer of knowledge scale was opposite in 
direction to the others, a potential to improve this aspect was possible. 
 
10.2.4 Guideline usage 
There was a significant difference in each hospital between those who said 
they used the guidelines and those who did not. Both overall, and in each 
hospital, those saying they used the guidelines were significantly higher scoring 
on the leadership commitment scale (table 10.7). There was also a significant 
difference overall on the transfer of knowledge scale, with those who used 
guidelines scoring higher. This was significant in hospital 2 but not hospital 1. 
 
Do not use 
SIGN 
guidelines
Use SIGN 
guidelines 
t Sig. (2-
tailed)
 N Mean Mean N  
OL 16 3.63 4.30 74 3.08 <0.007
Clarity of Purpose  16 4.00 4.56 74 1.98 <0.060
Leadership  16 3.04 4.17 74 4.15 <0.000
Experimentation 16 3.66 4.09 74 1.69 <0.106
Transfer of Knowledge 16 3.67 4.28 74 2.23 <0.036
Teamwork  16 4.02 4.55 74 1.56 <0.135
Table 10.7 OL score differences between those who said they did not use 
guidelines and those who said they used them. 
 
This important result suggested that the organisational leaders used SIGN 
clinical guidelines. Since they were more dissatisfied with OL, those who did 
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not use them perhaps saw more potential for OL improvement, because they 
were more dissatisfied with the OL capacity. 
 
10.2.5 Change implementation   
Encouraging change with formal support from the organisation 
The OL scores of those who said change was helped by formal support by the 
organisation, differed from those who did not (table 10.8). Formal support 
covered increases in time and resources, organisational initiatives such as 
publication and the support of consultants and managers. It was a general 
question and so not classified as a type of guideline adoption. 
 
Formal 
support
Not formal 
support 
t Sig. 
 N Mean N Mean  
OL 27 3.90 65 4.28 2.16 <0.036
Clarity of Purpose  27 3.76 65 4.72 4.16 <0.000
Leadership  27 3.92 65 3.96 0.16 <0.871
Experimentation 27 3.73 65 4.12 1.84 <0.073
Transfer of Knowledge 27 4.02 65 4.23 0.77 <0.446
Teamwork  27 4.17 65 4.56 1.61 <0.114
Table 10.8 Differences in OL scale scores between those saying change was 
helped by some formal support from the hospital and those not mentioning this 
 
The group wanting more formal support from the hospital were significantly 
lower on clarity of purpose/mission. This also held true in both hospitals 
individually. This suggested that those high on this aspect of OL capacity used 
guidelines in less resource-intensive way, or that they already had the 
resources they needed to accomplish all of their aims. 
 
10.3 Study samples and guideline adoption 
To recap, the three OL capacity distinctions were between those who  
1. said the aim of audit of guidelines was to check practice, and others 
mentioning other type 1 audit aims, 
2. used guidelines, and those who did not, and 
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3. wanted more formal support for guideline implementation from the 
hospital and those who did not. 
 
These were analysed for differences within the two study samples (hospitals 
and professions) using chi square. There were 4 Chi square tests in this group, 
so bonferroni correction meant a significance level of < 0.0125 was required. 
 
One chi square was significant at that level: 
 
Profession 
 Doctor Nurse 
Did not mention support from hospital 11 (48%) 46 (82%) 
Support from hospital would help change 12 (52%) 10 (18%) 
Total 23 56 
 
Table 10.9 Comparison of professions mentioning formal support. N=79  
X2 = 7.92, DF1, p<0.006 
 
Significantly more doctors than nurses mentioned matters involving formal 
support from the hospital as an encouragement to change (table 10.9). This was 
the case in each hospital separately as well as overall. This had already been 
found with a slightly different comparison group, in chapter 9. No direct 
examples of learning how to learn, or deutero-learning were found. 
 
10.4 Comparison of OL score for type of change within hospitals 
As the primary cases were the hospitals it was appropriate to look at 
differences in OL scores between type 1 and type 2 changes within each 
hospital. There were two questions on changes, the first was about changes to 
the interviewees’ own practice and the second was about other changes. The 
main point here was that senior clinical respondents in the higher OL capacity 
hospital 1 reported type 2 guideline related change to their practice, while 
those in hospital 2 did not. Even within the higher OL context (hospital 1), 
there was a significant difference in OL capacity between those reporting type 
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2 change only, and type 1 change only. Scores for each type are shown in tables 
10.10 (hospital 1) and 10.11 (hospital 2). 
 
Question Type 1 
Score 
N Type 2 
Score 
N T P 
Change to own practice as a result 
of the guideline 
4.07 22 5.23 5 2.8 <0.01 
Other changes from this guideline 4.12 12 4.53 5 0.59 <0.58 
Table 10.10 Hospital 1: Comparison of means for OL score associated with type 
1 change only and type 2 change only (overall N =48) 
 
 
As the tables show, the OL score associated with type 2 change (only) to the 
interviewees own practice was greater than that associated with type 1 change 
only. The small numbers of type 2 changes made it difficult to compare them 
statistically with type 1 changes, but despite this there was a significant 
difference in OL score between those reporting the two types in their own 
practice in hospital 1. Experimentation, transfer of knowledge and teamwork 
were the sub-scales involved. 
 
Question Type 1 
Score 
N Type 2 
Score 
N T P 
Change to own practice as a result 
of the guideline 
4.14 28 - 0 - - 
Other changes from this guideline 3.94 10 4.38 1 0.66 <0.53 
Table 10.11 Hospital 2: Comparison of means for OL score associated with type 
1 only and type 2 change only (overall N = 44) 
 
There was a large difference in the same direction in the OL capacity scores of 
those reporting type 2 change at all and those reporting only type 1 change, 
especially in hospital 1, (4.1 type 1, and 4.6 type 1) and this was significant at 
p<0.05 for the experimentation subscale, but not for the OL scale as a whole. 
There was a significant difference between the hospitals in the proportions of 
those reporting any type 2 change to their practice, whether or not they also 
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reported type 1 change. Thirteen in hospital 1 and 3 in hospital 2 reported any 
type 2 change, and X2 for this was 5.6 (p<0.019) (see table 10.12). 
 
 Hospital Type 1 change 
only
Any Type 2 
change 
Total
 1 23 13 36
 2 30 3 33
Total  53 16 69
Table 10.12 Numbers reporting type 1 change only versus any type 2 change to 
their practice (type 1 and type 2 or type 2 only), by hospital. 
 
There was no association between reporting of any type 2 change and 
profession. 
 
10.5 Conclusion  
Interviewees who returned a survey had significantly higher OL scores than 
those who returned a survey but refused to be interviewed, and this tended to 
support the idea that the higher response rates in hospital 1 were themselves 
an indication of higher OL capacity. The disseminees reproduced dissemination 
methods they had experienced when they disseminated in their turn, in that 
those who had used both single and two-way methods tended to have had both 
used on them when guidelines were disseminated to them before. The use of 
two-way methods diminished as dissemination filtered through from 
respondents to their staff (chapter 9), and this may have been owing to a need 
for more support from the organisation, for example, more time for dialogue. 
 
Change 
The type of change reported showed differences in OL capacity levels and 
between hospitals: 
• There was a significant difference in OL scale scores after bonferroni 
correction between the types of change reported in hospital 1. Those 
reporting only type 2 change to their practice scored generally higher. 
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This was statistically significant in hospital 1, although relationship was 
not statistically proven overall (because of the lack of type 2 change in 
hospital 2).  
 
• There was significantly more type 2 change in hospital 1 than in hospital 
2, but doctors and nurses reported similar proportions of type 2 change. 
 
Guideline usage 
There was a relationship in each hospital between guideline usage and OL score:  
• in both hospitals those using guidelines scored significantly higher on 
leadership commitment than those who did not use them. 
• in hospital 2 only, those using guidelines scored significantly more highly 
on transfer of knowledge than those who did not use guidelines.  
 
Beliefs 
Significant differences were found in the OL score associated with 2 particular 
type 1 beliefs and other type beliefs about the topic concerned:  
• Those seeing the function of guideline based audit as to check practice 
had lower transfer of knowledge and experimentation scores.  
• Those wanting the organisation to support them in guideline 
implementation were lower on clarity of purpose. 
 
Study samples involvement in implementation activities or beliefs with  
OL capacity differences   
Two study samples were significantly involved in any of these differences – 
doctors were more likely to want organisational support with guideline 
implementation. This confirmed results reported in chapter 9. There was also a 
significant correlation between being a doctor and saying that the medical 
profession had been involved in the audit. Hospital 1 carried out more type 2 
change. 
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The comparisons of OL scores associated with substantive categories were 
carried out within the relevant type (type 1 or type 2) of guideline 
implementation. This was intended to show which within-type categories were 
active in creating any significant differences between types. It may have 
obscured OL capacity differences that would have been identified if 
comparison had been made with all other substantive responses to the question. 
Those comparisons were not made because they were not connected to the 
hypothesis, which was concerned with OL differences between types of 
guideline adoption. 
 
The high level research question asked whether two theoretical activity and 
belief patterns surrounding guideline implementation existed and if so were 
differently associated with OL capacity. The contribution made by the analysis 
presented in this chapter was to test the differences in OL capacity associated 
with each pattern part by part across the stages of implementation. Here, the 
patterns themselves rather than the study samples were the focus of 
attention.  
 
The OL differences found between guideline implementation activities did tend 
to support rather than disprove the hypothesis, checking practice was very 
much a type 1 activity and of lower OL than other type 1 implementation 
activities. The higher OL score associated with type 2 change speaks for itself. 
The higher OL scores of those who used guidelines centred on leadership and 
transfer of knowledge rather than experimentation, but these activities would 
support innovative learning.  
 
The study samples analysis, carried out where OL capacity differences between 
patterns were found, tested the overall hypothesis, (that there was a 
difference) by checking whether study samples with high OL capacity were or 
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were not associated with guideline implementation activities identified as 
associated with high OL capacity using an analytical frame independent of the 
study samples. 
 
This test of the hypothesis did not disprove it. The two study samples involved 
were doctors, who asked for more support to implementation of change (a 
belief that this was needed being associated with lower OL capacity scores)  
and hospital 1 which did more type 2 change (an outcome associated  with 
higher OL capacity scores, as was hospital 1). It was at first sight anomalous 
that doctors, generally a higher OL capacity group, were associated in each 
hospital with a lower OL capacity belief.  When the subscale involved actively in 
creating this significant overall difference was taken into account it was less 
surprising, it was the clarity of purpose scale. The low score given among 
doctors on this indicator was recognised as a more general issue in chapter 6 
and attributed there to a perceived mismatch between professional and 
organisational imperatives. Each doctor wanted more resources for their own 
practice, which professionally came first, before the organisation. 
Specialisation did not prevent this tendency.  
 
The three different analyses presented in the previous three chapters, in 
combination with the rich contextual illumination provided by the humanistic 
analysis in chapter 7, have cumulatively made a strong case for the overall 
research hypothesis that there were indeed two types, type 1 and type 2, of 
guideline implementation, and that these were differently associated with OL 
capacity, type 2 implementation generally being associated with high 
perceptions of OL capacity.  It now remains to discuss each of the individual 
research questions in the context of the other relevant evidence described in 
the literature review, and to show in detail how my study contributes to that 
overall scholarly effort. 
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Section 4 - Discussion 
Chapter 11 - Discussion 
11.1 Introduction 
Although the literature review found little or no directly relevant research on 
the relationship of evidence-based clinical guideline implementation to 
organisational learning culture, there was a body of work on the implementation 
of strategic change, and a small number of theoretical papers commenting on 
the possibilities for OL in the NHS77;298, and on related cultural issues. There 
was a larger amount of research on the implementation of guidelines in health 
services. 
 
The implementation of change work reviewed the main approaches to 
understanding and creating strategic change in organisations. The most suitable 
approach to apply in hospitals came from a tradition of careful analysis of 
processes or ‘processualism’ which saw change as emerging from detailed 
attention to process rather than as a result of top level directives, and as 
having plural outcomes. It saw the strategy creation fundamental to the 
generation of innovative change as collective sensemaking.323 For Ferlie and 
Shortell this was facilitated in a context of small autonomous units.122   
 
Three main approaches to OL were distinguished. The most appropriate OL 
frame for understanding guideline implementation was a perspective on OL as 
information creation and use by organisations.  As a result of the deaths in 
Bristol of children owing to heart operations,220 it was recognised that although 
there was an abundance of data about the quality of care, it was not being used 
to prevent error. A learning culture was then accepted as a key factor in 
improving health care throughout the NHS.382 There was little help from the 
Bristol report on what to change structurally to achieve this. Extra resources 
were necessary but not sufficient. Lessons from Bristol included the 
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importance of clinical leadership, accountability and monitoring.418 Clinical audit 
did not work in isolation, it had to be connected to other organisational cycles, 
such as a standard setting cycle, a patient care cycle and a change cycle.333 
Agreed guidelines could help to knit together some of these processes. 
Guideline implementation had been found to be the most frequently used 
approach to implementing organisational change in hospitals.414 Another lesson 
from Bristol was the suggestion that progress in quality improvement might be 
a useful marker of wider organisational function and health.418 One way of 
testing this idea was to measure the association of OL score with guideline 
implementation in individual hospitals.  
 
The guidelines implementation work was summarised in SIGN guideline 50, as 
shown in table 11.1: 
  
Variable effectiveness Largely Effective 
Audit and feedback Reminders 
Local consensus conferences Educational outreach (for prescribing) 
Opinion Leader Interactive educational workshops 
Patient mediated interventions Multi-faceted interventions 
Table 11.1 Effectiveness of interventions to promote implementation of 
guidelines378 
 
Multi-faceted interventions included more than one of any of the interventions 
in the table.  
 
Throughout the discussion the key themes of communication, innovation, clinical 
audit and leadership are discussed where appropriate for each research 
question. As well as this, the findings are also interpreted with reference to 
the institutional context. The information perspective on OL is used as another 
organising framework for discussion of guideline adoption. Hospitals are the 
primary case for the analysis and professions are discussed as nested cases 
within hospitals where appropriate (where there were differences between 
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hospitals in the behaviour of the professions). Each part of the guideline 
adoption process is covered as necessary in two sections: issues in common for 
both hospitals, and issues that showed a difference between hospitals. 
The specific sub-questions for the hypothesis were divided into preliminary 
questions and main hypothesis testing questions, and the discussion was 
organised by research question. Preliminary questions were concerned with 
validation of the OL scale and identifying hospitals of significantly different 
OL capacity to test the association of OL and guideline implementation. 
 
11.2 Discussion of findings  
11.2.1 OL capacity  
Research question 1a (preliminary) - Was the OL capacity scale 
valid in the acute NHS hospital environment?  
Correlation between the OL scale, the job satisfaction scale and the hospital 
culture scale was statistically significant. This showed the OL capacity scale 
had criterion validity when used in an NHS acute hospital. The correlation of 
the OL sub-scales and main OL scale was evidence of the OL scale’s reliability 
and validity in the NHS setting. All five sub-scales of the OL capacity scale 
were associated highly significantly with each other.  
 
Predictive validity was tested using the predicted association between seniority 
and higher OL score which was mentioned by the developer (personal 
communication from Goh S.) and this was confirmed in my study as part of the 
main data gathering. Also as predicted, senior doctors in hospital 1 gave the 
highest mean scores.  The scale could have been further tested for validity by 
using correlation with another OL scale. But no other OL scales had been 
developed to apply to NHS hospitals. Perhaps the correlation of the OL scores 
with a criterion such as complaints could have been tested across a number of 
acute hospitals. This would have been a separate project, and would have been 
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subject to its own problems. For example, were hospitals in middle class areas 
likely to get more complaints because middle class people were more likely to 
complain? 
 
Formality and hospitals 
The formalisation scale did not show a significant negative correlation with the 
OL scale, as was expected. Unexpectedly, clarity of purpose was correlated 
positively and highly significantly with formalisation and slightly less strongly 
with other items on the OL scale. Possible explanations for this were: 
 
1. the hospital mission was not functioning fully as a part of OL capacity,  
2. formalisation was in fact not antagonistic to OL capacity in these NHS acute 
hospitals,  
3. hospital leadership was perceived by clinicians as too formal to function as 
needed in the OL process. 
 
All of these may have been true in some way. Certainly, at the time of writing 
there was great interest in the connections between leadership and quality 
improvement. An issue of Quality in Health Care devoted a whole supplement to 
the topic. There were lessons here about the difference between conditions in 
the NHS, and business, which was much simpler.133 Hospitals possibly needed 
sound formal structures to retain clarity of organisational purpose.  
 
There was a demand for more formal support from each profession in each 
hospital, with the proviso that nurses overall had a lower demand than doctors. 
Using institutional theory to interpret this, it could be seen as a sign that 
doctors were able respond to institutional pressure for change implementation 
in hospitals with requests for more resources because they had their own 
professional rationale which did not include any responsibility for supplying 
resources. These pressures operated on individual doctors through medical 
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professional clinical structures (directorates) within the hospital, which were 
always led by doctors, not nurses. 
 
Research question 1b (preliminary) - Were the OL capacity scores 
of the hospitals significantly different as theoretically predicted?  
 No significant difference was found for the whole senior comparison group 
between hospitals. When a more detailed analysis was done differences 
emerged for certain aspects of profession and age. These are discussed in 
separate sections. 
Hospitals and professions 
The much lower OL capacity of consultants at hospital 2 in comparison with 
those at hospital 1 was the main OL difference between hospitals. This lower 
OL capacity may have been self-reinforcing. “Magnet” hospitals (N=39) which 
attracted nurses were identified in the US. They had better nurse job 
satisfaction, nurse relationships with physicians and nurse autonomy. For 
Medicare patients their mortality rate was 4.6% lower than for 195 control 
hospitals.1 It was quite possible that magnet hospitals may have counterparts at 
the other end of the scale, which could be termed “sink” hospitals.  
 
Doctors in hospital 1 reported higher OL capacity than nurses in hospital 1. This 
was as expected in hospital 1 and in line with doctors’ greater responsibilities 
and the greater complexity they had to deal with. But it was unexpected that 
this did not apply in hospital 2. This may have been because hospital 2 was less 
well aligned with helping professionals to meet the research-driven pressures 
of their professional institutions than hospital 1. Doctors needed to solve the 
problems of the complex adaptive organisational systems of 21st century 
healthcare328 so on that count, professional pressures from the medical  Royal 
Colleges may have been behind the times, as hinted at above. 
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Senior nursing staff generally reported higher OL capacity than junior nurses, 
but this was significantly higher only in hospital 2 nurses. In hospital 2 
therefore it may have been senior nurses who were taking on this learning and 
problem solving role in their own way for the hospital. Hospital 2 must have 
enabled them to meet the pressures of their professional institutions better 
than it enabled doctors to meet their professional pressures. 
 
The more important the group in the organisation the more their OL score 
reflected on the organisation as well as the group. Thus the low scores of 
consultants in hospital 2 were likely to reflect serious problems with OL 
capacity. Senior nurses at H2 were significantly higher than the H2 consultants 
on clarity of purpose and mission, team-working, and experimentation. Senior 
nurses were known sometimes to cover up for consultants,175 and this may have 
raised their OL scores in hospital 2. For example, to reduce “cognitive 
dissonance” or tension caused by a mismatch between reality and expectations 
they may have unwittingly adjusted their espoused theories to make them more 
in line with their actions. The fact that the difference in OL capacity between 
junior and senior nurses was significant in hospital 2 continued a pattern of 
division there, which must have adversely affected communication for junior 
nurses as well as their team-working, because these were other subscales in 
the OL capacity scale. 
 
High stress levels may have been both a cause and an effect of low OL in some 
consultants. Petrie noted that senior doctors in Scottish hospitals were often 
over-stressed.321 He blamed lack of resources. The logic of rationing was that 
pressure on resources made organisations more efficient. But it has been 
argued that when reengineered to do just what was necessary with maximum 
efficiency, organisations had little spare capacity.47  Spare capacity was needed 
for learning, learning was essential for improving services and so providing 
spare capacity for learning was justified even in a situation where resources 
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were insufficient to meet the immediate demand for service. Hospital 2 was 
under funded in comparison with hospital 1. The Maclean report confirmed 
hospital 2 to be funded at the lowest level of all Glasgow hospitals. It had a 
deficit of 3.5%-11.0%.256 Low funding limited the ability to introduce OL 
mechanisms such as time for dialogue. The NHS too, had little spare capacity. 
For example it was underfunded in comparison with the European average 
spending on state health care.212 A number of co-ordinator roles were 
introduced to facilitate the learning process, but what was really needed 
especially in very under funded hospitals was time, and with it willingness for all 
staff to take on these activities, and to be trained in OL skills, especially 
dialogue.  
 
Age comparisons between hospitals, and relation to OL score 
Doctors’ view of OL capacity peaked at age 31-40. The peak was earlier in 
hospital 2. Doctors’ view of OL capacity declined overall with age in both 
hospitals, while nurses’ generally rose or reached a plateau. The general decline 
in the view of OL capacity of consultants with age was concerning, as because 
of their seniority they may have blocked change and OL. They were also as 
discussed for research question 1a above, likely to be, in most hospitals, the 
most important drivers of change.  
 
At hospital 2 consultants aged 30-50 had lower OL scores than those 51-60. If 
the OL scale was an index of satisfaction, they were less satisfied and saw 
more potential for improvement at hospital 2 than older consultants. This was a 
special factor for hospital 2. These younger consultants could have had 
different (higher) standards for hospital functioning in the areas measured by 
the scale than the older ones. That this difference was most apparent in the 
middle age ranges not the oldest in hospital 2 was interesting. Did it imply the 
older ones were habituated to their environment in hospital 2 and accepted it, 
or that they had joined hospital 2 longer ago, when it had had a better 
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reputation, and this still influenced their view? Had their standards slipped or 
become outdated? Or were they simply less motivated because they felt they 
had already “made it” in their careers, or learning had ceased to motivate 
them? Interviews contained several references to reluctance to change by both 
nurses and doctors often primarily targeted at older consultants, though nurses 
were included in this. 
 
In doctors generally the peak in their perception of OL capacity was most 
strongly influenced by the peak in their clarity of purpose/mission at age 31-40. 
After this they seemed to lose belief in the hospital. This could well have been 
related to disappointed hopes for funding their innovations, one interviewee 
said how discouraging this was. Were they choosing the wrong innovations to 
push? This could be seen as a misalignment of hospital and professional 
institutional pressures on consultants. Hospitals were the local delivery vehicles 
for treatment and care, but the professions had a national organisation (the 
Royal Colleges) where prestige and position were gained by international 
research reputations rather than by prowess in delivering local services 
efficiently and effectively. Hospitals accepted the value of international 
research reputations, but the converse did not apply: Royal Colleges had no way 
of recognising and rewarding local heroes.  
 
Other evidence suggested that a similar decline occurred elsewhere with purely 
clinical or technical performance, and that this was related to keeping up to 
date clinically. A study of 1135 physicians (mainly obstetrics and gynaecology 
and paediatrics) measured their performance on optimal clinical criteria on five 
sites in the mid west of the USA. It found “Physicians with fewer years of 
practice performed somewhat better than physicians with more years since 
medical school graduation.”311 
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11.2.2 Question 2 (Preliminary) - Guideline adoption - Was it 
possible to identify different guideline adoption patterns (reflected in 
dissemination, implementation and audit activities and beliefs) as 
theoretically predicted? 
 
Did the two patterns exist? 
The characteristics looked for as criteria for coding a response as indicating 
either a single or double loop organisational process for that activity were given 
in chapter 3.  These were relatively easily applied to responses about all stages 
of guideline dissemination and implementation. It was not possible to link 
statistically the individual stages together in different patterns for type 1 and 
type 2 and compare the resulting groupings statistically between hospitals. This 
was because individuals would often respond in both categories, and would not 
consistently (or exclusively) report either type at all stages of guideline 
adoption. So what was gathered was information on the amount of emphasis put 
on each type of adoption at each stage, rather than numbers of responders who 
mentioned exclusively either one or the other. 
  
Coding issues for guideline implementation patterns – did all 
responses fit the categories? 
Answers to some questions, particularly about audit, were about neither type 1 
nor type 2 learning as the categories did not apply. In other cases they did 
apply, but neither type of learning was referred to. For example, ten 
interviewees (five from each hospital) said very little or nothing had been done 
to disseminate the guideline to them. They tended to be junior staff or staff 
who had come into post after the guidelines came out, or night staff or ITU 
staff. 
 
The patterns were identified using one overall coding structure, and this 
worked, there were no special factors which made it impossible to apply the 
concept of two types of learning in the same way to the data from each 
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hospital. This meant it was easier to compare the patterns quantitatively. In a 
sense it was too easy to make quantitative comparisons of common themes, and 
there was a risk of losing the powerful illumination that full context could give. 
The qualitative contextual analysis in chapter 7 helped to retain perspective.   
 
Although examples of activities and beliefs supporting a type 2 learning process 
were found, type 2 was far rarer than type 1 in both hospitals. This accorded 
with Argyris’s findings that model 2 organisations were rare. The mixing of 
type 1 and type 2 responses in practice showed that they were both part of the 
same model, type 2 did not exist independently of type 1, rather it was a special 
form of behaviour that was displayed within the context of day to day type 1 
routine. 
 
Institutional pressures to imitate other hospitals were not necessarily inimical 
to type 2 learning provided there was enough organisational headroom and 
available evidence for informed dialogue. 
 
11.2.3 Question 3 (Main hypothesis testing) - Types of guideline 
adoption and OL 
Research Question 3a – Did the hospital of higher OL capacity 
have significantly more emphasis on generative guideline 
implementation patterns than the lower OL capacity hospital?  
 
The stages of guideline adoption make the framework for this part of the 
discussion, with a further section on general beliefs about guideline adoption. 
The descriptive results about the main guideline implementation activities and 
beliefs are discussed in the context of other guideline implementation 
research, to test external validity of the findings. 
 
 
Chapter 11 - Discussion 
 345
Dissemination 
Common issues for both hospitals.  
There was some demand by G – grade nurses for their own copies of guidelines. 
For them, concerning this, consultants were the representatives of the 
organisation. SIGN sent the guidelines primarily to its Royal College members, 
(in hospitals, mainly hospital consultants). Consultants got sent only a copy for 
themselves by SIGN and did not have spare copies to pass on. SIGN did not 
disseminate them through the hospital structure. The transfer between 
individual and organisational learning was seen by Romme and Dillen346 as the 
most important problem for OL to solve. One way of encouraging this transfer 
was by making contributions to OL a driver for career progression. In medicine, 
individuals were motivated to do audit by career advancement through 
publication, rather than altruism.210 The other side of the coin, perhaps a 
necessary precursor to this, was the transfer from the organisation to the 
individual. Without their own copies of guidelines, individual reflection and 
group learning was difficult for nurses as personal perspectives could not be 
developed, and questions and criticisms could not be thought of in advance of 
group meetings to allow more two-way communication. As Schuck said,  
“Learning how to think means developing the intellective skill required 
for original independent problem solving.” 357 
 
After describing “play”, or liberation from the constraints of objects, as the 
first condition for learning, Schuck describes the role of the group in learning: 
“A second condition for learning is social mediation. Learning is a social 
experience; it is accomplished through interactions with and assistance 
from other people.”357 
 
Social mediation did not mean abandoning autonomous individual learning, 
rather, it enhanced it. The demand especially from nurses, for discussion about 
guidelines, could thus have been motivated by a wish for increased autonomy. 
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Without the group, individual learning was less action-focused, because the 
purpose of social thinking was action.421 So, to distinguish too sharply between 
individual and social /group learning led to confusion: 
"Those who forget that sensemaking is a social process miss a constant 
substrate that shapes interpretations and meaning."421 
 
That there was a statistically significant association between experiencing and 
using both one and two-way methods of dissemination together rather than 
either one alone indicated that not only the content but also the method of 
dissemination was transferred. This was a form of learning how to learn.  
Perhaps the ease of forgetting the social nature of sensemaking explained the 
tendency to lose the social side of it, and therefore the conditions supportive 
of type 2 learning, as information was cascaded through the hierarchical tiers 
of the clinical structures. Resource limitation would have an effect here too in 
limiting time for discussion. 
 
Thus there was less explicit support than might have been expected for social 
diffusion through informal networking. This is worthy of discussion, as social 
interaction has been found the most effective way of getting research into 
practice in health153 and other contexts.346;439 Because of the high value on 
evidence currently espoused in the clinical culture, (and by health service 
researchers) the role of evidence may have been over-emphasised by clinicians 
as a factor in encouraging change. This may be seen in the emphasis by Kitson 
et al (mostly from nursing backgrounds) on evidence as an important contextual 
factor in the implementation of change,224;351 and equally in the contradictory 
view found by Dopson et al,100 (mostly managerial and public health 
backgrounds) that evidence was not actually as important as other cultural 
factors (see chapter 3). Organisational “hallways” for informal and open 
discussion have been identified as essential for OL.97 
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Hospital-specific factors 
In hospital 1 the effect of the different dissemination methods employed by 
the nursing and medical professions may have been masked by the involvement 
of consultant staff in the guideline development groups, which may have meant 
they had more copies of the guidelines to distribute to nurses, earlier warning 
of what was coming, and the ability to influence it.  
 
In hospital 2 the ward information about guidelines was described as chaotic, 
which could well have been related to an information bottleneck which also 
existed in hospital 1, but was there attributed to operations managers and 
nurse managers more than to inter-professional communication difficulties. 
 
Two way (type 2) dissemination tended to mean discussion, which was single 
rather than multi-disciplinary, in hospital 2 and vice versa in hospital 1, where 
inter-specialty medical discussion was also more of a feature. In hospital 2 
especially, it was through existing structures (for example ward briefings by G 
grade nurses) rather than special project groups.  
 
The reduction in two-way methods in dissemination used as compared with 
dissemination experienced, which was especially apparent in hospital 2, gave 
some support to Argyris’s idea that defensive practices were self-sealing. The 
external evidence represented by guidelines might or might not help to fight 
this  “cultural censorship”.175 Whether effective would depend on whether 
other aspects of context were supportive. The guidelines were used in a more 
open way in hospital 1, which had a range of contextual factors more amenable 
to change, especially expectations of openness and collaboration (chapter 7). 
These seemed to have led to more innovation, which was associated with inter-
speciality and inter-professional collaboration between those involved, since 
fellow specialists perceived similar problem situations. 
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Implementation  
Issues in common for both hospitals 
Doctors implemented guidelines by developing protocols (a form of generative 
or innovative learning) and in both hospitals they were significantly more 
involved in this than were nurses. Nurses wanted to be more involved in protocol 
development to put the practical nursing perspective. This was an issue of 
inter-professional communication. In both hospitals fewer nurses than doctors 
had been members of implementation groups. In both hospitals patient 
representatives were never on protocol development groups. This contrasted 
with the SIGN policy of including them on national guideline development 
groups377 and seemed illogical until the high cultural value placed on research 
evidence rather than patients’ experience locally in hospital 1, and the 
protectionism and lack of time which seemed to exist in parts of hospital 2 
were taken into account. Both factors may have had the same effect. 
 
In both hospitals nurses made much more mention of type 1 implementation 
methods such as auditing the delivery of the protocols, while doctors 
mentioned both type 1 and type 2 methods. Few clinicians emphasised a goal of 
changing clinical practice in specific projects.210 Those who did were doctors 
who mentioned discussing audit feedback. This implied that the medical rather 
than the nursing profession was able to make a difference to hospitals’ OL 
capacity. The medical profession led others through their specialist knowledge, 
but while remaining open to inputs from other specialists. Nurses had a clearer 
organisational perspective as indicated by their higher clarity of purpose 
scores. The two perspectives were complementary within a specialism. 
  
The combined analysis (chapter 10) showed that those who said the aim of audit 
was to check practice had significantly lower transfer of knowledge scores than 
those who did not. Checking practice was an activity usually focused within units 
and professions rather than across them.   
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Richards and Goh found consistently low transfer of knowledge scores in the 
organisations in which they tested the OL capacity survey. They attributed this 
to “de-layering” and that the use of information technology had not been fully 
optimised.338 “De-layering” would be threatening to staff in the way that audit 
seen as checking might be (that is to say, job security might be affected). If 
so, it was bound to lead to a failure of audit even to detect error. The hospital 
mergers mentioned at interview were another threatening contextual factor 
which may have discouraged transfer of knowledge about internal performance 
within units. 
  
Professional conceptions of innovation perhaps needed to be extended to 
include innovations to the delivery of care as well as innovations to the care 
delivered. Innovative OL had to be grounded in solid clinical data, but needed a 
wider vision of the organisation encompassing data from outside it, including 
data on cost. One way to achieve this was to involve nurses more actively with 
doctors and managers in multidisciplinary audit, for example contributing to 
setting goals, not just data gathering, their main involvement in clinical audit,279 
or reminding doctors to consider guideline recommendations.  
 
Nurses brought a perspective of practical caring rather than curing.226 They 
were also more aware of organisational mission statements than were medical 
staff, and so able to catalyse an innovative process by putting together their 
knowledge of real problems at the most basic level in delivering care and an 
understanding of high level organisational goals.  
 
 In both hospitals doctors’ main interpretation of quality improvement was 
limited to clinical audit, while for nurses it was to improve practice more 
generally in both hospitals. Doctors’ lead audit role was confirmed by research 
in North West England,58 where nurses, although seen as enthusiastic, were 
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perceived by audit staff, chairs of audit groups, and audit leads as participating 
less than doctors in clinical audit. Organisational and cultural reasons perceived 
included that historically audit had been introduced in medical practice before 
being extended to cover other professions, hierarchical relationships between 
doctors and nurses, and lack of commitment to involve nurses from some senior 
doctors and managers. Lack of protected time, practical support, knowledge and 
skills, together with too great a workload pressure were other reasons. Again, 
nurses appeared an under-tapped audit resource for hospital OL. 
 
Audit findings were most commonly communicated about team rather than 
individual compliance. It was possible that this blocked any motivation to 
improve, because individuals could still avoid recognising their own personal 
failings, which, in the context of a supportive team, they might remedy. 
Measurement by individual clinician outcomes would not easily apply in most 
specialties, which were team based. Their feasibility has been criticised even in 
surgery on features such as low numbers of cases for each individual surgeon, 
wide confidence intervals and biased data collection.419 Even surgery was in 
reality also a team activity.289 Although publication of outcomes has been 
criticised,262 in its favour was that as we have already seen, social mediation 
enhanced individual learning, and publication was a form of social mediation. The 
distinction between individual and organisational learning was found problematic 
too, in recent work on measurement of organisational learning, which 
recommended that studying them as intertwined elements of organisational 
learning be considered.233   
 
Hospital-specific issues 
Senior nurses interviewed in hospital 2 were significantly less likely to feel 
they had been involved in adapting guidelines for local use than were these 
nurses in hospital 1 (chapter 9). This may have been because some nurses were 
involved in the research for the development of the SIGN guideline itself in 
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hospital 1. But there also seemed to be a greater feeling of autonomy among 
the hospital 1 nurses, which was reflected in the greater leadership role of 
specialist nurses (chapter 7). Despite having been less involved, OL scores in 
hospital 2 senior nurses were similar to the hospital 1 senior nurses. Perhaps 
this lack of involvement was felt particularly among the hospital 2 junior nurses. 
This group was important because it had most patient contact. 
 
The main type 2 clinical audit aim seen was testing interventions, but type 2 
aims were much less frequently mentioned than type 1 aims and especially rare 
in hospital 2. The institutional theorist’s viewpoint on this could be that the 
pressure to implement scientific evidence was a powerful force in all local 
contexts, but worked through pressure from Royal Colleges as well as from the 
NHS.  The NHS national environment for bringing to bear evidence of good 
practice on hospitals had become much more “interconnected” and uncertainty 
about best practice had been reduced. This met two of the conditions Oliver 
hypothesised as likely to reduce resistance to institutionalisation from 
organisations.300 From Greenwood and Hinings’ perspective,154 hospital 1 was 
more tightly coupled with the NHS executive than hospital 2, but instead of 
increasing pressures for conformity as they predicted this seemed to have 
worked the other way. In that hospital, the Royal College institutions were 
influencing the NHS executive on behalf of the medical profession, and in the 
process winning more leeway to research and be innovative. Through SIGN, the 
permeability between the Royal College and the NHS Executive institutional 
fields had been enhanced, allowing, as Greenwood and Hinings predicted 
theoretically, higher rates of radical but evolutionary change. Hospital 2, on the 
other hand, was less permeable with Royal Colleges and as a result of this, with 
the NHS Executive. As would be predicted by Greenwood and Hinings, it was 
approaching radical change as a result of the MacLean report’s recommendation 
that it be replaced with a new hospital.  
 
Chapter 11 - Discussion 
 352
The orthopaedic surgeons showed (chapter 7), that evidence could be 
challenged more easily by a united professional consensus across hospitals. The 
value of producing SIGN guidelines containing recommendations backed by “C” 
grade evidence (see appendix A3.1) was called into question if it was less likely 
to be implemented. An evaluation of the Promoting Action on Clinical 
Effectiveness programme (PACE) found that strong evidence greatly improved 
chances of successful change to clinical practice.101 PACE was a late 90’s English 
initiative for funding local pilots that reviewed evidence and put it into practice 
without using centrally generated guidelines.  
 
The main group seen as doing the audit in hospital 2 was the audit office, in 
hospital 1 it was doctors. The dominant model in hospital 2 was therefore one 
of the audit office checking professionals’ practice, not of professional 
innovation. This difference between hospitals was significant before bonferroni 
correction (see chapter 9). This was a quantitative view of the qualitative 
evidence in chapter 7, confirming the extra commitment of hospital 1 doctors 
to implementation through audit in contrast to hospital 2. Nurses had not taken 
over the audit process in hospital 2, the audit department had done it.  
 
Of the 8 doctors who saw their own profession as doing the audit (the 
majority), 7 were from hospital 1, no doctor from hospital 1 saw the audit 
office as doing it, while in hospital 2 the majority (4) of doctors who replied to 
this said the audit had been done by the audit office. This underlined the 
difference between the hospitals in senior doctors’ perceptions of their 
profession’s role in audit. They valued clinical audit in hospital 1. 
 
Learning and changes to practice 
The main uses of information (especially audit-based) from the implementation 
of guidelines in changing practice are discussed below under the categories of 
error prevention (adaptive learning) and innovation (generative learning). 
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Information creation and use were intertwined in practice. Information was 
used to create more information – new protocols and audit data for example.  
 
Common factors in both hospitals 
Type 1 changes to individuals’ own practice were much more common than type 2 
changes in both hospitals.  
 
Hospital-specific factors 
Type 2 change to personal practice was mentioned in hospital 1 more than in 
hospital 2. This supported the hypothesis that hospital 1 was of higher learning 
capacity than hospital 2, and that changes resulting from guideline 
implementation were thus associated with a higher OL capacity. 
 
Error prevention 
Common factors in both hospitals 
Error prevention was a higher priority in the NHS than in commercial 
businesses because health care was higher risk for patients than most business 
activities were for their customers. It was perhaps for this reason that type 1 
learning (compliance) improving accuracy and hence safety was so emphasised 
by respondents. Clinical managers were overloaded with data. They needed to 
separate signal from noise. However, they could not risk the business manager’s 
tactic of distorting data to filter out the noise more quickly, in the hope that 
any decision was better than none and would validate itself in time by 
automatically creating the reality that accorded with it.421 Such an approach 
was even riskier in clinical decisions than management ones because clinical 
decisions were about individual patients, and most diseases ran a predictable 
course, which implied there was a right decision to be made. The patient had an 
important part to play in sharing responsibility for the final decision.109  
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More effective delivery of treatment was the main change to practice in each 
hospital (see chapter 9), and classified as type 1. Other research on 
implementation of the DVT guideline had investigated implementation methods 
but not changes to practice.413 Indications that there were still important 
variations in practice, even post SIGN guidelines, came in April 2001 when 
Petrie cited continued inconsistency in Scotland in DVT prophylaxis and 
unstructured care of adolescent and pregnant diabetics.321 The existence of 
variation meant some practice must be sub-optimal, and so could be unsafe. 
Petrie did not give the evidence on which these statements were based, but my 
research implied it was likely that such variation from best practice would exist 
in hospitals less closely linked in to the Royal Colleges, because institutional 
pressures from them to improve clinical practice by implementing best 
professional practice would be diluted.  
 
Hospital-specific factors 
More effective delivery of care was mentioned more at hospital 2, as was 
increased awareness, the next most frequent category (also type 1). This 
usually seemed to mean extra vigilance in preventing error in individual practice, 
and the accompanying knowledge of best practice. Such an approach was likely, 
in the absence of resources to implement best practice, to increase the stress 
for individuals and so might actually have the unintended effect of increasing 
the likelihood of error. For example, a systems approach to the causes of poor 
patient care showed a non-learning blame culture would impair clinicians’ 
performance through increased stress, depression, alcohol and drug abuse, so 
creating more error and increasing blame and impairment.128 This scenario was 
more likely in under funded hospitals such as hospital 2.  
 
More effective delivery included for example more reliable, quicker prophylaxis 
meaning safer treatment. Safer treatment was not always the same as better 
treatment. The patient for example might prefer to take a greater risk for a 
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greater chance of success. One felt such a choice would be unlikely to be 
offered to patients, especially in hospital 2.  
 
Learning about other hospitals was mentioned a number of times, mostly by 
doctors, in hospital 1 but not at all in hospital 2. The more active role of 
hospital 1 doctors was again underlined. 
 
There was a significant difference between hospitals in the balance of type 1 
and type 2 learning in individuals’ own directorate or team. There was more type 
2 learning (by both nurses and doctors) than expected at hospital 1, and less 
type 1, in comparison to the position in hospital 2 (see chapter 9). Double loop 
learning would have been encouraged by multi-directorate fora and inter-
specialty collaborations which were seen at hospital 1 but little seen at hospital 
2 (chapter 7). 
 
In hospital 1 as compared to hospital 2, nurses emphasised the importance of 
simplicity and clarity in guidelines, and guidelines were nothing if not a way of 
simplifying complex information. However, a little recognised danger was that, 
as highlighted by Weick, guidelines might increase narrow competence at the 
expense of OL capability:  
 "Any device that reduces information load pre-structures what people 
will notice and affects the sense they can then make."421..... "As we have 
seen before, seeing what one believes and not seeing that for which one 
has no beliefs are central to sensemaking. Warnings of the unbelievable 
go unheeded."421 
 
This implied that guidelines could cause errors, rather than reducing them, by 
blinkering perception, because health professionals who saw only what they 
expected to see would be less likely to notice anything unfamiliar which might 
be a warning sign that something was wrong.  Most interviewees thought of 
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uniformity as consistency which promoted reliability. The blinkers were 
evidence-based, but they were blinkers nonetheless. 
 
The cultural change needed to design human systems that prevented and 
trapped error was an important feature of the report on the Bristol case. 
There could have been similar reports about other parts of the NHS.382 The 
systems had to be embedded in an open culture because as “An organisation 
with a memory”87 comparing safety cultures and blames cultures said: 
“ ‘Blame cultures’ on the other hand can encourage people to cover up 
errors for fear of retribution and act against the identification of the 
true causes of failure, because they focus heavily on individual actions 
and largely ignore the role of underlying systems. The culture of the 
NHS still errs too much towards the latter.”  
 
Guidelines might encourage an established blame culture, but shift the main 
value towards compliance rather the doing the best for the patient. If errors 
were then defined in a limited way as non-compliance with a guideline, serious 
real errors could go unrecognised more easily than in a non-guideline 
environment. There were signs that this might be a tendency in hospital 2. 
Innovation 
In this section a more general perspective is taken, rather than splitting 
discussion between factors common to both hospitals and hospital-specific 
factors, as most of the innovations mentioned happened in hospital 1.  
 
Hospital 1 did more generative (innovative) learning in teams or directorates 
than hospital 2, and more inter-organisational learning. Guidelines could help to 
foster ‘generative’ or creative relationships between aligned (similarly focused) 
but heterogeneous actors by providing permission, space and time for talking,235 
if used to support exploratory dialogue. This was more than competence, which 
was having knowledge or ability to act.137 The collaborative consensus culture in 
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hospital 1 could be expected to support this behaviour better than the more 
closed, narrowly individualist medical culture in hospital 2. 
 
There was a great variety of type 2 changes, both to team and individual 
practice. The introduction of specialist nurses was important. Nurses were also 
said now to take more initiative in starting prophylaxis in both hospitals. This 
gave support to the idea that guidelines helped to increase the autonomy of the 
nursing profession.  
 
From an information perspective it was striking that devising new systems that 
would improve care29 and trap error31 was not mentioned, except by the hospital 
1 clinical audit co-ordinator.  
 
General views on aims, systems, culture and guidelines  
In this section differences and similarities between hospitals are discussed 
together.  
Uniformity of care and safety 
Improving the consistency or uniformity of care was the main purpose seen for 
SIGN guidelines. It was mentioned to the same degree in both hospitals, but in 
hospital 2, especially by nurses. Perhaps this was in reaction to the more varied 
consultant practice there. Uniformity was seen as an error prevention system in 
itself – health professionals did not have learn more than was necessary when 
they transferred between units, directorates, and even between wards. 
Therefore they were less likely to make errors. This was an example of the 
institutionally-driven safety culture which valued safety above most other 
virtues, even innovation and patient choice. Neither innovation nor increased 
patient choice was mentioned as an aim of guideline implementation in either 
hospital. Litigation risks for negligence were the institutional mechanism 
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involved, but this was the institutionalisation of a value system rather than a 
specific practice. 
 
Uniform practices made feasible the design of supposedly failsafe error 
prevention systems.31 The problem was that if the systems encouraged routine 
behaviour they would breed error by narrowing peoples’ vision.  
 
Best clinical practice and error prevention 
Interviewees in both hospitals also saw implementing best practice as an 
important aim for SIGN guidelines. The disadvantage of this was that as a 
result most health professionals appeared to espouse perfection, which was in 
turn perhaps a reason for the existence of a destructive blame culture. 
Solutions used in other high risk industries were accessible if medicine was 
seen as such.30 Otherwise the blame culture prevented communication, and that 
in turn increased the likelihood of error. 
 
To prevent errors, it was necessary to identify the most common errors and 
reach an agreed understanding of why they happened.  This required breaking 
the ingrained connection of error with incompetence in the medical culture.31 
Local error reporting systems reported on their own success in error 
identification rather than on actual frequency of error.113 A national system for 
anonymous error reporting was launched in January 2001 in the UK.410 But 
uniformity in care procedures could help only the reporting, counting and 
comparison of the most common errors through routine statistics.  
 
Own perceived uses for guidelines 
Interviewees saw their own main practical uses for guidelines as reference and 
setting or agreeing the clinical policies, which formed the local rules (see 
chapter 9). Again this confirmed a picture of doctors involved in active policy 
creation and innovation with specialist nurses in hospital 1, while nurses 
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followed the rules set out in the guidelines in hospital 2. SIGN intended 
guidelines to be applied to individual cases with discretion  “particularly in 
diagnosis where absolute certainty is often unobtainable.”255 so these comments 
may have shown a tendency to formalise guidelines as tablets of stone in 
hospital 2 – which SIGN did not intend.  
 
Implementation and learning styles 
Implementing guidelines was generally seen as carrying them out, but also as 
adapting them, knowing about them and checking compliance. Each of these 
could be argued to be associated with a phase of the learning cycle, no one 
being the complete story. To facilitate effective implementation, as guideline 
implementation was a learning process, a unit needed (as Kolb suggested231) to 
create dialogue including people with learning styles covering all stages of the 
learning cycle, and beliefs about the nature of guideline implementation. 
Multidisciplinary directorate meetings were held in theory at hospital 1, not 
only lack of time prevented many nurses from attending, it was perhaps also a 
fear that their lack of specialist knowledge of relevance to the debates that 
went on would make them feel out of place, because specialisation was so highly 
valued.   
 
Barriers to the implementation of guidelines 
Senior clinicians said the main barrier to implementation of guidelines was 
difficulties in dissemination followed by cost and by resistance to change (see 
chapter 9). Other Scottish research in the mid-1990’s.69 showed 69% of 
consultants thought lack of training was the reason for failure to follow 
guidelines. The reason for this may have been that joint training was a 
consensus building process. The finding that 88% felt guidelines would restrict 
clinical freedom was clearly connected to my finding that disagreement with 
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guidelines was an important barrier. Ninety percent of consultants were 
worried guidelines would increase the risk of legal action against them.318  
 
Facilitators and barriers to implementation of change generally  
These were often seen as two sides of the same coin – the presence or absence 
of a condition.  
 
Facilitators to implementation of change generally 
Formal support from the hospital was important in both hospitals. Within this, 
time was the main factor – for example having time to discuss the guideline 
with others. This was in line with the Scottish research dating from the mid 
1990’s which found that 76% of hospital consultants and 72% of nurses said 
they had too little time to follow protocols. More recent research found time 
and resource needed to be devoted to a period of local negotiation and 
adaptation of the evidence for the local context.101 Opinion leader support was 
also important.36;101 This agreed with my findings – the support of the 
consultant, clinical director and management was mentioned as part of this 
formal support process facilitating change, change management.  
 
Issues raised about change in a study of communication in an NHS study 
included lack of time to discuss problems, lack of feedback, lack of two-way 
communication, lack of involvement in change, and overload with irrelevant 
(especially bureaucratic) information.407 
 
There was some evidence that learning styles varied across professions. Some 
of the misunderstandings about the functions of guidelines between doctors 
and nurses (for example nurses’ view of doctors as rather inconveniently 
“having their own ideas”) were explained by conflicting learning styles: 
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“When managers have learning styles similar to another group they have 
little trouble communicating with that group. When style differences 
are great, communication difficulty arises.”231 
 
The need for time for nurses to train without adversely affecting ward 
functioning was corroborated by a study of multi-professional training in 
Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI).178 Interestingly, this study placed most 
importance on:  
“Cultural barriers over perceived differences in learning approaches, 
especially articulated by Doctors and Nurses, and the pace of learning.” 
 
The replication in 1990 of a study from 1934 confirmed that physicians still 
had a bias toward action, leading, for example to problems such as unnecessary 
tests and interventions for patients.12 The problem with this for OL was that if 
one or two phases of the learning cycle dominated others, the cycle would not 
work: 
“we can conclude that the most effective learning systems are those 
that can tolerate differences in perspective.”231 
 
Since most work systems left too little time for reflection,29 the action-
oriented work of nurses could imply an action-based learning style preventing 
them from contributing reflectively to local protocols on nursing issues.  
 
Barriers to implementation of change generally 
Other research on barriers to audit-based change showed staff attitudes were 
the most mentioned problem.211 This agreed with my finding that cultural issues 
were mentioned (especially in hospital 1) as a main barrier to the 
implementation of change. The other barriers were very similar to those which 
came out about the implementation of guidelines, and this in itself underlined 
the important insight that guideline implementation was about the 
implementation of change.  
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11.2.4  OL and guideline implementation activities 
Research Question 3b - Were potentially goal changing 
(generative) guideline implementation and dissemination methods 
and beliefs (model 2) connected to significantly higher OL 
capacity from adaptive beliefs encouraging compliance? 
 
There was a significant difference in OL score between those reporting the 
two types of change in their own practice in hospital 1. The OL score associated 
with type 2 change was always greater than that associated with type 1 change, 
and in spite of the low numbers this consistency in direction improved the 
reliability of this finding. The finding was in accordance with the hypothesis, in 
that it showed guidelines could be associated with type 2 change and that 
higher OL capacity accompanied this more creative change. That type 2 and 
higher OL capacity were associated also incidentally helped to validate the 
coding of these activities as type 2. 
 
Those clinical managers who had experienced both types of dissemination (one 
way and two way) were significantly more likely than those who had experienced 
only one type to use both of them to disseminate to their staff in their turn. 
This added support to the view that type 1 and type 2 learning went naturally 
together in the hospitals. 
 
Research Question 4 (Hypothesis testing) - Substantive activities 
and beliefs involved in guideline adoption and OL.  
 
This section asks whether the main guideline implementation activities and 
beliefs were connected to significantly different levels of OL capacity from 
others. This analysis was carried out within type, so OL capacity of beliefs of 
either type was compared with OL capacity associated with all other beliefs of 
that type mentioned for that issue.  
 
Chapter 11 - Discussion 
 363
Involvement with guidelines 
Use of guidelines was significantly associated with a higher OL score in both 
hospitals together and in each hospital, and particularly with leadership, again 
in both hospitals together and in each (see chapter 10). There was also a 
relationship with transfer of knowledge, guideline users giving higher scores 
than non-users, especially in hospital 2. Interviewees quite probably reported 
higher OL capacity than others in the hospital, since they reported higher OL 
capacity than those who responded to the survey alone. 
 
The higher OL scores of those using guidelines suggested guideline use was 
especially connected to leadership and transfer of knowledge. Implementation 
group membership was not associated with any significant differences in OL 
capacity. This disagreed a little with an association between involvement in 
successful quality improvement teams and “organisational citizenship behaviour” 
which was found in a Canadian study.200 Organisational citizenship was not the 
same as OL however, for example the latter did not include experimentation or 
any obviously double-loop learning-related items, it was much more about 
achieving good relationships with colleagues and customers. 
 
Beliefs and OL score 
The two type 1 beliefs associated with significantly lower OL scale score than 
other type 1 beliefs were:  
 
1. Those seeing the function of guideline based audit as to check practice had 
significantly lower transfer of knowledge scores. This was true in both 
hospitals together and in hospital 1, but there was no significant difference in 
hospital 2, though the direction of the difference was the same. Those seeing 
checking practice as an aim of audit also had considerably lower leadership and 
experimentation scores than those who did not, though not significant at 5%. 
 
Chapter 11 - Discussion 
 364
2. Those wanting the organisation to support them in change implementation 
were significantly lower on clarity of purpose. This was the case in both 
hospitals together and in each hospital separately. 
 
Only one study sample was significantly involved in any of these differences – 
doctors were more likely to want organisational support with guideline 
implementation. This held true overall and in each hospital. Perhaps doctors did 
not feel they knew what hospital purposes were as distinct from professional 
purposes. The differences are discussed below under the themes of leadership 
and support structures for change (for example audit and guidelines 
departments). 
 
Leadership 
The right leadership has been noted as a key aspect of improving OL. 
Tannenbaum found for example, when comparing a Health Maintenance 
Organisation (HMO) with a division of a bank, that supervisors tended to 
operate in more of a guidance/enforcement role than in the coaching role 
exhibited in the HMO.393 The HMO had a more effective learning environment. 
It was plausible to see a key role of the OL leader as connecting individual 
learning purposes to organisational priorities.233 The correlation between the 
clarity of the purpose OL sub-scale scores and formalisation scores found in my 
study both overall and in each hospital implied that many were going about this 
in a non-learning way. The correlation was strongest for hospital 2 doctors, 
though not significant for any profession alone within a hospital. The 
organisational “mission” was therefore perhaps being imposed (particularly in 
the view of hospital 2 doctors) in a one-way model rather than resulting from a 
two-way dialogue between staff and those setting the strategic direction at 
the top of the organisation. In that case, senior nurses and consultants needed 
to learn to facilitate such a dialogue to lead OL. 
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The general movement for quality improvement in health care has supported 
the recognition of organisational collaborative skills as necessary clinical 
skills,33 but on the evidence of this study, this agenda had yet to find its way 
into hospital 2. 
 
Both the guideline and protocol developers were designers (strategists), and 
therefore leaders in Senge’s sense: “In a learning organisation, leaders’ roles 
differ dramatically from that of the charismatic decision maker. Leaders are 
designers, teachers and stewards.”.313;370 The project results showing guideline 
users scored highly on leadership implied that guideline use was part of this 
new OL type of leadership role.  
 
The main support needs found for guideline implementation were educational. 
This suggested that an educational type of leadership was needed. This meant, 
for Senge “helping everyone in the organisation, oneself included, to gain more 
insightful views of current reality.”313;370. An organisational learning strategy, a 
design for learning, was required to help hospitals like hospital 2 where 
organisational learning was not happening very well naturally. 
 
Such a strategy would recognise distinctions such as one made by Weick, 
between ignorance, which was reduced by one-way communication, and 
confusion, which needed two-way interaction: 
"there is a difference between ignorance and confusion. To remove 
ignorance, more information is required. To remove confusion a different 
kind of information is needed, namely, the information that is 
constructed in face to face interaction that provides multiple cues."421 
 
This suggested that confusion was a major aspect of the lack of understanding 
often cited as a barrier to implementation and change, especially in nurses.  
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 "People mistakenly try to reduce their confusion with formal 
information processing that is not rich enough or their ignorance with a 
group meeting that is too rich."421 
 
Nurses had access to the guideline folders on the wards, so ignorance was not a 
large problem for those interviewed. A reflective comparison of possible goals 
and the eventual agreement on what the guidelines were for, how they fitted in 
to existing practice, why certain uses or interpretations were not appropriate 
or practical was an educative process as well as training. For Downie and 
Charlton, education concerned matters of intrinsic importance, it took a wide 
perspective and was related to other activities thought valuable, and it created 
in those who were engaged in it a sense of caring about what they were doing.103  
Support for change implementation wanted from the organisation  
Those wanting more time and resources from their hospital to support guideline 
implementation gave lower scores to clarity of purpose and mission. This needed 
careful interpretation. Clarity of purpose was clearly related to leadership. The 
mission involved was the organisational mission, which doctors, perhaps because 
of their more effective professional networks, regarded as less important than 
nurses. Their professional individual responsibility to do their best for their 
own patients perhaps reinforced the division between individual and 
organisational learning for some clinicians. As Berwick et al said “Nurses 
improve nursing, doctors improve doctoring. But part by part improvement will 
not in general achieve the improvement of systems as a whole.“ This, and other 
traditions of professional behaviour were predicted to “prove dysfunctional in 
the world of quality management”.33 
 
To bridge this gap between traditional professional behaviour and the learning 
organisation, clinicians would need to be helped to identify and argue for clinical 
priorities that matched their skills and were also clinical priorities for the 
hospital. Donaldson discussed the need for education in leadership skills for 
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clinicians. These skills included not only diagnosis and treatment and care, but 
also the ability to communicate, inform and educate, to assess and improve 
quality of care, recognise unsafe practice and act to prevent it, and to work in 
multidisciplinary teams. He called for a more systematic approach to identifying 
clinical leaders.99 
 
This all supported the view that clinical audit needed to be implemented in 
support of clinical leadership, for example by clinical directors as in hospital 1, 
rather than as a centrally driven replacement to it as in hospital 2. 
 
 
11.3 Limitations of the study 
11.3.1 Case selection methods 
Hospitals  
Although hospital 1 was higher on the OL capacity scale than hospital 2 
(especially for consultants), numbers in senior comparison group were low and 
did not show a statistically significant difference. But the criticism of the 
consultant body in the MacLean report on hospital 2256, which came out in 1999, 
6 months before data gathering for my project, implied it was important.  The 
specific criticism was that despite the hospital recently having high complaint 
levels, 
“Because of other commitments consultant staff are not readily 
accessible to relatives, so that communication is usually by the specialist 
Registrars or SHO’s.” 
 
MacLean praised the implementation of SIGN guidelines but queried recording 
about TED stockings and criticised surgery and Clinical Nurse Managers: 
“With respect to prophylaxis against deep vein thrombosis and 
pulmonary embolism, better completion of the Risk Assessment forms is 
required in General Surgery and Clinical Nurse Managers need to ensure 
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that there is better compliance with recordings of the use of 
compression stockings.” 
 
My study had found qualitative evidence of variable practice in surgery, and had 
highlighted a general lack of involvement by clinical nurse managers in the 
implementation of SIGN guidelines at any level. There was implicit criticism of 
hospital 2 culture in the use of capitals for the report’s self-avowedly most 
important recommendation: 
 “ALL CLINICIANS SHOULD NOW PARTICIPATE OPENLY AND 
CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE DEBATE ON RESHAPING ACUTE 
CLINICAL SERVICES...” 
 
In itself, the lower response rate in hospital 2 could be taken as an indicator of 
lower OL capacity, showing unwillingness to reveal information (defensiveness) 
and to be involved in knowledge creation and sharing as an OL activity. 
 
Guidelines  
The guidelines were implemented later in hospital 2 than hospital 1, so hospital 
2 may have been a year or so behind in an extended change process. The low 
response rate from those implementing diabetes guidelines in hospital 2 meant 
the implementation of the two guidelines, which were meant to contrast on the 
amount of OL capacity required for their implementation, could not be 
compared. This turned out to be strength rather than a weakness, as it allowed 
some welcome simplification to the research design. The selection process for 
the guidelines was retained in the methods section to show that the selection 
process had a rationale, and that the main guidelines had different 
characteristics, thus were more representative of SIGN guidelines than if only 
one implementation had been examined. 
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Health professionals  
Difference in health professional selection between hospitals 
 
No reminders were possible in hospital 1 because of reliance for sample 
selection on the personnel department in hospital 1. The sample was made larger 
than originally planned in both hospitals in order to give a greater chance of 
obtaining the numbers required. Exhaustive demographic comparisons showed 
similarity on the main demographic indicators. That it was more difficult 
achieve the same response rate in hospital 2 did not invalidate the comparison 
of responders’ attitudes about learning capacity between hospitals.  
 
The use of telephone as well as written requests for participation in hospital 2 
was the main difference in contact method between hospitals. It meant those 
asked could not deny receiving the request in the first place. Telephone 
reminders increased the response rate. A number of those reminded said they 
had not received the letter requesting participation. There could have been a 
number of reasons for this:  
 
1. The postal system in hospital 2 may really have been inefficient.  
2. The letter could have gone to the bottom of the in tray as a low priority, and 
been thrown away later as too late to respond to.  
3. The claim of non-receipt could have been a deliberate strategy to reduce 
unnecessary workload.  
 
If any behaviour like this reflected OL capacity it was likely to be evident from 
the scale score of respondents after reminders. There was, in fact, no 
significant difference on any of the scale scores between the first and second 
time responders in hospital 2. There is a possibility that the reason for needing 
a reminder was lack of time, particularly as this was the main reason given for 
non-participation. In this case, the busiest and most influential doctors and 
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nurses may have been under-represented, but if this was the case it would 
presumably have applied in both hospitals and so the comparison would have 
remained sound. Those who did not respond at all could have had different 
attitudes from the responders in either hospital. That was a different problem 
and was addressed through the interviews by asking about colleagues’ opinions. 
Most said others would agree with their views. 
 
The more positive clinicians may have responded. The results may therefore 
have over-estimated OL scale scores and the more positive attitudes and 
beliefs about guidelines. This has been noted elsewhere as a difficulty in 
descriptive research in clinical audit.71 For comparative research such as this, 
where response rates between groups were similar it was less of a difficulty, 
because the most positive segments, or the top slices, were compared.  The 
comparisons of OL scores for study samples were also limited to senior clinical 
staff, and this group (after reminders) had a similar response rate in each 
hospital. 
 
Role of senior clinical staff in influencing the learning culture  
Consultants trained junior doctors. Consultants were likely to represent 
organisational culture as they tended to be long serving in the same 
organisation. They also helped to create it and pass it on.175 G grade senior 
nurses were in charge of wards. They were responsible for the quality of the 
nursing care and the delivery of treatment. They were long serving and so likely 
to absorb, reflect and pass on organisational culture. They assessed ward staff. 
The study did not examine the speed with which junior staff took on the 
culture. 
 
Chapter 11 - Discussion 
 371
11.3.2 Response rates in context  
The percentage response was relevant to the survey rather than the interviews 
because the surveys were used only for quantitative analysis and needed to be 
statistically representative. The rate among senior clinical staff, the group 
used to make the quantitative comparisons of OL scale score between study 
samples, was acceptable for research in this setting. The balance of senior and 
junior staff in the group used to relate interview data and scale scores was not 
significantly different between hospitals. The senior staff group used to 
compare guideline implementation activities on OL score (chapter 9) was 62. 
This was smaller than for the other comparisons and so had a lower power to 
detect differences. 
 
The lower response rates were among junior staff. The overall response rates 
were as expected for research in this context. This was evident from the 
amount of research attention given to maximising response rates for this type 
of research in this setting.79 Other studies of health professionals with low 
response rates gave a benchmark for the minimum acceptable (publishable) 
response rate in this type of setting. Using the search term “low response rate” 
six databases (CINAHL, BIDS ISI (SOC SCI), MEDLINE, BIDS EMBASE, 
BIDS IBSS and Web of Science (SCI and SOC SCI)) were searched, In total, 
17 papers were identified. There was some overlap between databases. Tables 
summarising numbers of hits and the research subject and response are given 
in appendix A6.1. Some of the papers commented on response rate issues at a 
methodological level, rather than (or as well as) reporting the results of a 
specific study. The importance of assessing reasons for non-response was 
highlighted.215 396 This was done in the present study, see results, chapter 6. 
 
11.3.3 Directorates included 
There was a difference in the directorates included in the study in each 
hospital. ITU was included in hospital 2, but there were no responses from ITU 
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in hospital 1. As part of anaesthetics and theatres directorate, it was excluded 
on the grounds that they were unlikely to see either diabetes or DVT cases. 
The OL capacity scores from ITU were higher than average, so boosted the OL 
score of nurses in hospital 2 slightly overall. For the hospital comparison, the 
inclusion of the 6 ITU nurses (all senior) put the senior nurses’ average in 
hospital 2 up from 4.14 to 4.20, and the average for the hospital as a whole up 
from 3.94 to 4.01. The mean for all senior nurses was increased from 4.17 to 
4.20. This did not affect the overall conclusions.  
 
11.3.4 Analysis 
The use of a single coder (the researcher) may have been a cause of inaccuracy 
or bias as the coding was not publicly tested. The limited success of the type 
classification could have been caused by idiosyncratic interpretations. However, 
coding was checked some months after it was initially carried out, and the 
single coder was aware of the importance of making explicit decisions about 
coding categories. The advantage of a single coder was that differing 
interpretations by multiple coders were avoided. The coding is available from 
the author for verification by any interested party, subject to confidentiality 
requirements. 
 
The large number of groups and stages of the guideline implementation process 
that had to be included meant comparison of the whole guideline adoption 
process between study samples was difficult. Guideline adoption had to be 
compared bit by bit, leading to large numbers of tests, and this meant the 
significance level required was more rigorous owing to the need for bonferroni 
adjustment. The bonferroni approach may well have been too conservative, 
leading to type 2 errors. 
 
Selection effects rather than actual changes could have caused the 
differences with age in individuals’ OL capacity as they got older. For example, 
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higher OL capacity individuals may have worked to a later age than others, who 
may have taken earlier retirement or left the organisation for other reasons. 
Differences in schooling experienced between generations may have caused the 
differences. For example older generations often had more formal schooling 
involving more rote learning, more repressive discipline and less emphasis on 
group work. 
 
11.3.5 Research strategy 
The multiple methods approach was labour intensive. Data gathering, data entry 
and qualitative coding were very time consuming. The mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods produced a great deal of combined data. The data were 
combined and analysed quantitatively as well as qualitatively, but always as 
cases in accordance with the case study strategy. The advantages of 
triangulation remained, and a comprehensive picture of attitudes, beliefs and 
activities was obtained and confirmed from multiple data sources.  
 
11.3.6 Scale reliability 
Another item-total correlation could have been carried out to supplement the 
developers’ tests of the OL scale, and to re-test its reliability in the NHS 
acute hospital environment. Reliability was tested through the correlation 
between subscale totals and scale totals, and through the graphical comparison 
of the mean scores for individual items between each hospital. The validity 
testing in the NHS hospitals largely removed the need to do exhaustive 
reliability testing again, since a valid measure is necessarily also a reliable 
measure. 
 
11.4 Final conclusions 
The study samples had the predicted differences in OL scores, doctors higher 
than nurses, and hospital 1 higher than hospital 2. OL score was related to age 
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range overall, and this was not unexpected. It increased with age for senior 
nurses, but not for senior doctors. The research showed that in each stage of 
guideline implementation activities and beliefs could be divided into two types 
operating broadly in either single or double loop learning modes. Overall, those 
individuals who implemented or used guidelines had significantly higher OL 
score than those who did not.  
 
OL capacity associated with type 1 and type 2 change was significantly higher 
for those making type 2 changes to their own practice in hospital 1 but not 
overall. There was more type 2 change associated with guidelines in hospital 1. 
This suggested that guidelines did not necessarily prevent type 2 change. OL 
capacity was not a measure of compliance with guidelines, but a higher OL 
capacity was associated with generative learning that was linked with guideline 
implementation. There was a separate dynamic or set of causes associated with 
change operating in each hospital.  The cultural context in hospital 1 was more 
favourable to innovation, with more supportive clinical leadership, a less 
centralised audit approach, more control of working protocols within 
directorates, better communication and team working between professions and 
specialties and more reliable basic information systems (for example the 
internal post). Nurse specialists appeared to play an important leadership role 
in collaboration with specialist doctors in hospital 1 innovations to service 
delivery. Consultants’ links to Royal Colleges were better in hospital 1. It was 
likely that the higher OL capacity was an outcome of all these contextual 
factors, and culminated in the organisational payoff of higher levels of 
innovation both generally and in association with the implementation of SIGN 
guidelines.  
 
The hospitals were not different in everything and there were a number of 
similar issues and themes, it was a question often of emphasis rather than 
presence or absence of a theme in each hospital. There were broadly similar 
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external institutional pressures from legislative policy and political 
requirements on each hospital. Hospital 1 appeared to be much more closely 
linked to the Medical Royal Colleges, and it used these links to become more 
involved with national NHS bodies. It did this through, for example, SIGN. This 
enabled it to participate in setting the agenda of national health service 
priorities, and in the process make sure they were in accordance with hospital 
and professional priorities.   
 
Doctors initiated innovation through cross-boundary working between 
specialities and professions. Cross-boundary working was not the exclusive 
preserve of doctors. It often involved collaboration between specialists – there 
was an example in hospital 1 of collaboration in audit between physiotherapists 
and midwives, each of which can be thought of as a specialist profession, and 
the increase in number of specialist nurses is likely in future to increase 
collaborative innovation involving them. Specialists were likely to lack a 
strategic view of the mission of the organisation as a whole. Generalist nurses 
and perhaps GPs could be more involved in generative learning processes in both 
hospitals to bring an organisational perspective to it, and other ways of 
connecting individual and organisational learning for more staff needed to be 
found by those in leadership roles, especially in hospital 2.  
 
11.4.1 What this study found 
 
To recap: the research asked whether two different activity and belief 
patterns surrounding guideline implementation in two Scottish acute hospitals 
were differently associated with a culture of organisational learning. The null 
hypothesis was “There are no differences in the SIGN guideline implementation 
process between hospitals of different OL capacity.” 
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The study has found evidence in hospitals and professions to falsify this null 
hypothesis. The evidence came from two data sources, these were firstly a 
quantitative scale measuring OL capacity, completed by doctors and nurses, and 
secondly semi-structured interviews, also with doctors and nurses about their 
guideline implementation activities and beliefs. The interviews were analysed in 
two ways, both to identify contextual differences and similarities between the 
hospitals qualitatively and also, using a quantitative comparative case study 
approach, to describe, compare and contrast the main patterns of guideline 
implementation between the hospitals. Three analytical perspectives were used, 
the two hospitals were compared on OL capacity score to see whether the 
differences in OL capacity predicted from the selection process and from the 
contextual analysis were confirmed, the guideline implementation activities and 
beliefs were then compared between the hospitals, and finally the main 
guideline implementation activities and beliefs were compared with others of 
the same OL type to see whether they were associated with a different OL 
score. The main findings emerging from these different analyses and data 
sources pointed to the same conclusion, that higher OL capacity and type 2 
guideline implementation were associated with each other, the consultants in 
hospital 1 were both predicted and found to be of highest OL capacity. The 
comparisons of the guideline implementation activities and beliefs between the 
hospitals found that, as predicted, where there was a significant difference, 
type 2 implementation was found in the hospital of higher OL capacity. Where 
there were significant OL capacity differences between the main individual 
guideline implementation activities in an implementation stage and others of the 
same type in that stage, these were as predicted, for example a view of audit 
as a checking process was associated with significantly lower OL capacity score. 
The consultants in hospital 2 did not score higher than hospital 2 nurses. It had 
been predicted that they would score higher, and that they did not was an 
interesting and unexpected finding. It implied perhaps that consultants as a 
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group were more sensitive than nurses to both OL capacity and incapacity in 
their hospitals. 
 
Methodological learning about qualitative analysis 
It was realised that chi-square tests could be used to compare the guideline 
implementation activities and beliefs between study samples. This was a way of 
making analytic induction a more explicit and rigorous process following 
accepted statistical rules. Yin’s quantitative approach to case study, (which was 
used in chapters 8, 9, and 10, after a separate more humanistic approach to the 
analysis of context in chapter 7), gave no guidelines as to exactly how many 
cases were needed to show a difference between rival theories although he 
accepted that the disproved theory may contain or be shown in some of the 
existing cases tested in the research, without negating a claim of difference.439 
 
The case study approach was vindicated by the different findings in each 
hospital, some of which would have been lost in a simple aggregation of the 
data. The finding of a significant difference between OL capacities associated 
with type 1 and type 2 learning in hospital 1 but not overall demonstrated this. 
 
11.4.2 The contribution made by this study to OL and guideline 
implementation theory   
Organisational Learning theory 
The main contributions made by this study were to the practical measurement 
of OL capacity in acute hospitals and in pragmatically assessing the relationship 
of this theoretical concept to the real activities involved in evidence based 
clinical practice guideline implementation in acute hospitals. Evidence of a 
relationship helped to validate the scale for use in acute hospitals. The OL 
capacity scale chosen for the purpose was a useful measure in the hospital 
context, though a particular peculiarity was found in relation to the scores for 
the sub-scale about organisational mission, in that these were unexpectedly 
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significantly correlated with the formalisation scale. Less surprisingly, in view 
of the many unsuccessful efforts through the history of the NHS to exert 
managerial control on the medical profession, it also confirmed that doctors 
were not always aware of the organisational mission of their hospital.  
 
The OL literature, especially Senge, sometimes treated single and double loop 
learning as if they were separate entities. My study reinforced the view that 
there was in fact no separation between the single and the double loop OL in 
practice; they worked together, type 1 being a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for type 2, but not vice versa. For this reason my research would 
imply that a solely “model 2” organisation is unlikely ever to be found, although 
in confirmation of Argyris’s findings, type 2 learning was much rarer than type 
1. Paradoxically, since specialisation was logically associated with type 2 
learning, specialist skill, especially in surgery, was developed by repetition - a 
form of type 1 learning. Carroll and Edmondson53 noted that expertise like this 
was a “competency trap” preventing organisational growth and change.  The 
expert practitioners got bored and younger staff avoided the predictable and 
routine work. My study suggested that other perspectives (for example from 
other professions) could help to prevent specialists falling into this competency 
trap. 
 
One organisational solution was to keep research and innovation activities 
separate from routine activities by using a separate R&D arm. Separation was 
likely to result in impractical or irrelevant innovations which would be resisted 
when it finally came to implementation.  An organisational attempt to entirely 
separate the two parts of learning activity was therefore likely to limit hospital 
performance.  My study lent support to this view from the insight that 
specialist nurses and specialist doctors working together created useful and 
feasible innovation to the delivery of care and treatment. Making nurses into 
specialists freed them from some of the routine of nursing care, and helped to 
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connect specialist doctors to the wider issues involved in routine care and 
treatment delivery. Specialist doctors appeared from comments (by ICU staff 
for example) in my study, to take more account of the views of specialist 
nurses than the views of general nurses or junior doctors.  
 
For Downie and Charlton,103 type 2 learning in industry and business was about 
expansion, competitive advantage in a turbulent world. Was it therefore less 
relevant to hospitals than an incremental type 1 learning which applied 
information and knowledge that had been generated outside the hospital? From 
the two hospitals it appeared not, an active involvement in knowledge creation 
with an element at least of control over choice of goals seemed essential to 
encourage whole-hearted adoption of evidence from elsewhere. Meeting health 
care and treatment needs rather than expansion or competition was the 
rationale for the NHS, and there was no practical limit to the amount of health 
care need or to the improvement possible in health care delivery, and thus no 
limit to the amount of OL desirable to meet the needs and create the 
improvements.  
 
Strategic change and guideline implementation 
These two topics are considered together since, as the literature review made 
plain, guideline implementation was best understood as an example of the 
implementation of a strategic initiative.  One practical issue for organisational 
design was that in hospital 1 a smaller span of control was recognised by both 
doctors and nurses to make dissemination easier. Royal Colleges, particularly 
associated with hospital 1, were small units too. These features were in 
accordance with Ferlie and Shortell’s views about factors encouraging 
change.122  
 
Much of the evidence about the most effective methods of implementing 
guidelines referred to the importance of choosing methods suitable to the 
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context for the implementation. In my study, contextual issues such as the role 
of the Royal Colleges in relation to hospitals sprang out as major influences on 
the acceptance of the guidelines, which were, ostensibly at least, a product of a 
collaboration between the Royal Colleges and the NHS. This was where my 
study had some relevant evidence to the field of institutional theory. In a 
turbulent environment of increasing uncertainty about what was best practice, 
owing to the high volume of research evidence and new treatments, hospital 1 
had managed, with other important hospitals, through its consultants’ 
connections with the medical and surgical Royal Colleges, to influence the 
standards of best practice accepted by the central policy making bodies of the 
NHS to such an extent that any deviation from these standards would require 
justification in the event of a legal challenge. It had thus been able to manage 
the uncertainty, so that although it followed best practice it was not 
institutionalised by the received standards, since it had in large measure 
created them through an evidence-based but also peer-agreement-based 
process of SIGN guideline development. This insight enriches and supports 
Burgoyne’s contention that some hospitals were, like some large old companies 
(MacDonald’s and Coca-Cola for example) able to stabilise the context in which 
they operated, which he saw as the highest level of OL.47 
 
Discussions with respected colleagues or consultants have been rated as the 
most important information source affecting clinical decision-making by 83% of 
3000 Canadian physicians.177 Guidelines were rated as having a major impact by 
only 44%. It was of pre-eminent importance to doctors to be respected by 
colleagues because they had to work flexibly with them. So, most doctors 
needed to see the evidence ratified in their own context and by their own team 
before they would implement it. The science base underpinned the culture, and 
was espoused, but these other variables were more important in the 
implementation decisions of most practising doctors.  
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As far as guidelines were concerned, their availability did not automatically 
mean doctors’ compliance partly for these cultural and contextual reasons. The 
study results confirmed this, for example the hospital 1 process of 
directorate-based collaborative protocol creation was such a peer ratification 
process, as well as addressing other implementation issues. The study also 
extended this cultural change model to nurses – who voiced considerable 
demand for more discussion at ward level. The recent spate of articles in 
nursing journals on reflective practice, problem-based learning and self-
directed learning130;208;345 confirmed nurses’ interest in type 2 learning.  
 
An evaluation of the implementation of SIGN guideline No. 2, on the 
prophylaxis of venous thromboembolism, confirmed that the majority of 
Scottish trusts had developed local protocols.413 Although audit of DVT 
prophylaxis was relatively common, few trusts were using audit in a systematic 
way to evaluate the effectiveness of local protocols, a potentially goal changing 
(type 2) activity. This was confirmed by the rarity of type 2 guideline 
implementation activities found by my study. 
 
Type 2 guideline implementation activities and type 2 change as a result did 
occur, guidelines did not prevent them happening, in fact they were one route 
for the supply of the type of valid information that Argyris cited as a governing 
variable for his model 2 “theory-in-use”, (chapter 2, table 2.1). Such 
information enhanced the probability of learning  by being concrete, clear, 
consistent, congruent and available (Chapter 2, box 2.1).  Guidelines promoted 
learning by providing standards of this standard, against which to measure data 
about clinical processes as the start of either single or double loop learning 
cycles. But in an institutionalised hospital such as hospital 2, where the culture 
tended towards model 1 “theory-in-use”, even evidence-based guidelines 
struggled to achieve their full potential in supporting even type 1 learning, and 
it was even more difficult for them to support type 2 learning and change. 
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Future implications for the NHS 
In his reference to a new sort of NHS a “values based system”89 Alan Milburn, 
UK Minister for Health in January 2002 implied the NHS identity would 
perhaps eventually be maintained solely through quality assurance. 
“Strengthened independent inspection” would replace some financial and 
management controls. In England, for example, this would include external 
accreditation by a Commission for Health Improvement with more powers.98 
The challenge would be to keep this valid – as seen recently in the fraudulent 
reduction of waiting lists.168 The measurement of OL capacity by profession 
may be one framework for inspection and accreditation if, as this study 
suggests, higher OL capacity is associated with the generation of innovation 
and improvement from within. Unlike compliance to external criteria this would 
be more motivating, and less easily faked. On the evidence found in this study, 
there is still a long way to go before type 2 OL will be sufficiently developed in 
all acute hospitals to give them the autonomy needed for a less controlling 
relationship by central government. 
 
A number of my findings pointed toward an OL role for Scotland’s managed 
clinical networks (MCNs) operating independently of hospital organisational 
boundaries.114 MCNs were a uniquely Scottish initiative to improve 
effectiveness and efficiency unconstrained by the organisational structures 
through which care was delivered.293 Their exact purposes needed to be worked 
out in action through funded pilot schemes.  
 
Wider patient focused groups such as MCNs would help to overcome such 
unhelpful specialty boundaries. An MCN could be an innovating organisation, as 
recommended by Galbraith.141  
“Organisations that want to innovate or revitalise themselves need two 
organisations, an operating organisation and an innovating organisation”  
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MCNs could not be fully separated from organisations providing healthcare, as 
otherwise the learning would not benefit them as much, but reservations of 
protected time could accomplish sufficient separation. The role of guidelines 
would be to provide a common (uniform) base for discussion about better 
methods of delivering the care recommended in them. MCNs may become a way 
of ensuring that the current emphasis on learning from mistakes does not trap 
the NHS in a further cycle of single loop (type 1) learning, a danger highlighted 
in the small but developing literature on OL in the NHS.298 
 
Type 2 learning from guidelines may in future be a role for MCNs. Certainly, 
MCNs would provide the essential social context for learning, and the time to 
“create, examine and redefine meanings”.357 Social learning could encourage new 
ideas better than could individual learning because “the best person to help you 
with your problem was someone who cannot see your problem in the same frame 
as you because he or she was ignorant of your world.”38 Through MCNs 
guidelines could bring together specialists with different frames of reference 
to spark the innovative ideas which “occur when knowledge of the essential 
specialties was coupled in as few heads as possible.”141 
 
SIGN national guideline development groups perhaps fulfilled the role of 
structural defence mechanisms or parallel organisations allowing open 
communications and sharing of mental models away from the restrictions and 
possibly some of the rivalries of the work situation. This no doubt had benefits 
for the work situation, but also importantly, the individuals who participated in 
or led these national development groups were very effective local champions 
for their guidelines, which explained the earlier uptake and enthusiasm at 
hospital 1. The SIGN groups also intensified the pressure on professionals and 
hospitals to implement best research-based practice, and to match outcomes 
obtained elsewhere.  What these national SIGN groups lacked as innovating 
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organisations was an ability to experiment with ideas generated from practice, 
some, but not all hospitals had sufficient capacity to do this. 
Further research needed  
The most obvious further research would be to develop an OL scale specifically 
for use in acute hospitals, with relevance to both clinical and organisational 
missions, and perhaps with a sub-scale measuring clinical mission in addition to 
or instead of organisational mission. Other subscales could be identified 
pragmatically using groups of clinicians to generate, test and select items. 
 
In further research comparing guideline implementation and OL capacity, it 
would be helpful to reduce the numbers of differences needing significance 
testing. This could be achieved by concentrating on larger numbers of 
consultants only, since they differed most between hospitals, and researching 
single stages of guideline adoption. As the directorate appeared to be the main 
learning unit for clinicians, in future research it would possibly be fruitful to 
concentrate on directorates or units hypothesised to be of different OL 
capacity such as ICU in comparison with Care of the Elderly. To verify the 
relationship of type 1 and type 2 learning to OL score, a future study could 
confine itself to the learning outcomes of implementation. There was no one 
implementation. Each stage of implementation had its own problems, each of 
which might be expressed differently in different contexts.  
 
An additional analysis I could have done, but was not directly relevant to the 
research question, would have been to compare the OL capacity scores for the 
main beliefs and activities associated with each stage of guideline 
implementation with all other responses by seniors and /or juniors, instead of 
as I did, comparing them only with the OL scores of those responding with 
replies on that topic categorised within the same theoretical OL type. 
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A1 Research Instruments 
 
A1.1 The OL Survey 
 
Swee C Goh & Associates 
Strategic Change and Learning Consultants 
 
THE LEARNING ORGANISATION SURVEY 
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETED 
 
The purpose of this survey is to gather information concerning organisational factors and 
management practices that may influence the learning capability of organisations. The 
survey has been tested with over 1000 employees and has been found to be statistically 
valid and reliable.  
 
There are no “right” or “wrong” answers. Please reflect carefully and answer all questions  as 
honestly as possible based upon your knowledge of the organisation. Your response will be 
kept confidential and will be aggregated with the responses so individual respondents cannot 
be identified. Some questions in this survey might sound similar to others. Please answer 
ALL of the questions. Thank you for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. Please 
return your completed form in the envelope provided. 
 
  
 
 
1                          7 
Strongly      Strongly 
Disagree     Agree 
1 I often have an opportunity to talk to other staff about successful 
programs or work activities in order to understand why they succeed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 There is widespread support and acceptance for the organizations 
mission statement . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 I can often bring new ideas to the organization. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 Failures are seldom constructively discussed in our organization. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 Current organizational practice encourages employees to solve 
problems together before discussing it with a supervisor. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 From my experience people who are new to this organization are 
encouraged to question the way things are done. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 Senior managers in this organization resist change and are afraid of 
new ideas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 Line managers in this organization encourage employees to 
experiment in order to improve work processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 New work processes that may be useful to the organization as a 
whole are usually shared with all employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 Innovative ideas that work are often rewarded by management . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11 Managers and employees of this organization share a common vision 
of what our work should accomplish. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12 In my experience, new ideas from staff are not treated seriously by 
management . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13 Managers in this organization frequently involve employees in 
important decisions . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14 We cannot usually form informal groups to solve organizational 
problems . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15 Managers in this organization can accept criticism without becoming 
overly defensive. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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16 We have a system that allows us to learn successful practices from 
other organizations . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17 Line managers in this organization often provide feedback that helps 
to identify potential problems and opportunities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18 I do not understand how the mission of this organization is to be 
achieved . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19 We have opportunities for self assessment with respect to goal 
attainment . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20 The organization’s mission statement identifies values to which all 
employees must conform. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21 Most problem solving groups in this organization feature employees 
from a variety of functional areas or divisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22 There is very little overlap in work between different units in the 
organization . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23 Most of our work must adhere to formal rules and procedures . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24 In my opinion, this organization has too many levels of hierarchy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25 We require approval in writing for the introduction of new work 
activities . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26 Our work is usually closely monitored and inspected by management  
. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27 Information and decision making must always go through proper 
channels. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28 Standard operating procedures have been established for almost 
every work situation . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29 I feel I am in a dead end job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30 I feel isolated at work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31 I am satisfied with my supervisor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32 I do not feel as if I am an integral part of this organization . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33 I have opportunities to work on challenging assignments. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34 My work makes full use of my skills and abilities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35 I have opportunities to improve my knowledge, skills and abilities in 
order to undertake new work assignments. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36 I know that failure will have negative repercussions on my career. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37 My work group is supportive of the work I do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38 Overall I am satisfied with this job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Instructions: This section asks for personal data related to your work experience.  
  Please respond by filling in the appropriate blank 
 
1 How long have you worked in this organization? ____________ (# of years) 
2.  What position do you currently hold in this organization?_________________(title) 
3 Please indicate your division/department____________________________ 
4  How long have you been in this position? _______________(# of years) 
5 In how many different organizations  have you been employed _____________ 
6 In how many different functional areas (e.g. personnel, finance, etc) have you been 
employed? ____________________  
7 Have you had experience in any other industry? Yes _____________  No 
__________ 
 Please specify ____________________________ 
8  If yes, how many years before joining your present organization? _______________ 
9  Gender:  Female _________  Male _________ 
10 Age group: 20-30 ______  31-40 ______ 41-50 ______ 51-60 _______ 60+ 
_______ 
 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Your responses will be kept 
completely confidential and all information will be statistically aggregated before 
being put into the final report. If you have additional comments please use the back of 
this page. 
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A1.1.1 Items for scales within Learning Organisation survey tool:   
 
Learning Capacity scale:  items 1-21,  
Formalisation scale:    items 22-28,  
Job satisfaction scale:  items 29-38. 
 
A1.1.2 Items for sub-scales of the learning capacity scale 
 
Clarity of purpose and mission:   items 2,18,20 and 19, 
Leadership commitment and empowerment: items 7, 11, 15, 17, 13, 
Experimentation:     items 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 
Transfer of knowledge:    items 1, 4, 9, 16, 
Teamwork and group problem solving:  items 5, 14, 21. 151 
 
A scale total for OL was calculated by reverse coding items 4,7,12,14 and 18, 
summing the scores and dividing by the number of items in the scale (21 for a 
complete scale). 
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A1.2 The Hospital Culture Scale (Rows compressed) 
 
 The Hospital Culture Scale SA A N D SD N/A D/K
1 The Physician-Nurse relationship is team 
orientated 
       
2 Physicians treat Nurses as handmaidens, not 
partners 
       
3 Physicians are the rulers of this hospital        
4 This hospital often makes changes to improve 
the delivery of healthcare 
       
5 When physicians are with patients they often 
talk to other health professionals in the room 
as if the patient did not exist 
       
6 Physicians go to great lengths to explain 
treatment programs to patients  
       
7 The Nurse-Physician relationship is 
characterised by mutual respect 
       
8 The success of health care professionals in 
this hospital depends on how willing they are 
to play hospital politics 
       
9 Health care professionals’ advancements are 
based on their commitment to patient care 
       
10 The goal or mission of this hospital has been 
determined by upper management without 
employee involvement   
       
11 Physicians are open to recommendations 
offered by Nurses 
       
12 Patient complaints are often dismissed by 
physicians  
       
13 Physicians often take the time to listen to 
patient concerns 
       
14 Health professionals at this hospital inform 
patients of alternative medical treatments  
       
15 This hospital has a clear, well accepted 
mission  
       
Answer N if you know that you neither agree nor disagree with the statement. 
Answer D/K if you do not have the knowledge to answer the question  
AS = strongly agree, A = agree, N = neither agree or disagree, D = disagree, SD = strongly 
disagree, N/A not applicable, D/K = do not know. (Klingle et al 1995, Evaluation and the 
Health Professions, 18, 2, 166-186)
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A1.3 Personal Details survey 
 
Further information (Fully confidential) 
 
How many SIGN Clinical guidelines have you 
helped to adapt for local use?   _________1 
Office 
Use 
 
2. What is your main job? Clinical Manager 6      
Audit facilitator 3  Medically qualified practising Doctor 1     Nurse  2  
Profession allied to medicine 4      Other 5   (Please specify) 
__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
   
3.  Do you normally work as part of a multidisciplinary clinical team?  
Yes1    No 2       Don’t Know 3  
(if No, please go to question 6) 
 
  
4 If yes, what is the size of your team (or your main team if you work for 
more than one)?                    1-5 1        6-10 2        >10 3  
  
 
5 Which of the following professions does your main team contain? 
  
Medical Doctor         1                               Nurse  6 2    
Audit/clinical effectiveness facilitator  7 3    
Profession(s) Allied to Medicine(PAM) 8 4    
   
Please specify which PAM(s) 
____________________________________ 
  
 
9 Have you implemented one of the following guidelines 
SIGN DVT prophylaxis 1   A SIGN diabetes guideline   2   Don’t Know3  
 
 
 
 
(If Diabetes please give the name here) 
_________________________________________________________
_____ 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate and give brief details if any of the following happened: 
10 A The guideline was audited 1  
________________________________ 
11 B Change to clinical practice  2  
_______________________________ 
12 C Other change to your work 3 
________________________________ 
  
 
13. Have you implemented any other SIGN clinical guideline?                    
Yes 1    No   2   Don’t Know 3  
Please give the name of the guideline(s) 
14_______________________________________________________
15_______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
16 Have you implemented any other  clinical guideline?  Yes 1    No   2   
DK   3  
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A1.4 Interview Schedule 
 
Question Reason asked 
1 Extent of previous involvement  (all 
respondents) 
 
1 How many SIGN guidelines have you 
helped to adapt for local use? 
To compare those with previous involvement in 
implementing guidelines with those without 
  
2 Dissemination  
1 Which guideline would you like to 
answer specific questions on? 
2 What was done to disseminate the 
guideline  
(a) to you? 
                                                                     
(b) to your staff? 
To compare complex with less complex 
implementation of a guideline 
 
To compare methods of dissemination, 
 
to compare adaptations made by managers to the 
dissemination methods they experience  
3 Would you do anything differently 
about dissemination next time?  
 
To compare learning about dissemination 
methods. To compare ideal with real 
dissemination methods  
 
*4 What explicit support would you like 
from the senior management team? 
To compare needed improvements to 
dissemination 
  
3 Implementation  
1 Were you a member of an 
implementation group? 
Comparison of level of involvement in 
implementation.  
2 Did you do things to make sure the 
guideline recommendations were put 
into practice? 
 
To compare active methods of implementation. 
*3 Was anything else done to 
implement the guideline? 
To compare perceptions of others activity to 
implement the guideline 
  
4 Audit  
1 Was practice audited? To compare awareness of audit 
*2 Who did the audit? 
(Which staff groups/directorates were 
audited?) 
To compare knowledge about the involvement of 
others in audit. 
*3 What were the aims of the audit? To compare aims of audit.  
*4 Were you in the group conducting 
the audit? 
To compare those involved in planning the audit 
and those not actively involved  
*5 Was that group a multiprofessional 
or uni-professional? 
 
To compare uni-professionally controlled audit 
with audit where more than one profession has 
control over the process 
*6 Did it include more than one 
directorate? 
To compare audit carried out in one directorate 
only, with inter-directorate audit 
*7 Did it include primary care? To compare audit confined to an acute trust and 
audit including primary care. To find out 
whether/how primary care was included. 
*8 What were the good and bad things 
about being/not being in the group? 
To compare motivations and justifications  for 
active involvement in audit.  
9 What do you understand by a quality 
improvement project in a hospital?  
To compare understandings of quality 
improvement (e.g. whether guideline 
implementation is seen as such) 
  
5  Implementation results  
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1(a) Were the findings communicated 
to you for your own practice? 
1(b) Would it have been communicated 
for your team – for their practice? 
To compare kinds of feedback. 
2. If there was a change to your 
practice as a result of the guideline, 
can you describe the most important 
change? 
To compare valuations of types of change, and to 
compare changes.  
3 Can you describe any other changes 
to practice from this guideline? 
To compare general changes. 
*4 Were the findings of any audit 
communicated to anyone outside the 
clinical team? 
To compare whether the team communicates 
about the wider impact of the findings and to 
whom. 
  
6 Team Learning    
1 Did you learn anything about the 
practice of other teams or directorates 
from implementing the guideline? 
To compare whether communication/learning  in-
coming  to the team/directorate. 
To compare the information received/learnt 
2 Have you found that the guidelines 
led to any new ways of working in your 
team or directorate?  
To compare whether the learning was put into 
practice. 
 
3. Was primary care involved in any of 
these new ways of working? 
To compare whether changes extended to 
external organisation (primary care) 
4. How the organisation help this 
learning process? 
To compare barriers and ideal solutions to them 
for the creation, communication and use of 
practical information  
  
7 General issues on guidelines - all 
respondents 
 
I’d like to ask you now about any 
previous experience of clinical 
guidelines you may have had. 
To construct and compare ideals for using clinical 
guidelines. 
 
  
1 What do you think SIGN clinical 
guidelines are for? 
To compare ideal aims 
2 Do you think other clinicians 
(nurses/medical staff)  think the same? 
To compare beliefs about other members of the 
profession, and other professions  
3 What do you think can stop 
guidelines from working? 
To compared general beliefs about constraints 
*4(a) How do you use SIGN 
guidelines? 
To compare general perception of personal uses  
4 (b) Do you think doctors use them in 
the same way? 
         Do you think nurses use them in 
the                same way? 
To compare general perceptions of use by the 
other professional group with perceptions of own 
professions use and own use.  
 
4 (c) Do you think your manager uses 
them in the same way? 
To compare managerial use and clinical use 
5 What are your general opinions on 
the effectiveness of  SIGN clinical 
guidelines? 
To compare attitudes to SIGN guidelines’ 
effectiveness 
6 What does implementation of a 
guideline mean to you? 
To compare understandings of  the concept of 
guideline implementation 
*7 What factors helped the 
implementation of change? 
To compare facilitating factors to implementing 
guideline based change generally 
*8 What factors stopped changes from 
working? 
To compare barriers to implementing guideline 
based change generally 
* shows questions for contextual issues 
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A1.5 Correspondence with authors of scales 
 
A1.5.1 Email to Prof Goh 15/5/2000 
 
Dear Professor Goh, 
 
I refer to your letter of June 18 1998, to me, giving permission for the use 
of the Learning Organisation Survey in my research. Thank you for this, and 
the information in the letter. I have now gathered the data and am recoding 
the reverse scored responses. There is one point I do not understand, you 
say in the letter items 29, 30, 32, and 36 must be reverse scored 
(8-response). I do not understand the reference to 8-response. Could you 
explain? 
 
With all best wishes, 
 
 
Andrew D. Millard, 
53, Thornly Park Avenue, 
Paisley, 
PA2 7SF 
Tel 0141 884 3620 
 
 
A1.5.2 Letter from Prof Goh 16/5/2000 
 
Hi: 
 
For those items I indicated that has to be reverse scored 
(8-response) means if the subject marked 5 on the scale in  
response to the item, the correct score should be (8-5) which is 3. 
What you have done is to reverse the 7-point scale, i.e. if the  
response had been 1 the correct score should be(8-1) which is  
7, the other end of the scale. 
 
I hope it clarifies what you have to do to code the responses on the  
survey. 
 
I would be very interested in your results and the data. If you can  
share it with me it would be much appreciated. You can send me  
the raw scores in an EXCEL file and a codebook on what the rows  
and columns mean and also some information on the sample you  
used. 
 
Thanks and good luck. Keep in touch. 
 
Swee C. Goh, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor  
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A1.5.3 Email from Prof S Goh 18/5/00 
 
Hi Andrew: 
 
An SPSS data file is fine. However, I have SPSS for Windows 98  
Version 10.0. Make sure it is the same or a lower version. 
 
You can deal with the missing values described for the overall  
scale. However, you should do the five sub-scale values as well in  
your analysis. T-tests between the two groups is fine, if that is  
what you are hypothesizing, that there will be a significant  
difference.  
 
The data is sensitive by level, that is more senior people tend to  
score higher, but it should not be highly significant. You may want  
to control for sample size differences. 
 
Did you measure job satisfaction and formalization as well? You  
may want to do a simple correlation between these two measures  
and the learning scale. 
 
Swee Goh 
GOH@profs.admin.uottawa.ca 
 
 
A1.5.4 Email to Prof Klingle 28.4.2000 
 
Dear Professor R. Klingle, 
 
I am a PhD student at the Department of Public Health, Glasgow University in 
Scotland. 
 
Some while ago, I discovered your interesting 1995 paper in Evaluation and 
the Health Professions (18, 2, 166-186), Communication among 
Physicians, Nurses and Patients in Hospitals. 
 
I am looking at Organisational learning capacity and its relationship to 
the implementation of evidence based clinical guidelines. For this I have 
gathered data using a scale developed by Goh and Richards (See: Benchmarking 
the Learning Capability of Organisations, European Management Journal 1997 
15, 5, 575-583). 
 
Unable to contact you previously, I discovered you at the university in 
Hawaii through a web search. I would like to use your scale to validate the 
learning capacity scale (predicting that they will correlate). 
 
I have gathered data but would like your permission to use the scale in this 
way. 
Could you please confirm which items should be reverse scored? Any comments 
or suggestions would be welcome. Has your scale been used in any other 
studies and are there any other peer reviewed publications about it? 
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With many thanks for your help, and best wishes, 
> > 
> > 
> > Andrew D. Millard, 
> > 53, Thornly Park Avenue, 
> > Paisley, 
> > PA2 7SF 
> > Tel 0141 884 3620 
> > 
> 
 
A1.5.5 Email from Prof R. Klingle, 16.08.00 
 
Dear Mr. Millard: 
 
I apologize for the late response but I've been working on some grant 
work and away from my office for most of the summer. 
 
You are correct, items 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, and 12 are the ones to be 
reversed. 
 
There have been a lot of requests to use the scale and I know that it 
has been used. However, I don't know if anyone has published their 
data. A lot of the people that have used it have done so to improve 
hospital communication. 
 
Renee Klingle 
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A2 Literature Review search strategy 
 
A2.1 Guideline implementation/audit 
 
A2.1.1 Exploratory searches (1997) 
Embase 1988-90 practice guideline (limited) 108 refs (on implementation) 
Embase 1991-93 Practice guideline (limited) 134 refs (on implementation) 
Embase 1996-7 Practice guideline (limited) 243 refs (on implementation) 
Bids ISI 1988-97 guidelines+audit 34 refs 
Bids ISS 1988-97 guidelines+audit 7 refs 
Bids ISI 1981-97 clinical audit + guidelines 49 refs 
Bids Embase 1981-97 health care quality + practice guidelines 67refs 
ASSIA 1986-96 clinical guideline 164 refs 
Medline (Pubmed) 1995-97 guidelines and clinical audit  42 refs 
Medline (Silver platter) 1986-95 research and (practice-guidelines or practice-
management-medical) 115 refs  
 
A2.1.2 Update searches 2001  
Medline (Silver platter) 1995-2001 research and (practice-guidelines or practice-
management-medical) 
Embase 1997-2001 practice guideline  
ASSIA clinical guideline 1997-2001 
 
A2.2 Organisational learning 
 
A2.2.1 Exploratory searches (1997) 
Bids embase 1981-1997 Organisational learning or clinical learning 11 refs 
Bids embase 1981-87 organisation and health and development 41 refs embase 
Bids isi soc sci 1981-97 organisation + health + development  2 refs 
Bids ISI (sci) 1981-97 Organisation + healthcare + development 15 refs 
ASSIA 1987-96 organisational + learning 71 refs 
BIDS IBSS 1988-2000 organis (z) ational learning, learning organis (z)ation marked 
list 128 refs (Computer file) 
Cinahl learning culture or learning capacity 1982-00, 15 refs (Computer file: 
learn_cult_capac) 
Embase  learning culture or learning capacity 1980 -2000, 72 refs (Computer file: 
learn_cult_capac) 
Medline learning culture or learning capacity 1982-00 46 refs (Computer file: 
learn_cult_capac) 
Ovid ISI/Web of Science sci and soc sci (all yrs) learning culture or learning capacity 
139 refs (Computer file: learn_cult_capac) 
Ovid ISI ISTP learning culture or learning capacity 1980-2000, 78 refs (Computer 
file: learn_cult_capac) 
(BPO) Learning 1994-5 (1) 48 refs selected, 15 further selected  
(BPO) Learning 1994-5 (2) 99 refs selected, 18 further selected  
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(BPO) Learning and health care industry 1986-97 29 refs  
(BPO) Learning and management 1986-97 129 refs  
(BPO) Organisation and health 1986-92  18 refs  
(BPO) Organisation and health  1993-4   22 refs  
(BPO) Organisational Development, Organisational change, organisational 
behaviour, organisational theory. (Thesaurus terms) 1994-5 15 refs  
(BPO) Organisation and health  1996-7   104 refs  
(BPO) Organisational learning  1996-7 3 refs 
Medline (Pubmed) 1981-97 Organisation /learning/development 43 refs 
Medline (Pubmed) 1981-97 organisation* learning 21 refs 
Medline (Pubmed) 1981-97  
 
A2.2.2 Update searches 2000-2001 
Medline learning culture or learning capacity 1966-2000, 46 refs. 
(BPO)  1997-2001   Organisation and health  
(BPO)  1997-2001   Organisational learning  
ASSIA 1997-2001  organisational + learning 
Medline learning culture or learning capacity 2000-2001 (Computer file: 
learn_cult_capac) 
Ovid ISI/Web of Science sci and soc sci (2000-2001) learning culture or learning 
capacity (Computer file: learn_cult_capac) 
 
 
A2.3 Clinical learning 
ASSIA 1987-96 clinical + learning + quality 22 refs 
Medline (Pubmed) 1981-97 Clinical learning /education+ audit 8 refs selected 
Medline (Pubmed) 1981-97 education 70 refs selected 
Biomed best evidence learning (28/7/00) 34 refs  (Computer file) 
BIDS ISI Soc sci 1981-1997 Clinical education 18 refs 
BIDS Embase 1981-97 Clinical education and practice guidelines 45 refs 
BIDS ISI Sci 1981-1997 clinical education 53 refs 
BIDS ISI sci 1981-1997 clinical learning 14 refs 
BIDS ISI soc sci 1981-97 clinical learning 15 refs 
 
 
A2.4 Management learning 
Bids isi soc sci 1981 - 97 Management learning/education 32 refs 
Bids embase 1981-97 management education 13 refs 
Bids ISI SCI 1981-97 Management education 8 refs 
ASSIA 1987-96 management + learning 54 refs 
 
 
Note:  Update searches were not relevant for clinical or management learning 
because the study was now focused on OL and guideline implementation 
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A3 Methods 
A3.1 strengths and weaknesses of routinely collected data as indicators 
of OL capacity 
 
Data Item Strength 
Planned procedures 
not carried out,63;194 
Falling levels showed improving organisation, for example 
better communication with patients, and greater accuracy of 
diagnosis. 
Waiting times193 Reductions in these could have been the result of an active 
effort by the hospital. 
Day surgery cases197  Increases in these could have shown the hospital was 
learning to put the national policy to increase day surgery into 
effect. 
Bed usage/occupancy 
rate198 
Increases could have shown increasing organisational 
efficiency. 
Complaints198;196 Falling complaints could have shown increasing patient 
satisfaction. It was reasonable to assume that successful 
organisational learning could lead to higher patient 
satisfaction. 
Wound infection rates  Falls in wound infection rates could have shown better 
hospital hygiene generally. 
Readmission rates Falls in these may have shown improving clinical outcome, 
which may have been the result of a learning process. 
Table A3.1.1 Data items –  strengths as learning indicators 
 
Data Item Weakness 
PROCESS  
Reduction in planned 
procedures not done 
Could have indicated decreasing sensitivity to the condition of 
the patient at the time of admission.  
Waiting time 
reduction 
Could have been result of a single consultant’s new policy. An 
indicator of increased productivity rather than learning. 
Increasing day 
surgery rate 
Could have been strongly affected by the individual policy of a 
single consultant.  
Increasing bed usage 
rate 
Did not guarantee clinical learning or effectiveness. The beds 
could have been fully used, while patients still received 
inappropriate care.  
OUTCOME  
Increasing complaints Could have merely shown good systems for gathering and 
recording complaints.  
Decreased wound 
infection rate 
Depended on good professional technique more than an 
organisational learning process.  Applied in surgery only. 
Decreased 
readmission rate 
May have been determined by casemix and bed availability as 
much as clinical need. Also changing GP referral patterns. 
Table A3.1.2 hospital selection indicators – reasons for rejection as independent 
indicators of learning capacity. 
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A3.2 SIGN classification of evidence levels 
Ia Evidence obtained from meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials 
Ib Evidence obtained from at least 1 randomised controlled trial 
IIa Evidence obtained from at least 1 well-designed controlled study without 
randomisation 
IIb  Evidence obtained from at least one other type of well designed quasi-
experimental study 
III Evidence obtained from well-designed non-experimental descriptive studies, such 
as comparative studies, correlation studies and case studies 
IV Evidence obtained from expert committee reports or opinions and/or clinical 
experiences of respected authorities 
 
A3.2.1 Classification of grades of recommendations 
A  Requires at least one randomised controlled trial as part of a body of 
literature of overall good quality and consistency addressing specific 
recommendation 
(Evidence levels Ia, Ib) 
B Requires the availability of well conducted clinical studies but no randomised 
clinical trials on the topic of recommendation  
 (evidence levels IIa, IIb, III) 
C Requires evidence obtained from expert committee reports or opinions 
and/or clinical experiences of respected authorities. Indicates an absence of 
directly applicable clinical studies of good quality. 
 (Evidence level IV)368 
 
A3.2.2 Organisational and clinical complexity of SIGN guidelines – 
results of selection process 
 
 Implementation Development – group members  
Guideline 
Number. 
Groups 
recommended. 
Med. 
Spec. 
Prof'ns Care 
types 
Pat rep Total 
(Complexity) 
2 (DVT) 4 9 2 2 0 17 
4 (Diabetes)  4 3 2 2 0 11 
9 (Diabetes) 4 3 2 2 0 11 
11 (Diabetes) . 3 3 2 0 8 
12 (Diabetes) 4 4 2 2 0 12 
19 (Diabetes) 4 1 3 1 0 9 
Means (all 17 
guidelines) 
3.81 4.12 3.00 1.76 0.12 12.59 
SD (all 17) 0.54 2.39 1.87 0.66 0.33 3.54 
95% CI (all 
17) 
3.55-4.07 2.98-
5.26 
2.11-
3.89 
1.45-
2.07 
-0.4-
0.28 
10.91-14.27 
Table A3.2.1 Organisational complexity indices for DVT prophylaxis and Diabetes 
pilot SIGN guidelines 
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GL. No. “A” Grade 
recommendations 
2 (DVT) 30 
4 (Diabetes) 1 
9 (Diabetes) 1 
11 (Diabetes) 6 
12 (Diabetes) 2 
19 (Diabetes) 4 
Mean (all 21 
guidelines) 
5.67 
SD (all 21) 6.78 
95% CI (all 21) 2.76- 8.58 
Table A3.2.2  Clinical complexity indices for DVT prophylaxis and Diabetes 
SIGN guidelines 
 
 
A3.3 Results of search for measurement scales 
 
Database 
(all through Athens 
service, carried out 
26-28 July 2000) 
Years 
searched 
Search strategy 
ref. * 
 
 
Number 
found 
Number with 
possible relevant 
measurement 
scales  
Refer-
ences 
for 
scales 
Ovid Medline 1966-2000 
search date 
27/07/00 
1 21 3 14;164;427 
 1966-2000 2 46 0  
Bids Embase 1980-2000 1 40 1 164 
 1980-2000 2 72 0  
Bids CINAHL 1982-2000 1 20 1 427 
  2 16 0  
Bids IBSS  1 0 0  
  2 5 0  
 1980-2000 Organis(z)ationa
l learning, 
Learning 
Organis(z)ation 
123 0  
Web of Science 
(SCI and SOC SCI) 
1981-2000 2 139 1 186 
Web of science 
(SCI and SOC SCI) 
1981-2000 1 44 3 14;164;234 
ISTP 1990-2000 2 78 0  
  1 3 0  
Table A3.3 Results of search for relevant scales  
*Note  1 = “Measurement scale” and (quality or learning or culture) 
2 = “Learning capacity” or “Learning culture” 
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A3.4 reasons for rejection of other learning capacity measures 
 
Method Reason for rejection 
Nominal group process. Statements made 
about learning in the organisation could have 
been ranked on how favourable they were.  
 
The nominal group process did not give 
direct quantitative comparability between 
groups. There were difficulties in 
organising time for health professionals to 
do this. 
Repertory grid techniques could have been 
used to elicit and compare personal 
constructs about organisational learning.219 
in 344 
This was not appropriate, as a quantitative 
measure was required. Qualitative 
comparison between cases was carried out 
through the interviews. 
Discourse analysis. Argyris6 used a type of 
discourse analysis in his analysis of the said 
and the unsaid in work conversations. This 
revealed skilled defensive strategies, which 
prevented learning from taking place. 
The problem in a busy hospital was that it 
was time consuming for participants.  Its 
concentration on detail made it unsuitable, 
as an overview of the organisational 
learning process was required.329 in 344 
Table A3.4 reasons for rejection of other learning capacity measures 
 
A3.5 Types of scale – strengths and weaknesses 
Scales were classified into two types – those asking the respondent for a direct 
assessment of the strength of their views and those measuring them indirectly. 
The merits and demerits for use in my study are summarised in tables A3.5.1 
and A3.5.2.  
 
A3.5.1 Direct estimation methods 
Scale type Strengths Weaknesses 
Categorical scale - two or 
more choices for 
respondents.115 
If the issue was black 
and white, and factual, 
this was the best 
approach. 
 
Categories restricted respondents. 
Dichotomous variables did not allow 
expression within a range. 
Respondents may think the 
categories were ordered.  
Adjectival scale - used 
adjectives which referred 
to a range of points along 
some continuum.115 
Less restricting than a 
categorical scale. 
Analysis with rankings 
allowed significance 
testing. 
Intervals may have differed for 
respondents if adjectives were 
interpreted differently. 
Likert scale – can overcome 
the problem unequal 
intervals to an extent, by 
standardising the 
adjectives to the strength 
Summed to produce a 
scale total. Item 
scores showed 
strength of agreement 
/disagreement with 
Likert scales might have confused 
different dimensions of an attitude 
in the same total score. Pattern of 
responses as well as the total score 
was needed. 
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Scale type Strengths Weaknesses 
of agreement or 
disagreement with a 
statement. Used to 
measure strength of belief 
or attitude.241;344 
individual scale items. 
Reliably ordered people 
about a particular 
attitude. Respondents 
preferred to express a 
degree of agreement 
or disagreement  
 
 
 
 
 
Questions had to be phrased about 
extremes of an attitude because: 
moderate statements did not 
encourage strong responses, 
agreement/ disagreement with a 
moderate statement had two 
meanings - the respondent had a 
stronger or a weaker attitude. 
Social desirability bias, as intentions 
were usually obvious. 
The midpoint on the scale was not 
necessarily the midpoint between 
two extreme scale scores. 
Visual analogue scale115 As for the Likert scale 
but addressed the 
problem of unequal 
intervals by allowing 
respondents to mark 
their response along a 
line. 
As for the Likert scale with the 
exception of the ability to deal with 
unequal intervals 
Semantic differential scale 
- a development of the 
visual analogue scale using 
multiple linear scales. 
Coded by measuring along 
the lines.304;344 
A useful tool in finding 
out what a concept 
means to a respondent. 
Not useful for finding the strength 
of the respondent’s belief in a 
concept. 
Table A3.5.1 Strengths and weaknesses of direct estimation scales  
 
A3.5.2 Indirect comparative methods  
These did not use direct estimation, (as did the preceding methods) but asked 
respondents to choose between two options. This avoided the problems of 
ordinal bias, where there was a tendency on the part of respondents to choose 
values they thought were higher, and social desirability bias, where 
respondents tended to choose responses they thought were expected, putting 
them personally in a good light. 
 
Scale type Strength Weakness 
Guttman scale - Developed a 
unidimensional scale by collecting a 
large number of statements and 
testing them on a standardisation 
group. The respondents had to agree 
The unidimensional  
assessment gave 
firmer ground for 
interpretation and 
statistical analysis 
This type of scale was 
unsuited to measuring 
multidimensional phenomena.  
The number of items agreed 
to was not foolproof as an 
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Scale type Strength Weakness 
or disagree. The cumulative order of 
the statements was worked out. 
Statements with a consistent order in 
relation to each other were retained 
in the scale. The measure of the 
strength of the attitude was then 
usually the number of items accepted 
or agreed to.163;344 
than 
multidimensional 
scales. 
attitude measure. The same 
number of items from 2 
respondents could be 
differently composed  
Thurstone scale - a large number of 
judges was used to sort a large 
number of statements from least to 
most desirable. The median rank of 
each statement was its scale value. 
About 25 statements were selected 
from the pool as representing equal 
intervals along the scale. These 
statements became a yes/no scale. 
344;406. 
Not obvious to 
respondents which 
answers would give 
a high score, so 
less open to social 
desirability bias 
than the Likert 
scale. 
Equal intervals. 
Particularly sensitive to the 
attitudes of the judges 
used in its development. 
These were possibly 
different from those of the 
research population 
Q-Sorts –Used to rank individuals on 
a range of concepts using picture 
cards386in344 
Less subject to 
biases caused by 
differing 
interpretations.  
 
 
Analysis was complex for 
large numbers. Difficult to 
draw abstractions. The 
pictures limited the 
responses (see adjectival 
scales above). 
Sociometric scales –Used to describe 
relationships in a group. Members of a 
group made choices among other 
members of the group (e.g. who they 
liked).72in344 
Straightforward 
for describing 
small networks. 
Results could  be 
displayed as 
sociograms. 
Not appropriate for 
gathering opinions about 
organisational culture and 
behaviour. Complex in large 
organisations. 
Table A3.5.2 Strengths and weaknesses of comparative methods scales 
 
A3.6 Participation request letters 
The requests for participation in the main study all carried the Glasgow 
University Letterhead and the Department of Public Health address. 
 
A3.7 Participation request letter used for pilot 
 
Dear, 
  
I would like to ask for your help in a research pilot on learning from the 
implementation of clinical guidelines.  
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The background issue to the study is whether, in the rapidly changing world of 
healthcare, the ability to learn or a quality control system using fixed parameters is 
likely to be the more successful. 
 
The purpose of the pilot is to test the interview schedule, to decide which of two 
survey questionnaires to use, and how to amend the one chosen for the health 
service. 
 
The main project will take place in another trust. Its aim will be to illuminate whether 
and how the learning culture of the organisation and teams in which guidelines are 
implemented has any effect on the success of the implementation. This will be 
measured by coding the variety, type and scope of changes reported.  
 
The pilot would involve a 30-40 minute interview pilot asking about your experience 
of the SIGN guidelines for Diabetes (all or any), and/or prevention of Deep Venous 
Thrombosis. I would also like you to complete and comment on the enclosed pilot 
questionnaires.     
 
I hope you will be able to see me.  
 
Yours etc., 
 
 
 
Andrew Millard 
Research Fellow 
Scottish Clinical Audit Resource Centre. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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A3.8 Project Summary enclosed with requests for participation in main 
study  
 
What are the effects of hospital learning capacity on the implementation of SIGN clinical 
guidelines for Diabetes and Prophylaxis for DVT? 
 
Aim 
The aim is to test whether there are differences in the methods used for the dissemination, 
implementation and audit of clinical guidelines in two acute hospitals with different 
organisational learning capacity.  
 
Objectives 
1. Compare guideline implementation, dissemination and audit in the hospitals selected.  
 
2. Classify and compare the guidelines - related changes in the two hospitals 
 
3. Compare the learning capacity of the two hospitals.  
 
Scientific background of study 
The concept of organisational learning has existed for over 10 years, but has come to the 
fore since more high profile and prescriptive change methodologies such as Total Quality 
Management (TQM) and Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) have failed to deliver.  
 
The health service has yet to explicitly apply the concept. We see many of its features in the 
emphasis placed by clinical governance on lifelong learning and organisational development. 
 
Methodology 
The two hospitals for the main study will be chosen on the basis of their likely ability to detect 
and correct error (learn), using well accepted routinely gathered data from SMR1 statistics. 
The hospitals selected will be further tested by administration of the survey and interviews. 
 
Pre-piloted, semi-structured interviews will aim to find out how SIGN guidelines have been 
implemented and to what effect. Examples focused on, but not limited, to Diabetes and the 
prevention of Deep Venous Thrombosis will be sought. 
 
The learning capacity of each organisation will be measured using validated questionnaires. 
They will be given to the individuals interviewed, and to a random sample of trust staff. 
 
The size of the survey sample of health professionals and clinical managers is c100 in each 
trust to give confidence intervals of +/-7% (p=0.05) (for a fifty/fifty split on a binomial 
variable).  The number of interviews (c100 in total) will allow confidence of +/- 10% for 
statistical analyses (same conditions). The interview data is mainly for qualitative use in 
discovering new variations and patterns in learning processes, rather than for quantitative 
comparisons. 
 
Analysis will show whether the guidelines are implemented and audited in different ways  or 
to different effect (triggering qualitatively different changes)  in the different hospitals. 
 
Principal inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
 
Exclusion: Trainees or new staff less than 10 weeks in post. 
Inclusion: Nurses/midwives D grade and above, Medical staff, all levels.  
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A3.9 Participation request for main study (version 1) 
 
Date 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 
I would be grateful for your participation in a research study looking at the wider 
effects of clinical guidelines ion the hospital. The project has been approved by the 
trust research committee and endorsed by the Medical and Nursing Directors. It is 
for a PhD at Glasgow University. A summary is overleaf. 
 
I wish to contact those involved in any way with providing prophylaxis for DVT or 
with treating diabetes. The project may affect support given to guideline 
implementation in the future. Participation is of course voluntary. If you are willing to 
participate, you will be asked to complete two short surveys taking about 15 minutes 
in total, and perhaps also to do an interview lasting not more than 30 minutes. 
 
Please complete and return the reply slip to the Personnel department at [Hospital] 
address below to indicate whether you would be willing to help. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Andrew Millard 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To: Andrew Millard, c/o Personnel Department, [Hospital]. 
 
DVT Prophylaxis/Diabetes guidelines study         
 
Name:______________________________Date___________________ 
 
I am willing to participate in the research    Yes/ No (Please circle response 
applying) 
 
Telephone ____________________ Post title ____________________________ 
 
Ward number ______________   Diabetes / DVT  (Please circle your preferred topic 
to focus on) 
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A3.9.1 Reply to acceptance of participation request version 1  
 
Date  
 
Dear 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my PhD research, your help is greatly 
appreciated. I enclose the survey, please complete all three sections before the 
interview if possible, and I will collect it when we meet. Some further information is 
enclosed. I got your name by random selection from the list of trust staff. All 
information you give me will be treated confidentially.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Andrew Millard 
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A3.10 Request for participation in main study  (version 2)  
SIGN Guidelines implementation study 
 
Date :  
 
Dear Colleague, 
 
I would be grateful for your participation in a research study looking at the wider effects of 
clinical guidelines in the hospital. Your name was randomly selected from the list of trust 
staff. The project has been approved by the trust research committee. It is for a PhD at 
Glasgow University, where I was until recently a research fellow. The information is 
confidential.  A summary is overleaf.  
 
If you are willing to participate, please complete the enclosed short surveys taking about 10 
minutes in total. It is not necessary to have implemented any guidelines to complete the 
surveys. If you would rather not participate, it would help greatly if you would briefly say why. 
 
I would like to interview those involved in any way with providing prophylaxis for DVT or with 
treating diabetes. Additional experience in the implementation of other SIGN guidelines is 
also relevant. The project may affect the support given to guideline implementation in the 
future. Participation is of course voluntary. If you would be willing to be interviewed on audio-
tape (lasting not more than 30 minutes), please tick the appropriate box. I will then arrange a 
time and place with you for the interview. If you would rather not be interviewed, it would be 
of great help if you would briefly say why. 
 
Please complete and return the reply slip and completed surveys using the internal mail and 
the return envelope enclosed. It should be sent to the Personnel department at [hospital] 
(address below). Thank you, 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Andrew Millard 
 
 
To: Andrew Millard, c/o Personnel Department, Queens Park House,  Victoria Infirmary. 
 
Guidelines implementation study         
 
Name:______________________________Date___________________ 
 
Telephone __________  Post title ________________Ward number ______  
 
I enclose completed surveys.     Yes   No  
 
If no, a reason will help the analysis_________________________________ 
 
I am willing to be interviewed.     Yes   No   
 
If no a reason will help the analysis _________________________________ 
 
Diabetes    DVT    (Please tick preferred focus) 
 
Note : There was no written reply to participation request version 2, as there was no need to 
send surveys, they were send with the request. 
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A3.11 Participation request letter reminder to junior nurses and doctors 
in Hospital 2  
 
(Seniors reminded by telephone) 
 
SIGN Guidelines implementation 
 
Date : 
 
Dear  
 
 
I would like to ask for your help in my PhD research which is being conducted 
through the department of Public Health at the University of Glasgow. I am looking 
at the influence of hospital culture on the implementation of SIGN clinical guidelines. 
The study focuses on but is not limited to DVT prophylaxis or diabetes. Names were 
randomly selected and confidentiality will be kept. 
 
The surveys enclosed measure organisation culture. They take 10 to 15 minutes. 
They do not assume any experience of implementing or using SIGN guidelines. 
Please complete and return in the addressed envelope. The implementation of the 
guidelines is researched through a taped structured interview, lasting approximately 
30 minutes. 
 
Please return the reply slip below even if you do not participate. 
 
Thank you for your help, 
 
 
 
Andrew Millard. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
To Andrew Millard, c/o Personnel Department (Hospital name) 
 
Guidelines implementation study 
 
Name________________________________  Date__________ 
 
Telephone _________ Post title ___________ Ward Number _______ 
 
I enclose completed surveys  Yes         No  
 
If no, please give the reason ___________________________________ 
 
I am willing to be interviewed Yes         No  
 
If no, please give the reason ___________________________________ 
 
Please tick preferred focus :  Diabetes    DVT Prophylaxis  
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A4 Pilot 
 
A4.1 Initial interview schedule 
 
 
Interview areas 
   
First, I’d like to ask some questions about guidelines generally and then move on 
to the specific guideline 
  
   
1General issues on guidelines - all respondents   
I’d like to ask you first about any previous experience of clinical guidelines you 
may have had 
  
   
1 What purposes do you think  clinical guidelines are used for by others?   
2 What do you see as constraints on the effectiveness of guidelines?   
3 How does your use of guidelines relate to the uses others put them to?   
4 Can you discuss briefly how you feel about guidelines?   
5 What are your general opinions on guidelines -    
prompts: importance,  effectiveness, wider purpose, practical issues   
6 What does implementation of a guideline mean to you?   
7 What does a quality improvement project in a hospital mean to you?    
 
2 Extent of previous involvement  (all respondents) 
  
1 Based on your experience of them, how successful do you feel guidelines are in 
improving healthcare?  
  
   
Very                       Fairly                  Don’t         Not very             Not at all   
successful      successful            know    successful        successful    
   
Probe: Why? ______________________________________________   
2 Have you been involved in implementation of any other SIGN guidelines before 
the DVT/Diabetes one?    Yes       No    Don’t Know    
 
 
 
 
   
3 Can you estimate the number?   1    2    3-5    6-10    >10    
   
4 How many guidelines have you been involved with in the last 6 months?   
   
3 Attitudes to guidelines  (all respondents)   
Introduction 
 
I’d like to talk with you about SIGN clinical guidelines and whether they help you as an 
individual, your work team, and ultimately the hospital, to learn and develop. 
 
General issues on guidelines 
Previous involvement with guidelines 
Your attitudes to guidelines 
Change and guidelines 
 
Your specific involvement with this guideline 
 Dissemination, implementation, audit, and the effect the guideline has had on your team
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1 How worthwhile is to implement guidelines in your view? (Do you think it is 
worth the effort?) 
  
   
Very           Fairly                  Don’t         Not very             Not at all   
worthwhile   worthwhile    know    worthwhile   worthwhile    
   
Probe: Why?   
   
4 Change and guidelines  (clinicians, service managers)   
   
1 What can encourage you to implement any changes caused by guidelines?   
   
2 What can prevent you from implementing changes  related to  guidelines?   
   
The following questions relate to the SIGN DVT or one of the SIGN Diabetes 
guidelines only 
  
5 Dissemination (Clinical staff, clinical managers only)   
 
1 Which guideline applied to your practice? 
  
SIGN DVT                        A SIGN Diabetes guideline       
If Diabetes, which one? __________________________________ 
  
Which did you apply to your practice?   
SIGN DVT                        A SIGN Diabetes guideline       
If Diabetes, which one? __________________________________ 
Which would you like to answer questions about? 
SIGN DVT                        A SIGN Diabetes guideline       
If Diabetes, which one? __________________________________ 
 
2 What was done to disseminate the guideline? 
  
Prompts: Uniprofessional meeting, multiprofessional meeting, newsletter, team 
meetings, mailshot, electronic mail, other. 
  
   
3 Was the dissemination process typical?         
Yes       No  Don’t Know  
 
 
 
 
 Prompt : (If it differed)  in what way?   
   
4 Would you do anything differently about dissemmination next time?  
Yes       No  Don’t Know  
 
 
 
 
Prompt : (If yes), what would it be and why?    
   
6 Implementation (GIG members, audit facilitators, service managers, clinicians)   
   
1 Did you actively implement the guideline - did you do things to make sure you or 
others complied with its recommendations? 
Yes       No  Don’t Know  
 
 
 
 
   
2 If yes, what did you do? 
3 If no, could you discuss why you did  not actively implement it? 
  
 
4 If a local version/protocol was developed, could you discuss how satisfactory it 
was from your point of view? 
  
   
5 Was anything else done to implement the guideline? 
 
  
7 Audit   
1 Was your practice audited in relation to the guideline?   
Yes       No  Don’t Know    
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2. Could you discuss briefly how you felt about this? 
  
   
3 What were the aims of the audit?   
   
4 How successful was the audit?   
   
Very           Fairly                  Don’t         Not very             Not at all   
successful  successful     know    successful   successful    
   
5 Probe: Why? ________________________________   
   
6 How worthwhile did you think the audit? (Did you think it was worth the effort?)   
   
Very           Fairly                  Don’t         Not very             Not at all   
worthwhile   worthwhile    know    worthwhile   worthwhile    
   
7 Probe Why?   
   
8 Did anyone provide input for the audit without being part of it (eg were not in the 
audit, but provided advice or help? 
  
   
Yes    No     Don’t Know    
   
9 If so, what did you find useful and/or not useful about the help?   
   
10 Were you in the group conducting the audit?   
   
Yes    No     Don’t Know    
   
11 What were the good and bad things about being in the group/not being in the 
group? 
  
   
12 What use did you make of the audit results?   
   
8  Audit results  (GIG members, audit facilitators, service managers, clinicians)   
   
1 What came out of the baseline audit for you? 
 
2. and the audit after implementation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. If there was a change to your practice as a result of the guideline, can you 
describe the most important change, and how it was implemented? 
  
   
4 What encouraged you to make the change?   
   
5 Can you estimate roughly how many of your patients are affected by the change 
(<1, <10, <20<30<40<50<100). 
  
   
6 Can you estimate roughly what proportion of your caseload this would form   
   
7 Age range of the patients affected All, 0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 
60-69, 70-79, 80-89, 90-99. 
  
   
8 What was the significance of this change for patients? 
Prompts: Life or death, increased survival time, increased quality of life, lowered 
morbidity) 
  
   
9 Can you describe any other findings from the audit?   
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10 Were the findings of the audit communicated to anyone outside the clinical 
team? 
Yes    No     Don’t Know  
  
11 If yes to whom?  
 
  
12 With what purpose?   
   
13 Did the audit results lead any change involving anyone outside the clinical 
team? 
  
   
Yes    No     Don’t Know    
   
14 If yes what were the changes?   
   
I’d like to ask you more about the effect of the guideline  in your team.   
   
9 Team Learning     
   
1 What effect do you think the guideline has had on the way of working in your 
clinical/management/audit team? 
  
   
2 Can you comment on the way audit results are shared by the team?   
   
3 Do you communicate more with other members of your team as a result of the 
guideline? 
  
Yes    No     Don’t Know    
4 Prompts Within the team?   
5 Between the team and other levels of the organisation?   
6 Between the team and other teams?   
   
7 Did you learn anything about the practice of other members of your team from 
auditing the guideline?  
  
Yes    No     Don’t Know    
   
8 Have you found that improved dialogue led to any new ways of working?    
Yes    No     Don’t Know    
   
9 If so, what was the change?    
   
10  Has the guideline changed the way you work with the rest of your team?   
Yes    No     Don’t Know    
11 If so how?   
   
12 Do feel that you need to learn anything more about any aspect of your practice 
or your organisation, to be a more effective (professional)?  
Yes    No     Don’t Know  
 
 
 
 
13 If yes what is it you need to learn? 
Has the guideline helped you to recognise this? 
  
14 Does your team need to learn anything to be a more effective team?  
Yes    No     Don’t Know  
15 If yes, what is it? 
Has the guideline helped you to recognise this? 
 
 
 
 
16 Does your organisation need to change in any way to provide a more effective 
health service to the local population?  
Yes    No     Don’t Know  
 
 
 
 
17 If so how? 
Has the guideline helped you to recognise this? 
 
18 Do you think there have been any changes in the ways clinicians and 
managers work together as a result of the guideline? 
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A4.2 The ordered pilot coding frame 
The responses to the initial interview schedule were put into categories for each question. The categories were then put into logical groups as shown in the 
following table  
 
Code Description Code Description 
    
1 Information, involvement and control 5 Control over information use 
1.1 Consultation and dialogue   
1.2  Void   
1.3 Checking involvement 6 Clinical audit 
1.4 Theory/practice gap   
1.5 Providing information 7 Time 
1.6 Requesting action   
1.7 Expressed need for more information 8 Limitations of information 
1.8 Inform/involve (one way) 8.7 Reduction of limitation 
1.9 Inform as reference information.   
1.10 Information overload 9 Equity (Monitoring this is an information use) 
    
2 Quality of information, evidence 10 Generating information 
  10.1 Generating information which can justify and trigger local action 
3 Motivation to use information 10.2 Using local information generated by others 
3.1 Information on how to motivate 10.2.1 Creating new activity  
  10.3 Creating new activity using locally generated information 
4 Using information 10.4 Help in generating information 
4.1 Uses threatening to staff 10.7 Information needs 
4.2 Uses supportive to staff   
4.2.1 Methods of using information supportively 11 Team uses of information 
4.3 Information for patients’ use 11.1 holistic understanding 
4.4 Closed information system. Team complacency – closed to 
new information inputs 
  
4.7 Specific information need   
Table A4.2 The ordered pilot coding frame 
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A4.3 Old and new questions / coding table 
The questions from the initial interview schedule were revised to remove those unnecessary and keep those relevant to the coding frame 
developed from the pilot. The following table makes explicit the links between the codes and the initial and revised interview schedules buy 
giving the question number in each, a description of the coded item and a comment on how the item coded related to the code. 
 
CODE Orig. qu. 
No. 
New 
qu. No 
Description of item coded Comment on item(s) coded, relationship with code and implications 
for research 
No. 
1.1  7.1 4.1 Although audit and 
implementation were said to be 
done a number of staff were not 
sure if their work had been 
included.  
Shows involvement and control in audit are low. Instead of asking whether 
their practice was audited, ask respondents to describe the most important 
change to their practice, and whether the findings were fed back to them 
individually or as part of a group 
1 
1.10 1.2 7.3 Information overload To reduce information overload and target the information effort more 
efficiently, the right information needs to be available to the right person at 
the right time. What information, when and to whom? How do we decide 
these issues? 
2 
1.1 6, 3.1, 
9.16 
5.4 
1.5 
3.2  - 
6.3(a) 
- 
7.6(a) 
Involvement 
consultation 
Wide involvement needed for 
effectiveness 
Wide involvement in deciding the local protocol  = involvement in 
constructing part of an information system, (because the audit indicators 
recommended in a local protocol are items of control information). What is 
there to learn from information system design theory? 
3 
1.1 1.6 7.7 Awareness + putting into 
practice = implementation 
Theories about the connection between theory and practice, and social 
creation of the self, which has intentionality and can act underlie this item 
4 
1.1 2.1 - The more attention and 
familiarity with guidelines, the 
more successful they are. 
This view was expressed by a nurse. Familiarity probably means familiarity 
in a group setting, where discussion and the opportunity to give ones own 
views and receive those of others have taken place. A setting is perhaps a 
factor in familiarity and ownership. Drawing out the implications of the 
theory for the local setting has to be done socially, not just because 
everyone then will be involved, but because an a team application is best 
thought through as a team. 
5 
2 4.2,  
4.1(*2) 
- Evidence, evidence strength This was cited as an encouraging factor for implementation. The information 
has more meaning apparently because it has been agreed by a wider group 
on the basis of wider and more systematic experience in a variety of 
settings. Thus it is thought to be on the whole preferable to put it into 
practice in the local situation than to go by the local experience of individual 
clinicians. This runs the risk of replacing reasoned local cases with 
6 
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CODE Orig. qu. 
No. 
New 
qu. No 
Description of item coded Comment on item(s) coded, relationship with code and implications 
for research 
No. 
“evidence-based” dogma which is not applicable locally.  
3 4.2, 5.2 
 
- 2.2(a) Inertia, prejudice, lack of 
evidence 
These motivational factors imply that there is not enough external challenge 
to local consensus 
7 
4.1 1.2,(*2) 
9.3, 9.5 
 
4.2 
 
1.3 
1.4 
 
1.6 
4.1 
 
4.2 
7.3 
- 6.1 
 
- 
 
7.4(a) 
- 
 
7.7 
- 
 
- 
 
Defensiveness – fear of 
deviation 
Loss of flexibility   
 
Nurse practitioners have more 
flexibility 
Litigation 
Risk management 
- managers’ responsibility 
fear of criticism/legal liability as 
encouragement to implement 
insurance policy 
When asked about himself, the respondent answered for “us”. “You” taken 
as plural. This is interesting because it indicates the strength of 
identification with the professional group/work team. 
 
There is a tension between wanting more flexibility - rules for the creation of 
rules - rather than rules themselves - and wanting the protection of following 
substantive recommendations.  
 
Qualitative evidence can be created and applied locally better than 
nationally or internationally. If the use of these methodologies were 
strengthened in local settings, qualitative research could be the means for 
generating rules governing the application of the quantitative evidence 
about causality 
8 
5 
1.1 
3.1 
 
 
1.2 
- 
 
 
7.3 
Clinical freedom 
variety of practice 
new activity developing 
uncritical compliance 
Comments as above 9 
6 6.2 3.2 Patient review on admission Information used to control the health care process - clinical audit. Patient 
review is carried out as a team, nurses physios, decision by MO. An issue is 
the role of individual feedback in team-informed decisions. Should it be to 
the individual, and to the full multidisciplinary team (who may then get 
information about multiple members of the same profession), only to the 
members of the same profession on the team, only to the individual and the 
leader of the full team, or to the individual and his or her professional line 
manager on the team or outside it 
10 
4.2 9.1,1.6 - 7.7 Multidisciplinary consensus A supportive use of information is consensus building. If the information is 
created together this equates to learning together, a good way of building 
consensus. 
11 
4.2 9.7, 9.1 6.1 - Discussion, team decisions Confidence to challenge care decisions or to raise concerns in the interests 
of the patients, and the skills to do it non-confrontationally, may be boosted 
if a team member is able to cite external evidence in the form of an agreed 
12 
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guideline, and is accepted/respected having built good relationships in the 
team. 
4.2.1 9.8 - Special Interest Group One way of creating qualitative evidence and consensus locally 13 
4.2.1 9.18  
 
(*2),3.1, 
1.1 
6.2 
 
- 
7.1 
Core team/ bigger team for bids 
“Clout” for bids. 
Guidelines based evidence can be used supportively in bids for resources. 
But this has to be put in a setting of local priorities and capacities 
14 
4.2 1.1 
1.1*2 
1.1, 3.1 
1.1 
7.1 
7.1 
7.1 
7.1 
Clinical purposes 
Promote best practice 
Improve patient care 
Follow best practice 
This is the view that guidelines say what should be done   15 
8 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
1.2 
 
4.4 
1.2, 1.1 
 
 
4.2, 1.2 
(*3),  
1.2, 9.7 
 
 
1.2,*2 
 
1.4 
1.2 
7.3  7.1 
 
 
- 7.3 
7.3 
6.1 
 
 
7.3 
 
- 
7.3 
No reference to resource needs 
weakens guidelines – for extra 
care,  
for implementation 
 
more time needed for co-
ordination of clinic – 
administration 
lack of time 
 
getting agreement to follow 
- argue have always done it 
Resource needs refers to local constraints and local settings, and thus is a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative issue. 
 
Information is limited when it is not wholistic - it is less easy to apply locally 
if it does not include an idea of resources needed to implement. 
 
 
 
Time is the problem - give the job to someone else and you lose the 
ownership, give the time and you increase the cost. One solution is to 
redefine the health care jobs and embed information creation and use in the 
culture. Also need to redefine nature of local knowledge - what justification 
is required for statements about own or team practice. 
 
16 
7 9.8 
1.4 
- 
- 
time saved (change) 
 -  and in national rather than 
local development 
Another wider perspective on the time issue. National development saves 
time developing them locally 
17 
0 1.3 7.4(a) A strange question Phrasing not understood - other professionals practice not a concern? 18 
1.3 1.6 7.7 Checking Awareness  Checking that staff were aware of guidelines was seen as a method of 
implementation. No involvement and control. 
19 
1.1 
1.4 
2.1 
 
2.1 
- 
 
- 
Distance 
Theory 
Experts 
The theme of remote theory and distant experts not relevant to real local 
practice. Suggestion of funded pilots: funding seems to signify serious 
intention, real action rather than unreal passive accident. Also overtones of 
20 
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2.1 - 
 
Like to see funded concrete pilot 
implementations 
official recognition and legitimacy, perhaps a critical assessment to quality 
assure the pilot. But could be a gold standard for implementation. Unfunded 
pilots might be more realistic. 
9 3.1, 4.1, 
1.5 
-   - 
7.6(a) 
Equity of care Encouraging equity by setting an across the board standard was a use for 
information seemingly accepted. There was no criticism of equity as a 
principle 
21 
1.5 5.2 (*2) 
5.2 
5.2 
5.2 
 
5.2 
5.2 
2.2(a) Postal dissemination 
Mention to colleague 
No hospital-wide discussion 
Departmental implementation 
only 
circulation of draft 
multi disc meetings 
Dissemination methods seemed underdeveloped. The nature of 
dissemination and its distinction from implementation was not always clearly 
understood. 
22 
1.4 6.1 
 
4.1 
3.2(a) 
 
- 
Needs to be active response to 
local problem 
Triggered by problem 
Implementation as active with a specific intention to address a local issue. 23 
10 7.1 4.1(a) Audit seen as work If audit is seen as work, the issue is then how can it be seen as good work? 24 
1.5 9.16 - Better IT A need to allow better provision of information. The organisational focus is 
changed to a focus on the learning team or directorate. 
25 
3 1.1 7.1(a) Imposition Change seen as preventing the clinician doing what they do 26 
1.4 1.1,1.5 
 
1.2 
7.1(a) 
 
7.3 
Theory vs practice 
Complexity of real life not dealt 
with in guidelines 
This gave an interesting perspective on the issues in mapping a pure 
system on to the messy real world, for example in co-morbidity which 
condition do you choose to treat and how do you make the choice? Criteria 
could be the seriousness of each problem for the patient, the effectiveness 
of the combinations of intervention that you can use together - how can 
clinical judgement be supported? 
27 
3 1.5 - Effective because mandatory What does mandatory mean when implementation can be messy? 28 
1.1, 
7, 
1.4, 
10 
1.6 
 
1.6 
7.7 
 
7.7 
No time for discussion to make 
local 
Communication of objectives 
Time as above 
 
Not agreement of objectives (Nursing) 
29 
8 
10 
 
2.1 - Initial success, then unstuck on 
fine detail or resource needs 
This is the reason why local adaptation is needed - so the fine 
detail/resource constraints do not make guidelines fail 
30 
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0, 1.4 4.2 - Inappropriateness to local circs Need to adapt information (criteria, standards) to local circumstances. 
There is a need for information on local circumstances to do this. 
31 
1.1 5.4 - Ideally involve people affected Need to involve/inform people who may have to change their practice in 
local protocol development 
32 
10 6.4 - Focused attention on clinical 
topic 
Helped a group to stand apart from a topic and look at it anew  33 
4.2 9.1 
1.5, 9.1, 
9.6 
9.1 
6.1(a) 
- 6.1(a) 
- 
6.1(a) 
teamwork  
cover 
 
agree approach 
Better teamwork, better arranging of cover when colleagues off work and 
agreement of a common approach were seen as benefits by nurses. The 
new question is less leading. 
34 
4.2 9.2 - Sharing = discussion 
CD takes steps if gross 
Sharing of results was seen as discussion at directorate meetings. The only 
action was seen as control action by the clinical director - no mention of 
whether downward to address problems of negligence/incompetence or up 
for more resources, or involving group in agreeing more efficient working 
practices 
35 
11 9.3 -- Reluctant to attribute causes for  
behaviour of team  
Factors affecting team performance are not researchable at local level. 
Possible reasons: 
1. Not enough numbers - and no qualitative methods 
2. Too dangerously personal 
36 
11 9.3 - Team is more cautious Team requires stronger evidence for action than an individual would?  37 
4.1 9.5 - Practice review committee 
would be unpleasant 
Again, dangerously personal if in house. The external peer review idea of 
managed clinical networks seems an appropriate way of lessening the 
danger of the personal element. 
38 
4.1 9.8 6.2 Interprofessional rivalry 
- extend clinical specialty power 
base 
Evidence and power locally. Will the strongest evidence always be the 
deciding factor in choosing alternative clinical practices? 
39 
4.2 9.15 - Minor improvements These were approved of 40 
4.1 9.16 6.3 Friction if snr management have 
to impose gls 
If quality improvement among each other is too risky for local clinicians, 
they fear that trust management will take punitive and insensitive action - 
again external peer review is a solution. What information will the external 
peers need?.  
41 
4.2 1.1, 1.4 7.1(a) - Decision support Decision support seen as  a helpful use of guidelines especially by nurses 42 
4.2 (all) 1.2 7.3 More rigid working to gls as part  43 
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1.3, 1.4 
(*4) 3.1 
9.6, 9.1 
9.15  
 
1.5 9.8 
1.4,  
1.4 
 
 
 
 
1.3 
 
7.4(a) - 
- 
- 6.2(a) 
- 
 
- 6.2(a) 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
7.4(a) 
of role 
consistency – e.g. consultants 
policies to Jds, (beneficial 
to pts) 
clinical techniques 
 
continuity 
setting boundaries 
support actions against 
challenge by other HPs 
 
 
 
active vs passive use – 
suggesting things to do 
(consultant role) 
Nurses emphasised consistency as a benefit and one accepted that nurses 
would work more rigidly to guidelines than doctors 
 
 
How beneficial to patients is consistency really? What about validity - 
applicability? 
Agreement on processes may be more important than agreement on aims 
for day to day working 
setting boundaries is a conceptual modelling process information creates 
the models and is then created by them in their own image. 
Supporting actions against challenge is the beginning of the security 
needed for productive dialogue, which can further develop conceptual 
models. 
Some roles have specific information functions - consultants role is currently 
seen as to recommend changes/ new activities (presumably out of 
comparison of an implicit model and real situation. Guidelines present 
models of care shorn of local constraints and should inject new vigour into 
the local modellers thinking. By making a common generic model available 
more widely, they would encourage others to participate in the modelling 
process. 
1.1 1.6 7.7 Implementation = selling Selling was seen as implementation - not the most collaborative model, but 
shows there is a need for development of more sophisticated and widely 
shared models in this area 
44 
10 1.7 7.8 QI as betterment of how’s rather 
than changing what’s 
Echoes the idea that research is about finding new facts, while audit is 
about improving current practice 
45 
4.2 2.1 - Success = more consistent 
treatment, better outcomes 
Reliability and validity 46 
3 3.1 
 
4.1 
 
4.1 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Worthwhile because better for 
patients 
Encouraged because better for 
patients -  
good feedback from patients, 
nurses, courses 
Professional motivation is to do a good job, and to improve and develop 
professional skills. Need for information to confirm whether practice is being 
done well is therefore a professional information need, and essential to the 
notion of professionalism.  
The encouraging/preventing factors will now come out of the analysis, and 
not direct questions. 
47 
1.1 4.1, 5.4 -   - consulted re protocol = Consulting all professions and staff about audit protocols involves them in 48 
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 committment to implement 
results of audit 
an essential professional activity where they participate in the process of 
developing their own profession, and their own personal professionalism 
4.1, 3, 
8 
6.1,  
5.2 
6.1 
3.2(a) 
2.2(a) 
3.2(a) 
adoption as policy - staff told to 
do it 
This implementation by dictat is anti-professional (and anti learning 
organisation) 
49 
4.2 9.1 6.2 streamlining care Need to be careful streamlining does not become conveyor belt because 
professionals then become bored and deprofessionalised, and patients 
dehumanised. This is a danger with conventional information systems - they 
are standardised to particular fields, codes and often interpretations, and 
may conceivably make professionals narrower and less able to fully 
respond to the rich variety of unique individuals they meet as their patients. 
50 
4.2 9.3 
 
 
9.11 
9.5 
 
9.10 
6.2 
 
 
6.2 
6.2 
 
6.2 
more discussion, flexibility,  
can raise patient problems 
in team 
baseline to raise questions 
team contains whole clinical 
hierarchy 
read more guidelines, have 
them available 
 
Again, having evidence-based information to support them can give 
individuals confidence to join in with local dialogue about individual patients. 
 
That the clinical team is conceived as including the full clinical hierarchy 
from top to bottom must be remembered - all those in it have operational 
roles - there is no one with a strategic planning role only. So all must be 
familiar with operational problems, especially with operational information, 
and hence perhaps the reluctance of consultants to plan using this 
information. In few other organisations are the senior policy makers also 
hands on workers 
51 
 9.15 6.2 Learning is by nature continuous 
- e.g. working at relationships 
The continuous and developmental nature of learning, means foundations 
need to be there before other constructs can be put in place. In a local 
setting in a local organisation this can mean many things - a good and self 
sustainingly positive culture informed by wider societal and professional 
values for example. 
52 
holism 
11 
9.17 6.3 Change currently planned will be 
detrimental “stupid” – 
fragmentation owing to 2 trusts 
in same hospital. 
It is perhaps difficult for the individual organisations in the NHS to build 
positive values when the NHS keeps reorganising, but on the other hand 
this may help to prevent negative self-serving cultures. 
53 
1.1 2.1 - Adherence to GL important for 
success 
Deprofessionalisation  54 
1.1 5.4 - Increase accessibility of GLs to Information delivery needs improving 55 
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P/t staff 
4.2 
4.4 
6.1 - Perception that they were doing 
it anyway  
Cultural/educational issues - in an information culture knowledge is based 
on data 
56 
4.3 9.1 6.2 More explaining to the patient 
(ECGs, for diabetics in annual 
review) 
Implications for information to patients/service users 57 
4.4 9.3 6.2 Communication problems – with 
junior doctors/new team 
members 
Team closed to new information from new members 58 
3.1 9.13 - Management skills Learning needs mentioned were the people management skills 59 
4.2 9.18 - Clinical manager saw herself as 
a manager 
 60 
4.4 9.16 6.3 Organisation gives excellent 
service – high level of one stop 
clinics, low waiting times. 
Does not mean the clinical service is good, though the administration may 
be. 
61 
10.1 1.3 7.4(a) Reactive only Service department - operating theatre in this case - was isolated. Shows 
need to ensure each departments role and information needs are 
understood by the other departments when implementing their own 
guidelines. Implies a need to consult first before assuming a guideline is not 
relevant to another department. 
62 
4.2 1.6, 1.7 7.7 7.8 audit Audit seen as involved with quality improvement and with guideline 
implementation 
63 
2 2.1 - More effective because printed Printing/publishing adds authority to information - perhaps because 
assumed to be more widely accepted (print runs are longer than photocopy 
runs). 
64 
4.2 3.1 
 
8.4 
- 
 
5.4 
Strengthens case for making 
improvements 
gave evidence for case to 
ambulance service 
Empowerment locally for operational staff 65 
8 4.2 - Lack of resources This implies a particular activity model implying particular resources. Has 
the wider issue been defined and alternative solutions examined? 
66 
1.6 5.2 2.2(a) Direct request from clinicians Conceptual modelling and analysis is carried out by clinicians (medical 
staff) to enable them to make reasoned requests. Nurses for some reason 
do not do this. 
67 
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1.7 5.4 - Would have commented at 
sisters meetings 
In retrospect, a nurse wanted to comment to her peers. Why didn’t she? 68 
1.7 6.4 - No information. isolation Theatre - an information island 69 
1.7 9.7,9.6 6.2 - Need to improve communication Greater consistency in information should help the reliability of day to day 
communication, but may reduce the variety and richness of debate about 
better solutions to problems - and may prevent perception of opportunities 
for development 
70 
4.2 9.11 6.2 Awareness of patient 
requirements 
Greater awareness of what patients might need is a benefit. May improve 
patient-nurse dialogue  
71 
4.7 9.12 - More feedback of results, what’s 
being changed 
Local information feedback systems needed 72 
4.7 9.17 6.3 Give information about 
existence of guidelines 
Information about information needed 73 
8.7 9.17 6.3 Provide the means to implement 
guidelines 
Information on implementation, or resources for implementation? 74 
4.2 9.18 - Correct skill mix Managers need to understand skill levels required. Implies divergence of 
view between management for efficiency/cost saving and management for 
quality of service. Common models of the service and the roles needed to 
provide it are needed to give more agreement on this. There will always be 
a tension, but rather manage it through a dialogue than conflict of resource 
power vs technical (skill) power. 
75 
4.2 1.3 7.4(a) Staff adaptation, rather 
adaptation of working practices 
to staff (A+E) 
Nurses had their own model of a good department, which was a smooth 
running one with no misunderstandings where each patient was treated 
consistently. It tends towards Handy’s role culture. It implies a standardised 
information system, and that staff (and perhaps patients) must fit into the 
structure rather than the other way round. But there must be an ability to 
cope with exceptions, so there has to be another more open information 
system and culture, and easy transition from one to the other, for patients 
as required, and for some staff. 
76 
1.8 1.6, 5.2 7.7 2.2 training Implies the transmission of a pre-set model of guideline use, which cannot 
be added to or adapted 
77 
10.2 1.7 7.8 QI is more than compliance A broader perception of quality improvement from a nurse - doing new 
things, maybe on the same external clinical evidence as before, but 
managerially innovative about implementation - eg one stop clinics, use of 
78 
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facilities by other professional groups, disease prevention services for 
population groups rather than reactive treatment for individuals one at a 
time. 
11 2.1 - GLs more successful with CG Clinical governance as the framework for creating consensus models 
between clinicians and managers to get agreement on what to do and how 
to do it.  
79 
10.3 4.1 - Triggered by complaints The patient as a prime source of local information driving development - 
why wait for complaints why not set up suggestion/comment systems - to 
feed the task culture for all professionals  
80 
8 4.2 - My job to solve problems What is solving problems? What counts as a problem? What as a solution? 
Do solutions need to be wider? 
81 
1.8 5.2 2.2 Team brief Team brief is top down information transmission - for news and information 
on operational implications of planning decisions, eg new operational 
procedures 
82 
1.9 5.2  2.2 folder in each dept. Information kept separate from daily work 83 
1 5.4 2.3 Open sessions to question an 
expert 
A demand for expert interpretation of guidelines exists among nurses 84 
10 6.1 3.2(a) Devised audit form Guideline triggered local information gathering. Audit information is 
essentially local case study. To be meaningful and useful in as a base for 
development, knowledge of other comparative cases is needed. For 
checking compliance alone this is not required. Comparative cases can be 
presented through clinical networks. Compliance information is only one 
part of the data gathered for such case study. Examples of other kinds of 
information needed are patient vignettes (as ideal types), accounts of ways 
of conducting dialogue between groups, new models of services, how they 
were developed, accounts of local constraints and their effect, descriptions 
of patients’ needs and views and how they are addressed. 
85 
10 6.2 3.2 Adapted GL Again,  generating local information out of the fusion of local data and 
nationally created evidence 
86 
4.2 6.2 3.2 Improved records Example of improvement to local information system 87 
4.2 6.2 3.2 Amended standards Example of improvement to local information system 88 
4.2 9.5 5.4 6.2 Freedom to develop clinic 
organisation 
An example of empowerment to a clinical manager to enable her to 
streamline a clinic 
89 
4.2 7.2 - good - triggered local policy Aim of the audit was to assess compliance but it triggered local policy 90 
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nevertheless 
4.2, 10 7.3 4.3 assess compliance Aim of the audit. Perhaps broader aim - to drive local policy - needs wider 
recognition locally 
91 
4.2, 
10.3 
7.5 - adaptation of practice Audit seen as successful when caused local practice to be adapted. (This 
adaptation must be validated by open debate and dialogue though - a good 
stage (among others) at which to include patients). Individuals involved in 
the situation cannot be wholly objective about success. A more valid 
assessment can come from analysing all the responses as a whole. 
92 
10.4 7.9 - keep it simple Most useful advice received about audit methodology was to keep it simple. 
This has implications for information systems. 
93 
7 
4.2 
 
7.11 
8.4 
4.8 
- 
time for extra paper work 
 - realised better paperwork 
improved patient care 
achievement as a group 
Need to reconceive healthcare as essentially an information processing 
activity. 
94 
10 7.12 - for reaudit Use of audit information for reaudit seems to imply no specific action taken 
after the first stage, other than perhaps feedback. The question was 
reformulated to focus on what was learnt from the results rather than how 
they were used. 
95 
10 8.9 5.3 saw whole picture for patient The audit enabled an appreciation of the whole system of care. Seems to 
imply an iterative process between audit and systems thinking 
96 
10 8.12 8.4 results communicated to 
directorate for personal 
development objectives 
An explicit connection between information for managing personal learning 
and audit 
97 
1.8 9.1 6.2 better inter-team relations Better inter-team relations - but no example 98 
1.8 9.5 5.4 More information given in 
reports 
Again no example - probes need to be ready for this sort of thing, rather 
than questions 
99 
1.8 9.5 5.4 More accurate information given 
in reports 
Enhancement of existing information and communication methods rather 
than development of them 
100 
1.8 9.7 
9.7 
- 
- 
Uncovered unexpected 
strengths and weaknesses in 
individuals 
Direct cultural change and redefinition of values resulting from introduction 
of guideline based audit. New information about colleagues ability to create 
information as well as about their performance leads to revaluing them in 
the new situation where more rigorous local information needs to be created 
to inform better actions 
101 
4.2, 1.8 9.9 6.2 more consensus on aims Fundamental requirement for effective team working is supported by use of 102 
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guidelines. Is this consensus on specific clinical or general strategic aims? 
Is it consensus between professions or within professions? 
1.8 9.9 6.2 more help in documentation - to 
make it “sound clinically astute” 
Nurses are worried about writing things down because this may appear to 
reveal lack of knowledge. 
103 
1.8 9.13 - Personal Learning 
- audit methods 
- question phrasing 
- best use of forms 
Information creation skills required. Not much other information was brought 
forth by this question. Methods of identifying learning needs may be needed 
too, but this is a separate research question. 
104 
11 9.15 - Team Learning  
- to look at practice  
A cultural change - towards looking systematically at practice, gathering 
data, creating information, and learning from that, rather than arguing 
theoretically.  
105 
10.7 9.17 6.3(a) more support to service 
improvement 
The organisation seen as not fully supporting professional attempts to 
improve the service. 
106 
1.9 9.18 6.3(a) Managers now more open Sound data should allow greater openness 107 
10 1.3 7.4(a) Interest stimulated by GP co-op GPs are acute hospitals’ customers and want to ensure they are getting a 
quality service for their patients and as they are also providers of services to 
patients  they are willing to collaborate with other providers to satisfy their 
own customers, the patients. The more control the patient has over the 
health professional  through an individualised economic relation, the more 
human the relationship can be. 
108 
1 1.4 - Involvement in SIGN open 
meeting good 
Possibly clinical leaders from all health delivery and commissioning 
organisations could usefully go to SIGN open meetings relevant to their 
area of leadership, and then lead implementation by acting as local experts 
and holding discussion and question/answer sessions for all staff needing 
involvement and consultation . 
109 
8, 1.4 1.4 - Worry about practicalities of 
implementation 
Resource constraints,  support from the organisation needed 110 
10 1.5 - A distillation of the 
evidence/information process 
 111 
8 2.1 - evolving process of 
implementation 
- longer than expected 
 
Learn as you go along - action research approach - learning how to learn as 
well. Lack of certainty about success of guidelines. Not a useful question  
112 
1 6.2 3.2 Directorate circulation (DVT) One way transmission model - obviously did not work 113 
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1 6.4 - Protocol development used 
circulation for comment - not 
necessarily a recommended 
method 
Problems here with circulation - the practicalities of deciding how to create 
information as a group. 
114 
4.2 7.3 4.3 Trust-wide audit, finished, not 
analysed. 
A long time coming - practicalities of information creation need streamlining 
again 
115 
8 9.4 6.2 Effort of audit Practicalities/resources 116 
1.8 1.3 - Unaware of others This question was deleted as a number of interviewees did not know how 
others used guidelines 
117 
1, 
4.2 
7.3 4.3 audit aims: to find out if practice 
as erratic as it seemed 
This was a simple aim but there was no explicit concept of follow-on action. 118 
10 7.3 4.3 Audit trigger - external funds An external incentive was needed to trigger the generation of local 
information - funding. 
119 
8 7.5, 7.9 6.2 Data coding difficulties The information created was limited because a pilot of the information 
creation and usage system was needed 
120 
8, 4.2 7.7 - Audit of over treatment needed 
too 
An extra unexpected information need revealed by the system - on over 
treatment 
121 
1 7.11 - clinician desire to improve 
hospital practice 
 122 
8 8.1 - It was a mistake to try to do the 
audit all in one - find out what 
was happening, and compare 
with standards and categorise 
risks 
Learning occurred about the development of a local information system 123 
4.2, 4.7 9.1 6.2 Put more thought into treatment Guidelines did not just encourage compliance but also thought 124 
1 9.3 - More discussion - but nurses still 
less aware/updated than 
medical staff of whats on paper 
Guidelines encouraged discussion. But the question was too leading and 
deleted. In this research about views and opinions, a central difficulty is how 
to bring out required information without leading respondents 
125 
1 9.5 - No written record of why on 
treatment 
This information came out in response to this question but was not in fact 
an answer to the question 
126 
4.2, 
4.9 
9.8,  
9.10, 
9.12 
6.2(a) 
6.2 
- 
No change to ways of working, 
except to comply. Still keep staff  
+ self updated 
Why did no action result from the thought and discussion? No consensus? 
What is the trigger for consensus and action? External: funds, evidence, 
review? Survival of professional credibility?  
127 
10 9.15 - decided Ward guidelines are  128 
Appendices 
 
 
429 
429 
CODE Orig. qu. 
No. 
New 
qu. No 
Description of item coded Comment on item(s) coded, relationship with code and implications 
for research 
No. 
needed. Have nursing policy 
manual 
1 9.18 6.3 More nursing involvement has 
happened over the past couple 
of years 
More nursing  involvement in strategic planning has resulted from guideline 
introduction. A broader question covered these issues in the revised 
interview schedule to avoid bias. 
129 
 Note:  Personal politics not covered 
questions overlapping 
  
 
Table A4.3 Old and new questions relationship to pilot coding frame  
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A4.4 Summary of revisions to the old interview schedule with reasons  
 
The following table summarises changes to the interview schedule. 
Subject Purpose Change 
Not part of research question 
Extent of 
previous 
involvement 
To compare experience of the two hospital 
samples 
Deleted since previous involvement was not part of the research 
question 
Dissemination To find out how the guideline was 
disseminated , and the acceptability of this. 
Question on typicality deleted - interviewees unlikely to know, and 
not essential to research question 
Attitudes to 
guidelines 
To assess how worthwhile guideline 
implementation is thought 
Deleted since covered by general issues 
Audit To describe the extent, nature and 
perceived success of the audit of the 
guideline 
This section was shortened to exclude attitudes about audit and 
audit support given. Reason: these were not a direct part of the 
research question.  
Too leading 
Implementation To discover what was done by the 
interviewee to ensure compliance or other 
use of the guideline 
Question about local protocol deleted - too leading. Otherwise, 
question whether interviewee was in an implementation group was 
added. 
Audit results To find out what change happened as a 
result of the guideline, and roughly estimate 
the impact of the change on patients and on 
the organisation.  
Deleted, and replaced with short section on implementation rather 
than audit results, asking for descriptions of changes to practice 
and communication of the findings of any audit.  
Impact of audit on patients could not be estimated by interviewing 
participants. 
Team Learning To ask specifically about new working 
methods within and between clinical teams 
and between clinical teams and senior 
management  
Shortened by removing questions about sharing of results and 
communication - too leading. Instead asked now about learning 
about other teams, and any new ways of working. A question 
suggested by a senior manager was added on how the 
organisation can facilitate learning from guideline implementation. 
Ordering 
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Subject Purpose Change 
General issues 
and attitudes 
about clinical 
guidelines 
To uncover differences in how different 
groups would ideally use guidelines 
More focused on Nurses’ and Clinicians’ views. Reordered to come 
more sympathetically at the end of the interview. 
Table A4.4.1 Changes made to the pilot interview schedule  
 
There was a short personal details survey. This was changed as in table A4.4.2. 
Subject Purpose Change 
Covered elsewhere 
The interviewee’s 
job 
to enable comparison of different roles 
and seniority levels 
Job title, length of service, department, time in the position, age and 
gender  were covered in the Goh and Richards learning organisation 
survey. A question on the function of the role was retained. 
Time in the role to indicate socialisation into role deleted as covered in the Goh and Richards questionnaire 
Retained 
Team 
membership 
to clarify working arrangements retained 
Membership of 
implementation 
groups 
to assess personal investment in 
guidelines success 
retained and additional information asked for  
Number of SIGN 
guidelines 
implemented  
To enable a quantitative comparison 
between groups on this  
Retained 
 
Audit and change 
resulting from 
SIGN guideline 
implementation 
To enable a quantitative comparison 
between groups on this 
Retained 
Aspects of 
hospital culture 
to cross validate answers to learning 
company questionnaire 
Deleted as the learning company questionnaire was not used. 
Table A4.4.2 Changes to personal details survey 
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A4.5 List of old interview questions, changes and reasons for change 
 
The following table gives reasons for the revision or deletion of each question in the initial interview schedule. 
 
 
 
 
 
OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
    
    
1General issues on guidelines    
1 What purposes do you think  clinical 
guidelines are used for by others? 
A 7.1, 7.2 Old question thought strange by respondents 
2 What do you see as constraints on the 
effectiveness of guidelines? 
R 7.3  
3 How does your use of guidelines relate to 
the uses others put them to? 
A 7.4, 7.5 Old question thought strange by respondents 
4 Can you discuss briefly how you feel 
about guidelines? 
D  question too unfocused 
5 What are your general opinions on 
guidelines -  
D  question too unfocused 
prompts: importance,  effectiveness, wider 
purpose, practical issues 
D 
 
 part of question 1.5 
6 What does implementation of a guideline 
mean to you? 
R 7.7  
7 What does a quality improvement project 
in a hospital mean to you?  
R 7.8  
2 Extent of previous involvement    
1 Based on your experience of them, how 
successful do you feel guidelines are in 
improving healthcare?  
D  Not relevant to RQ 
Probe: Why? _ D  Not relevant to RQ 
2 Have you been involved in A 1.1 New question gives an adequate  idea of previous 
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OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
implementation of any other SIGN 
guidelines before the DVT/Diabetes one? 
involvement level 
    
3 Can you estimate the number? A 1.1 New question gives an adequate  idea of previous 
involvement level 
    
4 How many guidelines have you been 
involved with in the last 6 
months?___________ 
A 1.1 New question gives an adequate  idea of previous 
involvement level 
    
3 Attitudes to guidelines    
    
1 How worthwhile is to implement 
guidelines in your view? (Do you think it is 
worth the effort?) 
D  Not relevant to RQ 
    
Probe: Why?   Not relevant to RQ 
    
4 Change and guidelines    
    
1 What can encourage you to implement 
any changes caused by guidelines? 
D  Self-report of reasons for motivation is of little value in 
establishing causal factors 
    
2 What can prevent you from implementing 
changes  related to  guidelines? 
D  Self-report of reasons for motivation is of little value in 
establishing causal factors 
    
The following questions relate to the SIGN 
DVT or one of the SIGN Diabetes 
guidelines only 
   
5 Dissemination    
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OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
 
1 Which guideline applied to your practice? 
D  Respondent now given no choice of which guideline to 
respond on - this is determined by the sampling 
Which did you apply to your practice? D   
 
2 What was done to disseminate the 
guideline? 
 
 
A 
 
 
2.1 
 
Question now separated into two parts about dissemination 
to self and by self 
Prompts: Uni-professional meeting, multi-
professional meeting, newsletter, team 
meetings, mailshot, electronic mail, other. 
A   
    
3 Was the dissemination process typical?      
 
D  Respondents showed lack of knowledge on this 
 Prompt : (If it differed)  in what way? D   
    
4 Would you do anything differently about 
dissemination next time?  
 
R 2.2  
Prompt : (If yes), what would it be and 
why?  
R 2.2  
    
 
6 Implementation (GIG members, audit 
facilitators, service managers, clinicians) 
   
    
1 Did you actively implement the guideline - 
did you do things to make sure you or 
others complied with its recommendations? 
A 3.2 wording simplified 
    
2 If yes, what did you do? 
 
R 
 
3.2 
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OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
3 If no, could you discuss why you did  not 
actively implement it? 
A 3.2 wording simplified 
 
4 If a local version/protocol was developed, 
could you discuss how satisfactory it was 
from your point of view? 
 
A 
 
3.3 
 
local version not always developed - new question is broader 
    
5 Was anything else done to implement the 
guideline? 
R  
3.3 
 
7 Audit    
1 Was your practice audited in relation to 
the guideline? 
A 4.1 less threatening to ask about practice in general rather than 
the respondents practice. New question 5.1(A) covers the 
issue of individual practice 
 
2. Could you discuss briefly how you felt 
about this? 
 
D 
 
 
 
    
3 What were the aims of the audit? R 4.3  
    
4 How successful was the audit? D  this should be apparent from the changes reported  
    
    
5 Probe: Why? D  Ambiguous - what caused the success or what 
characteristics did you consider to be those of success - 
neither is useful for the RQ 
    
6 How worthwhile did you think the audit? 
(Did you think it was worth the effort?) 
D  Not relevant to RQ 
    
7 Probe Why? D  Not relevant to RQ 
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OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
    
8 Did anyone provide input for the audit 
without being part of it (eg were not in the 
audit, but provided advice or help? 
D  Not relevant to RQ 
    
    
9 If so, what did you find useful and/or not 
useful about the help? 
D  Not relevant to RQ 
    
10 Were you in the group conducting the 
audit? 
R 4.4  
    
11 What were the good and bad things 
about being in the group or not being in it? 
R 4.8  
    
12 What use did you make of the audit 
results? 
D  Covered in sections 5 and 6 
    
8  Audit results  (GIG members, audit 
facilitators, service managers, clinicians) 
Section 5 which replaces this section is 
now entitled “implementation results” to 
cover a situation where the guideline is 
said to be implemented but no audit has 
been done 
   
1 What came out of the baseline audit for 
you? 
 
D  Question both too general and confined to audit. Covered by 
asking about change and learning 
2. and the audit after implementation? 
 
D  as above 
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OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
3. If there was a change to your practice as 
a result of the guideline, can you describe 
the most important change, and how it was 
implemented? 
A 5.2 two questions in one. “how it was implemented” not part of 
RQ and deleted 
    
4 What encouraged you to make the 
change? 
D  Self-report of reasons for motivation is of little value in 
establishing causal factors 
    
5 Can you estimate roughly how many of 
your patients are affected by the change 
D  Not part of RQ to establish the size of the effect 
    
6 Can you estimate roughly what 
proportion of your caseload this would form 
D  Not part of RQ to establish the size of the effect 
    
7 Age range of the patients affected D  Not part of RQ to establish the size of the effect 
    
8 What was the significance of this change 
for patients? 
Prompts: Life or death, increased survival 
time, increased quality of life, lowered 
morbidity) 
D  Not part of RQ to establish the size of the effect 
    
9 Can you describe any other findings from 
the audit? 
A 5.3 phrasing made relevant to guideline implementation rather 
than just audit 
    
10 Were the findings of the audit 
communicated to anyone outside the 
clinical team? 
 
R 5.4  
11 If yes to whom?  D  Replaced with “Why”, which will bring out who and the reason 
Appendices 
 
 
438 
438 
 
 
 
 
OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
 for doing so too 
12 With what purpose? D   
    
13 Did the audit results lead any change 
involving anyone outside the clinical team? 
A 6.2 The new question will cover changes in the team, whether 
they involve people from outside it or not 
    
14 If yes what were the changes? A 6.2 the prompt covers this 
    
9 Team Learning      
    
1 What effect do you think the guideline 
has had on the way of working in your 
clinical/management/audit team? 
A 6.2 “new ways of working” covers all effects 
    
2 Can you comment on the way audit 
results are shared by the team? 
D  Not specific enough 
    
3 Do you communicate more with other 
members of your team as a result of the 
guideline? 
D  Self-report  is of little validity in identifying real behaviour 
(Feder G) 
4 Prompts Within the team? D  “ 
5 Between the team and other levels of the 
organisation? 
D  “ 
6 Between the team and other teams? D  “ 
    
7 Did you learn anything about the practice 
of other members of your team from 
auditing the guideline?  
A 6.1 New question about implementing rather than auditing 
    
8 Have you found that improved dialogue A 6.2 The word dialogue was leading and replaced with guidelines 
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OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
led to any new ways of working?  as a more neutral term in this context 
    
9 If so, what was the change?  A 6.2 covered 
    
10  Has the guideline changed the way you 
work with the rest of your team? 
A 6.2 covered by the broader question 
11 If so how? D  Its the role of the analysis to answer this 
12 Do feel that you need to learn anything 
more about any aspect of your practice or 
your organisation, to be a more effective 
(professional)?  
D  Came across as rather patronising. Covered in 6.1 
13 If yes what is it you need to learn? 
 
Has the guideline helped you to recognise 
this? 
D 
 
 
D 
 as above 
 
Self-report of reasons for motivation is of little value in 
establishing causal factors 
14 Does your team need to learn anything 
to be a more effective  
team?  
 
15 If yes, what is it? 
 
Has the guideline helped you to recognise 
this? 
D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
  
 
Replies to this were either about specific clinical skills or too 
broad to mean much. Covered from a different perspective in 
q6.3 
 
Self-report of reasons for motivation is of little value in 
establishing causal factors 
16 Does your organisation need to change 
in any way to provide a more effective 
health service to the local population?  
A 6.3 the amended question focuses specifically on support to 
learning and implementation in this context 
17 If so how? D  The “how” is incorporated in the new question 
Has the guideline helped you to recognise 
this? 
 
D 
 Self-report of reasons for motivation is of little value in 
establishing causal factors 
18 Have there been any changes in the   Did not lead to much useful additional information in the pilot 
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OLD QUESTION 
Retained = R 
Deleted = D 
Amended = A 
 
If retained/ 
amended, no. of 
question in revised 
version of 
questionnaire 
DELETION/AMENDMENT MADE AND REASON WHY 
way clinicians and managers work together 
resulting from the guideline? 
D and responses tended to reiterate those to previous 
questions about using guidelines to get more resources 
 
Table A4.5 Revisions to the old interview schedule with reasons
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A5 Results 
A5.1 Previous experience of responders 
 
Group Hospital 1 Mean no. 
of previous orgs
Hospital 2 Mean no. 
of previous orgs  
N 
Senior clinical responders  2.93 2.96 87 
Junior responders 2.86 2.51 98 
All survey responders 2.9 2.8 194 
Table A5.1.1 Number of previous organisations for clinical responders in each 
hospital 
 
 
Group Number of 
functions Hosp 
1 
Number of 
functions Hosp 2 
T 
 
2 tailed Sig  
 
 Mean N Mean N   
Junior staff 1.59 59 1.24 38 1.22 <0.23 
Senior staff 1.38  40 1.0   46 1.54 <0.130 
All staff 1.5   101 1.1   89 2.24 <0.028 
Table A5.1.2 number of organisational functional areas worked in (by hospital)  
 
A5.2 Mean scale score and age 
The table gives mean scale score in each age range (graph in the main text). 
 
Age range  Learning 
Capacity 
Formalisation Job 
satisfaction 
Hospital 
culture 
20-30 Mean 3.7 4.5 4.5 2.9 
 N 41 41 41 39 
31-40 Mean 4.0 4.6 4.8 3.2 
 N 93 93 93 93 
41-50 Mean 4.2 4.5 5.0 3.3 
 N 45 45 45 44 
51-60 Mean 3.9 3.9 5.0 3.4 
 N 17 17 17 16 
Total Mean 4.0 4.5 4.8 3.2 
 N 196 196 196 192 
 
Table A5.2.1 Scale means for age ranges  
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Profession  Age range  Learning 
Capacity 
Formalisation Job 
satisfaction 
Hospital 
culture 
Doctor 20-30 Mean 3.8 3.3 5.0 3.3 
  N 7 7 7 6 
 31-40 Mean 4.3 3.8 5.8 3.7 
  N 11 11 11 11 
 41-50 Mean 3.8 3.8 5.4 3.7 
  N 9 9 9 8 
 51-60 Mean 3.6 3.5 5.1 3.6 
  N 11 11 11 10 
 Total Mean 4.0 3.7 5.4 3.6 
  N 38 38 38 35 
Nurse 20-30 Mean 3.7 4.8 4.4 2.8 
  N 31 31 31 30 
 31-40 Mean 3.9 4.5 4.6 3.0 
  N 59 59 59 59 
 41-50 Mean 4.3 4.7 4.9 3.1 
  N 32 32 32 32 
 51-60 Mean 4.5 4.5 4.7 3.1 
  N 6 6 6 6 
 Total Mean 4.0 4.6 4.6 3.0 
  N 128 128 128 127 
Midwife 20-30 Mean 3.6 5.2 4.3 3.3 
  N 2 2 2 2 
 31-40 Mean 4.1 5.0 4.7 3.3 
  N 23 23 23 23 
 41-50 Mean 4.0 5.0 4.6 3.3 
  N 4 4 4 4 
 Total Mean 4.1 5.0 4.7 3.3 
  N 29 29 29 29 
Table A5.2.2 Scale means for age ranges split by profession. 
 
 
 
Table A5.2.3 (below) gives a similar breakdown for sub-scale score  
Profession 
flag 
Age 
range 
 Clarity of 
Purpose 
and 
mission 
Leadersh
ip 
commitm
ent and 
empower
ment 
Experime
ntation 
Transfer 
of 
Knowled
ge 
Teamwork 
and group 
problem 
solving 
Doctor 20-30 Mean 2.79 3.80 3.66 4.32 4.57
  N 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
 31-40 Mean 4.55 3.89 4.10 4.50 4.55
  N 11.00 11.00 11.00 10.00 11.00
 41-50 Mean 3.95 3.73 3.58 3.45 4.22
  N 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
 51-60 Mean 3.19 3.91 3.11 3.72 4.30
  N 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00
 Total Mean 3.69 3.84 3.61 3.98 4.40
  N 38.00 38.00 38.00 37.00 38.00
Nurse 20-30 Mean 4.32 3.22 3.48 3.83 3.84
  N 31.00 31.00 31.00 31.00 31.00
 31-40 Mean 4.47 3.65 3.71 3.73 4.01
  N 59.00 59.00 59.00 59.00 59.00
 41-50 Mean 4.47 4.21 4.26 4.30 4.58
  N 32.00 32.00 32.00 31.00 31.00
 51-60 Mean 4.83 4.20 4.23 4.29 5.17
  N 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
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 Total Mean 4.45 3.71 3.82 3.92 4.16
  N 128.00 128.00 128.00 127.00 127.00
Midwife 20-30 Mean 4.63 3.70 2.60 3.13 4.50
  N 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
 31-40 Mean 4.49 3.92 4.00 4.04 4.29
  N 23.00 23.00 23.00 23.00 23.00
 41-50 Mean 4.38 3.80 3.50 4.19 4.59
  N 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
 Total Mean 4.48 3.89 3.84 4.00 4.34
  N 29.00 29.00 29.00 29.00 29.00
Clinical 
Audit 
Facilitator 
20-30 Mean 4.25 5.60 5.80 6.25 4.33
  N 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 Total Mean 4.25 5.60 5.80 6.25 4.33
  N 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 20-30 Mean 4.07 3.40 3.53 3.94 4.01
  N 41.00 41.00 41.00 41.00 41.00
 31-40 Mean 4.48 3.75 3.83 3.89 4.14
  N 93.00 93.00 93.00 92.00 93.00
 41-50 Mean 4.36 4.08 4.06 4.12 4.51
  N 45.00 45.00 45.00 44.00 44.00
 51-60 Mean 3.77 4.01 3.51 3.92 4.61
  N 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00
 Total Mean 4.31 3.77 3.79 3.96 4.24
  N 196.00 196.00 196.00 194.00 195.00
Table A5.2.3 Sub-scale means for age ranges split by profession. 
 
 
Directorate Date of first implementation 
General Medicine 5/2/97 
Care of the Elderly 10/3/97 revised 12/97 
General Surgery 19/2/97 revised 10/99 
ENT 2/6/97 
Intensive Care 1/12/96 
Gynaecology 1995 RCG Guidelines (same as SIGN) 
Obstetrics (until summer 98) 1995 
Orthopaedics No set guideline. Consultant statements of 
current practice used, not formalised. 
Table A5.2.4 Hospital 2  – directorate implementation dates for SIGN DVT 
prophylaxis guideline.  
 
Directorate Guideline Date of first implementation 
Diabetes Centre Visual impairment  3/96 
Diabetes Centre Cardiovascular disease No need to change 
Diabetes Centre Renal disease No need to change 
Gynaecology Diabetic Pregnancy No need to change 
Diabetes Centre Diabetic foot disease On hold  
Table A5.2.5 Hospital 2 – directorate implementation dates for SIGN Diabetes 
guidelines 
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A5.3 Mean scale item scores 
Mean for each scale item by hospital and overall – shown in the main text as a 
graph. 
Report
4.15 108 1.48 3.97 89 1.78 4.07 197 1.62
3.95 104 1.35 3.95 87 1.52 3.95 191 1.43
4.24 108 1.45 4.11 89 1.50 4.18 197 1.47
3.70 106 1.74 4.03 88 1.71 3.85 194 1.73
4.09 107 1.41 4.27 90 1.39 4.17 197 1.40
3.75 109 1.61 3.84 90 1.70 3.79 199 1.64
4.12 109 1.68 4.34 90 1.72 4.22 199 1.70
4.24 109 1.49 4.19 90 1.76 4.22 199 1.61
4.29 108 1.50 4.02 90 1.48 4.17 198 1.49
2.81 107 1.51 2.66 90 1.51 2.74 197 1.51
3.80 109 1.55 3.48 90 1.57 3.65 199 1.57
4.14 109 1.38 3.80 90 1.59 3.98 199 1.49
3.44 108 1.58 3.21 90 1.67 3.33 198 1.62
4.23 109 1.57 3.91 90 1.65 4.09 199 1.61
3.58 109 1.55 3.54 89 1.58 3.56 198 1.56
3.78 108 1.45 3.86 90 1.55 3.81 198 1.49
4.04 109 1.45 4.14 90 1.72 4.09 199 1.57
4.21 108 1.65 3.89 88 1.59 4.07 196 1.63
4.82 108 1.47 4.33 90 1.82 4.60 198 1.65
4.83 109 1.47 4.47 89 1.54 4.67 198 1.51
4.62 108 1.38 4.34 89 1.48 4.49 197 1.43
LO1
LO2
LO3
LO4
LO5
LO6
LO7
LO8
LO9
LO10
LO11
LO12
LO13
LO14
LO15
LO16
LO17
LO18
LO19
LO20
LO21
Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
1 2 Total
HOSPITAL
 
 
Table A5.3.1 Means for individual items in the learning capacity questionnaire. All 
survey respondents, both hospitals.  
 
A5.4 Overall distribution of scores 
OL Capacity Formalisation Job 
satisfaction 
Hospital 
culture  
 Seni
or 
All Seni
or 
All Senio
r 
All Seni
or 
All
N 90 199 90 198 90 198 88 195
Mean 4.08 3.98 4.31 4.49 5.03 4.78 3.34 3.17
K-S (Z) 0.72 0.74 0.98 1.09 0.91 1.23 0.82 0.58
Sig. (2-tailed) <0.7
0 
<0.66 <0.3
0
<0.20 <0.38 <0.11 <0.5
3 
<0.91
Table A5.4.1 Overall distribution of scores - One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
results  
Appendices 
 
 
445
445
A6 Discussion  
A6.1 Search details for “low response”. 
The following table gives the actual references found and databases searched for 
low response-rates, while the table following that gives details of the topics, 
population and response rate of studies with low response rates. 
 
Database 
(all through Athens 
service, carried out 26-31 
July 2000) 
Years 
searched 
Number 
found 
Number 
relevant  
References of relevant 
articles 
Ovid Medline 1966-2000 212 8 126;299;326;327;396;397;411;433 
Bids Embase 1980-2000 187 6 39;64;129;215;411;425 
Bids CINAHL 1982-2000 11 1 309 
BIDS ISI (SOC SCI) 1980-2000 28 6 169;309;327;396;402;411 
Bids IBSS 1980-2000 0 0  
Web of Science (SCI and 
SOC SCI) 
1981-2000 133 7 169;327;396;397;402;425;431 
Table A6.1.1 “Low response rate” – numbers of papers found 
 
 
 
Subject of data collection Professional group and 
response rate 
Recording patient activities in a psychiatric unit. 309 50% Health professionals in 
psychiatry.   
Evaluation of a university counselling course 169. 33% Counselling students.  
1016 psychiatric nurses from Stockholm (Sweden) and Birmingham 
(England) who responded to a postal questionnaire on their 
psyche-social work environment and feelings of professional 
fulfilment, mental energy and work-related exhaustion 402. 
Low. Psychiatric nurses. No 
specific rate given. 
A postal survey of GPs’ communication needs 39 28% General Practitioners 
(GPs) 
A survey of prescribing practices among psychiatrists 64 33% Psychiatrists 
Survey of 4,000 Midwestern physicians - their attitudes and 
practices regarding elevated serum cholesterol and their use of 
referrals for nutrition counselling.299 
15.8% Physicians 
A surgical services learning needs assessment  326 56% Various types of staff 
members in a surgical unit 
Use of the Nottingham Health Profile to test the validity of census 
variables to proxy the need for health care 327 
59% General public  
National postal study of GPs surveyed about their work with 
alcohol-misusing patients 396 
44% GPs  
 
Postal survey  to gather information from general practitioners 
regarding aspects of computerisation 397 
54% GPs 
Postal survey to explore the attitude of practising physicians toward 
written medication information for patients. 411 
27.5% .1500 GPs and 500 
internal medicine specialists  
Postal questionnaire using clinical  vignettes to assess general 
practitioners' use of aspirin in the secondary prevention of vascular 
events: Knowledge, attitudes, and current practice 425  
54% GPs 
Postal questionnaire to assess dentists' perceptions of difficulties 
encountered in providing dental care for British Asians433 
41% Dentists 
Table A6.1.2 “Low response rate” search results – subjects of papers found 
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